IN RE: M.S.-L. (2025)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 M.L. (“Father”) appeals from the Second Judicial District Court, Silver Bow County's May 31, 2024 order terminating his parental rights to his child M.S.-L. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

¶3 On November 9, 2021, the Child and Family Services Division of the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (“Department”) filed a Petition for Emergency Protective Services, Adjudication of Child as Youth in Need of Care (“YINC”), and Temporary Legal Custody regarding M.S.-L. The Petition was based on concerns regarding M.S.-L.’s exposure to illegal substances. M.S.-L tested positive at birth for methadone, hydromorphone, norburphrophine, morphine, amphetamines, and methamphetamine. The District Court granted the Department's request for emergency protective services on November 10, 2021. On February 10, 2022, the District Court adjudicated M.S.-L. as a YINC and granted the Department temporary legal custody of M.S.-L. The District Court found Father's treatment plan was appropriate and ordered it on June 29, 2022.

¶4 Father was arrested in January 2023 for a parole violation. On April 11, 2023, the Department petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to M.S.-L. based on § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, citing his failure to complete a treatment plan and asserting he was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The District Court held a termination hearing on May 13, 2024, at which Father was present via zoom because he remained incarcerated.

¶5 On May 31, 2024, the District Court issued “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Terminating [Father's] Parental Rights.” The termination order included three sections: (1) Findings of Fact; (2) Termination of Father's Parental Rights; and (3) Conclusions of Law. Although the “Termination” section correctly referenced § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, as the basis upon which the Department sought termination of Father's parental rights, the Conclusions of Law based the termination on §§ 41-3-423(2)(e) and -609(1)(d), MCA.

¶6 We review a district court's decision to terminate parental rights for an abuse of discretion. In re B.Y., 2018 MT 309, ¶ 7, 393 Mont. 530, 432 P.3d 129.

¶7 Father argues that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to make statutorily required findings of fact in support of its decision.¹ A court may order a termination of parental rights pursuant to § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, only if it first finds “by clear and convincing evidence ․ that ․ an appropriate treatment plan that has been approved by the court has not been complied with ․ and the conduct or condition of the parents rendering them unfit is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.” “In determining whether the conduct or condition of the parents is unlikely to change within a reasonable time” a district court must consider the following:

(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent of a duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely to care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child within a reasonable time;

(b) a history of violent behavior by the parent;

(c) excessive use of intoxicating liquor or of a narcotic or dangerous drug that affects the parent's ability to care and provide for the child; and

(d) present judicially ordered long-term confinement of the parent.

Section 41-3-609(2), MCA.

¶8 The Department concedes that the District Court did not make sufficient express findings in its May 31, 2024 order to support termination under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, but argues that we should apply the doctrine of implied findings to remedy the error. “Under the doctrine of implied findings, ‘otherwise facially insufficient findings of fact may be minimally sufficient if, within the scope of the express findings made, more specific findings of fact necessary to the determination can be clearly inferred from other express findings or the evidentiary record.’ ” In re L.A.G., 2018 MT 255, ¶ 25, 393 Mont. 146, 429 P.3d 629 (quoting In re D.L.B., 2017 MT 106, ¶ 13, 387 Mont. 323, 394 P.3d 169). But “ ‘the implied findings doctrine is not unlimited,’ particularly when the proceeding involves express statutory requirements.” In re L.A.G., ¶ 25 (quoting In re D.L.B., ¶ 14). “We will not stretch the doctrine of implied findings to remedy ․ orders that are beyond bare-bones or spartan.” In re D.L.B., ¶ 14 (quotation omitted).

¶9 The District Court made nine findings of fact in its May 31, 2024 order. The only finding that may bear on the application of § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA, is that Father was incarcerated at the time of the hearing. The evidentiary record and the scope of the express findings that were made do not allow us to clearly infer the more specific findings of fact necessary to the District Court's determination.

¶10 Based on the District Court's failure to address the relevant statutory factors, we must vacate the District Court's May 31, 2024 order and remand this matter to the District Court to enter specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to the basis upon which the Department sought termination of Father's parental rights. In the meantime, the Department shall retain temporary legal custody of M.S.-L. pursuant to the District Court's February 10, 2022 order.

¶11 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent or modify existing precedent. The District Court's order is vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father also argues that the District Court erred by terminating his rights pursuant to §§ 41-3-423(2)(e) and 41-3-609(1)(d), MCA, when the Department based its argument for termination solely on § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. The Department concedes that the District Court could not have terminated Father's rights pursuant to §§ 41-3-423(2)(e) and 41-3-609(1)(d), MCA, because it did not present evidence to support termination under those provisions. If the District Court terminates Father's parental rights on remand, it can clarify the provision upon which it is basing the termination.

JAMES JEREMIAH SHE

We Concur: BETH BAKER LAURIE McKINNON INGRID GUSTAFSON JIM RICE