PETER JASON HELFRICH v. THE STATE OF NEVADA NDOC NEVADA BOARD OF PAROLE COMMISSIONERS NEVADA DIVISION OF PAROLE AND PROBATION OFFICER MERCADO WESTCARE NEVADA INC AND AARON FORD (2023)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

This pro se original petition for a writ of mandamus appears to challenge the conditions of petitioner's parole.

Having reviewed the petition, we are not persuaded that our extraordinary and discretionary intervention 'is warranted. See NRS 34.170; Pan v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 224. 88 P.3d 840, 841 (2004) (writ relief is proper only when there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law and the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that writ relief is warranted). Even assuming the relief sought here could be properly obtained through a petition for a writ of mandamus, any application for such relief should be directed to and resolved by the district court in the first instance so that the factual and legal issues can be fully developed, providing an adequate appellate record to review. See Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) (recognizing that ah appellate court is not the appropriate forum to resolve questions of fact and noting that when there are factual issues presented, appellate courts will not exercise their discretion to entertain a petition for extraordinary relief even if “important public interests are involved”); State v. County of Douglas, 90 Nev. 272, 276-77, 524 P.2d 1271, 1274 (1974) (noting that “this court prefers that such an application [for writ relief] be addressed to the discretion of the appropriate district court” in the first instance), abrogated on other grounds by Att'y Gen. v. Gypsum Res., 129 Nev. 23, 33-34, 294 P.3d 404, 410-11 (2013); see also Walker v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev. 678, 684, 476 P.3d 1194, 1199 (2020) (noting that this court typically will not entertain petitions for extraordinary relief that implicate factual disputes). Accordingly, we

ORDER the petition DENIED.¹

Stiglich, C.J.

Cadish, J.

Herndon, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Given this order, petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction is denied as moot.