OHIO SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY PEERLESS INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY AND WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY v. MINOR CHILD BRYAN GALLAGHER AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF CAMILLE GALLAGHER AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF KEITH HALEY INDIVIDUALLY JEREME BOTIZ JAMES HU RICHARD BELSKY YVONNE ARNONE PATRICIA SUTHERLAND AS HEIR OF KATHLEEN MUSTAIN RYERSON DECEASED JUDITH BEAUMIER IN HER CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF RICHARD RYERSON DECEASED AS HEIR OF KATHLEEN MUSTAIN RYERSON DECEASED JUDITH RYERSON IN HER CAPACITY AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIX OF THE ESTATE OF KATHLEEN RYERSON DECENDENT AND AS HEIR OF KATHLEEN MUSTAIN RYERSON DECEASED CAROLYN STRONG INDIVIDUALLY AND KATHLEEN GRACIAS INDIVIDUALLY (2025)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal of a district court order granting in part and denying in part respondents’ motion to strike appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the second amended third-party complaint. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Timothy C. Williams, Judge.

Respondents filed an amended third-party complaint against appellants on November 2, 2023. They served the complaint on November 9, 2023. On October 10, 2024, appellants filed a special motion to dismiss under NRS 41.660, Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. Respondents moved to strike appellants’ motion on the basis that it was untimely and that the district court lacked discretion to ignore the mandatory provision of NRS 41.660. Under NRS 41.660(2), “[a] special motion to dismiss must be filed within 60 days after service of the complaint, which period may be extended by the court for good cause shown.” The district court granted respondents’ motion to strike because appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion was untimely.¹ The district court also noted that appellants “failed to address the ‘good cause’ standard as set forth in the statute” and “provided the court with no basis to use its discretion to extend any deadline.” Additionally, as the district court noted, because the motion to strike was granted, respondents were “not required to file an opposition” to appellant's anti-SLAPP motion. The merits of appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion were never reached by the district court.

Respondents have now filed a motion to dismiss this appeal, arguing that a district court order granting a motion to strike an antiSLAPP motion is not an appealable order. Appellants oppose the motion and respondents have filed a reply. We agree with respondents. While NRS 41.670(4) allows an appeal “[i]f the court denies the special motion to dismiss[,]” it does not, as respondents point out, permit an appeal from an order granting on procedural grounds a motion to strike a motion to dismiss made pursuant to NRS 41.660.

No other statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from the challenged order. See Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013) (this court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule”). Accordingly, we grant respondents’ motion to dismiss and

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

Pickering, J.

Cadish, J.

Lee, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court denied the portion of respondents’ motion that sought reasonable costs, attorney fees, and monetary relief.