STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TERRANCE LAQUAN SCOTT (2023)

On 2 May 2020, defendant Terrance Laquan Scott shot and killed the mother of his two children, Jasmine Nicole Upsher, and then shot himself in the head while the two were riding together in a car. Defendant survived, but his self-inflicted injury resulted in brain damage. After a lengthy recovery process, defendant was arrested on 24 September 2020. Defendant was subsequently indicted on 13 October 2020 for one count of willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously killing Jasmine in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17.

On 8 March 2022, defendant filed a motion requesting a capacity hearing. On 25 March 2022, the trial court held a hearing in which both the State and defendant presented expert testimony. Ultimately, the trial court deemed defendant capable to proceed to trial. Defendant was arraigned in open court, and he entered a plea of not guilty.

This matter came on for trial on 28 March 2022 in Wake County Superior Court. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found defendant guilty of one count of first-degree murder. The trial court entered Judgment and Commitment on 4 April 2022, sentencing defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of a superior court. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-27(b) and 15A-1444(a). Defendant presents one issue on appeal: whether the trial court abused its discretion in proceeding to trial under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-1001(a) in violation of defendant's federal due process rights.

Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion. The trial court's determination is supported by appropriate findings of fact, which are in turn supported by competent evidence adduced at the hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling.

I.

A.

Defendant and Jasmine started a relationship in approximately 2016, and they had two children together. Jasmine's mother, Saundra Upsher, testified that the relationship between Jasmine and defendant began deteriorating in the months leading up to the murder.

Defendant began regularly following Jasmine to work out of suspicion that she might be having an affair. Defendant retaliated against Jasmine after observing her talking to a man by refusing to let her drive their shared vehicle.

The growing tension in the relationship turned violent two days before defendant murdered Jasmine. Jasmine called her mother in tears and asked her for a ride. When Saundra and her son, DeShawn Musgrove, arrived at the home of defendant and Jasmine, Saundra noticed that defendant was extremely angry. Jasmine informed Saundra that before she and DeShawn arrived, defendant had pushed her and inflicted an injury near her elbow. Saundra eventually succeeded in removing Jasmine from the house, but defendant refused to let them take the children. Following this altercation, Jasmine did not return to live with defendant.

Shortly after Jasmine left the house, defendant called Saundra and told her that Jasmine had taken one of his guns. Jasmine told Saundra that she did take a gun from defendant, and that she gave it to DeShawn for safekeeping. Defendant asked DeShawn to return the gun, but DeShawn refused to do so given defendant's pattern of violent behavior directed at his sister.

On the morning of 2 May 2020, a clothing iron fell and injured defendant and Jasmine's son. The child suffered third degree burns and was transferred to the burn unit at UNC Chapel Hill. Jasmine rode in the ambulance, and defendant and Saundra followed in their own vehicles.

After arriving at UNC, Jasmine stayed in the hospital room. Due to COVID restrictions, only one visitor could be in the room at a time. Jasmine asked Saundra to stay while she went to work. Jasmine and defendant left the hospital together.

At around 4:07 p.m. on 2 May 2020, after receiving a text from his own mother seeking an update, defendant responded by telling her his planned actions: “I'm killing myself and Jasmine.” Defendant also sent his mother various pieces of financial information, including the amount of money in his bank account and his personal identification number.

At approximately 4:10 p.m., Charlene McCormick was waiting in her car at a stop light on a road near Highway 70 in Wake County when she heard a loud pop coming from a red car in front of her (later identified as Saundra Upsher's car). Moments later, the passenger side door opened and a young woman, later identified as Jasmine, fell to the pavement. McCormick then heard another loud pop, and she observed the red car crash nearby.

Around the same time, off-duty paramedic Anthony Lee Bradshaw came upon the scene and began to render aid to Jasmine. Bradshaw concluded that Jasmine was not breathing but did have a pulse. The paramedic noticed a large amount of blood coming from Jasmine's head. Moments later, Jasmine's pulse was gone, and Bradshaw began CPR. The paramedic noticed brain matter appearing from the back of Jasmine's head and through her nose while performing CPR.

Soon after, North Carolina State Trooper Brandon Barefoot came upon the scene and called for assistance from the fire department and emergency medical services (“EMS”). After EMS workers arrived on the scene, they halted life saving measures and pronounced Jasmine dead.

As Trooper Barefoot investigated the car crash, he encountered defendant inside of the car, slumped over and unconscious, about a quarter mile up the road from Jasmine's body. Trooper Barefoot noticed a handgun laying on the floorboard near where defendant was sitting. He was unable to enter the car but was eventually able to break one of the car windows. As soon as the window was broken, defendant began to show signs of movement.

Trooper Barefoot demanded that defendant show his hands, but defendant was unable to do so. The trooper determined that defendant could not understand his orders. He testified that defendant looked like he had been shot in the head based on the amount of blood present in the vehicle. Soon after, additional law enforcement officers arrived, and Trooper Barefoot provided cover while other officers attempted to extract defendant from the vehicle.

Deputy Gabriel Romero with the Wake County Sheriff's Department cut defendant's seatbelt to complete the extraction. Defendant then grabbed the seatbelt and began fighting with the deputy. Deputy Romero struck defendant with a radical nerve punch several times until defendant released his grip. Defendant was immediately given emergency medical care and transported to WakeMed Hospital in Raleigh.

When defendant arrived at WakeMed, he was admitted to the trauma unit. It was later determined that he suffered a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. Defendant's injury resulted in brain damage. Defendant was arrested on 24 September 2020.

B.

On 25 March 2022, the trial court conducted a hearing to determine defendant's capacity to proceed.

The State presented the testimony and report of Dr. Thomas Owens, the psychiatrist who evaluated defendant at Central Regional Hospital on 14 February 2022. After a 90-minute videoconference with defendant, Dr. Owens concluded defendant was fully capable to stand trial. Dr. Owens reported that he was convinced that defendant did not suffer from any sort of mental illness, and that he was “pleasantly surprised” by defendant's memory and concentration. Overall, Dr. Owen's concerns about defendant's capacity “did not rise very high.”

As part of defendant's evaluation, Dr. Owens conducted multiple psychological tests. Dr. Owens conducted a cognitive screening examination designed to test memory and concentration. Defendant completed this memory test with 100% accuracy and performed more than adequately with respect to his cognitive screening. Dr. Owens also conducted a capacity-to-proceed evaluation regarding defendant's awareness of his current criminal charges, the seriousness, courtroom procedures, and courtroom personnel. Defendant was fully aware that he was charged with murdering someone important in his life.

Ultimately, Dr. Owens concluded defendant could assist his attorney in a rational and reasonable manner despite defendant's lack of memory surrounding the alleged murder. Further, Dr. Owens concluded defendant could consult his attorney with respect to the strength of the evidence against him, and that he had sufficient capacity to completely review all evidence.

The defense presented the testimony and report of Dr. Katayoun Tabrizi. Dr. Tabrizi is a psychiatrist, having worked as the Medical Director at Central Prison Hospital earlier in her 30-year career. She met with defendant twice for a total of three hours and fifty minutes, each time in person. Dr. Tabrizi agreed with Dr. Owens’ opinion that defendant has peritraumatic amnesia for events in the time preceding the offense, and total amnesia for the offense itself. However, Dr. Tabrizi questioned whether defendant understood the nature of these proceedings given that defendant seemed to have some confusion as to whether the death penalty was a potential punishment in this case. Dr. Tabrizi stated that additional testing may be necessary to determine defendant's capacity to stand trial.

Defendant argued his lack of memory of the murder would make it impossible to assist trial counsel because he is unable to provide evidence of his state of mind and feelings at the time of the murder.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court ruled from the bench:

All right. The Court having considered the evidence and reviewing the applicable case law, what the defense is arguing is that – it's essentially that [defendant] cannot cooperate with counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed, in part because he's unable to give evidence that would assist his case and his mental state. That was actually the law in this state until 1973 when the Legislature enacted General Statute 15A-1001 et seq. That is not the test anymore. It is whether he can assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.

I think I read State v. Avery different than the defense. In State v. Avery, not only did the defendant have amnesia, his memory, his intellectual functions, judgment, and insight were limited, and the Court still found that he had the capacity to proceed. You know, I find that he's able to understand the nature and objects of the proceedings against him. He's able to understand and comprehend his own situation in reference to these proceedings and to assist his defense counsel in a rational or reasonable manner.

․

[In the case sub judice,] there is no question [defendant] has suffered brain damage, but the Court, based off the legal standard, finds that the defendant ․ has the mental capacity to stand trial, and trial will proceed as scheduled on Monday starting at 10:00 a.m.

II.

On appeal, defendant asserts that his amnesia rendered him incapable to stand trial under North Carolina Law, and that he was therefore tried in violation of his federal constitutional due process rights. We disagree.

This Court reviews the trial court's ruling on the question of a defendant's capacity to stand trial for abuse of discretion. State v. Gates, 65 N.C. App. 277, 284, 309 S.E.2d 498, 502 (1983) (citing State v. McGuire, 297 N.C. 69, 254 S.E.2d 165 (1979)).

Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes section 15A-1001(a):

No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is [1] unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, [2] to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to [3] assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001 (a) (2022). “The objective of the statute is to ensure that a defendant will not be tried or punished while mentally incapacitated.” State v. Aytche, 98 N.C. App. 358, 361, 391 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1990). Section 15A-1001(a) “provides three separate tests in the disjunctive. If a defendant is deficient under any of these tests[,] he or she does not have the capacity to proceed.” State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 688, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989) (citations omitted). However, these tests do not require a defendant “to be at the highest stage of mental alertness to be competent to be tried.” Id. at 689, 374 S.E.2d at 575.

The general rule ․ which we adopt, is that amnesia does not per se render a defendant incapable of standing trial or of receiving a fair trial. Partial amnesia places a defendant in no worse a position than the defendant who cannot remember where he was on a particular day because of the passage of time, or because he was insane, very intoxicated, completely drugged, or unconscious at the time. In each of these cases, the defendant's available defenses may be limited or impaired because of his present inability to reconstruct a past period of his life.

State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 12, 337 S.E.2d 786, 792 (1985) (cleaned up).

Defendant concedes he arguably understood the nature and charges against him, as well as his own situation in reference to the proceedings. However, it is defendant's contention that although he was physically present in the courtroom, his ability to assist in his defense was significantly impaired by memory gaps of which he was not aware. Defendant's contention is without merit.

Defendant's case is like Avery in that both defendants had amnesia resulting from a self-inflicted gunshot to the brain. The defendant in Avery, unlike defendant here, also suffered from limitations in intellectual functioning, judgment, and insight. Our Supreme Court still determined that, notwithstanding memory impairment, the defendant was competent to stand trial and “capable of assisting his defense.” Avery, 315 N.C. at 11, 337 S.E.2d at 791.

In this case, considering the competent evidence presented at the hearing, in particular the testimony of Dr. Owens, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion. Rather, the trial court had a firm evidentiary basis in finding defendant capable of proceeding to trial. Contrary to defendant's argument, there is no indication that the trial court ignored the testimony of Dr. Tabrizi, or that the trial court erroneously believed amnesia could never, as a matter of law, be grounds for a determination that a defendant is incompetent to proceed. Whether a defendant suffers from amnesia, and to what extent, is evidence that should be considered by the trial court and applied to the test formulated in section 15A-1001(a), and that is precisely what the trial court did in this case.

Defendant was provided with medical examinations by two experts, and during a lengthy competency hearing, he was provided with the opportunity to be heard through the presentation of evidence and argument. After the presentation of evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court made sufficient findings to support its conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial and could assist his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. The fact that the trial court was unpersuaded by defendant's evidence, but was persuaded by the State's, does not render the decision an abuse of discretion. “When the trial judge conducts the inquiry without a jury, the court's findings of fact, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal.” State v. Willard, 292 N.C. 567, 575, 234 S.E.2d 587, 592 (1977).

Finally, defendant alludes to his right to procedural due process being violated, without arguing the point on appeal or having raised the issue in the trial court. This issue is not properly before us. We deem it unpreserved and abandoned. See State v. Kirkwood, 229 N.C. App. 656, 664, 747 S.E.2d 730, 736 (2013) (“Constitutional questions not raised and passed on by the trial court will not ordinarily be considered on appeal.”); see also N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6).

III.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that defendant had the capacity to proceed. The trial court's findings that, despite defendant's amnesia, he was able to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, and to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner, is supported by competent evidence adduced at the hearing. § 15A-1001(a).

NO ERROR.

Report per Rule 30(e).

GORE, Judge.

Judges DILLON and ARROWOOD concur.