IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF v. << (2014)

Defendant R.J. appeals from an April 19, 2013 order terminating his parental rights to his three children.   We affirm, substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Mark Nelson in his comprehensive written opinion dated April 19,

 2013.1

I

The evidence was reviewed at length in Judge Nelson's opinion which, based on our review of the record, is supported

 by sufficientcredible evidence.R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A).The

record can be summarized as follows.   The children are twins, T.W. and M.W., born in December 1998, and J.J., born in October

 2000. TheDivisionofChildProtectionandPermanency(D ivision)

 hasbeeninvolvedwiththefamilysince2005.Afterle ngthyand

 1 Judge Nelson also terminated the parental rights of the children's mother, M.W., based on her seemingly intractable substance abuse problems and her psychological and emotional inability to care for the children.   The mother did not appear for the guardianship trial and has not appealed from the order terminating her parental rights.

unsuccessful efforts to provide the parents with services for their substance abuse issues, the Division performed an emergency removal of the children in March 2011 and placed them in foster homes.   All of the children have special needs.

 Inadditiontohishistoryofdomesticviolenceand% rdrug

abuse, defendant has been diagnosed with psychological problems, and has a significant criminal history.   In fact, he lived with the children and their mother only sporadically, because of his several periods of incarceration.   At the time of the trial in

 2013,defendanthadbeenconvictedofsexualassault onaten-

year-old girl, and was serving a prison term of four years, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2.

Judge Nelson credited the testimony of Dr. Karen Wells that defendant does not, and will not at any time in the foreseeable future, have the psychological and emotional capacities to care for any of the children.

At the time of the trial, the twins were living with a foster mother, P.F., who was a friend of M.W.'s family, and was the children's godmother.   The twins had lived with P.F. since the spring of 2011, and had a parent-child bond with her.   P.F. wished to adopt them.   The third child, J.J., was living in a different foster home, but P.F. testified that she was also willing to care for him and would be willing to adopt him as

well. P.F. further testified that she believed strongly in open adoption and permitted all of her foster children to maintain relationships with their biological families.   She emphasized that, all along, she had supported allowing the boys to see their mother, with whom they had an emotional bond, and would continue to do so.   She also expressed her willingness to let the boys visit with other relatives if they wished to do so.

Judge Nelson found that the children had “no real relationship” with defendant, and they resented him for physically abusing their mother.   In fact, during an in camera interview with Judge Nelson, all of the children asserted that they wanted “no contact” with defendant.   The twins, who were almost fifteen years old at the time, went so far as to record a video message for defendant expressing their wish that he leave them alone and cease litigating this guardianship action, so that they could be adopted.   Dr. Wells testified unequivocally, that all of the children needed the permanence of adoption.   According to Judge Nelson, during his in camera interview, all three children stated their preference to be adopted by P.F.

The youngest child, J.J., who was twelve at the time of the trial, had previously told his case worker at various times that he wanted to be adopted by either P.F. or by his paternal grandmother.   However, during the trial, he stated his preference

to be adopted by P.F. The grandmother testified that she would like to adopt J.J., who had lived with her for several months in

2011. He was removed from the grandmother's home in October

2011, and placed with a maternal aunt, due to allegations of physical abuse by the grandmother.2The Division did not substantiate the allegations but J.J. did not return to the grandmother's house.   The aunt moved out-of-state in April 2012, and J.J. did not wish to move with her.   At that point, he was placed in a non-relative foster home.

Based on the trial record, Judge Nelson concluded that the

Division had satisfied the four prongs of the best interests test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C–15.1a, and that defendant's parental rights

 should beterminated.

II

In striking a balance between a parent's constitutional rights and the children's fundamental needs, courts employ the

 four-part guardianshiptest articulated inN.J.Divisionof

 2 Defendant admitted to the Division case worker, Tanya Green, that P.F. had been involved in the children's lives for many years, and he did not object to the twins living with her.   The twins told Green that they had no interest in visiting the grandmother because she used to hit them when they were very young, and they did not want to live with her.   They repeated those statements in their in camera interview with the judge.   They also told the judge that defendant used to explode in anger at them and hit them on occasion.

 and codified asN.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1a:

a.  The division shall initiate a petition to terminate parental rights on the grounds of the “best interests of the child” pursuant to subsection (c) of section 15 of P.L.

 1951,c.138(C.30:4C-15)ifthefollowing

standards are met:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm.   Such harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child;

(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights;  and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

 [N.J.S.A.30:4C-15.1a.]

In their application, the four factors above “ ‘are not discrete and separate, but relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests.’ ”   N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.

 FamilyServs. v.G.L.,191N.J.596,606–07(2007)).

In reviewing Judge Nelson's decision, we must defer to his factual findings unless they “ ‘went so wide of the mark that a

 mistake must have been made.' ”N.J.Div.ofYouth & Family

 Servs.v.M.M.,189N.J.261,279(2007)(citation% romitted). So

long as “they are ‘supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence,’ ” a trial judge's factual findings will not

 bedisturbedonappeal.InreGuardianshipofJ.T.,26 9N.J.

 Super.172,188(App.Div.1993)(citationomitted). An dweowe

special deference to the trial judge's expertise in handling

 familyissues.Cesarev.Cesare,154N.J.394,411–13% r(1998).

Judged by those standards, we find no basis in this record to second-guess Judge Nelson's decision.

 Onthisappeal,defendantarguesthattheDivisionf ailed

to satisfy the third prong of the best interests test in several ways.   He contends that the Division failed to provide him with sufficient services, failed to place all of the children with the paternal grandmother, and failed to advise her about the option of kinship legal guardianship (KLG).  We conclude that his arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion

 inawrittenopinion.R.2:11-3(e)(1)(E).Weaddthe% rfollowing

comments.

services from the Division would permit defendant to function as the children's parent.   We find no basis to second-guess the judge's decision to credit Dr. Wells's testimony that defendant is psychologically unable to care for his children.   Further, at the time of the trial, defendant was unable to care for the children because he had pled guilty to child molestation and was serving a four-year NERA prison term.   Additionally, it is crystal clear that the children, who were old enough to express their wishes, wanted no contact with defendant.

 Moreover,thegrandmotherdidnottestifythatshew anted

to enter into a KLG arrangement;  she wanted to adopt the children.   Her willingness to adopt the children, and P.F.'s willingness to do the same, rendered KLG an inappropriate

 option.SeeN.J.Div.ofYouth & FamilyServs. v.P.P.,180

 N.J. 494,508 (2004).

We recently observed that KLG “may be suited to circumstances where the biological parent may yet become fit to care for the child and the caretaking parent is willing to abide that time while taking full responsibility for care of the

 child.”N.J.Div.ofYouth & FamilyServs.v.H.R.,% r431N.J.

 Super.212,229(App.Div.2013). Thatismanifestly notthe

situation here.   Even if the grandmother had become the

defendant's essentially non-existent relationship with the children and there was no prospect that he would become a fit parent.   And lastly, none of the children expressed a preference to live with the grandmother, as opposed to living with their foster mother and godmother, P.F.

 Wenotethat,whilethisappealwaspending,the Division

submitted a letter on July 24, 2013, advising this court that the twins had been removed from P.F.'s home and placed in juvenile detention, based on allegations that they sexually assaulted a child in P.F.'s home.   The Division advised that it was planning to find the twins new placements in a residential facility.   The Division advised that J.J. had been placed with P.F., who still wanted to adopt him.   Defendant's brief, filed August 7, 2013, did not address this information beyond noting it in a footnote, but we conclude it does not change the result in this case.   Given the children's non-existent relationship with defendant, their antipathy toward him, and his inability to care for them, termination of defendant's parental rights remains in their best interests.

 Affirmed.

PER CURIAM