KEITH DONALD v. THE CITY ATTORNEY OF NORTH LAS VEGAS AND THE NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL (2025)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION

This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition seeks various forms of relief.¹ In particular, petitioner seeks to (1) compel the justice court to rule on his motion for dissolution of a TPO and declare that no valid TPO existed at the time of his arrest; (2) compel the municipal court to adjudicate several pending motions, currently docketed as “received”; (3) compel the clerks of both courts to restore suppressed filings nunc pro tunc; (4) compel adjudication of pending discovery disputes; (5) void all municipal court rulings after August 26, 2024, prohibit the judge from presiding over the matter while motions for disqualification, vacatur, and habeas remain unresolved, and issue relief related to the TPO, 2024 warrant, and remand order; (6) declare void or grant habeas corpus relief from petitioner's conviction pursuant to a no contest plea; (7) stay proceedings pending this court's resolution of this petition; and (8) grant other relief.

Preliminarily, we decline to treat this petition as an emergency under NRAP 21(a)(6), as petitioner has not demonstrated that the close of discovery in his federal case and an upcoming hearing in the municipal court case require expedited consideration of his petition. Further, petitioner improperly combines arguments related to two separate lower court cases in a single petition.

Nevertheless, we have considered the documents on file with this court, and we conclude that petitioner has not demonstrated that our intervention by extraordinary writ is warranted. See Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004) (observing that the party seeking writ relief bears the burden of showing such relief is warranted); Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991) (recognizing that writ relief is an extraordinary remedy and that this court has sole discretion in determining whether to entertain a writ petition). Several of petitioner's arguments relate to occurrences over one year ago or are inappropriate for writ relief. See Halverson v. Miller, 124 Nev. 484, 487, 186 P.3d 893, 896 (2008) (“A petition will only be granted when the petitioner has a clear right to the relief requested and there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,”); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of N. Nev. v. State x rel. Pub. Works Bd., 108 Nev. 605, 611, 836 P.2d 633, 637 (1992) (describing the doctrine of laches as to a writ petition). Further, it appears that many of the documents petitioner claims were “suppressed” from the lower court dockets were instead transmitted to petitioner's then-attorney for consideration. And we anticipate that the more recently received or filed documents will be acted upon as the lower courts’ dockets allow. Accordingly, we decline to intervene, and we

ORDER the petition DENIED.²

Herndon, C.J.

Parraguirre, J.

Stiglich, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Petitioner's motion to docket his nonconforming petition under NRAP 25(e) is granted. However, we caution petitioner that any future filings in this court should conform to the NRAP.

2.   In light of this order, petitioner's October 6, 2025, request for status update or expedited consideration and October 14, 2025, emergency motion to show cause or, in the alternative, motion to expedite adjudication of pending writ petition are denied as moot. Although this court has also reviewed petitioner's notice of filing and supplemental record transmission, which was filed as part of his October 14 motion, we caution petitioner that documents addressing independent issues must be filed separately.