PINE RIVER LANE TRUST v. HSBC BANK USA AS TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF ACE SECURITIES CORP HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2007 HE1 ASSET BACKED PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES (2022)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Reviewing the order de novo, Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008), we affirm.¹

In dismissing appellant's complaint, the district court assumed that a February 2010 Notice of Default was sufficient to trigger NRS 106.240’s 10-year limitations period but concluded that an October 2010 Notice of Rescission effectively reset that period. After this appeal was docketed, this court decided SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d 194 (2022), which, as appellant acknowledges, is consistent with the district court's reasoning.²

Nonetheless, appellant contends that it should have been allowed to conduct discovery into whether respondent's predecessors accelerated the loan either before or after the October 2010 Notice of Rescission. We are not persuaded that the district court abused its discretion in denying appellant's request. See Aviation Ventures, Inc. v. Joan Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005) (reviewing a district court's refusal to allow discovery for an abuse of discretion). Contrary to appellant's interpretation SFR, we held that a Notice of Rescission was effective to reset any acceleration that may have occurred before the Notice of Default. See SFR, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d at 197 (“Thus, we reject SFR's argument that some prior unidentified acceleration remained intact after the bank rescinded the notice of default.”). And to the extent that appellant articulated its desire to conduct discovery into whether there was an acceleration after the Notice of Rescission that would have also implicated NRS 106.240’s 10-year time frame, the district court was well within its discretion to deny that request. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing expeditions.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument is not warranted.

2.   In SFR, the deed of trust beneficiary made a superpriority tender, such that the deed of trust remained as an encumbrance following the HOA's foreclosure sale. 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d at 196. In this case, the record is unclear why the HOA's foreclosure sale did not extinguish the deed of trust.

3.   The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the decision of this matter under a general order of assignment.