CASSANDRA CWIK v. MARK BEARDSLEY (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to amend a stipulated judgment to add post-offer interest to the amount specified as punitive damages. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kathleen E. Delaney, Judge.

Cassandra Cwik sued Mark Beardsley for injuries she sustained during a car crash after Beardsley allegedly failed to yield at a stop sign. Cwik served Beardsley with an offer of judgment under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.117 to settle her claims for a lump sum of $250,000, inclusive of interest, costs, and attorney fees. Beardsley let the offer expire without accepting it.

The parties later settled. They memorialized the settlement in a stipulated judgment wherein Beardsley agreed to pay Cwik almost $675,000. Referencing a series of separate stipulations and orders that are not part of the record on appeal, the stipulated judgment awards Cwik $300,000 for past pain and suffering, $32,559 for past medical expenses, $250,000 in punitive damages, and $62,088.31 in prejudgment interest on the past compensatory damages. The stipulated judgment then states, “The total judgment of $673,917.86, plus any costs, post-offer interest and attorney fees to be subsequently adjudicated by the Court, shall incur postjudgment interest at the legal rate per annum from June 4, 2024, until paid in full.” The parties’ lawyers jointly submitted this form of stipulated judgment to the court, which signed and filed it.

Cwik timely moved for attorney fees and costs and to amend the judgment to add post-offer interest. Relying on Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 826, 711 P.2d 1, 2 (1985), the district court denied the motion to amend to the extent it sought post-offer interest on the punitive damages. Cwik appeals, arguing NRCP 68 and/or NRS 17.117 entitle her to post-offer interest on the punitive damages. Beardsley counters that the stipulated punitive damages amount was intended to be the final figure, that the parties took into account the time value of the money and his own conduct when arriving at that number, and that had the parties intended for the punitive damages to accrue interest they would have said so in the stipulated judgment.

A district court's decision concerning attorney's fees, costs, and interest is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. N. Las Vegas Infrastructure Inv. & Constr., LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 139 Nev. 46, 50, 525 P.3d 836, 841 (2023); M.C. Multi-Family Dev., LLC v. Crestdale Assocs., Ltd., 124 Nev. 901, 916, 193 P.3d 536, 546 (2008). But de novo review applies to questions of law, Jones v. Ghadiri, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 546 P.3d 831, 835 (2024), and to the interpretation of contracts. See Nev. State Educ. Ass'n v. Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass'n, 137 Nev. 76, 80, 482 P.3d 665, 671 (2021). The principles of contract law apply to settlement agreements. MMAWC, LLC v. Zion Wood Obi Wan Tr., 135 Nev. 275, 279, 448 P.3d 568, 571 (2019). A contract's language determines its meaning, and any ambiguity in a contract will be construed against the drafter. See id. at 279, 448 P.3d at 572; Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 215-16, 163 P.3d 405, 407 (2007).

A stipulated judgment “ends all contention or controversy between the parties within the scope of the judgment” and generally is final and conclusive and cannot be modified or appealed. 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 174 (2017); see also Richard v. Innovative Tech. & Consult. Ltd. Corp., 399 So.3d 1114, 1116-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2024) (explaining that a court only retains jurisdiction to the extent specifically reserved in the agreed-upon final judgment and concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to award mediation fees because the issue had not been reserved). Because a stipulated judgment “represents a settlement of the controversy by the parties, it is usually presumed that the parties intended to settle all aspects of the controversy, including all issues raised by the papers comprising the record.” 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 187 (emphasis added). Parties can “reserve an issue or claim” for further litigation. Id.; see Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 130 Nev. 22, 24, 317 P.3d 828, 830 (2014) (noting that the parties in that case had reached a settlement in which the appellants had “preserved their right to seek compound interest” on the judgment); cf. NRCP 68(a) (“Unless otherwise specified, an offer made under this rule is an offer to resolve all claims in the action between the parties to the date of the offer, including costs, expenses, interest, and if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract, attorney fees.”). But to reserve an issue or claim, the stipulated judgment “must precisely state what issues or claims are being reserved.” See 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 173. Therefore, “in the absence of language evidencing an intent to preserve specific issues or claims for further litigation, it is presumed that the parties intended for the stipulated judgment to resolve all contested issues and claims raised in the record.” Przekopski v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Colchester, 26 A.3d 657, 664 (Conn. App. 2011).

As the briefs in this case attest, it is an open question of law whether a stipulated judgment that includes a punitive damage component can support the award of post-offer interest on that component. Compare, e.g. Ramada Inns, 101 Nev. at 826, 711 P.2d at 2 (holding that punitive damages do not bear prejudgment interest because they are imposed to punish not to compensate), with Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mercer, 111 Nev. 318, 324, 890 P.2d 785, 789 (1995) (holding that post-offer interest may be added to a future damages award even though such damages ordinarily do not bear prejudgment interest); see also Olson v. Mid-Century Insurance, Case No. 86892 (Order, Sept. 4, 2025) (unpublished; rehearing pending) (allowing post-offer interest on a judgment entered on a verdict that awarded punitive damages). The stipulated judgment did not specifically reserve this legal issue. Instead, it set out each component part of the judgment—including a specific sum for prejudgment interest on the sum agreed to as past damages—then stated “[t]he total judgment of $673,917.86, plus any costs, post-offer interest and attorney fees to be subsequently adjudicated by the Court, shall incur postjudgment interest at the legal rate per annum from June 4, 2024, until paid in full.” (Emphasis added.) The question is whether the italicized language sufficiently reserved the legal issue respecting post-offer interest on the stipulated punitive damage award to overcome the presumption that a stipulated judgment concludes the case.

We conclude that it did not. The reference to post-offer interest is part of a three-item list—costs, post-offer interest, and attorney fees—in a sentence specifying that the whole of the judgment shall bear postjudgment interest at a specified rate. The other two items in the list—costs and attorney fees—are collateral, meaning they do not affect the judgment's finality and can be calculated and added after its entry. See NRCP 58(c) (providing that entry of judgment may not be delayed for the “taxing of costs”); NRCP 54(d)(2)(A) (stating that a district court may entertain a postjudgment motion for attorney's fees). But discretionary prejudgment interest, especially when there is a legal dispute as to its availability, differs in that it is not wholly collateral to claims concluded by the judgment. See Osterneck u. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 175—76 (1989) (stating that, “unlike a request for attorney's fees or a motion for costs, a motion for discretionary prejudgment interest does not raise issues wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of action, nor does it require an inquiry wholly separate from the decision on the merits”) (citations omitted) (cleaned up). It is not inconsistent with the entry of a stipulated final judgment to leave collateral calculations as to attorney fees and costs—and post-offer interest on yet-to-be-determined attorney fees and costs—to the district court to decide. But if the stipulated judgment meant to reserve the right to litigate the entitlement to post-offer interest on a stipulated punitive damage award, it should have specifically so stated.

At minimum, the stipulated judgment is ambiguous on the extent of its reservation. Problematically, the record does not include the separate stipulations and orders to which the stipulated judgment's footnotes refer. See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (presuming missing portions of the record disfavor the appellant). Adding to the ambiguity is the fact the stipulated judgment sets specific amounts for each of the judgment's component parts, including the amount of the past damages, the amount of the prejudgment interest on the past damages, and the amount of the punitive damages, making no provision for interest on the punitive damages beyond the provision for postjudgment interest on the whole of the judgment. The stipulated judgment is printed on paper bearing Cwik's attorney's firm logo. It thus appears that Cwik's attorneys drafted the stipulated judgment, so its ambiguity must be construed against Cwik. See MMAWC, 135 Nev. at 279, 448 P.3d at 572 (noting ambiguities are construed against the drafter). Given the reservation's ambiguity and the legal issue's complexity, had Cwik wanted to reserve the issue of post-offer, prejudgment interest on the punitive damages and pursue it by postjudgment motion to amend and subsequent appeal, she needed to specifically reserve that issue in the stipulated judgment.

For these reasons, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Pickering, J.

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

In this appeal, the parties dispute whether post-offer interest should be awarded on the punitive damages portion of the judgment, given that Cwik's final judgment was indisputably greater than the amount of her offer of judgment under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.117, which Beardsley rejected. The district court denied Cwik's motion seeking such post-offer interest, relying on this court's decision in Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 711 P.2d 1 (1985) which held that under NRS 17.130, prejudgment interest may not be awarded on punitive damages. Just two months ago, in a portion of an unpublished order endorsed by 6 out of 7 Justices of this court, we held that post-offer interest on punitive damages is proper under the offer of judgment rule:

In declining to award post-offer interest on punitive damages, the district court erred in relying on Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Sharp, 101 Nev. 824, 826, 711 P.2d 1, 2 (1985), which discusses prejudgment interest pursuant to NRS 17.130, rather than post-offer interest pursuant to NRCP 68. As already established, the two types of interest are distinct in character and purpose, and our conclusion today therefore does not conflict with our holding in Ramada Inns. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's decision and remand for further proceedings regarding post-offer interest.

Olson v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., Docket No. 86892, WL 2554820 (Nev. Sept. 4, 2025) (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding). Given that holding and the reasoning supporting it, this court should reverse the district court's decision in this case which made the same error as the district court in Olson.

Instead, however, the majority affirms, holding that the stipulated judgment entered by the district court did not sufficiently reserve the issue of post-offer interest on the punitive damages award or* at least is ambiguous on this issue. This is an argument Beardsley never made, in this court or below. The judgment entered by the district court laid out the specific items of damages, then recited the total judgment amount “plus any costs, post-offer interest and attorney fees to be subsequently adjudicated by the Court.” Beardsley chose not to even file an opposition to Cwik's subsequent motion seeking attorney fees based on the judgment exceeding the prior offer of judgment, indicating his understanding that such a motion would be forthcoming based on this language in the judgment. He did oppose the motion seeking post-offer interest on punitive damages, making the arguments he presents here in reliance on Ramada Inns but he did not argue that he was blind-sided by the motion.

Similarly, in this court, Beardsley argues that post-offer interest on punitive damages is not proper. He does also argue, without citation to any authority, that because the parties stipulated to the amount of punitive damages but did not include interest in their stipulation, the court should not add such interest. However, he does not argue the issue was not reserved for subsequent court consideration or that it was ambiguous, or even that he was surprised by the request; indeed, he does not discuss the pertinent language of the judgment at all. Moreover, it would be strange if he had argued that the judgment specifically reserved the subsequent award of costs and the award of attorney fees but did not reserve the issue of post-offer interest which was identified between costs and fees in the very same clause. Yet, that is precisely the position the majority adopts today.

Beardsley certainly did not stipulate to the award of post-offer interest and had every right to dispute the propriety of its award. But the judgment clearly contemplated subsequent motion practice to resolve the issues of “costs, post-offer interest and attorney fees.” I note that these are the three items—in the same order—discussed in the penalty provision of the offer of judgment rule. NRCP 68(f)(1)(B). I also note that, with the judgment having already included prejudgment interest on the compensatory damages from the date of service of the complaint, the only additional post-offer interest to be sought would be with respect to the punitive damages. I agree with the majority that a stipulated judgment must specifically state what issues are being reserved, but it did so here. I would reverse the district court decision declining to award post-offer interest on the punitive damage award, and I therefore dissent.