STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. RASHAD WALKER DERRICK MOSS (2013)

Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his residence, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with the intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–5(a)(1), and one count of third-degree CDS possession with the intent to distribute within 500 feet of public housing, N.J.S.A. 2C:35–7.1. Defendant was sentenced to three concurrent and extended six-year prison terms, subject to three-year periods of parole ineligibility.

Defendant appealed, arguing:

I.  THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS UNDER THE CONTROLLING CASES OF STATE v. BOLTE [,] [115 N.J. 579 (1989) ] AND ITS PROGENY.

II. THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN FAILING TO CON–SIDER A LESSER SENTENCE AND IN GRANTING MUL–TIPLE EXTENDED TERMS (Not Raised Below).

We previously reversed the order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence and remanded for further proceedings.  State v. Walker, No. A–4672–08 (App. Div. June 28, 2011).   As a result, we found it was not necessary to reach the arguments contained in Point II. Id., slip op. at 2.

The Supreme Court granted certification.  208 N.J. 601 (2012).   On April 10, 2013, the Court reversed our prior judgment and remanded so that we might rule on defendant's Point II. State v. Walker, _ N.J. _, _ (2013) (slip op. at 22).

In Point II, defendant argues that the trial judge erred in failing to consider a lesser sentence and in granting multiple extended terms.   These arguments were not asserted in the trial court.

We reject the contention that the trial judge was not authorized to impose three concurrent extended terms.   Defendant relies on N.J.S.A. 2C:44–5(a)(2), but we have recognized that this statutory prohibition does not apply to mandatory extended terms, which were imposed here, only discretionary extended terms.   See State v. Singleton, 326 N.J.Super. 351, 355 (App.Div.1999).   And we reject the argument that the sentence was excessive.   The sentence imposed was reached after an appropriate assessment of the aggravating factors;  the judge found the presence of no mitigating factors.   Those findings were “fully supported by the evidence,” State v. Dalziel, 182 N.J. 494, 505 (2005), and in reviewing the matter, we are presented with no principled reason to find that the trial judge abused her discretion, State v. Gardner, 113 N.J. 510, 516 (1989).

Affirmed.

PER CURIAM