IN RE: THE HONORABLE MICHELE FIORE (2026)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL, DENYING PETITION, AND AFFIRMING INTERIM SUSPENSION

These consolidated cases challenge orders of suspension issued by respondent the Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline (the Commission) and a complaint filed by the Commission director.

Appellant/petitioner Michele Fiore (Judge Fiore) filed three separate cases against the Commission. On March 6, 2026, this court entered an order consolidating Docket Nos. 89037 (appeal from the order of suspension without salary), 90650 (appeal from the order of suspension with salary), and 90810 (petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition regarding the complaint). The underlying proceedings arose from federal criminal charges that were brought against Judge Fiore, and allegations of ongoing misconduct occurring during her time as a judicial officer.

In July 2024, the Commission began inquiry into Judge Fiore's alleged misconduct after a federal grand jury indicted Judge Fiore for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and six counts of wire fraud. As part of this initial investigation, the Commission entered an order suspending Judge Fiore with salary. In October 2024, Judge Fiore's case went to trial and a federal jury found Judge Fiore guilty on all counts. In response to her conviction for felony offenses, the Commission rescinded the suspension with salary and instead suspended Judge Fiore without salary. The appeal and amended appeal involving these orders was assigned Docket No. 89037. In April 2025, before Judge Fiore was sentenced, President Donald Trump issued an Executive Grant of Clemency that bestowed a full and unconditional pardon for all charges against Judge Fiore in the federal criminal action.

In May 2025, the Commission responded by entering an order rescinding Judge Fiore's suspension without salary and instead suspending her with salary. The appeal from this order was assigned Docket No. 90650. Also in May 2025, Paul Dehyle, the Commission director, instituted a new complaint against Judge Fiore for violating the code of judicial conduct. Judge Fiore petitioned for a writ of mandamus and prohibition regarding the complaint, which was assigned Docket No. 90810.

Docket No. 89037

In October 2024, a federal jury found Judge Fiore guilty on all counts. As a result, the Commission issued orders suspending Judge Fiore without salary pursuant to NRS 1.4675(2)(b). That statute provides “[t]he Commission may suspend a judge from the exercise of office without salary if the judge ․ is found guilty ․ [of] a crime punishable as a felony.” Judge Fiore appealed. Due in part to the suspension without salary being rescinded after Judge Fiore's pardon, both parties conceded at oral argument that this matter is now moot. See Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov't, 120 Nev. 712, 720, 100 P.3d 179, 186 (2004) (recognizing that “cases presenting live controversies at the time of their inception may become moot by the occurrence of subsequent events”). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.

Docket No. 90650

In May 2025, the Commission entered an order rescinding Judge Fiore's suspension without salary pursuant to NRS 1.4675(2)(b) and suspending her with salary pursuant to NRS 1.4675(4). Judge Fiore argues the Commission abused its discretion by ordering the suspension. According to Judge Fiore, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to suspend her and failed to provide her with adequate notice in violation of due process guarantees. This court reviews purely legal questions, including issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation, de novo. In re Halverson, 123 Nev. 493, 509, 169 P.3d 1161, 1172 (2007). The Commission's final decision to suspend a judge, however, is reviewed for abuse of its discretion. Id. at 510, 169 P.3d at 1172-73.

The Commission has jurisdiction

Judge Fiore argues that the Commission lacks jurisdiction to order her suspension because the Commission can only impose discipline based on “an act or omission that occurs on and after the date on which the judge enters upon the duties of office.” NRS 1.440(2)(b) (emphasis added). Because the misconduct leading to the federal criminal action occurred before she took the bench, Judge Fiore argues the Commission cannot discipline her. We disagree.

To begin, the Commission has yet to impose any discipline or punishment on Judge Fiore. Rather, the issue of Judge Fiore's alleged misconduct remains in the investigative phase. There has been no filing of a formal statement of charges by the Commission, no adjudication of any formal charges, and no discipline imposed regarding any formal charges. Moreover, the interim suspension order clearly explains that the Commission based the suspension on an allegation that Judge Fiore has engaged in misconduct during her time as a judicial officer. Thus, we conclude that the Commission has jurisdiction under NRS 1.440(2)(b) to impose Judge Fiore's interim suspension with salary pursuant to NRS 1.4675(4).

The Commission did not abuse its discretion

Judge Fiore argues the Commission abused its discretion in determining that she posed a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or to the administration of justice. The Commission is permitted to impose an interim suspension on a judge in judicial discipline proceedings “in its discretion,” Nev. Const, art. 6, § 21(9), and this court reviews the Commission's decision to issue a suspension for an abuse of discretion, In re Halverson, 123 Nev. at 510, 169 P.3d at 1173 (“[A] tribunal abuses its discretion when, among other things, it applies an incorrect legal standard.”).

The Commission examined the evidence submitted and the totality of the circumstances and found by a preponderance of the evidence that Judge Fiore posed “a substantial threat of serious harm to the public and to the administration of justice.” See In re Halverson, 123 Nev. at 510-11, 169 P.3d at 1173 (explaining that the proper standard for determining whether an interim suspension is warranted is “whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that a judge poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or to the administration of justice”). The Commission explained that the interim suspension was based on Judge Fiore's ongoing deceit of donors and unjust enrichment during her time as a judicial officer, “harm[ing] the public's perception of the judicial system and its confidence in the system's legitimacy, creating] the appearance of impropriety, reflect[ing] adversely on [Judge Fiore's] honesty and character, and undermin[ing] her ability to impose justice and apply the law fairly.” See also id., at 522, 169 P.3d at 1180 (explaining the purpose of an interim suspension is to “protect the public and administration of justice” and noting “[a]n effective justice system requires public confidence in the judiciary's integrity”). We conclude Judge Fiore has not demonstrated the Commission abused its discretion in determining that an interim suspension was warranted.¹ Therefore, we affirm the Commission's decision to suspend Judge Fiore with salary.

Docket No. 90810

In May 2025, the Commission's director, Paul Dehyle, instituted a new complaint with the Commission against Judge Fiore for violating the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct Rules 1.1 and 1.2. Judge Fiore petitioned for a writ of mandamus and prohibition.

A writ of mandamus is available to “compel the performance of an act that the law requires ․ or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.” Int'l Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); NRS 34.160. A writ of prohibition may be issued to “arrest[ ] the proceeding of any tribunal ․ when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal.” NRS 34.320. Such extraordinary relief is available only where there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170; NRS 34.330; Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Ultimately, it is within this court's sole discretion whether to consider a petition for extraordinary relief. Smith, 107 Nev. at 677, 818 P.2d at 851.

This court has entertained petitions for a writ of mandamus when a judge seeks prehearing relief during disciplinary proceedings on the basis that “no adequate legal remedy exists.” Jones v. Nev. Comm'n on Jud. Discipline, 130 Nev. 99, 104, 318 P.3d 1078, 1082 (2014); see also Andress-Tobiasson v. Nev. Comm'n on Jud. Discipline, No. 77551, 2019 WL 2094207, at *1 (Nev. May 10, 2019) (Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petition for Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition). Here, however, Judge Fiore is not challenging any of the Commission's discretionary procedural actions. Instead, Judge Fiore petitions for a writ of mandamus or prohibition regarding the complaint itself, seeking to foreclose the Commission from investigating her and potentially considering formal disciplinary proceedings. Because the Commission has not yet imposed any discipline or even filed a formal statement of charges to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings, we decline to entertain the petition for a writ of mandamus as it is premature. We also decline to entertain the petition for a writ of prohibition because, at this early point in the process, it remains to be seen whether formal proceedings will be brought and whether any potential formal proceedings “are without or in excess” of the Commission's jurisdiction. NRS 34.320. Based on the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal in No. 89037 as moot, affirm the order of suspension in No. 90650, and deny the petition in No. 90810.

It is so ORDERED.

Herndon, C.J.

Pickering, J.

Bell, J.

Cadish, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Stiglich, J.

Lee, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Having considered the parties’ remaining arguments in No. 90650, we conclude they are without merit.