IN RE: E.P. (2023)

Respondent-father (“Father”), the father of the juvenile E.P. (“Eliza”)¹ , appeals from the trial court's adjudication determining Eliza to be an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. For the reasoning below, we affirm in part and vacate in part.

I. Background

Eliza's parents were never married. In July 2020, after a hearing on the matter, Father was granted primary physical custody of Eliza, who was almost fifteen years old at the time. In the custody order, the court found that “[a]s the minor child has gotten older and this case has progressed, the minor child has experienced a deterioration in her mental health and behavior which has exacerbated conflict between [Father and Eliza's mother] and the minor child.”

A. Petition Allegations

On 20 October 2020, petitioner Durham County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that Eliza was an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. To support these allegations, DSS first noted that there was a child protective services (“CPS”) history with the family dating back to 2011.

1. 19 August 2020 CPS Report and Investigation

On 19 August 2020, DSS received a CPS report. The reporter alleged that Eliza was with Father at the Emergency Department in Duke University Medical Center (“DUMC”) based on an involuntary commitment petition filed by Father after he and Eliza had a physical confrontation. The reporter stated that Eliza disclosed various acts of physical and mental abuse allegedly perpetrated by Father. However, there were no marks, bruises, or injuries noted on Eliza that day. The reporter also stated that Eliza “denied suicidal ideations, but sometimes she questions the reason she is here on earth.”

The next day, on 20 August 2020, Eliza was admitted to Old Vineyard Behavioral Health in Forsyth County and diagnosed with ADHD, PTSD, and depression. While she was receiving treatment, Father called Old Vineyard several times “in an irate manner including yelling at staff.”

The next day, on 21 August 2020, a DSS social worker attempted a home visit with Father. However, Father refused to cooperate and asked the social worker to leave, stating that “he did not want to deal with any [s]ocial [w]orkers from Durham County DSS․” Father also “refused to answer any questions regarding the allegations reported [to DSS] and became irate and [was] screaming” at the social worker.

On 3 September 2020, Eliza was discharged with a plan that Eliza receive intensive in-home services. Eliza and her family had already been receiving services from a program known as “Youth Villages” for about six months. The therapist at Youth Villages diagnosed Eliza with “Externalized Behaviors and Anxiety.”

2. 13 October 2020 CPS Report

On 13 October 2020, DSS received a new CPS report which stated that Father was refusing to pick Eliza up from the DUMC Emergency Department because he felt she needed to be in the hospital. Eliza had been taken to the DUMC Emergency Department five times in the previous two weeks, and each time she “was evaluated and found to NOT meet criteria for acute hospitalization.” DUMC accused Father of using Eliza's mental health diagnoses against her in order to have her involuntarily committed and reported that Father “has exhibited a pattern of emotional abuse, medical neglect, and educational neglect, and abandonment – all of which cause [Eliza] significant distress responses.” DUMC also believed that Father's “pattern of documented neglect and abuse” put Eliza “at risk for further physical and psychological abuse, which is incrementally harmful to her psychological well-being, resulting in irreparable harm.” The reporter at DUMC considered Father to be a barrier to Eliza receiving recommended treatment and schooling, as he refused to pick Eliza up from hospitals despite her being medically cleared for discharge, was verbally hostile to staff regarding Eliza's treatment recommendations, and attempted to negotiate with treatment providers in exchange for coming to retrieve Eliza. DUMC did not recommend discharging Eliza to Father's care.

B. Filing of Petition and Nonsecure Custody

Based on the foregoing, on 20 October 2020 DSS filed its petition and obtained nonsecure custody of Eliza the same day. In addition to the narrative above, DSS also alleged that both parents had mental health issues, failed to provide Eliza with appropriate care and supervision, and that there was no relative willing and able to provide proper support and supervision for Eliza in a safe home.

C. Adjudication and Disposition Hearings

The adjudication and disposition hearings took place over ten separate days between 10 February 2021 and 12 April 2022.

1. Adjudication

The adjudication hearing, which took six days (five days for testimony and one day for rendering the trial court's ruling), included the testimony of seven witnesses. DSS also submitted Eliza's medical records from various facilities, including DUMC.

The evidence presented by DSS tended to show the following: Father filed involuntary commitment petitions regarding Eliza on at least five occasions between August and October 2020. A social worker investigated the first CPS report received by DSS, which was submitted after the first involuntary commitment petition. On 21 August 2020, the social worker went to Father's home, but he became upset when discussing the allegations and asked her to leave. She returned to Father's home two weeks later, on 3 September 2020, after Eliza had returned home, but Father refused to allow the social worker to speak with Eliza. The social worker returned a week later, accompanied by law enforcement, but Father still refused to allow Eliza to speak in private with the social worker. He did, however, allow the social worker to ask Eliza questions through law enforcement while he was present.

After Father filed another involuntary commitment petition on 7 October 2020, Eliza was examined by DUMC and discharged the next day because she did “not meet criteria for an acute psychiatric hospitalization at this time.” A few days later, Father filed another involuntary commitment petition, and Eliza returned to DUMC.

A DUMC case manager evaluated Eliza on 12 October 2020. She determined that Eliza was not a danger to herself or others. She called Father to inform him Eliza was ready for discharge, and he responded by screaming into the phone that he would not be coming to pick Eliza up. Father also threatened to sue the case manager and to have her license taken away. Based on her interactions with Eliza and Father, the case manager submitted a CPS report to DSS.

The next day, on 13 October 2020, another case worker visited Father and encouraged him to work with the wraparound facilitator at Youth Villages. Father agreed to work on a plan utilizing those and other available resources. The case worker also spoke with Eliza, who did not appear to be under any distress but “did express some jitteriness” when discussing Father.

Eliza spent the next weekend with her mother. However, on 18 October 2020, when she was returned to Father, he filed another involuntary commitment petition shortly thereafter.

Eliza was again evaluated by DUMC and discharged on 19 October 2020. Father picked Eliza up. But there was an argument between them on the ride home, so Father returned Eliza to DUMC. Father claimed that Eliza had tried to jump out of his moving vehicle, but Eliza denied this accusation to the case manager, who was again conducting her evaluation. The case manager again contacted DSS, because she believed Father was abusing the emergency system by filing repeated involuntary commitment petitions when Eliza did not meet the medical criteria to be committed. The social worker then filed the juvenile petition. Eliza was discharged to the custody of DSS on 21 October 2020.

Father testified, both as part of DSS's case-in-chief and as part of his own case. He admitted that he had filed five to six involuntary commitment petitions regarding Eliza between August and October 2020, but justified doing so based on Eliza's behavior. Father described Eliza becoming violent, including by punching and kicking him, chasing him, throwing things, and kicking walls and doors. He believed that Eliza's behaviors were primarily attributable to her cell phone use, and he asserted his right as a parent to take the cell phone away when Eliza was using it inappropriately. He also testified that he was encouraged to file involuntary commitment petitions by law enforcement and DSS.

Father also solicited testimony from a wraparound counselor and a former GAL. Both described witnessing outbursts and escalations by Eliza. The counselor stated that she saw Eliza push an empty bookshelf over on Father, and the GAL testified seeing Eliza screaming at Father about going shopping. The counselor also discussed her efforts to assist the family. She recommended a “family support partner” be added to the case, but Father declined that involvement. The wraparound facilitator had also attempted to establish plans around Eliza's cell phone usage and to manage Eliza's escalations, but these plans were unsuccessful.

On 14 January 2022, the trial court rendered its oral ruling on adjudication. The court concluded Eliza to be an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile. On 17 June 2022, the trial court entered a written order consistent with its oral ruling.

2. Disposition

By order entered 17 June 2022, after a four-day hearing, the trial court entered its written disposition order with a primary plan of reunification with either parent. In the order, the trial court set out case plans for both parents and directed Eliza to remain in the custody of DSS. Father appeals.

II. Analysis

Father argues that the trial court improperly adjudicated Eliza on all three grounds—as an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile—without resolving the two “factual foundations” which led to the adjudication. He also argues that the trial court made insufficient findings to support an adjudication of dependency.

An adjudication hearing is “a judicial process designed to adjudicate the existence or nonexistence of any of the conditions alleged in a petition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-802 (2021). When determining whether a child is abused, neglected, or dependent, “the determinative factors are the circumstances and conditions surrounding the child, not the fault or culpability of the parent.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).

An adjudication order “shall be in writing and shall contain appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-807 (2021). “The trial court is required to resolve the material, disputed factual issues by its findings of fact.” In re M.M., 230 N.C. App. 225, 238, 750 S.E.2d 50, 58 (2013). This Court reviews an adjudication order “to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by ‘clear and convincing competent evidence’ and whether the findings, in turn, support the trial court's conclusions of law.” In re R.S., 254 N.C. App. 678, 680, 802 S.E.2d 169, 171 (2017). “Unchallenged findings are binding on appeal.” In re V.B., 239 N.C. App. 340, 341, 768 S.E.2d 867, 868 (2015). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. In re D.M.M., 179 N.C. App. 383, 385, 633 S.E.2d 715, 716 (2006).

A. Findings of Fact

We first address Father's challenges to the trial court's findings of fact. Father divides these challenges into three groups: first, Father argues that fourteen findings are improper because they “contain either conclusions of law or ultimate findings of fact[;]” second, he argues that forty-six findings “are not properly made evidentiary findings, because they merely recite the evidence, e.g., the content of a witness's testimony, or what someone ‘reported’ or ‘believed[;]’ ” and lastly, Father argues that nine findings of fact are unsupported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.

Father's objections to the first two groups of challenged findings are broadside challenges that only identify the findings at issue through two footnotes. Father does not identify any specific portions of any of the challenged findings, even though all of them include multiple sentences. Our appellate courts have consistently rejected this type of unspecific, unmoored challenge to findings of fact. See, e.g., In re N.P., 374 N.C. 61, 65, 839 S.E.2d 801, 804 (2020) (“Such broadside exceptions, however, are ineffectual, and findings of fact not specifically challenged by a respondent are presumed to be supported by competent evidence and binding on appeal.”); In re A.C., 247 N.C. App. 528, 537 n.4, 786 S.E.2d 728, 736 n.4 (2016) (“Absent a more particularized argument as to particular facts, we decline to review the findings alluded to in respondent-mother's broadside exceptions.”).

As to the second group of challenged findings, while we agree with Father that many of the findings recite testimony or other evidence, we note that our Supreme Court has stated that “there is nothing impermissible about describing testimony, so long as the court ultimately makes its own findings, resolving any material disputes.” In re A.E., 379 N.C. 177, 185, 864 S.E.2d 487, 495 (2021) (cleaned up). As discussed below, we conclude that the trial court made sufficient findings to resolve material disputes in the evidence regarding Eliza's status at the time the juvenile petition was filed. Accordingly, the trial court's recitation of testimony and other evidence as part of its findings is immaterial.

With respect to the final group of challenged findings, we only address those that are necessary to adequately resolve Father's arguments. See In re T.M., 180 N.C. App. 539, 547, 638 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2006) (concluding “ample other findings of fact support an adjudication of neglect, erroneous findings unnecessary to the determination do not constitute reversible error.”). These are findings of fact 46, 64, and 97, in which Father challenges the italicized sentences:

46. The father has been a barrier to the provision of [Eliza] receiving recommended treatment and schooling, refuses to pick her up from hospitals when she is medically and psychiatrically cleared to discharge, threatens that he will just bring her back (and then does), is verbally hostile to medical staff regarding [Eliza]’s care and recommendations, and attempts to negotiate with treatment providers in exchange for coming to retrieve [Eliza] after being medical[ly] cleared.

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64. [The wraparound facilitator] developed a Crisis Plan that had an Exit and Leave strategy for the parents that they could use ․ to help them in de-escalating or coping with [Eliza]. [The wraparound facilitator] testified that calling law enforcement was not part of the Original Crisis Plan. [The wraparound facilitator] requested a family support partner due to the family conflict. The father rejected this support partner.

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97. The Court finds that [Eliza] struggled at her father's home from August 2020 to October 2020. The father's responses to [Eliza]’s behavior exacerbates her well-being and created more isolation for her. For the past two years, this world has been in a pandemic where isolation is prominent, the father's behaviors towards [Eliza] created more isolation. Withholding [Eliza]’s phone for three weeks and indefinite periods created more isolation for her. Moreover, these numerous IVC's also affected [Eliza] being able to see her mother.

As to finding of fact 46, Father argues that the case manager only testified that he tried to negotiate with her and not with Eliza's actual treatment providers. However, statements reflecting that Father tried to negotiate with “treatment providers” appear multiple times in Eliza's medical records, which were submitted to the court. Thus, finding of fact 46 is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

As to finding of fact 64, Father argues that “[t]o the extent this finding is a suggestion that the rejection of the initially proposed support partner somehow had adverse consequences, it is unsupported, because the uncontradicted testimony shows that someone else stepped in to fill that role.” A challenge to what a finding of fact “suggests” is not a proper evidentiary challenge to the finding. The statement that Father rejected the family support partner is a fact, which is fully supported by the wraparound facilitator's testimony. Thus, finding of fact 64 is also supported by clear and convincing evidence.

Lastly, as to finding of fact 97, Father argues that “[t]o the extent this may be read as an evidentiary finding about Eliza being ‘isolated,’ it is unsupported because although [Father] did restrict her phone access, he still let her socialize with friends in person.” Father's argument does not address the actual findings made by the trial court, which state that Father's actions created more isolation for Eliza; they do not state that Father kept Eliza completely isolated. The finding that the removal of the phone created more isolation is supported by the wraparound facilitator's testimony, during which she stated that, at the times Father was restricting Eliza's phone usage, “the majority of Eliza's socialization was coming through social media” due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, Father's challenge to this finding of fact also fails.

B. Material Conflicts

Father argues that the trial court's order must be vacated in its entirety because it “failed to resolve material conflicts in the evidence regarding the two principal factual foundations underlying the abuse, neglect, and dependency adjudications.” He identifies these “principal factual foundations” as (1) his “decision to restrict Eliza's phone access” and (2) his “decision to seek hospitalization for Eliza.” He contends that these two decisions were the sole basis of the adjudication, and the trial court's order fails to resolve why these two decisions—which Father believes are valid choices he made as a parent—constituted abuse, neglect, and dependency.

Essentially, Father believes that the justifications he provided for these two “factual foundations” (that he took away Eliza's phone because she “had been receiving pictures of older men and had been placing inappropriate things on social media” and that he repeatedly attempted to have Eliza involuntarily committed based on his concerns she was a danger to herself or others) were not adequately addressed or refuted by the trial court's order. Father describes these as two “unquestionably valid and appropriate parenting decision[s],” and he suggests the adjudication order does not explain “how or why” these otherwise valid decisions amounted to abuse, neglect, and dependency.

Father's framing of the case requires considering the justifications of his “parenting decisions” in a vacuum and ignores the context provided by the trial court's numerous findings of fact, which detail the constant cycle of Father attempting to have Eliza hospitalized at DUMC, DUMC's repeated determinations that Eliza did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment, and Father's refusal to accept DUMC's conclusions or to take any steps to mitigate her behavioral issues.

The findings fully acknowledge Father's given justifications for his actions, generally provided through his own testimony. First, regarding Father's justifications for removal of Eliza's cell phone privileges, the court found:

41. The father testified that [Eliza] would chase him, and he would lock himself in the bathroom. The father testified that he would call law enforcement to the home. The father testifies that [Eliza] does not like being told “no” and that she has acted aggressively towards him because she wants her phone. The father testified that prior to August 2020, he took the phone because [Eliza] wanted the phone to speak to older men on it.

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54. The father testified to several occasions that [Eliza] became violent shortly after he got custody in July 2020. In August of 2020, the father testified that he had taken her cell phone indefinitely. The father told [Eliza] that it would be quite some time that she would get her cell phone. [Eliza] became angry. [The wraparound facilitator] testified that she came to the home, and she witnessed [Eliza] trying to throw a bookshelf on him.

55. The father believes that the entire problem with [Eliza] is her cell phone. ․

56. The father testified that [Eliza] had been receiving pictures of older men and had been placing inappropriate things on social medi[a]. The mother told the father that she had found some inappropriate pictures of older boy teens on [Eliza]’s phone and told this to the father.

57. The Court finds that the father took [Eliza]’s phone away from [Eliza] prior to August 2020. The father would return [Eliza]’s phone for a brief time, and she would talk to older males on social media (Instagram and Snapchat) and send pictures to older boys. The father did not want older boys ․ contacting [Eliza]. The father wanted [Eliza] to focus on her schoolwork, stop[ ] cussing, stop being violent towards him and to work on herself.

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59. The father admitted that on one occasion he kept [Eliza]’s phone for three weeks. On one occasion, he returned the phone when she was cleaning her room and being respectful.

60. The father testified that while [Eliza] was in his care, [Eliza] never met these conditions and she continued to act out. He also testified she can get her phone when she stops doing what she is doing.

61. The father stated that he is her father and if she cussed at him then he removed the following privileges 1) video games privileges 2) phone privileges and 3) and made her go to her room. He testified he was not going to negotiate with a child.

62. The father testified that [Eliza] had been receiving pictures of older men and had been placing inappropriate things on social media. The father made the following statement: “He is the father of his child. I can tell my child “No” just like any other parent” and if I believe that she was not capable, respectful, and responsible and at every time I will take the [Eliza]’s phone”.

As to Eliza's repeated hospitalizations based on Father's filing of involuntary commitment petitions, the trial court found:

26. On October 12, 2020, the father filed another petition to have [Eliza] involuntarily committed and she was brought back to [DUMC]. As it relates to this petition, the father and [Eliza] told [the case manager] that they had an altercation over the Nintendo Switch (“switch”) on October 11, 2020. The father specifically told [the case manager] that [Eliza] was asleep last night in her pajamas, and he went into her room to take her Nintendo switch from her to see if she was looking at pornographic material and she got mad and that she was screaming and chased him around the house. [Father] called the police. Both [Eliza] and her father stated to [the case manager] that the police did nothing.

27. On October 12, 2020, [Eliza] was admitted to DUMC for an IVC. [The case manager] conducted a psychiatric evaluation of [Eliza] on October 12, 2020. [The case manager] determined that [Eliza] was not at an acute risk of harming herself or others. [Eliza] presented to her that she was not homicidal or suicidal. [The case manager] asked [Eliza] several times if she wanted to commit suicide and [Eliza] responded that she had a family friend that killed herself and that she would not commit suicide. [Eliza] was crying and appeared helpless to [the case manager]. After [the case manager] informed the father that [Eliza] was being discharged, [Father] became agitated and belligerent towards [the case manager]. He began threatening to sue her.

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29. On October 13, 2020, a new CPS report was received by Durham DSS which stated that the father was refusing to pick his minor child up from the DUMC Emergency Department because he feels that the minor child needed to be in a hospital. The father then agreed to follow through with all resources identified by DUMC and Youth Villages. However, prior to the filing of the juvenile petition, the father does not take the child home but returns to the DUMC Emergency Department and reported that she needed to be hospitalized. This has occurred multiple times in the month of October 2020. It was reported to Durham CPS that the father took [Eliza] to DUMC ER for an involuntar[y] commitment, because he felt that [Eliza] was homicidal and suicidal. However, the reporter did not believe that [Eliza] was homicidal and suicidal ․ The father yelled at the reporter after being told [Eliza] was going to be discharged. The father believed that [Eliza] needed medical treatment.

30. [The case manager] conducted a second psychiatric evaluation of [Eliza] on October 14, 2020. On one of these times, the father took [Eliza] back to the hospital within an hour and a 1/212 from her being discharged. The father reported to DUMC that [Eliza] tried to grab the steering wheel and tried to jump out a moving vehicle. [The case manager] spoke to [Eliza], and she asked [Eliza]: “Well here you are again. What happened?” [Eliza] responded that “my dad said that I tried to jump out of the car. He said that he is bringing me back and so here we are.”

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35. On October 18, 2020, the father filed another petition to have [Eliza] involuntarily committed and she was brought back to [DUMC]. Father testified that [Eliza] was screaming and yelling in car and that she was going to tell people that he abused her. [The case manager] determined again that [Eliza] was not ․ homicidal or suicidal. Once again, it was determined that [Eliza] was not homicidal or suicidal and she was released. She was released to her father. While on the way to their home from the [DUMC] Emergency Department, the father testified that [Eliza] started to threaten to jump out of a moving car after the father kept threatening to put her back on punishment and take her phone away.

36. On October 19, 2020, the father took [Eliza] back to DUMC himself. [Eliza] began cussing at the father while they were in the car. The father was told by DUMC medical staff that [Eliza] was “moody.” As soon as the father and [Eliza] got into the vehicle, the father told [Eliza] that she was not going [to] have her phone, she was not going to have Nintendo switch and she would go to her room. [Eliza] called him a BITCH and that she wanted her phone. He testified that [Eliza] also stated that she wanted him to call the police so that she can tell them that he assaulted her, and father testified that he allows daughter to speak to law enforcement. [Father] believed that [Eliza] wanted to be taken back to DUMC because she did not want to follow his rules.

37. The father admits that [Eliza] was taken to DUMC by the Sheriff on October 19, 2020. [Father] took [Eliza] back to [DUMC] within an hour and a half after she was discharged by DUMC, and it had been determined that [Eliza] was not suicidal or homicidal. The father took [Eliza] back to DUMC because he did not feel that [DUMC] spent sufficient time in conducting its psychiatric examination. The father reports that he took her back to [DUMC] based on [Eliza]’s behavior in the car.

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39. From August 2020 until October 2020, the father admitted that [Eliza] was taken to the hospital about 5 to 6 times. The father also admitted to having [Eliza] involuntarily committed five times from August 2020 to October 2020․ The father testified that he was told to call law enforcement when [Eliza] would behave violently.

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68. ․ At the time, [Eliza] was ready for discharge on October 19, 2020, [The wraparound facilitator] admitted that there was no plan for [Eliza] upon discharge. The father was refusing to pick [Eliza] up from [DUMC] after she was ready for discharge. The father believed that [Eliza] needed a long-term care in a facility. ․

After making these findings acknowledging Father's explanations for his actions, the trial court went on to make findings resolving why, despite the explanations, other evidence presented showed that Father's treatment of Eliza led to her being an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile:

96. [Eliza] has been the subject of 27 CPS reports and in the middle of contentious parental conflict since 2012. In addition to that, she has been involuntar[il]y committed by her father numerous times from August 2020 to October 2020.

97. The Court finds that [Eliza] struggled at her father's home from August 2020 to October 2020. The father's responses to [Eliza]’s behavior exacerbates her well-being and created more isolation for her. For the past two years, this world has been in a pandemic where isolation is prominent, the father's behaviors towards [Eliza] created more isolation. Withholding [Eliza]’s phone for three weeks and indefinite periods created more isolation for her. Moreover, these numerous IVC's also affected [Eliza] being able to see her mother.

98. From all accounts, [Eliza] is hurting badly. She is depressed, overweight and angry. Based on the evidence, the Court is unclear whether [Eliza] has had consistent medication management, because the father is adamant that he was given [Eliza] medication when she was staying with him, but the mother testified that [Eliza] was not tak[ing] her medication and she found pills that she was taking. Because of [Eliza]’s behaviors, this Court doubtful as to whether she was taking her medication and if she was taking her medication whether her medication was working.

99. The father is an authoritative father in which he has rules pertaining to discipline. Removal of the phone was a trigger for [Eliza]’s behaviors. The Court did not hear any other means to try to regulate [Eliza]’s phone usages except for removal of the phone. The Court finds that removing [Eliza]’s phone for three weeks during the pandemic was harsh. [Father] stated to this Court that he does not negotiate with a child.

100. On October 19, 2020, the father stated that he was not going to negotiate with a child, but the father allowed the child to speak to law enforcement even though he testified that the child was going to lie and say that he assaulted her. [Father] also acquiesced and granted the child's request to take her back to [DUMC]. The father says on this occasion that he didn't see anything wrong with this. The Court finds how unhappy [Eliza] had to have felt in that moment to want to go back to [DUMC] and not the father's home.

101. The court gives great weight that [Eliza] was not hospitalized or involuntarily committed when she was with her mother. The mother is the non-removal parent. The Department has alleged three (3) grounds in its juvenile petition.

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103. The Court finds that the best evidence as to whether [Eliza] is emotionally abused is [Eliza]. The Court believes the father's accounts as it relates to [Eliza]’s escalating behaviors. The Court had previously found her diagnosis as PTSD, ADHD, and Depression. [Eliza] is unhappy, mentally unwell, and unstable.

104. The father believes that [Eliza] is the way she is because of all the domestic violence, sexual abuse, and physical abuse that she either witnessed or experienced at her mother's home. In addition, [Eliza] had ADHD, PTSD, and depression as diagnosis. The father does not believe that he contributed to [Eliza]’s behavior.

105. Most of [Eliza]’s aggressive behaviors were because the father would not allow her to have her phone. And when the father would tell her no, [Eliza] would act out aggressively. The father's response to [Eliza]’s aggressive behavior was to call law enforcement and then file five (5) petitions to have her involuntarily committed. By calling law enforcement and attempting to have her involuntarily committed caused emotional abuse to [Eliza] and affected her mental health.

106. [Eliza] is miserable, and the father testified that he would make her go to her room and that he would also take her phone when she acted out. It is clear to this court that the father's responses to [Eliza]’s behaviors were not working. Moreover, the father's responses to [Eliza]’s behaviors exacerbated her mental wellbeing causing it to deteriorate.

107. The father was unable to parent [Eliza] when she experienced violent outbursts. He would call law enforcement to try to help him calm her down and then he tries to have her IVC'd. [The wraparound facilitator] would then talk to [Eliza] to try to calm her down. At the time of these outbursts, he would also call [the GAL]. It is clear to this court that these responses from the father were not working.

108. The father's misuse of the emergency system is extremely detrimental to [Eliza]. Filing a petition to have someone involuntarily committed should be used when necessary. [DUMC] determined that [Eliza] was not a danger to herself and others. Even after the father was told that ․ [Eliza] was not suicidal or homicidal, he would just take her right back to [DUMC].

109. Also, the court gives great weight that since the age of eight years old, [Eliza] has been the subject of multiple CPS cases. [Eliza] has been in parental conflict for almost half her life. At each CPS investigation, she was interviewed. When she was IVC'd, she was evaluated and spoke with hospital staff. Additionally, law enforcement was repeatedly called to [Eliza]’s residence.

110. The court finds that the father's home was an injurious environment. The father has his strict rules surrounding the restoration of returning [Eliza]’s phone and [Eliza] had no room for error. The father's behavior created an environment that was injurious such that it caused [Eliza] to be emotionally abused, angry and unhappy. [Eliza] was so unhappy on October 19th, that she asked her father to take her back to [DUMC].

111. The Court finds that the father's fixated perspective that he is the good parent along with the fact that the father believes that it is the mother that damaged [Eliza] caused the father to have a lack of insight in how to parent [Eliza]. The minor child, [Eliza], has been at [DUMC] Emergency Department five times within ․ a two-week period. Each of the five times, [Eliza] was evaluated and found to NOT meet criteria for acute hospitalization. [Eliza]’s father used her mental health diagnosis against her in order to have petitions issued in an attempt to have her involuntarily committed. [Eliza]’s father has exhibited a pattern of emotional abuse, medical neglect, and educational neglect, and abandonment - all of which cause [Eliza] significant distress responses. Because of this pattern of documented neglect and abuse, [Eliza] will continue to be at risk for further physical and psychological abuse, which is incrementally harmful to her psychological well-being, resulting in irreparable harm.

112. Further, [Eliza]’s father has been a barrier to the provision of her receiving recommended treatment and schooling because he refuses to pick her up from hospitals when she is medically and psychiatrically cleared to discharge, threatens that he will just bring her back (and then does), is verbally hostile to staff regarding [Eliza]’s care and recommendations, and attempts to negotiate with treatment providers in exchange for coming to retrieve [Eliza] after being cleared.

The trial court's findings reflect that Eliza was suffering from various mental health conditions; that these conditions were exacerbated by Father's parenting style (which included his decisions to take Eliza's phone and other electronics away from her); that Father made no attempts to alter his parenting to account for Eliza's mental health issues; and that when Eliza became upset and potentially violent, Father would only respond by attempting to have Eliza involuntarily committed, despite being told consistently that Eliza did not meet the specific criteria for hospitalization. The court explained that this cycle—where Father would make decisions that he knew (or should have known) would upset Eliza, Eliza would become upset and/or violent in response, and Father would then try to have Eliza hospitalized—traumatized Eliza and made her an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile.

Father argues extensively that the trial court was required to resolve whether he “was somehow parenting inappropriately when he restricted his daughter's phone access and sought to have her hospitalized.” His focus is misplaced. As previously noted, for purposes of adjudication, “the determinative factors are the circumstances and conditions surrounding the child, not the fault or culpability of the parent.” In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 109, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984). See also In re J.S., 182 N.C. App. 79, 86, 641 S.E.2d 395, 399 (2007) (“The purpose of the adjudication and disposition proceedings should not be morphed on appeal into a question of culpability regarding the conduct of an individual parent.”).

As shown by the trial court's findings, Eliza's circumstances and conditions at the time the petition was filed ² were that she had been diagnosed with multiple mental health conditions. Due to the combination of these conditions and the stresses placed upon her by her home life, she was suffering from significant emotional distress after having been repeatedly taken to the DUMC emergency department over the course of two weeks despite not meeting the criteria for involuntary commitment. At the time the petition was filed, Eliza had been returned to DUMC by Father within an hour and a half of her prior discharge. Eliza's distressed status is clearly reflected in the trial court's findings, which are supported by Eliza's medical records from DUMC. Because of her distressed status, the court determined that Eliza was an abused juvenile “in that her parent ․ creates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile,” a neglected juvenile in that Father's “home was an injurious environment[,]” and a dependent juvenile in that Father “was unable to parent [Eliza] when she experienced violent outbursts” and “[t]here is no relative of the child who is willing and able to provide proper care and supervision of the child in a safe home.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1), (9), (15) (2021) (defining “abused juveniles,” “dependent juvenile,” and “neglected juvenile”).

The trial court's explanation of why Eliza met the definition of an abused, neglected, and dependent juvenile is readily apparent from a careful reading of the court's findings of fact. Father's argument focuses only on his right to make the decisions he made, but he ignores the trial court's focus on the specific negative impact these decisions had on Eliza and her mental health, and how that negative impact supported her adjudication. Thus, we conclude that Father's argument that the trial court failed to resolve material conflicts in the evidence as to the “two principal factual foundations” for the adjudication of Eliza as abused, neglected, and dependent is unconvincing. Since Father does not otherwise challenge the abuse and neglect adjudications,³ we affirm the trial court's order as to those adjudications.

C. Dependency

Finally, Father specifically challenges the trial court's conclusion that Eliza was a dependent juvenile. He argues that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings to address both prongs of the definition of dependency.

The Juvenile Code defines a dependent juvenile, in relevant part, as “[a] juvenile in need of assistance or placement because ․ the juvenile's parent, guardian, or custodian is unable to provide for the juvenile's care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child care arrangement.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9). When adjudicating a juvenile as dependent, “the trial court must address both (1) the parent's ability to provide care or supervision, and (2) the availability to the parent of alternative child care arrangements.” In re P.M., 169 N.C. App. 423, 427, 610 S.E.2d 403, 406 (2005). “Further, a child may not be adjudicated dependent when she has at least one parent capable of providing care or supervision.” In re E.P.-L.M., 272 N.C. App. 585, 597, 847 S.E.2d 427, 437 (2020).

Here the trial court found:

47. [The social worker] asked [Father] about placement options for [Eliza]. He mentioned a brother. He did not agree with [Eliza] being placed with her mother[.] [Eliza's mother] tendered the name of her sister. [The social worker] did a kinship care assessment, and it was not approved as an appropriate placement option for [Eliza] at the time. The father was not in agreement to have [Eliza] be placed with the mother.

․

107. The father was unable to parent [Eliza] when she experienced violent outbursts. ․

The trial court did not make any findings regarding whether Eliza's mother was unable to parent her. In its findings describing the time period leading up to the filing of the juvenile petition, the court found it notable that Eliza successfully stayed with mother during her visitation weekend: “[t]he court gives great weight that [Eliza] was not hospitalized or involuntarily committed when she was with her mother.” There is nothing in the order that suggests that Eliza's mother could not provide proper care and supervision at the time the petition was filed, which was just days after the successful visitation period.⁴

Moreover, finding 47 did not resolve whether Father's brother was a suitable alternative placement. While the finding reflects that DSS conducted a kinship care assessment of Eliza's maternal aunt, there is nothing suggesting a similar assessment was pursued with respect to Father's brother. Without resolving the viability of this placement, the trial court could not make an ultimate determination that Father did not provide an alternative childcare arrangement for Eliza.

We, therefore, vacate the trial court's adjudication of Eliza as a dependent juvenile. See In re M.H., 272 N.C. App. 283, 290-91, 845 S.E.2d 908, 913-14 (2020).

III. Conclusion

The trial court made sufficient findings of fact to resolve the material conflicts in the evidence surrounding Eliza's status as an abused and neglected juvenile at the time the juvenile petition was filed. The trial court's adjudication of Eliza as an abused and neglected juvenile is therefore affirmed.

The trial court did not make sufficient findings to show that Eliza's mother was unable to provide her with proper care and supervision, or that Father could not provide an adequate alternative childcare arrangement. The trial court's adjudication of Eliza as a dependent juvenile is therefore vacated.

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART.

Report per Rule 30(e).

FOOTNOTES

1.   A pseudonym is used to protect the juvenile's identity and for ease of reading.

2.   Father repeatedly mentions, in both his principal brief and his reply brief, that, after Eliza came into DSS custody, she was hospitalized and her cell phone was taken away. This post-petition evidence is not relevant to the trial court's determination of whether the facts alleged by DSS in the juvenile petition are true, which is the relevant adjudication inquiry. See In re A.B., 179 N.C. App. 605, 609, 635 S.E.2d 11, 14 (2006).

3.   Because of the structure of Father's argument, we offer no opinion on whether the trial court's findings would support a conclusion that Eliza is abused or neglected. We only consider (and reject) the argument raised: that the trial court's order did not resolve material factual disputes in its findings of fact. See Goodson v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 171 N.C. App. 596, 606, 615 S.E.2d 350, 358 (2005) (“It is not the duty of this Court to supplement an appellant's brief with legal authority or arguments not contained therein.”).

4.   DSS and the GAL assert that Father should be “prohibited from arguing that the trial court erred in failing to make findings as to whether or not the mother was an appropriate placement option” since he vehemently opposed Eliza being placed with her mother. We find this assertion unpersuasive, as Father's position on where Eliza should be placed is a separate issue from whether Eliza's mother can provide proper care and supervision.

PER CURIAM.

Panel consisting of Judges DILLON, ARROWOOD, and GRIFFIN.