AWARTANI v. MOSES CONE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OPERATING CORPORATION (2018)

Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's dismissal of their putative class action against Defendant Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. The theory of their lawsuit is that the doctrine of necessaries—a legal principle that makes a spouse liable for the other spouse's medical expenses—violates the Women's Property Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, which provides that a woman's property cannot be subject to debts incurred by her husband. N.C. Const. art. X, § 4.

After the trial court dismissed their claims, Plaintiffs sought to bypass this Court and have our Supreme Court hear this case directly through discretionary review. They also asked the Supreme Court, alternatively, to exercise its supervisory authority and instruct this Court to ignore its earlier precedent because “[w]ithout such direction from this Court, it seems likely that no Court of Appeals panel will engage with the constitutional issues.” Awartani v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. Operating Corp., No. 426P17 (filed Dec. 13, 2017). The Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs’ requests. Awartani v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. Operating Corp., ––– N.C. ––––, 809 S.E.2d 865 (2018); Awartani v. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. Operating Corp., ––– N.C. ––––, 809 S.E.2d 863 (2018).

Plaintiffs took these unusual steps in our Supreme Court because this Court already addressed their legal theory several years ago. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. Operating Corp. v. Hawley, 195 N.C. App. 455, 672 S.E.2d 742 (2009). In Hawley, we rejected the argument that the doctrine of necessaries was “inconsistent with article X, section 4 of the N.C. Constitution.” Id. at 457–58, 672 S.E.2d at 744.

To be sure, Hawley is a short opinion that offered little analysis of the constitutional claim. But the opinion's brevity does not free us from the rule that “[w]here a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.” In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). Many decisions of this Court, given our caseload, lack the depth of analysis typical of our Supreme Court's decisions. If this lack of legal analysis on its own deprived an opinion of precedential value, much of our jurisprudence suddenly would cease to be controlling. We decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to unsettle so much of our own precedent. What matters is not the quality of Hawley’s legal reasoning, but that Hawley considered and rejected the same constitutional argument that Plaintiffs assert here.

Accordingly, bound by our decision in Hawley, we reject Plaintiffs’ argument and affirm the trial court. If Plaintiffs desire further review of this constitutional issue, they must seek relief from our Supreme Court.¹

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the trial court's order.

AFFIRMED.

Report per Rule 30(e).

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by Hawley, we need not address Moses Cone's alternative grounds to affirm the trial court's dismissal order.

DIETZ, Judge.

Judges TYSON and BERGER concur.