DEBORAH ALLEN v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR POMERANTZ STAFFING COWORX STAFFING SERVICES (2013)

Deborah J. Allen appeals a final decision of the Board of Review dismissing her appeal of a decision of the Appeal Tribunal that she acknowledges receiving on June 5, 2010.   Allen filed the appeal on April 4, 2011, about ten months after her receipt of the Tribunal's determination, and the Board dismissed it because Allen had not filed within ten days as required by N.J.S.A. 43:21–6(c) and had not established good cause within the meaning of N.J.A.C. 12:20–4.1(h).  As the administrative agency's decision is consistent with the statute and regulation and supported by the record, we affirm.  Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 212–14 (1997);  R. 2:11–3(e)(1)(D).

A deputy claims examiner denied Allen's claim for unemployment compensation benefits on April 27, 2010, and she filed a timely appeal of that determination with the Appeal Tribunal.   Following a hearing on May 27, 2010, the Appeal Tribunal determined that Allen was disqualified pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21–5(a).   The Tribunal decision was mailed on June 2, 2010, and Allen acknowledges receiving it on June 5, 2010.   Nevertheless, she did not file her appeal until April 4, 2011.   To establish good cause for her delay, Allen advised that on June 5, 2010, she was “in the last stages of being evicted,” was “[b]ecoming homeless,” “needed to act fast,” was “near a nervous breakdown” and did not know where she was going to live.   Additionally, she contended that she still did not have “a residence to call [her] own,” was suffering from high blood pressure and cholesterol, which had worsened with her “ordeal,” and had been “depressed for months.”

N.J.A.C. 12:20–4.1(h) defines “good cause” allowing the Board to consider the merits of an appeal filed beyond the ten-day statutory period as follows:

(h) A late appeal shall be considered on its merits if it is determined that the appeal was delayed for good cause.   Good cause exists in circumstances where it is shown that:

1.  The delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the control of the appellant;  or

2.  The appellant delayed filing the appeal for circumstances which could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented.

Finding no basis for concluding that the Board's

determination is arbitrary, capricious or lacks support in the record, we affirm.  Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210–12.   Appellant's arguments do not warrant any additional discussion.   See R. 2:11–3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

The opinion of the court was delivered by GRALL, J.A.D.