THE STATE OF NEVADA COMMISSIONER OF INSURANCE AS RECEIVER OF LEWIS AND CLARK LTC RISK RETENTION GROUP INC v. UNI TER UNDERWRITING MANAGEMENT CORP UNI TER CLAIMS SERVICES CORP AND RE CORPORATION (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING

These are consolidated appeals from a final district court judgment in a tort action following receivership challenging postjudgment orders enforcing a settlement agreement (Docket No. 87367) and awarding attorney fees and costs (Docket No. 85907). Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Nancy L. Allf, Judge.¹

In Docket No. 87367, the Commissioner challenges a June 29, 2023, order granting the motion to enforce the settlement agreement and issuing a satisfaction of judgment. In Docket No. 85907, the Commissioner challenges the award of partial attorney fees and costs.² As explained below, we conclude first that the appeal in Docket No. 87367 is moot and dismiss in part. We next conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and abused its discretion in failing to consider the agreement in awarding attorney fees and costs. We therefore vacate the attorney fee award and remand for the district court to reconsider the fees and costs warranted in light of the settlement agreement.

This court recently resolved two related appeals consolidated for disposition in State, Commissioner of Insurance v. Chur, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 69, 581 P.3d 441 (2025). In this order, we resolve the two remaining appeals that were consolidated with Chur during its pendency but deconsolidated for disposition. The dispute underlying the appeals began when the Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Nevada was made the receiver of and ordered to liquidate insurer Lewis & Clark LTC Risk Retention Group, Inc. (L&C). 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 69, 581 P.3d at 446. In the liquidation process, the Commissioner initiated civil actions against (1) L&C's directors and (2) its reinsurance brokers—Uni-Ter Underwriting Management Corp., Uni-Ter Claims Services Corp., and U.S. RE Corp (the Corporate Defendants). Id. The directors were dismissed as defendants early in the proceedings, and the matter proceeded to a trial at which the Commissioner obtained a jury verdict against the Corporate Defendants. Id.

The Commissioner moved for attorney fees and costs based on an offer of judgment.³ The Corporate Defendants disputed the costs sought. Separately, following nonpayment of the judgment, the Commissioner and the Corporate Defendants entered into a settlement agreement on July 13, 2022. The settlement agreement contained a provision for a payment by August 19, 2022. Payment was delivered on August 24, 2022, and the Commissioner accepted the check. On October 21, 2022, the Corporate Defendants moved to enforce the settlement agreement. On November 9, 2022, the Commissioner, in turn, appealed the judgment, arguing that the Directors were erroneously dismissed from the action (Docket No. 85668). On November 29, 2022, the district court entered an order declining to rule on the motion to enforce the settlement because the appeal divested it of jurisdiction. On December 2, 2022, however, the district court nevertheless addressed the Commissioner's attorney-fee motion and awarded attorney fees and costs in part. On December 14 and 16, respectively, the Corporate Defendants moved to reconsider the settlement order and the award of fees and costs. The Commissioner appealed the award of fees and costs on December 30, 2022, arguing that costs should have been awarded in full (Docket No. 85907).

On April 12, 2023, the district court denied the Corporate Defendants’ motions for reconsideration of the enforcement order and the award of fees and costs, again concluding that the pending appeals divested it of jurisdiction. The Corporate Defendants moved to vacate this order, and on June 29, 2023, the district court agreed in an order granting the motion to vacate. The court thus entered a satisfaction of judgment, ruling that the payment pursuant to the settlement agreement satisfied the trial judgment and any liability for attorney fees and costs. The Commissioner appealed from the June 29 order and the satisfaction of judgment (Docket No. 87367).

The appeal in Docket No. 87367 is moot

The Corporate Defendants argue the pending appeal in Docket No. 85668 divested the district court of jurisdiction, the June 29 order is therefore void, and the appeal in Docket No. 87367 is thus moot. We agree.

During the pendency of an appeal, the district court lacks jurisdiction to act on issues then before this court. Mack-Manley v. Manley, 122 Nev. 849, 855, 138 P.3d 525, 529 (2006). The district court retains limited jurisdiction to address matters independent from or collateral to the appealed order. Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 49, 52, 228 P.3d 453, 455 (2010). It may address and potentially deny but may not grant such a motion. Id. at 52-53, 228 P.3d at 455. A district court order entered without jurisdiction is void, and an appeal from such an order will be dismissed as moot. E.g., Harrah's Club v. Nev. State Gaming Control Bd., 104 Nev. 762, 764, 766 P.2d 900, 902 (1988).

During the pendency of this appeal, this court reviewed a jurisdictional challenge to the consolidated appeals. We concluded that the Corporate Defendants’ pending motion for reconsideration challenging the attorney fee award rendered the 85907 appeal timely as of the April 12 order denying reconsideration. State, Comm'r of Ins. v. Chur, Nos. 85668, 85728, 85907 (May 30, 2024) (Order Partially Dismissing Appeal and Reinstating Briefing).⁴ As a result of that appeal, we concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the ‘‘second vacating order,” that is, the June 29, 2023, order. Id. The June 29 order is therefore void, and the challenge levied against it in Docket No. 87367 is moot and correspondingly dismissed.⁵

The district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs

The Commissioner argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying portions of its request for costs without sufficient explanation or opportunity for the Commissioner to clarify the costs. The Corporate Defendants disagree and further argue that the settlement agreement precludes an award of attorney fees or costs to the Commissioner in any amount. The Corporate Defendants argue that the matter should be remanded for the district court to consider attorney fees in light of the settlement agreement. The Commissioner argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.

We review an award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev. 67, 80, 319 P.3d 606, 615 (2014). “Nevada adheres to the American Rule that attorney fees may only be awarded when authorized by statute, rule, or agreement.” Pardee Homes of Nev. v. Wolfram, 135 Nev. 173, 177, 444 P.3d 423, 426 (2019). Where a contract term addresses attorney fees and is clear and unambiguous, courts will enforce those terms as written. Id. at 178, 444 P.3d at 427. Settlement agreements are contracts. May v. Anderson, 121 Nev. 668, 672, 119 P.3d 1254, 1257 (2005).

The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Commissioner. Months earlier, however, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that provided that

[The Commissioner] hereby releases [Corporate Defendants], and each of their respective agents, assigns, affiliates, entities (and agents, members, managers, directors, officers, employees, trusts, representatives, and attorneys of such related entities) employees, former employees, representatives, owners, insurers, attorneys, predecessors, and successors, and each of them (the “Defendant Released Parties”), from any and all charges, complaints, claims, promises, agreements, controversies, liabilities, obligations, damages, actions, causes of action, suits, rights, demands, costs, losses, debts and expenses (including attorney's fees and costs actually incurred), of any nature whatsoever, known or unknown, whether based on tort, subrogation, contract, quasi-contract, or any other theory of recovery or responsibility, that the [Commissioner] now has or could have had against the Defendant Released Parties.

(emphasis added). The order awarding attorney fees and costs did not address this relevant provision or any effect it may have on the Commissioner's entitlement to recover fees. The district court did not address whether the settlement agreement precluded a further award of attorney fees and costs to the Commissioner when it granted the Commissioner's motion in part.

The district court had jurisdiction to determine whether the settlement agreement applied here. EDCR 7.50 provides that a settlement agreement between the parties will be enforceable if it “is in writing subscribed by the party against whom the same shall be alleged.” We have concluded that a nearly identical rule, DCR 16, provides that a settlement agreement may be enforced if it is in writing. Grisham v. Grisham, 128 Nev. 679, 683, 289 P.3d 230, 233 (2012); cf. The Power Co. v. Henry, 130 Nev. 182, 187, 321 P.3d 858, 861-62 (2014) (holding that an “unconsummated settlement understanding” was not a binding settlement agreement under EDCR 7.50 or DCR 16 and thus was unenforceable.). The district court is appropriately situated to address the applicability of the settlement agreement in the first instance.⁶ See 9352 Cranesbill Tr. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 136 Nev. 76, 81-82, 459 P.3d 227, 232 (2020) (recognizing that it is the province of the district court to make factual determinations in the first instance and that “[the appellate] court[s] will not address issues that the district court did not directly resolve”).

The Commissioner misplaces reliance on Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994), which is distinguishable in that it concerns the jurisdiction of federal courts, and the Commissioner indeed identifies authority acknowledging that Kokkonen does not address a state court's jurisdiction. Kokkonen makes plain the gulf between its subject matter and that presented here: “enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 382. The state district court may construe the settlement agreement and enforce it consistent with the principles of contract interpretation. The Power Co., 130 Nev at 189, 321 P.3d at 863.

Insofar as the Commissioner contests the construction of the settlement agreement, such disputes should be litigated before the district court in the first instance on remand. Given that the district court had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and the agreement bears on the availability of attorney fees and costs, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in awarding costs without addressing the settlement agreement. We therefore vacate the order awarding attorney fees and costs and conclude that on remand the district court should reconsider the Commissioner's motion for attorney fees and costs in light of the settlement agreement. See Exigent Tech., Inc. v. Atrana Sols., Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (vacating award of attorney fees and remanding for reconsideration where the enforceability of a settlement agreement bore on whether fees and costs may be awarded); Hawkins v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 900, 905, 407 P.3d 766, 771 (2017) (directing the district court to vacate attorney fees awarded without this court's guidance on a material issue).

Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court DISMISSED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.

Herndon, C.J.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

Cadish, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Honorable Patricia Lee, Justice, having recused herself, did not participate in the decision in this matter.This court has determined that these appeals shall be consolidated. Accordingly, the clerk of this court shall consolidate these appeals for all appellate purposes. NRAP 3(b)(2).

2.   We direct the clerk of this court to correct the caption to conform to the caption in this order.

3.   We recount the relevant proceedings of this complex dispute only as necessary to contextualize our dispositions here.

4.   The appeal in Docket No. 87367 was consolidated with the other current appeals after the jurisdictional challenges to the other cases were resolved and that appeal was not addressed in the May 30 order. State, Comm'r of Ins. v. Chur, Nos. 85668, 85728, 85907, 87367 (July 1, 2024) (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Consolidating Appeals, and Reinstating Briefing).

5.   Insofar as the Commissioner also argues that the June 29 order improperly provided affirmative relief pursuant to NRCP 60(b) and that it lacked required findings, those arguments are likewise moot.

6.   We recognize that the district court sought to do so pursuant to the June 29 order but that order, once again, is void.