STATE OF MONTANA v. KURTTIS WARREN COPYAK (2025)

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Kurttis Copyak (Copyak) appeals his conviction of Impersonation of a Public Servant, in violation of § 45-7-209, MCA,¹ following a jury trial in the Second Judicial District of Montana, Butte-Silver Bow County. Copyak argues the District Court erroneously denied his challenge of a juror for cause, as well as his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. Copyak alternatively argues conditions imposed on his unsuspended sentence banning him from having contact with the victim and from entering a specific location are illegal and should be struck from his judgment.

¶3 On December 12, 2021, Copyak went to a strip club at or near 1000 Grizzly Trail in Rocker, Montana, where Yvette was working as a dancer. Yvette had been a dancer for twenty years and recognized Copyak as someone who had previously visited the club. As she was dancing, Copyak told Yvette: “You're a real pretty girl. I would be careful if I was you.” When Yvette moved closer to hear him better, Copyak again commented on Yvette's beauty and said he would put Yvette “in a trap house.” Yvette did not know what Copyak meant but was frightened. Thinking Copyak might want to “take [her] against [her] will,” she returned to dancing by the pole on the stage. When she finished her routine, Yvette could see Copyak trying to get her attention. Yvette's boss—unaware of their earlier encounter—instructed her to respond to Copyak. Yvette approached Copyak near a rail that divided the customer tables from the dancers’ offstage area, upon which he placed what appeared to be a U.S. Marshal's badge and said, “Yeah, I'd be real careful if I was you.” Yvette testified: “I thought this man was a U.S. Marshal threatening my life.” She threw the item back towards Copyak and alerted her boss. Yvette later testified that Copyak did not directly claim to be a U.S. Marshal or a police officer, and that he did not demand anything specific from her. Copyak left the club around midnight.

¶4 Yvette's shift ended at 2:00 a.m. She was living in an RV at the time, which she parked in the nearby Town Pump parking lot. After completing her shift and parking her RV for the night, Yvette left her dog in the RV and went to a fellow dancer's room at the Red Lion Inn to socialize and smoke marijuana. She returned to her RV around 4:00 a.m., let her dog out, and walked to the front of her RV to start the generator. After a few minutes, she called for her dog, who she explained “always” came back to her. Yvette heard someone say, from the darkness, “I have your dog.” Startled, she ran inside her RV to retrieve mace, which she could not find. She then heard a knock at her door. Yvette opened the door to find Copyak standing there holding her dog. Yvette ran to the Town Pump and told the clerk to call police.

¶5 Police found Yvette's RV in the location she reported, and Copyak in his vehicle parked approximately 150 feet from Yvette's RV. Copyak told an officer that, after he left the club, he went to McDonald's and then to the Red Lion Inn to check on the price of a room. After deciding against getting a room, Copyak claimed he went to a casino and then parked in the Town Pump parking lot to “put some stuff away.” Copyak said he did not recognize the woman who lived in the RV and was simply returning the dog to the vicinity from which it came. Copyak was placed under arrest and officers located a “window breaker” tool and two knives clipped to his waistband, a toy badge and “challenge coin” inscribed with the words “U.S. Marshal” in his wallet, and a set of binoculars in his vehicle. The State charged Copyak with Impersonation of a Public Servant, a felony under § 45-7-209, MCA. The matter was tried in October 2022.

¶6 During jury selection, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors: “Is there anyone that sits here today that says, you know, I'm a little uncomfortable with this, this just probably isn't the case for me?” Prospective juror Fink raised her hand and stated, “My husband was a police officer, and so I hold them in a high regard. So, I don't know the whole case, so maybe he presented himself as that. I do hold them in a high regard.” In response to a question from the prosecutor, Fink acknowledged that it might be more difficult for her to admit that police make mistakes. When asked whether she could balance law enforcement's testimony “and anybody else's testimony along with all the evidence and consider it as a whole before [making a] decision,” Fink responded: “I think I could do both sides.” When questioned by Copyak's counsel about whether her “perception of law enforcement [might] create any biases towards or against law enforcement,” Fink said, “I'd like to say no, but I do hold them in high regard. So, I mean, I would do my best to be unbiased.” The District Court asked Fink if she had “a natural bias towards the police department,” to which Fink replied, “No. I just hold officers in a high regard.” Copyak's counsel challenged Fink for cause, which the District Court denied. Defense counsel struck Fink from the panel with his first preemptory challenge.

¶7 The jury convicted Copyak of the charge, and the District Court sentenced Copyak to a term of five years’ commitment to the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC), with credit for 76 days served. The District Court further ordered “that the Defendant shall have no contact with the victim in this matter, nor should he enter or remain on the premises of 1000 Grizzly Trail.” Copyak appeals.

¶8 This Court reviews a district court's denial of a challenge for cause for abuse of discretion. State v. Anderson, 2019 MT 190, ¶ 11, 397 Mont. 1, 446 P.3d 1134. “A district court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a challenge for cause when a juror's statements during voir dire raise serious doubts about the juror's ability to be fair and impartial.” State v. Johnson, 2014 MT 11, ¶ 8, 373 Mont. 330, 317 P.3d 164. The Court reviews de novo a district court's denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Boyd, 2021 MT 323, ¶ 12, 407 Mont. 1, 501 P.3d 409. Where sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict, the verdict must be affirmed, even though the evidence could have supported a different result. State v. Spottedbear, 2016 MT 243, ¶ 8, 385 Mont. 68, 380 P.3d 810. We review a lower court's criminal sentence for legality, analyzing whether the sentence falls within parameters set within applicable sentencing statutes. State v. Thompson, 2017 MT 107, ¶ 6, 387 Mont. 339, 394 P.3d 197; State v. Erickson, 2008 MT 50, ¶ 10, 341 Mont. 426, 177 P.3d 1043.

¶9 The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Copyak's challenge of prospective juror Fink for cause because her statements did not raise serious questions about her ability to be impartial. “Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution guarantee the right to a trial by an impartial jury.” Johnson, ¶ 10. Under Montana law, a person may challenge for cause any prospective juror “having a state of mind” that prevents “the juror from acting with entire impartiality and without prejudice to the substantial rights of either party.” Section 46-16-115(2)(j), MCA. If a district court improperly denies a challenge for cause, such an abuse of discretion is grounds for automatic reversal. Johnson, ¶ 10. However, “we give deference to a district court's determination regarding a challenge for cause.” Johnson, ¶ 20 (citing State v. Robinson, 2008 MT 34, ¶ 13, 341 Mont. 300, 177 P.3d 488 (“the decision whether to grant a challenge for cause is within the discretion of the trial judge, who has the ability to look into the eyes of the juror in question, and to consider her responses in the context of the courtroom”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gunderson, 2010 MT 166, 357 Mont. 142, 237 P.3d 74; State v. Hatten, 1999 MT 298, ¶ 28, 297 Mont. 127, 991 P.2d 939 (“[b]ecause the trial court is best able to observe the jurors and to decide the potential for prejudice when allegations of juror misconduct are raised, the trial court has significant latitude when ruling on such matters”)). Thus, “we will affirm a district court's denial of a challenge for cause if ‘the juror convincingly affirms his ability to lay aside any misgivings and fairly weigh the evidence.’ ” Johnson, ¶ 10 (quoting State v. Allen, 2010 MT 214, ¶ 26, 357 Mont. 495, 241 P.3d 1045).

¶10 During voir dire, Fink revealed that she had family members who worked in law enforcement and candidly stated that she held police “in a high regard.” However, she explained that she had never served on a jury before and that she “would do [her] best to be unbiased.” Fink answered the District Court Judge, “no,” in response to his question asking if she had a “natural bias” toward police. The questioning by the attorneys and judge did not coax Fink to respond in a certain way but was clearly an effort to clarify whether she could serve as an impartial juror. Fink's statements, taken as a whole, establish her desire to serve properly and to set aside any natural biases in order to fairly weigh “both sides” of the story presented, dispelling questions about her impartiality. See Johnson, ¶ 19 (“while a juror's initial, spontaneous statements are important, we do not view them in a vacuum, but instead look at the juror's responses as a whole, including later responses to questioning”). Having respect for law enforcement or, as we addressed in Johnson, believing police officers can be more credible than average citizens, does not establish a bias necessitating removal of a juror if she can nonetheless judge the case properly. See Johnson, ¶ 19. Considering Fink's direct denial of a bias affecting her ability to fairly weigh testimony, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Copyak's challenge for cause.

¶11 Next, we conclude the District Court did not err by denying Copyak's motion to dismiss because the State introduced sufficient evidence to prove the requisite elements of the crime of Impersonation of a Public Servant:

A person commits the offense of impersonating a public servant if the person falsely pretends to hold a position in the public service with the purpose to induce another individual to submit to the pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense to the individual's prejudice.

Section 45-7-209(1), MCA (emphasis added). Copyak challenges on appeal the prosecutor's jury argument that the State did not have to prove Copyak's specific motive. He also argued to the District Court that evidence for “submission to authority is missing in this case,” and thus contends that, even if the jury believed he had a criminal purpose for his actions, it is “pure speculation” to say he undertook his actions “to somehow enable a criminal purpose he never undertook.”

¶12 The statute requires the impersonator to “falsely pretend” to be an official “with the purpose” of inducing another to submit to or act in reliance upon his “pretended official authority.” Section 45-7-209(1), MCA. It does not require the impersonator to verbally identify himself as a public servant, make any specific demand, or to succeed in convincing an individual of his supposed authority or in prompting the individual to action. The criminal mental state of “purposely”—here, that the defendant acted with the purpose of inducing another to submit—can be proven by circumstantial evidence, as the jury was instructed. See State v. Clausell, 2001 MT 62, ¶ 31, 305 Mont. 1, 22 P.3d 1111 (“We have held that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to obtain a conviction. ․ Moreover, criminal intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct or positive proof and therefore must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by witnesses and the circumstances as developed by the evidence.” (citations and quotations omitted)). “Circumstantial evidence need only be of sufficient quality and quantity to legally justify a jury in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the charged offense collectively.” State v. Daniels, 2019 MT 214, ¶ 44, 397 Mont. 204, 448 P.3d 511. The State's jury argument that it need not prove Copyak's “motive,” that is, his specific reason or objective for inducing Yvette to submit to his authority, is correct; the statute requires only that a defendant “falsely pretend” to hold a position “with the purpose” of inducing another to submit to or act in reliance upon the proffered authority.

¶13 Here, circumstantial evidence, combined with the direct evidence Yvette offered in her testimony at trial, provided sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer and conclude that Copyak acted with the purpose of inducing Yvette into submitting to his supposed authority as a U.S. Marshal. Copyak's displaying of a U.S. Marshal's badge or coin, his repeated statements that Yvette should be “careful,” and that he was going to put her in a “trap house” and keep her there, looked and sounded authoritative, and were frightening to Yvette. She viewed Copyak as being different from other strip club patrons offering usual suggestive remarks, and she testified to believing Copyak was someone who could keep her “against [her] will.” Based on the evidence about what happened in the strip club alone, a jury would have a basis to infer that Copyak's intended purpose in displaying the badge or coin and making his statements was to falsely present himself as a U.S. Marshal to induce Yvette to act in reliance upon that pretense during that evening.

¶14 Further, the Information charged Copyak with acting “at or near 1000 Grizzly Trail and other locations,” and the jury was instructed that it had to find that Copyak's actions occurred “in Silver Bow County.” The jury was also free to consider evidence that the same man who interacted with Yvette at the strip club later sought lodging at the hotel in which Yvette had met with her friend, parked his car 150 feet away from her RV during the night, captured Yvette's dog and called to her from the dark, and knocked on her door while holding her dog. After Copyak was apprehended, police found a set of binoculars, a window breaker tool, knives, a toy badge and a challenge coin on or near his person. A rational juror could choose to believe Copyak's story that this second encounter with Yvette was purely coincidental, but would be equally justified in inferring from this evidence that Copyak was further pursuing his charade of possessing authority so that Yvette would submit to it. For all these reasons, we affirm the District Court's denial of Copyak's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence.

¶15 Finally, the State concedes that the District Court's imposition of conditions upon Copyak's sentence was incorrect. The District Court sentenced Copyak to a five-year commitment to the DOC, with no time suspended, pursuant to § 45-7-209(2) and § 46-18-201(3)(a)(iv)(A), MCA, but added the conditions that Copyak have no contact with Yvette and not enter the premises at 1000 Grizzly Trail. A district court's authority to sentence a defendant is defined and constrained by statute, and there is no authority for a sentencing court to impose conditions on an unsuspended DOC sentence. State v. Burch, 2008 MT 118, ¶¶ 12, 36, 342 Mont. 499, 182 P.3d 66. Because no portion of Copyak's sentence was suspended, the District Court lacked the authority to impose these conditions. See Gunderson, ¶ 109. We thus reverse the imposition of these conditions and remand for entry of an amended judgment wherein the District Court may either strike the conditions or restate the conditions as parole recommendations. State v. Heafner, 2010 MT 87, ¶ 13, 356 Mont. 128, 231 P.3d 1087.

¶16 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review.

¶17 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The District Court's Judgment incorrectly cites § 45-5-207, MCA (2021) as the statute prohibiting Impersonation of a Public Servant. In briefing, all parties recognize § 45-7-209, MCA, as the applicable statute in this matter.

JIM RICE

We Concur: BETH BAKER LAURIE McKINNON INGRID GUSTAFSON Justice James Jeremiah Shea has recused himself and did not participate in this matter.