HARDIN v. STATE (2025)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Nathan Hardin appeals the denial of his Petition for Relief from Sex Offender Registration and Request for a Hearing by the Third Judicial District Court, Powell County, on March 13, 2024. The issues on appeal are whether the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Hardin's Petition for Relief from Sex Offender Registration and whether the Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA) violates Hardin's substantive due process rights and acts as an ex post facto punishment.

¶3 Hardin was convicted of Sexual Assault-10-Year Age Difference under § 18-3-402(1)(e), C.R.S., in Logan County, Colorado on February 3, 2014. Hardin was required to register as a sexual offender in Colorado. Hardin subsequently moved to Montana.

¶4 On June 11, 2021, Hardin was sentenced to the Montana State Prison (MSP) for Threats and Other Improper Influence in Official and Political Matters under § 45-7-102, MCA. Hardin was sentenced to five years, partially suspended. Hardin was released to probation and parole on February 19, 2024. Hardin petitioned the Logan County Court in Colorado for relief from registry as a sexual offender, and the court issued an Order to Discontinue Sex Offender Registration in Colorado on June 12, 2024.

¶5 Hardin also filed a Petition for Relief of the Duty to Register as a Sex Offender on September 6, 2023, in the Powell County, Montana District Court. Hardin asserted he met the statutory requirements under § 46-23-506, MCA, and therefore no longer had to register as a sexual offender in Montana. The District Court denied Hardin's petition on March 13, 2024, without holding a hearing. The court reasoned that because Hardin had been incarcerated at MSP and not required to register during that period, it was unclear whether he met the statutory requirements to register for 10 years.

¶6 We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a petition for relief from the duty to register as a sexual offender for abuse of discretion. Langford v. State, 2013 MT 265, ¶ 10, 372 Mont. 14, 309 P.3d 993. An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts arbitrarily, without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. Langford, ¶ 10. Our review of constitutional issues is plenary. State v. Samples, 2008 MT 416, ¶ 14, 347 Mont. 292, 198 P.3d 803.

¶7 Hardin asserts it has been over 10 years since he was required to register as a sexual offender in Colorado. Hardin argues the absence of specific language—regarding whether time spent incarcerated on charges unrelated to the original offense counts towards fulfilling the 10-year registration requirement—has led to a misinterpretation of the law and undermines his rights. Hardin's position is that all time subsequent to the initial conviction should count towards fulfilling the registration requirement regardless of the nature of any subsequent convictions.

¶8 The State argues it is the conviction itself that requires Hardin to register in Montana—not whether the Colorado court granted his petition for relief. Despite the Colorado court determining Hardin does not have to register anymore in Colorado, it did not vacate the underlying conviction. Additionally, the State argues Hardin's Colorado conviction would be equivalent to Montana's sexual intercourse without consent under § 45-6-501, MCA, and thus would require him to register as a sexual offender in Montana.

¶9 First, we consider whether Hardin met the statutory criteria for the 10-year registration requirement. A sexual offender is required to register as a sexual offender for life except: (1) as provided in subsection three of the statute, and (2) during a period of time the sexual offender is in prison. Section 46-23-506(1), MCA. Subsection three provides that any time after 10 years of registration, a sexual offender may petition the court for relief from registering. Section 46-23-506(3), MCA. The court may grant the petition on finding the offender has maintained a clean record during the registration period, and continued registration is not necessary for public protection. Section 46-23-506(3)(a)-(b), MCA. “[T]he sexual offender has a clean record if, during the period of time in which the sexual offender was required to register as a sexual offender:” he was not convicted of any felony, he was not convicted of any sexual offense, he completed any period of supervised release, probation, or parole, and he successfully completed a sexual offender treatment program. Section 46-23-506(5), MCA.

¶10 Section 46-23-503, MCA, provides that a sexual offender must be notified in writing of his duty to register not less than 10 days prior to release from confinement, and § 46-23-504, MCA, provides a sexual offender must also be registered within 10 days after his release from confinement. In State v. Azure, 2008 MT 211, 344 Mont. 188, 186 P.3d 1269, we found the trigger for the duty of sexual offender registration is the release from confinement, not release from confinement and supervision. Azure, ¶ 29. Thus, Azure was required to register within 10 days of release from confinement, notwithstanding continued Department of Corrections supervision during Azure's conditional release.

¶11 Here, during Hardin's 10-year registration period, he committed the felony offense of Threats and Other Improper Influence in Official and Political Matters under § 45-7-102, MCA, and was sentenced to five years, partially suspended in MSP. Thus, the time Hardin spent incarcerated in MSP does not count towards his 10-year registration requirement because during that time, he could not register as a sexual offender. Additionally, Hardin did not maintain a clean record during his 10-year registration period as required by § 46-23-506(3)(a), MCA.

¶12 We find the District Court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. Even though the District Court admitted it did not know whether Hardin met the statutory criteria for registration, it still came to the correct result of denying Hardin's petition. See State v. Polaski, 2005 MT 13, ¶ 23, 325 Mont. 351, 106 P.3d 538 (“[W]e will affirm a district court when it reaches the correct conclusion even if it did so for the wrong reason.”).

¶13 Next, we consider Hardin's constitutional claims. Hardin claims Montana's registration requirements violate his substantive due process rights because they are punitive, and were not clear at the time of sentencing. Hardin claims Montana's registration requirements operate as an ex post facto law and unfairly punish him.

¶14 Hardin asserts this Court held the registration requirements were unconstitutional in State v. Sedler, 2020 MT 248, 401 Mont. 437, 473 P.3d 406 and State v. Hinman, 2023 MT 116, ¶ 12, 412 Mont. 434, 530 P.3d 1271. However, in Sedler, we found the requirements of § 46-23-506(2)(a), MCA, and § 46-23-506(3)(a), MCA, facially unconstitutional, but recognized the rest of the act was “otherwise legitimate.” Sedler, ¶ 19. Namely, we found it was unconstitutional to require an offender to petition for relief even though the District Court was required to grant the petition after 10 years of registration—such a ministerial act unfairly extended an offender's registration period. Sedler, ¶ 19. Since Sedler, the Montana Legislature amended those specific provisions in 2021 and 2023 to what the current statute provides. Thus, Hardin's argument relying on Sedler is not persuasive.

¶15 Additionally, in Hinman, we discussed the 2007 amendments to SVORA as applied to Hinman. Although there was a 2021 amendment in place at the time of Hinman, Hinman was charged with failure to register in 2019 which triggered our review of the law in place at the time of the charge. Here, Hardin was not charged with failure to register, rather he petitioned the court for relief himself in 2024. On appeal, even though Hardin was initially charged in 2014, both parties cite to SVORA's most recent 2023 amendment. As such, for purposes of this opinion we consider the 2023 version of SVORA, and Hardin's argument relying on Hinman is not applicable.

¶16 Our review of questions of constitutional law, including alleged violations of the ex post facto clauses, is plenary, and we review the district court's interpretation of the law for correctness. See State v. Egdorf, 2003 MT 264, ¶ 12, 317 Mont. 436, 77 P.3d 517; Hinman, ¶ 12. The constitutionality of a legislative act is presumed unless its unconstitutionality appears beyond a reasonable doubt. Egdorf, ¶ 12. The challenging party must prove it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. Egdorf, ¶ 12.

¶17 First, we turn to whether Hardin raised a valid challenge to the facial constitutionality of the registration requirements of § 46-23-506, MCA. As we noted in Sedler:

A substantive due process analysis requires a test of reasonableness of a statute in relation to the State's power to enact such legislation. The essence of substantive due process is that the State cannot use its police power to take unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action against an individual. In order to satisfy substantive due process guarantees, a statute enacted under a state's police power must be reasonably related to a permissible legislative objective.

Sedler, ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Webb, 2005 MT 5, ¶ 22, 325 Mont. 317, 106 P.3d 521). On a facial challenge, the challenging party must show that “no set of circumstances exists” where the statute would be valid or that the statute lacks any “plainly legitimate sweep.” In re S.M., 2017 MT 244, ¶ 10, 389 Mont. 28, 403 P.3d 324.

¶18 As amended, the petition requirements do not result in a ministerial action from a district court. Rather, a district court has discretion to grant or deny the petition based on a set of criteria. The 2023 amended SVORA petition requirements are reasonably related to assuring public safety. If an offender has maintained a clean record during the 10 years and is not a danger to public safety, a district court may grant the petitioner relief. However, if an offender has committed any felony or sexual offense during that time and presents a threat to public safety, the district court has the discretion to deny the offender's petition. Filing a petition gives the district court a chance to review the offender's 10-year registration period and determine if further registration is necessary to protect the public. Hardin's argument is largely based on Hinman, but that case considered the retroactive application of 2007 amendments to the statute. Hardin's conviction was in 2014, and he has failed to point to any amendments of the statute since that could constitute retroactive punishment—the 2023 substitution of “clean record” for “law abiding” is not a substantive change. As such, Hardin has failed to make a bona fide showing of § 46-23-506(3)(a) and (b), MCA, to be facially unconstitutional.

¶19 As applied to Hardin, we come to the same conclusion. Hardin argues that SVORA violates the ex post facto clauses in Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 31, of the Montana Constitution. These constitutional provisions prevent the retroactive application of criminal laws. Hinman, ¶ 13.

¶20 Hardin has not demonstrated how once lawful conduct is now being retroactively punished. Hardin must continue registering as a sexual offender because he has not maintained a clean record nor met the 10-year registration requirement. Maintaining a “clean record” was a revision in the 2023 amendment that replaced a requirement that offenders remain “law abiding citizens.” However, even looking at prior SVORA amendments going back to 2007, there has always been a provision providing that if an offender commits a crime during his 10-year registration period, he will not be relieved from registration. See § 46-23-506, MCA, (2007) (stating sexual offender must remain a “law-abiding citizen”). As such, Hardin has always been on notice that if he commits a crime during his registration period, then he will not be relieved from registration. Thus, Hardin has not demonstrated the registration requirements of SVORA are unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶21 Finally, Hardin claims the District Court was wrong to deny his request for a hearing on his petition, especially since the District Court was unsure whether Hardin met the statutory requirements. We note it is not optimal for a District Court to deny a request for a hearing on a petition for relief from sexual offender registration. Although § 46-23-506, MCA, does not mandate a hearing, it is strongly inferred the court should conduct one. See § 46-23-506, MCA (“[p]rior to a hearing on the petition, the county attorney shall mail a copy of the petition to the victim of the last offense for which the offender was convicted if the victim's address is reasonably available.”). Despite this, we find no error by the District Court in not holding a hearing under the circumstances of this case.

¶22 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶23 Affirmed.

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We Concur: JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA, J. LAURIE McKINNON, J. BETH BAKER, J. JIM RICE, J.