WOODY v. FLIGHTGEST INC 10 (2019)

Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff FlightGest, Inc. (“FlightGest”) appeals from an order entered 19 May 2018 granting Third-Party Defendant Muncie Aviation Company's (“Muncie Aviation”) motions to dismiss FlightGest's third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We agree the third-party complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and, as a result, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the third-party complaint.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

FlightGest alleged the following in its third-party complaint: Plaintiff William Woody (“Woody”) requested that FlightGest install a quick drain oil valve on his personal aircraft. FlightGest ordered a quick drain oil valve from Muncie Aviation, an Indiana Corporation doing business in North Carolina. FlightGest provided Muncie Aviation the make, model, and serial number of Woody's aircraft. The third-party complaint alleged that, using the information provided by FlightGest, Muncie Aviation selected a quick drain oil valve for Woody's aircraft and then sold and delivered it to FlightGest. Woody was forced to make an emergency landing of his aircraft on 29 March 2016.

Woody filed a complaint against FlightGest on 20 June 2017 alleging his emergency landing resulted from the installation of an “incorrectly sized” quick drain oil valve on his aircraft and further alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress.

FlightGest filed its third-party complaint on 12 December 2017 against Muncie Aviation for contribution and indemnity. Muncie Aviation filed motions to dismiss the third-party complaint on 16 February 2018 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2017) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(2) (2017) (lack of personal jurisdiction). The motions to dismiss were heard by the trial court on 23 April 2018. The trial court heard the arguments of both parties, and took the matter under advisement. The trial court entered a written order on 9 May 2018 granting Muncie Aviation's motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

II. Analysis

A. Motion to Dismiss Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6)

FlightGest contends the trial court erred in granting Muncie Aviation's motion to dismiss under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). We disagree.

1. Standard of Review

The motion to dismiss under [Rule] 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. In ruling on the motion, the allegations of the complaint must be viewed as admitted, and on that basis the court must determine as a matter of law whether the allegations state a claim for which relief may be granted.

Kohn v. Firsthealth Moore Reg'l Hosp., 229 N.C. App. 19, 21, 747 S.E.2d 395, 397 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “We conduct a de novo review of the pleadings to determine their legal sufficiency.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Corneal, 238 N.C. App. 192, 195, 767 S.E.2d 374, 377 (2014).

A complaint will be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when: “(1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiff's claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiff's claim.” Krawiec v. Manly, 370 N.C. 602, 606, 811 S.E.2d 542, 546 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although our “system of notice pleading affords a sufficiently liberal construction of complaints so that few fail to survive a motion to dismiss[,]” Wray v. City of Greensboro, 370 N.C. 41, 46, 802 S.E.2d 894, 898 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted), “[w]hen the complaint fails to allege the substantive elements of some legally cognizable claim, or where it alleges facts which defeat any claim, the complaint must be dismissed.” Oberlin Capital, L.P. v. Slavin, 147 N.C. App. 52, 56, 554 S.E.2d 840, 844 (2001). This Court is not required “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Strickland v. Hedrick, 194 N.C. App. 1, 20, 669 S.E.2d 61, 73 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2. Indemnity and Contribution

In its third-party complaint, FlightGest alleged it was entitled to common law indemnity or, in the alternative, contribution from Muncie Aviation. We discuss each in turn.

“In North Carolina, a party's rights to indemnity can rest on three bases: (1) an express contract; (2) a contract implied-in-fact; or (3) equitable concepts arising from the tort theory of indemnity, often referred to as a contract implied-in-law.” Kaleel Builders, Inc. v. Ashby, 161 N.C. App. 34, 38, 587 S.E.2d 470, 474 (2003). In the present case, FlightGest pled indemnity implied-in-law. “[I]ndemnity implied-in-law arises from an underlying tort, where a passive tort-feasor pays the judgment owed by an active tort-feasor to the injured third party.” Id. at 39, 587 S.E.2d at 474. Therefore, “to successfully assert a right to indemnity based on a contract implied-in-law, a party must be able to prove each of the elements of an underlying tort such as negligence.” Schenkel & Shultz, Inc. v. Hermon F. Fox & Assocs., 180 N.C. App. 257, 268, 636 S.E.2d 835, 843 (2006).

“Contribution is generally defined as ‘the right of one who has discharged a common liability or burden to recover of another also liable [the fractional] portion which he ought to pay or bear.’ ” Irvin v. Egerton, 122 N.C. App. 499, 501, 470 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting 18 C.J.S. Contribution § 2, at 4 (1990)). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1B-1(a) states:

Except as otherwise provided in this Article, where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.

N.C.G.S. § 1B-1(a) (2017). “A basic prerequisite to [a] plaintiff's right of contribution is that there be joint tort liability.” Insurance Co. v. Surratt, 19 N.C. App. 745, 746, 200 S.E.2d 220, 221 (1973). “Without a tort, there can be no tort-feasor; and without a tort-feasor, there can be no right to contribution[.]” Kaleel Builders, 161 N.C. App. at 43, 587 S.E.2d at 477.

3. Negligence

As discussed above, claims for indemnity and contribution must be accompanied by allegations of an underlying tort. In its third-party complaint, FlightGest alleged that Muncie Aviation was negligent. “The essential elements of any negligence claim are the existence of a legal duty or standard of care owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, breach of that duty, and a causal relationship between the breach of duty and certain actual injury or loss sustained by the plaintiff.” Cordaro v. Harrington Bank, FSB, ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 817 S.E.2d 247, 252 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

FlightGest alleged the following:

7. In the course of its work selecting, selling and delivering the quick drain oil valve, Muncie Aviation had a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that they provided FlightGest with the proper part.

8. Muncie Aviation negligently failed to perform the duty described in the preceding paragraph. This negligence caused Muncie Aviation to provide FlightGest with an incorrectly sized quick drain oil valve.

9. Woody alleges the Landing was necessitated by an incorrectly sized quick drain oil valve installed on his aircraft.

FlightGest alleged Muncie Aviation had a duty to provide FlightGest – not Woody – “with the proper part.” FlightGest further alleged that Muncie Aviation “negligently failed to perform the duty described in the preceding paragraph[,]” referring to the “duty to take reasonable care to ensure that they provided FlightGest with the proper part.” Absent from the third-party complaint is any allegation that Muncie Aviation owed a duty to Woody.

FlightGest contends that, construing the language of the third-party complaint liberally, Muncie Aviation was on notice that FlightGest was alleging Muncie Aviation owed a duty to Woody. Additionally, FlightGest argues that, since the third-party complaint contains an allegation that Muncie Aviation's conduct was the proximate cause of Woody's injury, that allegation “necessarily entails the assertion that Muncie [Aviation] should have reasonably foreseen the consequences its conduct could have on Woody.” In that “foreseeability of injury establishes both legal duty and proximate cause,” FlightGest contends the allegation that Muncie Aviation's conduct was the proximate cause of Woody's injury confirms that Muncie Aviation had a duty to Woody. However, duty and proximate cause are two distinct elements of negligence, and an allegation of one does not excuse the absence of the other.

Under a liberal reading, the allegations in the third-party complaint at best suggest a duty between Muncie Aviation and FlightGest. However, the allegations do not aver a duty between Muncie Aviation and Woody. See Harris v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 180 N.C. App. 551, 555, 638 S.E.2d 260, 265 (2006) (“[T]he first prerequisite for recovery of damages for injury by negligence is the existence of a legal duty, owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, to use due care. If no duty exists, there logically can be neither breach of duty nor liability.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)). “If the facts as alleged by the plaintiff, taken as true, are insufficient to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty or standard of care, the complaint must be dismissed.” Scadden v. Holt, 222 N.C. App. 799, 801, 733 S.E.2d 90, 92 (2012). In the present case, the facts alleged in the third-party complaint, taken as true, do not establish that Muncie Aviation owed Woody a legal duty. Accordingly, FlightGest failed to allege the substantive elements of negligence as required for its indemnity and contribution claims, and the trial court properly dismissed the third-party complaint.

B. Motion to Dismiss Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(2)

FlightGest also contends the trial court erred in granting Muncie Aviation's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. However, since we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the third-party complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we need not address the trial court's dismissal of the third-party complaint under Rule 12(b)(2).

III. Conclusion

FlightGest failed to sufficiently allege that Muncie Aviation was liable in tort to Woody. As a result, FlightGest's claims for indemnity and contribution cannot stand and the trial court properly dismissed its third-party complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).

AFFIRMED.

Report per Rule 30(e).

McGEE, Chief Judge.

Judges BERGER and MURPHY concur.