JOSEPH OETTINGER JR v. MAKE CENTS OF IT LLC QB TRAINING SOLUTIONS (2013)

Plaintiff Joseph Oettinger, an attorney, filed this action in the Special Civil Part after receiving at his Westwood office an unsolicited fax advertisement from defendant Make Cents of It, LLC, doing business as QB Training Solutions.   His complaint alleged that the fax transmission violated both the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 227, and the New Jersey Junk Fax Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8–157 to –160.   Plaintiff sought $500 in statutory damages for the unauthorized fax, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(3) and N.J.S.A. 56:8–159(b), which he requested the court to treble in its discretion.   He also sought costs and counsel fees.

After defendant failed to respond to the summons and complaint, plaintiff obtained a default.   At the ensuing proof hearing on June 18, 2012, at which defendant also failed to appear, the Special Civil Part judge entered default judgment for $500, plus $22 in costs.   The judge denied plaintiff's request for counsel fees because he had represented himself in the lawsuit.   Plaintiff moved to amend the judgment to include a counsel fee award, which the judge denied.   This appeal by plaintiff, which defendant has opposed through counsel, followed.

The sole issue before us is the trial court's denial of counsel fees to plaintiff.   Defendant has not filed a cross-appeal contesting its liability for the unwanted fax, nor has it appealed the trial court's award of damages and costs.

After considering the arguments presented to us, we conclude that the trial court's denial of counsel fees to plaintiff was appropriate.   As the Supreme Court held last year in Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230 (2012), in reversing counsel fees that had been awarded to a licensed attorney who had represented herself in proceedings relating to her service as a parenting coordinator, the “better rule” is that fee awards to self-represented attorneys should be disallowed.  Id. at 263.   Although the Court recognized in Segal the competing policy arguments for and against such fee-shifting, it found “the reasoning of those precedents that reject counsel fee awards to attorneys who represent themselves to be persuasive in the circumstances of [that] appeal.”   Id. at 264.   Among other things, the Segal majority underscored the United States Supreme Court's conclusion that “allowing pro se attorney litigants to secure an award of attorney's fees would create an unwanted disincentive for attorneys to hire counsel.”  Ibid. (citing Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 1438, 113 L. Ed.2d 486, 493 (1991)).   The Court in Segal also found it problematic to allow the self-represented lawyer “to be compensated for her time expended in securing relief when others [who are not lawyers] would be precluded from being compensated for their time.”  Ibid.

The same policy reasons apply here.   See DepoLink Court Reporting & Litig.   Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J.Super. 325, 341 (App.Div.2013) (analogously holding that a self-represented attorney's time spent representing himself is not an eligible “ascertainable loss” under the Consumer Fraud Act).

We are unpersuaded by plaintiff's attempts to distinguish Segal or to repudiate its reasoning.   Plaintiff argues that the fact that the Junk Fax Act's fee-shifting provision, N.J.S.A. 56:8–159(b), uses the term “shall” signifies that a fee award to any prevailing plaintiff under the statute is mandatory, regardless of the plaintiff's self-represented status.   We do not construe the statute in that fashion.   Doing so would give self-represented lawyers who receive unwanted faxes a significant monetary advantage over pro se non-attorneys, who likewise seek relief under the statute and who devote their own time and attention uncompensated to their lawsuits.   There is no indication that the Legislature wanted such a disparity.

Our decision in Alpert, Goldberg, Butler, Norton & Weiss, P.C. v. Quinn, 410 N.J.Super.   510 (App.Div.2009), certif. denied, 203 N.J. 93 (2010), which preceded the Supreme Court's guidance in Segal, likewise is not helpful to plaintiff.   In Alpert, we upheld the denial of attorney's fees under the court rule relating to frivolous litigation, Rule 1:4–8, to a law firm representing itself.  Id. at 547.   We reject plaintiff's argument that Alpert aids his quest for fees here, insofar as our opinion distinguished counsel fees that are “actually incurred” from those that are “imputed.”   Ibid. The distinction does not assist plaintiff because there is nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion in Segal, nor in the particular federal or state statutes that are applicable here, that “imputes” or otherwise evinces a policy to authorize counsel fee recoveries by a plaintiff who is a self-represented attorney.

Affirmed.

PER CURIAM