JOHN PRITCHETT v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (2013)

Appellant John Pritchett, an inmate at New Jersey State Prison (NJSP) in Trenton, appeals from the June 30, 2011 final decision of the Department of Corrections (DOC) finding him guilty of disciplinary infractions .701, unauthorized use of mail or telephone, and *.803/*.215,  attempting to possess narcotics with intent to distribute.   Pritchett contends he was denied due process because the disciplinary report was not timely served and he was denied confrontation and access to confidential reports.   He also contends the final decision was not based on sufficient credible evidence in the record or adequately explained.   Having considered Pritchett's arguments in light of the record, we affirm.

The charges involved in this case stem from a lengthy investigation conducted by the NJSP Special Investigation Division (SID), which revealed that Pritchett and other inmates conspired with family members, friends, and other members of the general public to obtain cellular telephones and drugs for delivery into the prison.   SID gathered information through communications data warrants, confidential informants, videotaped interviews, and financial instruments received and cashed.

Pritchett was charged on June l7, 2011, with the disciplinary infractions and served with the disciplinary report that day.   The report stated that the investigation determined Pritchett defeated the existing departmental system designed to monitor, control, and curtail inmate phone usage and conspired with other inmates and civilians to smuggle narcotics into the prison.   On December 8, 2006, Pritchett made a three-way call using inmate Boone's pin number to a female involving “giv[ing] her money [ ] to go to the hood.”   A confidential informant identified Pritchett by name as being part of a drug conspiracy at NJSP.

Pritchett was granted the assistance of counsel substitute.   His hearing began on June 20 and was adjourned several times for various reasons, resuming on June 30, 2011.   He declined the offer to call witnesses on his behalf and to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses.   Pritchett was not permitted to confront the confidential informant or granted access to the SID confidential reports of September 6, 2006, and May 15, 2008, for security reasons.   However, he was allowed the opportunity to listen to the December 2006 recorded conversation where arrangements were being made to smuggle drugs into the prison.   His counsel substitute submitted a written statement in his defense, and Pritchett made a statement in which he did not deny making the call but claimed “that is not me that they are talking about.   That is somebody else talking about me.”

Based on summaries of the SID confidential reports, various recorded interviews and recorded phone calls, the prehearing detention report, and other evidence, the hearing officer found Pritchett guilty of the charges.   The hearing officer concluded Pritchett was afforded due process, the informant was credible and the information reliable, and Pritchett offered no evidence to discredit the information obtained from the informant or the recorded phone conversation.   As Pritchett does not challenge the sanctions, we need not recite them.

Pritchett administratively appealed, and on July 26, 2011, NJSP's Assistant Superintendent, William Anderson, upheld the hearing officer's decision, explaining:

A review of the charges, investigation, and their adjudication reveals that 10A and all of the safeguards therein were afforded to you.   Your explanation failed to disclose any valid violation of standards, or give any basis for the extension of leniency.   You were offered the opportunity to call witnesses, but did not, because the nature of the information was received from sources which would be at risk if exposed[.]  [T]here is no misinterpretation of the facts [.]  [F]or this reason the decision of the Hearing Officer will be upheld.

This appeal ensued.

On appeal, Pritchett argues that he was denied due process because he was denied the right to confront the confidential informant and review the confidential SID investigatory reports;  there were significant deficiencies in the charges and proceedings, including delays in the hearing;  and the decision of the hearing officer was arbitrary and capricious and not supported by any substantial and/or credible evidence.

The scope of our review of an agency decision is limited.  “An appellate court ordinarily will reverse the decision of an administrative agency only when the agency's decision is ‘arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [ ] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.’ ”   Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J.Super. 18, 23 (App.Div.2005) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579–80 (1980)).  “ ‘Substantial evidence’ means ‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ”  Figueroa v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 414 N.J.Super. 186, 192 (App.Div.2010) (quoting In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961)).

Although prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply, see Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975), when reviewing a determination of the DOC in a matter involving prisoner discipline, we consider not only whether there is substantial evidence that the inmate committed the prohibited act, but also whether, in making its decision the DOC followed regulations adopted to afford inmates procedural due process.   See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194–96 (1995).

Pritchett complains a due process violation occurred when he was not permitted to learn the identity of, or confront, the confidential informant.   This argument lacks merit.   Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4–9.14(b)(1), a hearing officer may refuse confrontation and cross-examination of a witness who is “[u]nduly hazardous to the correctional facility/unit safety, security, orderly operation, or goals” and (b)(6), “a confidential informant.”   The safety of the informant who provided information concerning Pritchett, other inmates, and individuals still in the community, would plainly be jeopardized if his or her identity were revealed.   Under those circumstances, we discern no basis for disturbing the hearing officer's determination to deny Pritchett's request to confront this individual.   Similarly, the hearing officer properly declined Pritchett's request for access to the confidential materials.   See Jones v. Dep't of Corr., 359 N.J.Super. 70, 77 (App.Div.2003).   We discern no other procedural deficiencies in the disciplinary charges and hearing.   See Avant, supra, 67 N.J. at 520.

Having considered the record in light of the foregoing principles, we also conclude that sufficient credible evidence in the record supports the DOC's determination that Pritchett was guilty of violating both of the prison rules involved here.   The SID report detailed the basis for each of the charges.   Recorded phone calls demonstrated that Pritchett misused the prison's phone system by making a three-way call using another inmate's pin number, and he did not deny making the call.   Pritchett offered no evidence to discredit the informant or the recorded phone conversation, which clearly implicated him in the drug conspiracy at the prison.   Contrary to Pritchett's contention that the hearing officer did not explain the reasons for his findings of guilt, the adjudications on each offense clearly set forth the evidence relied upon by the hearing officer.

Affirmed.

PER CURIAM