JUNEAU v. STATE (2025)

[¶1] Jordan Juneau appeals from a district court order denying his application for postconviction relief. We conclude the court erred in concluding Juneau failed to establish his sentence was illegal. We reverse and remand with instructions.

I

[¶2] In December 2021, the State charged Juneau in Wells County with attempted murder with a dangerous weapon, a class A felony, armed robbery with a dangerous weapon, a class A felony, and burglary, a class B felony. See Case No. 52-2021-CR-00098 (“0098”). Later in December 2021, the State charged Juneau in Stutsman County with unauthorized use of personal identifying information, a class C felony. See Case No. 47-2021-CR-00668 (“0668”). In July 2022, the State charged Juneau in Stutsman County with theft of property, a class B felony, and criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor. See Case No. 47-2022-CR-00301 (“0301”).

[¶3] On May 10, 2023, Juneau entered Alford pleas in the 0668 and 0301 cases. Juneau's pleas were based on a binding plea agreement. At the parties’ request, the district court accepted Juneau's pleas but scheduled sentencing before the judge handling case 0098. The court specifically informed Juneau that the sentencing judge could accept or reject the plea agreement. The court then explained:

If [the judge] rejects the plea agreement, you would then have the opportunity, if you wish, to withdraw your plea of guilty and maintain a plea of not guilty, and the matter could be scheduled for trial.

Or, if the judge rejects the plea agreement, you could go forward with sentencing and not withdraw your plea, but that is going to be up to you to decide.

Later, Juneau asked, “Well, would the judge be able to give me more than four years?” The court responded:

No. So, if the judge says no. I'm not accepting this plea agreement, whatever it is, and I don't know what it is, and frankly, it's not important that I know for the purposes of today's hearing. But if the judge says no, Mr. Juneau. I'm not accepting the plea agreement that is put forward under Rule 11 by you and your attorney and the prosecutor, then the sentencing sort of stops at that point.

And then the question is posed to you and your attorney, and you'd have a chance to consult with him if you wish. You can either then withdraw your plea of guilty and maintain a not guilty plea, and the matter can go to trial after that. Or you can say I'm going to roll the dice, and I'm going to be sentenced by [the judge] on an open plea basis.

See N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4), (5). After accepting Juneau's pleas, the court stated it did not need to put the details of the agreement on the record. At no time during the May 10, 2023 hearing did the parties disclose the agreement's terms to the court, although when the court asked Juneau if anyone had made any threats or promises to get him to plead guilty, Juneau responded, “No. Well, I mean, they made promises, yeah. Actually, they did. That I would only be able to receive a sentence of no more than four years.”

[¶4] At an August 24, 2023 hearing, the district court sentenced Juneau in both the 0668 and 0301 case, treating his plea as an “open plea.” In response to a question from the court, Juneau's counsel represented to the sentencing judge that the plea was an “open plea”:

[THE COURT:] Gentleman, correct me if I'm wrong, I believe, this is a binding plea agreement?

MR. SANDNESS: It's my understanding, since we have sentencing on the Wells County's case, this will be an open plea.

THE COURT: Open plea. All right.

The court entered a criminal judgment in case 0301, sentencing Juneau to five years on the first count, 360 days on the second count, with all counts concurrent, and the sentence to run concurrent with the 0668 case and a Minnesota case. In case 0668, the court sentenced Juneau to five years, the sentence to run concurrent with the 0301 case and the Minnesota case. In case 0098, the court sentenced Juneau consecutive to the two Stutsman County cases (0668 and 0301).¹

[¶5] In September 2023, Juneau applied for postconviction relief in case 0301. Juneau's application does not relate to case 0668. In his application, Juneau claimed his sentence was illegal because it was not imposed in accordance with the plea agreement. The State answered the application and moved for summary disposition, which Juneau opposed.

[¶6] In February 2024, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the application, at which Juneau testified of his understanding of the plea agreement. In March 2024, Juneau submitted proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for remand. The State filed a response, stating it “is familiar with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's motion and is in agreement with the accuracy of the procedural history, as well as the factual events in the underlying matter.” The State then indicated it does not oppose the court granting a remand “for further dispositional hearings consistent with the agreed upon plea negotiations between the State and Mr. Juneau[.]”

[¶7] On March 18, 2024, the district court entered an order denying and dismissing Juneau's application. The court found that Juneau entered a plea of guilty under what “may have been a Rule 11 binding plea agreement,” but that “the exact nature of the plea agreement remains unclear” and was “never clearly set forth” on May 10, 2023, as sentencing was to occur before a different judge on August 24, 2023. The court concluded Juneau failed to establish the sentence was illegal and denied postconviction relief.

II

[¶8] In postconviction relief proceedings, the applicant has the burden to establish the grounds for relief. Urrabazo v. State, 2024 ND 67, ¶ 6, 5 N.W.3d 521. This Court's standard of review in postconviction proceedings is well established:

A trial court's findings of fact in a post-conviction proceeding will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if it is not supported by any evidence, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, a reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Questions of law are fully reviewable on appeal of a post-conviction proceeding.

Jung v. State, 2024 ND 94, ¶ 6, 6 N.W.3d 853 (quoting Black Elk v. State, 2023 ND 150, ¶ 5, 994 N.W.2d 394).

III

[¶9] Juneau argues the district court erred in denying postconviction relief because the sentencing court imposed an illegal sentence by treating his guilty plea as an “open plea.”² Juneau requests this Court reverse the order denying postconviction relief and allow him to correct an illegally imposed sentence or, in the alternative, to withdraw his pleas to correct a manifest injustice.

A

[¶10] The Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act provides a person convicted of and sentenced for a crime may apply for postconviction relief on the ground “the sentence was imposed in violation of” North Dakota law. N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(1)(a). Rule 35(a), N.D.R.Crim.P., provides, “The sentencing court shall correct an illegal sentence at any time[.]” This Court has stated these postconviction remedies co-exist for similar purposes and may be used “interchangeably” to attack an illegal sentence. State v. Kovalevich, 2023 ND 206, ¶¶ 10-11, 997 N.W.2d 628; DeCoteau v. State, 504 N.W.2d 552, 556 (N.D. 1993). Thus, our cases applying Rule 35(a) assist in addressing Juneau's claim the district court imposed an illegal sentence.

[¶11] Generally, a sentence is illegal under N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a) if it is not authorized by the judgment of conviction. State v. Glasser, 2021 ND 60, ¶ 7, 956 N.W.2d 373.

Examples of illegal sentences include: a sentence in excess of a statutory provision or in some other way contrary to an applicable statute, a sentence which fails to conform to the oral pronouncement of the sentence, or a sentence which is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served. In addition, a sentence is illegal if it does not comply with a promise of a plea bargain or when the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction to impose it.

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Hutchinson, 2017 ND 160, ¶ 9, 897 N.W.2d 321 (citations omitted)).

[¶12] Because Juneau's sentence was entered based on guilty pleas, Juneau's alternative request that he be permitted to withdraw his pleas implicates N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d). When an applicant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea in an application for postconviction relief, the application is treated as one made under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2), which provides: “Unless the defendant proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, the defendant may not withdraw a plea of guilty after the court has imposed sentence.” This Court reviews the district court's decision on whether circumstances establish a manifest injustice for an abuse of discretion. Belyeu v. State, 2024 ND 133, ¶ 7, 9 N.W.3d 648. “A court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id.

B

[¶13] Rule 11, N.D.R.Crim.P., controls the entry of pleas and the making of plea agreements. We have explained, “Rule 11(a) regulates entry of guilty, not guilty, and conditional pleas. Rule 11(b) regulates the advice judges must provide to defendants, ensuring voluntariness, and requiring a factual basis containing all elements of a crime before a guilty plea can be accepted.” State v. Fischer, 2024 ND 29, ¶ 15, 3 N.W.3d 142 (cleaned up). “Unlike Rule 11(a) and (b) pertaining to pleas, Rule 11(c) regulates the use of plea agreements.” Fischer, at ¶ 15.

[¶14] Rule 11(c), N.D.R.Crim.P., provides the required plea agreement procedure:

(1) In General. The prosecuting attorney and the defendant's attorney, or the defendant when acting pro se, may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions. If the defendant pleads guilty to either a charged offense or a lesser or related offense, the plea agreement may specify that the prosecuting attorney will:

(A) not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges;

(B) recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, that a particular sentence is appropriate; or

(C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case.

(2) Disclosing a Plea Agreement. The parties must disclose the plea agreement in open court when the plea is offered, unless the court for good cause allows the parties to disclose the plea agreement in camera.

(3) Judicial Consideration of a Plea Agreement.

(A) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the presentence report.

(B) To the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(B), the court must advise the defendant that the defendant has no right to withdraw the plea if the court does not follow the recommendation or request.

(4) Accepting a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that, to the extent the plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the agreed disposition will be included in the judgment.

(5) Rejecting a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects a plea agreement containing provisions of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) or (C), the court must do the following on the record and in open court:

(A) inform the parties that the court rejects the plea agreement;

(B) advise the defendant personally that the court is not required to follow the plea agreement and give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the plea; and

(C) advise the defendant personally that if the plea is not withdrawn, the court may dispose of the case less favorably toward the defendant than the plea agreement contemplated.

․

(Emphasis added.) Rule 11 provisions are “mandatory and substantial compliance is required to ensure a defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters a guilty plea.” State v. Brame, 2023 ND 121, ¶ 4, 993 N.W.2d 338 (quoting State v. Yost, 2018 ND 157, ¶ 17, 914 N.W.2d 508). “Rule 11 does not require any ritualistic, predetermined formality by the trial court.” Id.; State v. Farrell, 2000 ND 26, ¶ 9, 606 N.W.2d 524.

[¶15] We conclude the district court's finding that Juneau entered his pleas under what “may have been a Rule 11 binding plea agreement” is clearly erroneous. The record demonstrates that Juneau entered his guilty pleas based on a binding plea agreement.

[¶16] We further conclude the district court erred in holding the sentencing court did not impose an illegal sentence. The sentence is illegal because it did not comply with the plea bargain. State v. Williamson, 2024 ND 7, ¶ 4, 1 N.W.3d 610 (stating we have recognized that an illegal sentence may fail to comply with a promise of a plea bargain); State v. Mackey, 2011 ND 203, ¶ 6, 805 N.W.2d 98 (“A sentence that fails to comply with a promise of a plea agreement is an illegal sentence.”); State v. Trieb, 516 N.W.2d 287, 292 (N.D. 1994) (stating “a sentence is illegal if it does not comply with a promise of a plea bargain”); DeCoteau, 504 N.W.2d at 556 (“If DeCoteau's sentence did not comply with a promise of the plea bargain, it would be illegal, and DeCoteau would be entitled to post-conviction relief.”); see also State v. Hutchinson, 2017 ND 160, ¶ 12, 897 N.W.2d 321 (concluding a sentence is not illegal “because it does not differ from the plea agreement accepted by the district court at the sentencing hearing and it falls within the statutory limits”).

[¶17] At the May 2023 hearing, Juneau twice stated a term of the plea agreement was that he would not be sentenced to more than four years. When Juneau asked whether the sentencing judge could give him more than four years, the district court responded, “No.” When the court asked Juneau if anyone had made any threats or promises to get him to plead guilty, Juneau responded, he was promised that he would “receive a sentence of no more than four years.” Juneau entered his pleas based on the binding plea agreement, but the court sentenced Juneau as if he entered open pleas and, contrary to the plea agreement, the sentence was for more than four years.

[¶18] The sentencing court sentenced Juneau contrary to the plea agreement based on Juneau's attorney's incorrect representation the pleas were open pleas. It is unclear from this record why Juneau's attorney represented to the sentencing court that the pleas were open pleas. However, irrespective of why the attorney made that representation, Juneau's pleas were based on a plea agreement and Juneau's sentence does not comply with the plea agreement. Thus, Juneau's sentence is illegal.

[¶19] Juneau requests this Court reverse the order denying postconviction relief and remand the case so the district court can correct the illegal sentence or permit him to withdraw his pleas. This Court has explained:

[W]hen a defendant brings a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a), N.D.R.Crim.P., the sentencing court should first determine whether the illegal sentence can be corrected in such a manner so as to preserve the intent of the original plea agreement and give the defendant that for which he bargained. Only if such modification of the original sentence cannot be done, should the defendant be given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

Ostafin v. State, 1997 ND 102, ¶ 15, 564 N.W.2d 616; see also Mackey, 2011 ND 203, ¶ 9, 805 N.W.2d 98 (concluding withdraw of guilty plea unnecessary to correct a manifest injustice when the court amends the sentence to provide the defendant the benefit of the plea agreement).

[¶20] Here, the district court did not comply with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(2) when it accepted Juneau's pleas in May 2023. Rule 11(c)(2) states “[t]he parties must disclose the plea agreement in open court when the plea is offered, unless the court for good cause allows the parties to disclose the plea agreement in camera.” Because the court did not comply with Rule 11(c)(2), as found by the district court, “the exact nature of the plea agreement remains unclear.” Accordingly, we remand to the district court to determine whether the terms of the plea agreement can be determined. If they can, we direct the court to accept or reject the plea agreement in compliance with N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(4) or (5). If the terms of the plea agreement cannot be determined, we direct the court to allow Juneau to withdraw his pleas in case 0301. See Ostafin, 1997 ND 102, ¶ 17, 564 N.W.2d 616 (remanding “to the sentencing court to determine whether the illegal sentence can be corrected so as to maintain the intent of the plea agreement and, if so, to re-sentence [defendant] ․ Only if the court cannot modify the sentence to ․ uphold the intent of the plea bargain, must [defendant] be allowed the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea”). We emphasize that Juneau's application only concerns case 0301, and that this order is limited to Juneau's pleas in case 0301.

IV

[¶21] We reverse the district court's order denying Juneau's application for postconviction relief and remand with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In 0098, Juneau was acquitted on the first count. The district court sentenced Juneau to thirty years on the second count, ten suspended, and ten years on the third count, the sentence to run concurrent with the Minnesota case.

2.   The State did not argue Juneau's sentence was imposed in an illegal manner rather than being an illegal sentence. See N.D.R.Crim.P. 35(a)(1) (distinguishing between “an illegal sentence” and “a sentence imposed in an illegal manner”); see also 3 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 582 (1982) (“A sentence within statutory limits, but that is contrary to a plea agreement that has been accepted, by the court, is not illegal. It has, however, been imposed in an illegal manner.”). Because the issue was not raised and briefed, we do not clarify in this opinion the distinction between an illegal sentence and a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.

Bahr, Justice.

[¶22] Jon J. Jensen, C.J. Daniel J. Crothers Lisa Fair McEvers Jerod E. Tufte Douglas A. Bahr