STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RONNIE LYLES (2014)

Defendant Ronnie Lyles appeals from that part of the October 4, 2011 Law Division order, which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) grounded on the ineffective assistance of plea counsel.   We affirm.

On February 22, 2000, defendant was arrested for armed robbery.   That same day, he was questioned about a murder.   In April 2000, a grand jury indicted him for first-degree robbery,

 N.J.S.A.2C:15-1a,andthird-degreetheft,N.J.S.A.2C:20–3. HeHe

subsequently pled guilty to the charges.   On August 18, 2000, the court sentenced him to a ten-year term of imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant

 tothe NoEarly ReleaseAct(NERA),N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2.

In June 2000, a grand jury indicted defendant for first-

 degreemurder,N.J.S.A.2C:11–3. OnOctober30,2002,a% rjury

found him guilty.   On March 5, 2003, the court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment with thirty-five years of parole ineligibility to run consecutively to the sentence he was serving for the robbery and theft convictions.   Defendant

 appealed,andwereversedandremandedforanewt rial.State

 v. Lyles,No.A–4683–02(App.Div.Dec.7,2006). Our% rSupreme

 CourtdeniedtheState'spetitionforcertification.State% rv.

 Lyles,190N.J.395 (2007).

On August 3, 2007, defendant pled guilty to third-degree

 hinderingapprehension,N.J.S.A.2C:29–3,andanamended% rcharge

 of first-degree aggravated manslaughter,N.J.S.A. 2C:11–4a(1).

Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant would receive a twenty-year term of imprisonment subject to NERA for the

aggravated manslaughter conviction, and a concurrent four-year term of imprisonment on the hindering apprehension conviction.   The sentence was concurrent to the robbery and theft sentences.   The plea agreement also provided that defendant would receive “straight jail time credit as opposed to gap-time credit for all time he has served since January 27, 2003 [the sentencing date on the original murder conviction].”

At the plea hearing on August 3, 2007, defendant testified under oath that he:  initialed and signed the plea agreement;  understood that the plea agreement provided he would receive straight jail time credits as opposed to gap-time credits for all time he had served since January 27, 2003;  and had no questions.

At sentencing on October 26, 2007, it was revealed that March 5, 2003, not January 27, 2003, was the correct sentencing date on the original murder conviction.   Plea counsel asked the court to honor the plea agreement, “particularly that aspect of the plea agreement calling for jail credits from the time of the original sentence.”   The court imposed a sentence in accordance with the plea agreement, and awarded defendant 1696 days of straight jail time credits from March 5, 2003 to October 25,

 2007. InaMarch27,2008amendedjudgmentofcon viction(JOC),

the court awarded defendant the jail time credits as well as 929 days of gap-time credits from August 18, 2000 to March 4, 2003.

On January 19, 2010, defendant filed a PCR petition, contending that he understood the plea agreement provided for straight jail time credits from the date of his arrest on February 22, 2000, to the date of his sentencing on the aggravated manslaughter conviction on October 26, 2007.   He argued that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to explain that the plea agreement provided otherwise, and by not requesting full jail time credits instead of gap-time credits.

In an October order and written opinion, Judge John Pursel held that defendant failed to establish that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and counsel's deficient

 performanceprejudicedhimunderStricklandv.Washington,% r466

 U.S. 668,104S.Ct.2052,80L.Ed.2d674(19 84).  CCiting

 Statev.Hernandez,208N.J.24(2011),InreHinsing er,180

 N.J.Super.491(App.Div.),certif.denied,88N.J.% r494(1981),

 andRule 3:21–8, thejudge determined that defendant was not

legally entitled to jail time credits after his sentence on the robbery and theft conviction on August 18, 2000.   However, the judge granted defendant's request to award him jail time credits

from January 27, 2003, the date set forth in the plea agreement.   The judge re-calculated all credits as follows:

178 days of jail time credit from February

22, 2000 to August 17, 2000 (as per

 Hernandez);

892 days of gap-time credit from August 18,

2000 to January 16, 2003;

1440 days of prior service credit from January 27, 2003 to January 5, 2007 as per the plea agreement;  and

293 days of jail time credit from January

26, 2007 as per the plea agreement.

On September 28, 2011, the judge amended the JOC to reflect the proper credits.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contention:

POINT I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.   THE LOWER COURT ORDER MUST THEREFORE BE REVERSED AND THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

We have considered this contention in light of the record and applicable legal principles and conclude it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.   R. 2:11–

3(e)(2).  We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Pursel in his comprehensive and well-reasoned written opinion.   However, we add the following brief comments.

Defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to establish whether plea counsel failed to explain that jail time credits would not be calculated from February 22, 2000.   The record confirms that defendant was fully apprised of the jail- time-credit consequence of his plea.   He was advised that he would not receive jail time credits from February 22, 2000 to January 27, 2003.   This was reflected in a memorandum of understanding and incorporated into the plea form, which defendant signed and initialed where indicated.   The issue was fully addressed at the plea hearing.

 Affirmed.

PER CURIAM