IN RE: DISCIPLINE OF Scott C. DORMAN (2018)

ORDER DENYING RECIPROCAL DISCIPLINE AND SUSPENDING ATTORNEY

This is a petition for reciprocal discipline of attorney Scott C. Dorman pursuant to SCR 114. Dorman has been disbarred from the practice of law in North Carolina. He did not self-report the disbarment to the Nevada State Bar, but he has filed an opposition to the petition.

Dorman's North Carolina misconduct arises from his representation of two clients. He failed to file pleadings in a divorce action or withdraw from the action, and after having remarried, the client discovered eight years later that he was never divorced. Dorman also accepted fees, court costs, and traffic fines from a client, but then he failed to deposit the amount received from the client in his trust account, appear on the client's behalf at a hearing, pay the client's court costs and fine, return the client's calls after the client was forced to pay the costs and fine himself, or refund the client's money.

Having considered the petition for reciprocal discipline and Dorman's opposition, we conclude that discipline is warranted, but that “the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in this state,” SCR 114(4)(c), and thus deny the petition for reciprocal discipline.¹ In particular, we conclude that disbarment is not warranted because disbarment in Nevada is not equivalent to the disbarment imposed on Dorman in North Carolina, as disbarment in Nevada is irrevocable while in North Carolina an attorney may seek reinstatement after five years. Compare SCR 102(1) with 27 NCAC 01B.0129 of North Carolina's State Bar Discipline & Disability Rules. Thus, we conclude that a five-year suspension is more appropriate than disbarment.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for reciprocal discipline, but suspend Scott C. Dorman from the practice of law in Nevada for five years from the date of this order. The parties shall comply with SCR 115 and SCR 121.1.

It is so ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   While Dorman argues that the proceeding in North Carolina violated his due process rights, we conclude that the North Carolina proceeding was not “so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process.” SCR 114(4)(a).