KIM LTD v. Liviu Radu Chisiu, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Alina Badoi, Deceased; and Liviu Radu Chisiu, as Parent and Natural Guardian of Sophia Relina Chisiu, a Minor, as Heir of the Estate of Alina Badoi, Deceased, Real Parties in Interest. (2022)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the district court to grant a motion for summary judgment.

The decision to entertain a petition for extraordinary writ relief lies within the discretion of this court. Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 679, 818 P.2d 849, 851, 853 (1991) (recognizing that writ relief is an extraordinary remedy and that this court has sole discretion in determining whether to entertain a writ petition). A writ of mandamus is available only to compel the performance of a legally required act or to cure an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion. Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). It is petitioners burden to demonstrate that extraordinary relief is warranted. Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004).

This court will generally not exercise its discretion to consider writ petitions that challenge district court orders denying summary judgment motions. State ex rel. Dep't Transp. v. Thompson, 99 Nev. 358, 662 P.2d 1338 (1983). However, the rule under Thompson is not absolute. See Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 122 Nev. 132, 142-43, 127 P.3d 1088, 1096 (2006). This court may consider writ petitions challenging district court orders denying summary judgment motions “where no disputed factual issues exist and, pursuant to clear authority under a statute or rule, the district court is obligated to dismiss an action.” Smith v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 113 Nev. 1343, 1345, 950 P.2d 280, 281 (1997).

Having considered the petition and the accompanying documents, we are not satisfied that our intervention by way of extraordinary writ is warranted. Here, petitioners asserted that the district court was required, as a matter of law, to dismiss the underlying matter under NRS 41A.097(2) based on the filing of a complaint after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. However, the district court found that there was “genuine issues of material fact” as to whether real parties in interest had been placed on inquiry notice, and therefore disputed factual issues exist. Accordingly, this case does not fall under the limited exception to the general rule in Smith. Although the rule under Thompson is not absolute, petitioner has not established that an eventual appeal does not afford an adequate legal remedy. NRS 34.170. Interlocutory review by extraordinary writ is not warranted in this case. For these reasons, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.