In the INTEREST OF E.H., minor child State of North Dakota, Petitioner and Appellee v. E.H., Child; T.T., Mother; Barb Oliger, Guardian ad Litem; and Executive Director of the Department of Human Services, State of North Dakota, Respondents W.H., Father; Respondent and Appellant
In the Interest of E.H., minor child State of North Dakota, Petitioner and Appellee v. E.H., Child; R.V., Mother; Barb Oliger, Guardian ad Litem; and Executive Director of the Department of Human Services, State of North Dakota, Respondents W.H., Father; Respondent and Appellant
In the Interest of R.H., minor child State of North Dakota, Petitioner and Appellee v. R.H., Child; R.V., Mother; Barb Oliger, Guardian ad Litem; and Executive Director of the Department of Human Services, State of North Dakota, Respondents W.H., Father; Respondent and Appellant
In the Interest of H.H., minor child State of North Dakota, Petitioner and Appellee v. H.H., Child; R.V., Mother; Barb Oliger, Guardian ad Litem; and Executive Director of the Department of Human Services, State of North Dakota, Respondents W.H., Father; Respondent and Appellant
In the Interest of J.V., minor child State of North Dakota, Petitioner and Appellee v. J.V., Child; R.V., Mother; Barb Oliger, Guardian ad Litem; and Executive Director of the Department of Human Services, State of North Dakota, Respondents W.H., Father; Respondent and Appellant
[¶1] W.H., father of the five children in these consolidated cases, appealed from an order affirming the juvenile court findings of fact and orders of the judicial referee terminating his parental rights. W.H. argues the judicial referee erroneously found that there was clear and convincing evidence to show the causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied, and that by reason thereof the children are suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. After conducting a de novo review under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 13, § 11, the district court affirmed the judicial referee's findings of fact and order and made its own findings and conclusions on the record, supporting the termination of parental rights. The court specifically adopted the findings made by the judicial referee that these children are in need of protection under N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-01(5). The judicial referee also found the children had been in foster care for 691 consecutive days as of the date of trial. The court on review expressly adopted the findings that the children had been in foster care and in the care, custody, and control of the Three Rivers Human Service Zone for at least 450 out of the previous 660 nights. See N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2).
[¶2] Because the district court's findings that the children were in need of protection and in foster care more than 450 out of the previous 660 nights were not clearly erroneous, the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating parental rights. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2), (4), and (7); see Interest of R.L.-P., 2014 ND 28, ¶ 23, 842 N.W.2d 889 (“Because a finding that the children have been in foster care more than 450 out of the previous 660 nights, along with a finding of deprivation [now “in need of protection”], is sufficient to terminate parental rights under N.D.C.C. § 27-20-44(1)(c) [see now N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-20(1)(c)], it is unnecessary to address the parents’ challenge to the finding that the conditions and causes of the deprivation will likely continue.”); see also Interest of A.P., 2022 ND 131, ¶ 3, 976 N.W.2d 244.
Per Curiam.
[¶3] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. Gerald W. VandeWalle Daniel J. Crothers Lisa Fair McEvers Jerod E. Tufte