REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY FOREIGN CORPORATION INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY AND AS SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES TOBACCO BUSINESS OF BROWN WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORPORATION WHICH IS THE SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO THE AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY v. TIMOTHY GEIST INDIVIDUALLY AND AS ADMINISTRATOR AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF VERNA LEE GEIST (2024)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION AND DISMISSING APPEAL

This appeal arises from a district court prejudgment sanctions order. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Ronald J. Israel, Judge. Respondent has filed a renewed motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant has opposed the motion, and respondent has filed a reply.

No statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an interlocutory district court order imposing sanctions. See generally Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, 129 Nev. 343, 345, 301 P.3d 850, 851 (2010) (recognizing that this court “may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule”). Although appellant specifies NRS 15.040 (providing that when the district court enters an order requiring payment, “it may be enforced by execution in the same manner as if it were a judgment”) and Mona v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 132 Nev. 719, 724, 380 P.3d 836, 840 (2016), as the bases for its appeal from the sanctions order, those authorities do not provide for an appeal from an interlocutory sanctions order.

This court's opinion in Mona appears to say the opposite, stating that “[a] sanctions order is final and appealable.” Id. Standing alone, this statement suggests appellant had an immediate right of interlocutory appeal from the sanctions order. However, when considered in context, Mona is distinguishable. The sanctions order in Mona arose post-judgment and involved a collection effort against a non-party, who may not appeal and must instead seek writ relief. The decision's statement respecting the appealability of sanctions orders generally thus was dictum and does not alter the general rule that, where there is no final judgment and no court rule or statute otherwise authorizing the appeal, this court lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders imposing sanctions against a party to the case. See Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984); Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 Nev. 243, 245-46, 235 P.3d 592, 594 (2010) (exemplifying that an interlocutory order imposing sanctions may be challenged in the context of an appeal from a final judgment, per Consolidated Generator v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998)). Accordingly, we grant the renewed motion to dismiss and

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

Herndon, J.

Lee, J.

Bell, J.