JAQUEZ TYREE SHELTON v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of one count of stop required on signal of police officer, one count of battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm, victim being a first responder, and one count of resisting public officer with use of a dangerous weapon. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.

Appellant Jaquez Shelton was convicted by a jury and sentenced to serve an aggregate prison term of 66 months to 16 years following his flight from a Nevada Highway Patrol (NHP) officer on March 11, 2022, and his resistance and battery of an NHP officer on April 1, 2022. Shelton appeals his judgment of conviction and sentence, claiming that the district court improperly admitted prior bad act evidence and inadmissible police testimony, his rights were violated by incomplete jury instructions, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him of all charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. He asks this court to reverse his judgment of conviction and remand the matter to the district court for a new trial, or remand for resentencing. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the March 10 incident

Shelton challenges the district court's admission of an uncharged act that occurred on March 10, 2022. We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence of another act for an abuse of discretion. Newman v. State, 129 Nev. 222, 231, 298 P.3d 1171, 1178 (2013). “An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.” Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001).

Here, the State offered evidence of the March 10 incident to identify the motorcycle rider who fled law enforcement on March 11, 2022. The district court also admitted the evidence on res gestae grounds. Shelton challenges the admission of the March 10 incident, claiming that the district court abused its discretion in admitting this evidence under both identity and res gestae grounds. Shelton also challenges the relevance to the charged crime, whether a Petrocelli hearing was properly conducted, and whether the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed the danger of any unfair prejudice.

To admit other act evidence, the district court must first determine, on the record and outside the jury's presence, whether: (1) the incident is relevant to the crime charged, (2) the act is proven by clear and convincing evidence, and (3) the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. Mclellan v. State, 124 Nev. 263, 269, 182 P.3d 106, 110 (2008).

In this case, the district court's admission of the March 10 evidence on identity grounds was proper. The March 10 incident is relevant to the stop-required charge because the consistency of the rider and motorcycle's description, the rider's behavior, the location and route of the rider, and the time of day at which officers encountered the rider tends to make the fact that Shelton was the rider who fled officers on March 11 more probable. The district court also found the March 10 incident to be proven by clear and convincing evidence after it considered the transcript from the preliminary hearing and heard argument on the matter. Furthermore, the prejudicial effect of the evidence is minimal when compared to its probative value, especially considering the evidence was used to prove identity as opposed to criminal propensity. The district court properly made these determinations on the record and outside the presence of the jury. See Petrocelli v. State, 101 Nev. 46, 51-52, 692 P.3d 503, 507-08 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Thomas v. State, 120 Nev. 37, 83 P.3d 818 (2004). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the March 10 prior evidence on identity grounds.

Shelton also challenges the district court's admission of the March 10 evidence on res gestae grounds. We have previously established that uncharged acts may only be admitted as res gestae if they are “part of the same transaction—the same temporal and physical circumstances—as the charged act.” Alfaro v. State, 139 Nev. 216, 227, 534 P.3d 138, 149-50 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have made clear that the evidence cannot merely “explain, make sense of, or provide a context for the charged crimes.” Id. at 227, 534 P.3d at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted).

In this case, the district court abused its discretion in admitting the March 10 evidence on res gestae grounds. While the March 10 and March 11 incidents are similar in occurrence, the two incidents are not part of the same temporal circumstances. Moreover, the State concedes that the March 10 incident “helped explain the series of interactions police had” with the motorcycle rider. Therefore, the district court acted arbitrarily by admitting the March 10 evidence on res gestae grounds. This error does not warrant reversal as the district court properly admitted the March 10 incident on identity grounds. As a result of admitting the March 10 evidence for identity purposes, the district court was required to give a limiting instruction to explain the limited use of the evidence. See Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 269, 182 P.3d at 110-11.

Limiting instruction for the admitted evidence

Though neither party raised this issue, it is well established that we may consider relevant issues sua sponte to prevent plain error. Bradley v. Romeo, 102 Nev. 103, 105, 716 P.2d 227, 228 (1986).

When evidence of other acts is admitted, it must be accompanied by an instruction explaining the limited use for which the evidence is admitted. See Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 269, 182 P.3d at 110-11. The limiting instruction must be given prior to admission of the evidence, and a general instruction must be given at the end of trial. Id. at 270, 182 P.3d at 111. If the prosecutor fails to request the instruction, the district court should raise the issue sua sponte. Id. at 269, 182 P.3d at 111. The district court's failure “to issue a limiting instruction [is] reviewed for nonconstitutional error under NRS 178.598.” Id. Here, the district court neither gave a limiting instruction when the evidence of March 10 was admitted, nor a general instruction at the close of trial. We must now determine “whether the error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.’ ” Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 269-70, 182 P.3d at 111 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).

In the present case, the evidence of guilt against Shelton is overwhelming. Testimony from the two NHP officers present on March 11 and April 1, the body camera footage from March 11, and the multiple events with identical attributes demonstrate that Shelton's conviction was inevitable, even with the necessary instructions. We therefore find that any error resulting from the absence of such instructions was harmless. See Mclellan, 124 Nev. at 271, 182 P.3d at 112 (recognizing a defendant does not suffer substantial or injurious effect when evidence of guilt is overwhelming).

The district court did not err by allowing officers to testify regarding the propriety of the methods used to apprehend Shelton

Shelton argues the district court erred by allowing NHP officers to testify about the propriety of the methods used to apprehend Shelton on April 1. As Shelton did not object to the testimony at trial, we review his contention under a plain error standard. Anderson v. State, 121 Nev. 511, 516, 118 P.3d 184, 187 (2005). To warrant reversal, we must determine that plain error occurred and that the plain error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Id. Plain error must be “clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record.” Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018).

During its case-in-chief, the State called three NHP officers—Jeffrey Thyr, Martin Vohwinkel, and Chad Pollock—to testify about the incidents that occurred on March 10, March 11, and April 1. During trial, Officers Thyr and Vohwinkel testified that Officer Vohwinkel's methods were in accordance with and did not violate NHP department policy. The State asked whether Officer Vohwinkel had been disciplined after the April 1 incident, which they denied. Sergeant Pollock—Officer Vohwinkel's superior—testified that he supported the methods used by Officer Vohwinkel.

Shelton takes issue with the district court's admission of the officers’ testimony, asserting that the testimony embraced an ultimate issue of the case—Shelton's guilt. Shelton contends that the officers’ opinion testimony directly commented on Shelton's guilt and thus was improperly admitted. He also argues that the testimony prevented him from arguing that his actions were permissible in light of the officers’ invalid conduct.

NRS 50.265 permits lay witnesses to give opinion testimony so long as it is “[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness” and “[h]elpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue.” NRS 50.295 further permits lay witnesses to give opinion testimony that “embraces an ultimate issue.” While direct opinions on a defendant's guilt are prohibited, witnesses may give testimony from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Collins v. State, 133 Nev. 717, 724-25, 405 P.3d 657, 664-65 (2017).

Here, the officers’ testimony concerned the propriety of Officer Vohwinkel's conduct in accordance with department policy, potential discipline resulting from the April 1 incident, and whether Officer Vohwinkel's superior agreed with his actions. The officers’ testimony does not amount to a direct opinion of Shelton's guilt. We therefore conclude the district court did not err by admitting the officers’ testimony.

The district court did not plainly err in administering jury instructions

Shelton challenges the district court's jury instructions, arguing the district court failed to sua sponte provide instruction on two occasions. He contends the instructions on the battery charge were incomplete without an instruction on self-defense, and that the instructions on the resisting charge were incomplete without an instruction defining a lawful stop. Shelton did not object to the district court's instructions during trial, thus, we review the district court's alleged failures for plain error. Anderson, 121 Nev. at 516, 118 P.3d at 187.

Alleged incomplete battery instruction

At trial, the district court proposed jury instruction number 5, instructing the jury on the elements necessary to convict Shelton of battery. Shelton claims his argument and presentation of evidence warranted the district court to sua sponte instruct the jury on a theory of self-defense. To support his claim, Shelton relies on our holding in Barone v. State, 109 Nev. 778, 858 P.2d 27 (1993), arguing he was not required to prove self-defense because the burden of proof would have been improperly shifted to him. We disagree with Shelton's contentions and conclude that Barone is inapplicable here.

In Barone, we reversed the district court's decision to deny the defendant's proposed self-defense instruction after he clearly articulated his self-defense theory throughout trial. Id. at 779-80, 858 P.2d at 27-28. Here, Shelton did not propose an instruction of his own and did not object to the district court's proposed battery instruction. In fact, Shelton's self-defense argument is not clear from a casual inspection of the record. Therefore, Barone is not applicable here. Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on self-defense.

Alleged incomplete resisting instruction

At trial, the district court proposed the following instruction as jury instruction number 10:

A Defendant is guilty of Resisting a Public Officer when the Defendant, in any case or under any circumstances willfully resists, delays or obstructs a Nevada Highway Patrol Officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his or her office.

Where a dangerous weapon, other than a firearm, is used in the course of such resistance, obstruction or delay, then the Defendant is guilty of Resisting a Public Officer with Use of a Dangerous Weapon.

Shelton argues that the legal duty Officer Vohwinkel was discharging or attempting to discharge on April 1 was a traffic stop. Shelton relies on the language from NRS 484B.550 to argue that Officer Vohwinkel was not discharging a valid legal duty on April 1 because his attempt to conduct a traffic stop was not signaled by the officer's lights and siren. He claims jury instruction number 10 necessarily requires an additional jury instruction on a lawful traffic stop—where lights and sirens are to be signaled prior to a stop, in accordance with NRS 484B.550. Under Shelton's argument, because the district court did not sua sponte issue a jury instruction on a lawful traffic stop, this court should reverse his conviction.

A casual inspection of the record reveals that Shelton did not request a lawful stop instruction. Shelton also failed to object to the district court's proposed instructions. Furthermore, Shelton specifically disavowed the very same argument he now raises on two separate occasions during trial. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the definition of a lawful traffic stop.

In sum, the district court in this case was not required to sua sponte provide additional jury instructions. Therefore, the district court did not commit plain error.

There was sufficient evidence to support all convictions

Shelton argues the State presented insufficient evidence of guilt as to all counts. We will reject a sufficiency of evidence challenge when, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Origel-Candido v. State, 114 Nev. 378, 381, 956 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Count 1: stop required on signal of police officer

A driver may be charged with felony stop required on signal of police officer when: (1) they willfully fail or refuse to stop their vehicle or otherwise flee or attempt to elude a police officer when given a signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, and (2) the driver operates the vehicle in a manner which endangers or is likely to endanger any other person or the property of any other person. NRS 484B.550(1), (3)(b). Shelton highlights the lack of testimony concerning who or what was endangered or likely to be endangered on March 11. He also maintains the State failed to prove that the March 11 rider was in fact Shelton.

We have previously held that fleeing officers in excess of 90 miles per hour while ignoring red traffic lights may lead a jury to reasonably infer that the driver was operating the vehicle in a manner likely to endanger the life or property of another. Nelson v. State, 123 Nev. 534, 542, 170 P.3d 517, 523 (2007).¹ Here, the testimony from the NHP officers present on March 11 portrays a motorcycle rider, matching the descriptions of the rider on March 10 and Shelton on April 1, weaving between traffic at speeds over 90 miles per hour. The testimony of the rider's behavior was corroborated by Officer Thyr's body camera footage.

As to the rider's identity, the officers testified that they believed the same rider was involved in all three encounters. They formed their belief on the consistency of the rider and motorcycle's description, the rider's behavior, the location and route of the rider, and the time of day at which officers encountered the rider. Viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear any rational trier of fact could have found Shelton to be the rider on March 11 and that he fled officers while operating his motorcycle in a manner likely to endanger people or property. Therefore, we find the State presented sufficient evidence of guilt.

Count 2: battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm, victim being a first responder

Under NRS 200.481, a person is guilty of battery with a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm if the person utilizes a deadly weapon to willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon another which results in substantial harm. NRS 200.481(1)(a), (2)(e)(2). Shelton challenges the evidence presented at trial, claiming it fails to show that he willfully ran his motorcycle over the officer or made physical contact with the officer. Shelton contends he merely reacted to Officer Vohwinkel's sudden grasp on his motorcycle's clutch, and that he did not know Officer Vohwinkel was a law enforcement officer.

The testimony elicited by the State provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find Shelton guilty of count 2. Officer Vohwinkel testified that he pulled alongside Shelton on his marked NHP motorcycle, wearing an NHP uniform and helmet. Officer Vohwinkel also stated that once he pulled up next to Shelton, Shelton turned to look at him and only then did Shelton attempt to accelerate his motorcycle. In addition, a witness observed the encounter and testified at trial, identifying Officer Vohwinkel as an NHP officer from approximately 50 yards away. The witness also described Shelton's attempts to kick and push away the officer. Thus, the evidence presented by the State, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would lead any rational trier of fact to find Shelton guilty of battery with the victim being a first responder.

Count 3: resisting public officer with use of a dangerous weapon

Resisting a public officer with use of a dangerous weapon is the willful resistance, delay, or obstruction of a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge a legal duty of his or her office, and a dangerous weapon is used during such resistance, obstruction or delay. NRS 199.280. Shelton challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence, reiterating that his actions were instinctual as opposed to willful. Shelton also claims the State failed to prove that Officer Vohwinkel acted in the discharge of a valid legal duty, thus excusing Shelton's conduct.

Testimony from Officer Vohwinkel and the witness show that Shelton's actions on April 1 were willful. Officer Vohwinkel's testimony portrays his attempt to grab Shelton's clutch to take power away from the motorcycle and initiate a traffic stop. The officer testified that Shelton intentionally turned his handlebars to free the clutch from the officer's grip. And once the clutch was released, Shelton engaged the throttle and attempted to speed away. After the bike came to rest, testimony suggested that Shelton stood up and attempted to walk away from the scene. Thus, any rational trier of fact could have found that Shelton willfully resisted Officer Vohwinkel.

As to the officer's valid legal duty, the evidence shows that Officer Vohwinkel attempted to conduct a traffic stop on April 1. Sergeant Pollock also testified that Officer Vohwinkel's conduct was consistent with a legitimate attempt to conduct a traffic stop. We note that it is the jury's job to assess any inconsistencies in the record and resolve them by weighing the credibility of witnesses and the evidence before it. McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). Our only concern on appeal is whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction. In this case, the State provided sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Shelton resisted Officer Vohwinkel in his attempt to effectuate a traffic stop. In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, sufficient evidence of guilt was presented to secure a conviction.

In sum, the State presented sufficient evidence of guilt to prove the essential elements of all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

Shelton's sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment

Shelton challenges his 66-month to 16-year sentence, arguing it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Nevada Constitutions because it was grossly disproportionate to the crimes for which he was convicted. He also asserts that mitigating factors were not properly considered. This court affords the “district court wide discretion in its sentencing decision[s].” Chauez v. State, 125 Nev. 328, 348, 213 P.3d 476, 490 (2009). We will refrain from interfering with the sentence imposed “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976). “A sentence within the statutory limits is not cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.” Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Shelton does not argue that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence, that the relevant statutes are unconstitutional, or that the sentence exceeds statutory limits. Instead, he argues his sentence is grossly disproportionate given the circumstances of the crimes. Shelton highlights the lack of damage and short duration of the March 11 incident. As to counts 2 and 3, Shelton again notes the short duration of the April 1 incident but also emphasizes that Officer Vohwinkel's injuries “were the result of him not letting go of Shelton's bike and falling” and were not life-threatening. Finally, Shelton asserts the district court failed to appropriately weigh his limited criminal history and other mitigating factors.

Here, we conclude that Shelton's sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The State presented evidence showing the nature of Shelton's crimes warranted the sentence he received. As to the stop required charge, Shelton fled NHP officers in a manner which endangered or was likely to endanger nearby people and property. The district court considered Shelton's actions, highlighting its need to deter similar reckless conduct, and sentenced Shelton accordingly. As to the battery and resisting charges, the district court considered the circumstances of April 1, the risks the officer took, Shelton's conduct towards the officer, and the extent of the officer's injuries. Furthermore, at sentencing the district court appropriately considered Shelton's two prior DUI convictions and his career as a veteran, crediting the latter as the reason for not applying the twenty-year-maximum term on the first responder enhancement. See NRS 193.1677(1). Therefore, we find Shelton's sentence is not so unreasonably disproportionate to the offenses as to shock the conscience and therefore does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.

There is no cumulative error

Finally, Shelton argues that cumulative error requires reversal. See Big Pond v. State, 101 Nev. 1, 3, 692 P.2d 1288, 1289 (1985). In this case, the only errors were the district court's failure to provide limiting instructions for the March 10 evidence and the district court's arbitrary admission of the March 10 evidence as res gestae, but as concluded above those errors were harmless. As such, there are no other errors to accumulate.² Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We acknowledge Nelson analyzed NRS 484.348, which has now been superseded by NRS 484B.550, but this revision does not alter the “endangers or is likely to endanger” language now at issue. See Nelson, 123 Nev. at 539-40, 170 P.3d at 521; see also NRS 484B.550(3)(b).

2.   Shelton raises multiple additional arguments on appeal but failed to adequately brief these arguments. Therefore, we decline to address any of Shelton's remaining arguments. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (noting issues lacking “relevant authority and cogent argument” need not be addressed by this court).