MICHAEL FLYNN SR v. MAYRA FLYNN (2013)

Defendant Mayra L. Flynn appeals from a July 22, 2011 order directing her to provide financial information to plaintiff Michael S. Flynn, Sr., and a September 9, 2011 order denying her motion for reconsideration.   For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Plaintiff and defendant were married on April 23, 1983.   Two children born of the marriage are emancipated.   The parties initially obtained a divorce from bed and board, which was converted to a final judgment of divorce on February 27, 2007.   The judgment of divorce incorporated a property settlement agreement (the Agreement) dated January 25, 2006.

The Agreement provided that plaintiff would pay defendant permanent alimony in the amount of $365 per week, based on plaintiff earning $82,000 per year and defendant's imputed income of $25,000 per year.   The Agreement also stated:

The parties will exchange W–2's or other income information by Feb. 15 of each year (beginning 2007).   If husband's income varies by 10% or more each party may seek to change alimony as it shall automatically be considered a change in circumstances.   If wife's income increases above $30,000 per year, it shall automatically be considered a change in circumstances warranting a review of the alimony.

In addition, the parties agreed that plaintiff would maintain a life insurance policy in the amount of $250,000, naming defendant as the irrevocable beneficiary, to secure his alimony obligation.

On February 18, 2011, the court granted defendant's motion to compel plaintiff to produce his 1040 income tax forms.   The same order denied defendant's request for an increase in alimony based on plaintiff's remarriage.

On June 1, 2011, defendant filed a motion to enforce litigants rights, alleging that plaintiff had not “supplied tax information for 2009 or 2010.”   Plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion to compel defendant to provide “accurate and honest” income information, including “complete tax returns” and “business and personal” bank statements.   In his cross-motion, plaintiff alleged that defendant never supplied her actual income, and further, that her previous tax returns were inconsistent with the case information statement she filed in August 2008.   In addition, plaintiff stated that if he supplied “the information as ordered by the court, [he would] have no leverage.”

On July 22, 2011, the court ordered plaintiff to provide defendant “with his 2009 and 2010 1040” statements and to otherwise comply with the February 18, 2011 order.   The July 22, 2011 order also addressed plaintiff's cross-motion and found that defendant failed to comply with the Agreement.   Accordingly, defendant was ordered to provide supporting documentation of her claimed income and expenditures, “including complete tax returns [with] all forms used to determine her adjusted gross income and business and personal bank statements,” for the years 2006 through 2010.

In her motion for reconsideration, defendant claimed she was “denied due process” because a court clerk informed her “she was not able to file answers” to plaintiff's cross-motion.   Defendant also certified she was self-employed, and “there [was] no W–2 or 1099 issued to [her] by her company.”   Plaintiff filed a response and cross-motion, seeking to enforce the court's July 22, 2011 order.   Plaintiff stated that although defendant did not “pay herself a salary, she did ‘write off’ everyday things like her car payments, cell phone, etc., as business expenses,” which were not reflected in her adjusted gross income.

The court denied defendant's reconsideration motion on September 9, 2011.   The court found defendant failed to establish a due process violation and failed to articulate a basis for relief from the July 22, 2011 order.   Additionally, the court granted plaintiff's motion to enforce the July 22, 2011 order.

Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred because she complied with the “nebulous verbiage” of the Agreement, which required the parties to “exchange W–2's or other income information.”   We do not agree.

“The basic contractual nature of matrimonial agreements has ‘long been recognized.’ ”  Sachau v. Sachau, 206 N.J. 1, 5 (2011) (quoting Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)).  “As a general rule, courts should enforce contracts as the parties intended.”  Ibid. “Similarly, it is a basic rule of contractual interpretation that a court must discern and implement the common intention of the parties.”  Ibid.

In this case, the parties agreed they would “exchange W–2's or other income information by Feb. 15 of each year (beginning 2007)” for the purpose of determining whether there was a change of circumstances.   Therefore, the orders entered on July 22, 2011 and September 9, 2011, were consistent with the parties' Agreement, and were a reasonable exercise of judicial discretion.

Affirmed.

PER CURIAM