ANGEL KHALIL JONES v. UNIQUE FASHION WILLIAMS (2025)

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This is an appeal from June 18, 2024, and May 21, 2025, district court orders in a child custody case.¹ Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; David S. Gibson, Jr., and Mary D. Perry, Judges.

This court's initial review of the documents before us reveals jurisdictional defects. On June 18, 2024, the district court entered an order providing that appellant would have limited supervised visitation with the subject minor child, at least until the conclusion of a related dependency matter and appellant filed a motion to modify custody. Notice of entry of that order was served on June 19, 2024. Appellant filed a timely motion to reconsider, but that motion was denied on October 14, 2024, with notice of entry served the same day. No appeal was filed within 30 days from service of either notice of entry. This appeal, filed on May 23, 2025, is untimely taken from the June 18 order. NRAP 4(a)(1); Healy v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 103 Nev. 329, 331, 741 P.2d 432, 433 (1987) (explaining that an untimely appeal fails to vest jurisdiction in this court).

Appellant filed a motion to set aside the June 18 order on April 16, 2025, and that motion was denied as untimely and successive in a written order entered on May 21, 2025. Appellant timely appealed from the May 21 order; however, even if the appeal was proper under NRAP 3A(b)(8). an issue we need not decide at this time, we conclude that the issues arising from the order denying the motion to set aside are no longer justiciable, such that the appeal as to that order must be dismissed as moot. In particular, several months after the June 18 order on custody was entered, the parties each filed motions to modify custody, with respondent also seeking to relocate, and a multi-day evidentiary hearing on those motions is underway. After the initial hearing date, the district court on March 20, 2025, entered a temporary custody order altering the parties’ custodial time pending a final custody decision after the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, and subsequent temporary orders have followed. Thus, the parties are no longer operating under the June 18 custody schedule, and they are able to present evidence as to the custodial arrangement they believe is currently in the child's best interest during the evidentiary hearing and custody proceedings currently underway. Day 2 of the hearing is scheduled for September 15, 2025. The district court presumably will soon enter a final custody order after the evidentiary hearing that any aggrieved party may appeal from. Consequently, whether appellant timely sought to set aside the June 18 order and raised new issues in his motion are no longer viable concerns and this court could grant no effective relief; thus, we conclude that the appeal from the order denying the motion to set aside is moot. Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 604, 245 P.3d 572, 575 (2010) (noting that, when subsequent events render an appeal moot and prevent this court from rendering any effective relief, the appeal typically will be dismissed).

For the above reasons, we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.²

Parraguirre, J.

Bell, J.

Stiglich, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On August 14, 2025, Jennifer Setters and Yadira Santana filed a notice of nonrepresentation, indicting that they were withdrawing from representing respondent in this case pursuant to NRAP 46(d)(3)(A). The notice, however, does not comply with that rule, which allows for counsel in criminal cases who have been incorrectly added upon docketing to file and serve, within 14 days of docketing, a notice stating that the attorney does not represent the respondent. NRAP 46(e)(3)(A) governs such notices in civil cases: however, the 14-day requirement is the same. In this instance, as respondent has filed an opposition in pro se, we will allow the untimely notice, and we direct the clerk of this court to remove Setters and Santana as counsel for respondent in this appeal. In light of this order, however, appellant need not comply with NRAP 46(e)(3)(A)’s direction to serve on respondent a copy of the notice of appeal.

2.   In light of this order, appellant's emergency motions to stay the district court proceedings, to reinstate parenting time pending appeal, and to unseal certain records, and his motions to waive transcript costs and for an extension of time to file the opening brief, are denied as moot.