KEITH INGLING v. MARIA DETTORRE (2012)

The parties were married in 1988, defendant Maria L. Dettorre gave birth to the parties' only child in June 1989, and the parties divorced four months later.   Following the divorce, the parties returned to court at least a dozen times to resolve custody, parenting time and child support disputes.   In this appeal, plaintiff Keith Ingling argues that the judge erred in finding the child was emancipated on June 1, 2011, claiming emancipation occurred at an earlier time.   We are constrained to remand for the trial judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law on that issue.

An evidentiary hearing regarding emancipation occurred on October 6, 2011.   At that time, plaintiff was represented by counsel, defendant represented herself, and only the parties' daughter testified.   By order entered on December 6, 2011 (the December order), the trial judge found the child was “no longer a full-time student” and that she had “moved beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by” defendant, “obtain[ing] an independent status of her own.”   The order did not identify when the parties' daughter became emancipated.   The December order also contained the judge's direction that defendant produce documents regarding the daughter's employment and academic attendance in 2011.

Another order was entered on January 27, 2012 (the January order), declaring the parties' daughter “ceased being a full-time college student ․ effective June 1, 2011” and was therefore emancipated as of that date.   The order directed the probation department to provide plaintiff with an appropriate credit and additionally required the parties' daughter to provide “written verification as to the date that she dropped her Spring 2011 semester courses.”

Plaintiff appeals the January order.   He argues that the judge erred in finding the child was emancipated on June 1, 2011, claiming the evidence demonstrated emancipation occurred by May 31, 2010.   This appeal cannot be decided on its merits at this time.

The record on appeal contains only a single transcript, which recounts the October 6, 2011 proceedings described above.   At the conclusion of those proceedings, the judge expressed a need for documentation to be provided to him in the following few days by the parties' daughter regarding her academic history.   The judge reserved decision on the disputed issues.   If the judge later rendered findings on the record—other than the conclusory findings stated in the December order, which we have already quoted—those findings are not contained in the record on appeal.¹  In addition, even if we were to conclude that the findings expressed in the December order met the requirements of Rule 1:7–4(a), those findings did not include an emancipation date.   And, although an emancipation date of June 1, 2011, is contained in the subsequent January order, no reasons were expressed by the judge for reaching that particular conclusion.

As a result, we have no way of knowing how the judge arrived at an emancipation date of June 1, 2011.²  The judge's failure to provide the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 1:7–4(a), necessitates a remand for a fulfillment of the judge's obligation in this regard.   See Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569–70 (1980);  Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J.Super. 91, 96 (App.Div.2006).

Remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law as to when the parties' daughter was emancipated.³  We do not retain jurisdiction.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. We are mindful that trial judges commonly note in their orders where a reader might find the underlying reasons for issuing the order.   The December and January orders contain no such statements.   We therefore assume that the judge placed no findings on the record other than those found within the four corners of the December order..  FN1. We are mindful that trial judges commonly note in their orders where a reader might find the underlying reasons for issuing the order.   The December and January orders contain no such statements.   We therefore assume that the judge placed no findings on the record other than those found within the four corners of the December order.

FN2. Because both the December and January orders contemplated the submission of additional information relevant to the fixing of an emancipation date, it may also be appropriate to conclude that:  the judge has yet to make a final determination on that point;  additional proceedings or findings were anticipated;  and the filing of an appeal was premature..  FN2. Because both the December and January orders contemplated the submission of additional information relevant to the fixing of an emancipation date, it may also be appropriate to conclude that:  the judge has yet to make a final determination on that point;  additional proceedings or findings were anticipated;  and the filing of an appeal was premature.

FN3. Because it is not clear whether the judge ever received the documentation twice ordered—suggesting the judge viewed this information as important—we do not foreclose the conducting of additional proceedings in that regard or for any other reason that may aid the judge in fully and fairly disposing of the issue in question..  FN3. Because it is not clear whether the judge ever received the documentation twice ordered—suggesting the judge viewed this information as important—we do not foreclose the conducting of additional proceedings in that regard or for any other reason that may aid the judge in fully and fairly disposing of the issue in question.

PER CURIAM