IN RE: J.G.F. (2024)

Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 J.G.F. appeals from the First Judicial District Youth Court's December 14, 2021 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and the March 10, 2022 Disposition Order placing J.G.F. on probation for three years under the supervision of Juvenile Probation. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether we should exercise plain error review of J.G.F.’s assertion that he was inadequately advised of his right to a jury trial; and (2) whether J.G.F. was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not file a motion to suppress his confession. We affirm.

¶3 On March 8, 2021, the State filed a Petition in youth court alleging that J.G.F., then 13 years old, committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute four counts of felony sexual assault against his 4-year-old sister, A.L.

¶4 Kristina Dukart is A.L.’s therapist. Dukart diagnosed A.L. with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and she observed that A.L. was exhibiting clinical indicators of sexual abuse. After seeing A.L. for several months, Dukart became concerned for her safety when A.L. disclosed during a play therapy session that “[J.G.F.] plays the pee pee game with me.” Dukart reported the suspected abuse to the Child and Family Services hotline, after which Child Protective Services made a cross-report to the Helena Police Department (“HPD”).

¶5 On February 22, 2021, HPD Detective Brandon Wootan and Child Protection Specialist Justina Clinch went to A.L. and J.G.F.’s home to speak to their mother, E.L. E.L. consented to a forensic interview of A.L., but she insisted it be done that same day. Paula Samms conducted a forensic interview of A.L. around 5:30 p.m. that evening. During the forensic interview, A.L. disclosed that J.G.F. “touches my body parts.”

¶6 Following A.L.’s interview, Detective Wootan informed E.L. of A.L.’s disclosures during the forensic interview. Wootan told E.L. that he would like to interview J.G.F. the next day. E.L. agreed to the interview but insisted that it take place that evening. J.G.F. was interviewed around 7:30 p.m. E.L. was present for the interview, as were Detective Wootan and Clinch. E.L. was seated next to J.G.F. on a couch throughout the interview. At the outset of the interview, Detective Wootan advised J.G.F. and E.L. of J.G.F.’s Miranda rights. Before asking them to sign the waiver, Detective Wootan asked J.G.F. and E.L. if they understood the rights he had just read and if they had any questions. Both J.G.F. and E.L. verbally acknowledged they understood the rights as explained to them by Detective Wootan and both signed a written waiver.

¶7 Detective Wootan began the interview by telling J.G.F. that he wanted the truth, and that J.G.F. should let him know if something was not true. J.G.F. described his siblings and family dynamic, stating that he tries to parent his younger siblings, including A.L., but he finds it frustrating and has been working on his anger issues. Detective Wootan informed J.G.F. that one of his siblings had said that J.G.F. inappropriately touched them, and he asked which sibling he thought had said that, to which J.G.F. responded “[A.L.].” Shortly after the interview commenced, J.G.F. acknowledged inappropriately touching A.L. “four or five” times.

¶8 At J.G.F.’s initial appearance in Youth Court, his counsel reported that he was denying the allegations. The Youth Court stated that because of the denials, it would not advise J.G.F. of all his rights, but it did advise him of the allegations in the Petition, the maximum penalty, that he had the right to remain silent, and the right to an attorney. The omnibus form indicated that the parties did not stipulate to the trial taking place without a jury.

¶9 At the final pretrial hearing, J.G.F.’s counsel informed the Court that he had “discuss[ed] [with J.G.F.] the jury trial and what it entails and the options at this point,” and that J.G.F. had “opted for a bench trial instead of a jury trial.” The Youth Court then asked J.G.F. directly: “[D]o you understand what we're talking about, not having a jury? I'll be the person that decides; do you understand that?” J.G.F. responded: “Uh-huh, yes.” The Court granted the request for a bench trial and scheduled an adjudicatory hearing.

¶10 The Youth Court conducted an adjudicatory hearing, at which it heard testimony from A.L., Kristina Dukart, Paula Samms, Tanya Martin (J.G.F.’s and A.L.’s maternal aunt), Detective Brandon Wootan, and J.G.F. The Youth Court found that J.G.F. had committed the acts alleged and granted the Petition.

¶11 We review de novo for correctness a youth court's application and interpretation of the Youth Court Act. In re K.J.R., 2017 MT 45, ¶ 11, 386 Mont. 381, 391 P.3d 71. We generally decline to address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Taylor, 2010 MT 94, ¶ 12, 356 Mont. 167, 231 P.3d 79 (citation omitted). “However, when a criminal defendant's fundamental rights are invoked, we may choose to review a claim under the common law plain error doctrine where failing to review the claimed error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process.” Taylor, ¶ 12 (citation omitted).

¶12 J.G.F. argues that we should exercise plain error review of his contention that his right to a jury trial was violated. J.G.F. argues that reversal is required because the bench trial was held without a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. J.G.F. argues that the Youth Court did not explicitly find, and there is insufficient evidence in the record establishing, that he properly relinquished his right to a jury trial.

¶13 Section 41-5-1502, MCA, prescribes the procedure for contested offenses in youth court; it provides in relevant part: “Prior to any adjudicatory hearing, the court shall determine whether the youth admits or denies the offenses alleged in the petition. If the youth denies all offenses alleged in the petition, the youth or the youth's parent, guardian, or attorney may demand a jury trial on the contested offenses. In the absence of a demand, a jury trial is waived.”

¶14 At the final pretrial hearing, J.G.F.’s counsel, in J.G.F.’s presence, requested that the trial be changed from a jury trial to a bench trial. J.G.F.’s counsel advised the Youth Court that after “discussing [with J.G.F.] the jury trial and what it entails and the options at this point,” J.G.F. “has opted for a bench trial instead of a jury trial.” Even though the statement was made in J.G.F.’s presence, the Youth Court confirmed his desire to waive a jury trial by asking J.G.F. directly: “[D]o you understand what we're talking about, not having a jury? I'll be the person that decides; do you understand that?” J.G.F. responded: “Uh-huh, yes.”

¶15 The parties dispute whether a written waiver was required in this instance. But even assuming for the sake of argument that a written waiver was required, the record here does not lead us to conclude that failing to review the claimed error may result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, may leave unsettled the question of the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings, or may compromise the integrity of the judicial process. J.G.F.’s waiver of a jury trial and request for bench trial was made on the record; it was explicit and it was unambiguous. We decline to exercise plain error review of J.G.F.’s claim that his right to a jury trial was violated.

¶16 J.G.F. next argues that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel did not move to suppress his confession. J.G.F. argues that his mother had a conflict of interest that prevented her from fulfilling her role to provide “counsel and support” as a parent to him. J.G.F. argues that a parent's consent to waive a youth's rights under § 41-5-331, MCA, is not valid if the parent has irreconcilable conflicts of interest with their child and the child did not obtain advice of counsel; alternatively, J.G.F. argues that E.L.’s conflicts of interest weigh heavily against any finding that J.G.F.’s confession was voluntary.

¶17 Article II, Section 15, of the Montana Constitution guarantees persons under 18 all the fundamental rights of Article II of the Montana Constitution unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protection of such persons. Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution, a youth has a due process right to assistance of counsel during delinquency proceedings when such proceedings may result in commitment to an institution. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1451 (1967). Toward that end, § 41-5-1413, MCA, provides a statutory right to counsel in all youth court proceedings.

¶18 The right to counsel in a youth court proceeding includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. In re K.J.R., ¶ 31. Although we have declined to adopt specific criteria for evaluating youth court ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we have held that when the youth failed to show that counsel's alleged deficient actions would have resulted in a different outcome or otherwise prejudiced the youth in any regard, the ineffective assistance claim was without merit. In re K.J.R., ¶¶ 31, 36.

¶19 The Youth Court Act requires that when a youth is taken into custody for questioning, they are “advised of the youth's right against self-incrimination and the youth's right to counsel.” Section 41-5-331(1)(a), MCA. Those rights may be waived by a youth who is under the age of 16 if the youth and the youth's parent or guardian agree. Section 41-5-331(2)(b), MCA. If there is disagreement, those rights can be waived only if the youth has had the advice of counsel. Section 41-5-331(2)(c), MCA. When considering waiver of rights and consent to questioning by a juvenile, we examine the “totality of the circumstances,” taking into account the following factors: “(1) the defendant's age and level of education; (2) whether the defendant was advised of his rights; (3) the defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice system; (4) the defendant's background and experience; and (5) the defendant's demeanor, coherence, articulateness, and capacity to make full use of his faculties.” In re C.T.P., 2004 MT 63, ¶ 25, 320 Mont. 279, 87 P.3d 399 (citation omitted).

¶20 Detective Wootan advised J.G.F. of his Miranda rights at the outset of the interview. After reading J.G.F. his rights, Detective Wootan asked J.G.F. and E.L. if they had any questions to ensure that J.G.F. understood his rights before asking him to sign the waiver. Both J.G.F. and E.L. verbally acknowledged they understood the rights as explained to them by Detective Wootan, they had no questions, and they both signed a written waiver. While unfamiliar with the criminal justice system and 13 years of age, J.G.F. was informed of his right to not answer questions and the right to stop answering questions. The interview lasted less than an hour, during which time Detective Wootan spoke calmly throughout. Although the interview was less than an hour long, Detective Wootan asked J.G.F. if he needed to take a break approximately halfway through. J.G.F. declined, stating, “I want to keep going.”

¶21 There is no Montana law or precedent in support of J.G.F.’s argument that E.L. “could not fulfill her role as a parent [to J.G.F.] to provide ‘counsel and support’ ” because she was also A.L.’s mother; nor does the record support the argument factually. As the State points out, when officers first contacted E.L. at her home about A.L.’s disclosure, E.L. responded that J.G.F. had not done anything and that it was “no big deal.” At the time that she and J.G.F. waived his rights and consented to the interview, there was no indication that she was not acting in J.G.F.’s best interests. During the interview, E.L. was generally calm and rarely interjected, until J.G.F. admitted that he had inappropriately touched A.L., at which time E.L. told J.G.F. to be “completely fucking honest.” In sum, there was neither a legal nor a factual basis for a motion to suppress.

¶22 Both parties encourage this Court to adopt a specific standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in youth court—with J.G.F. encouraging us to adopt a modified version of the standard we adopted in In re A.S., 2004 MT 62, 320 Mont. 268, 87 P.3d 408, and the State advocating for adoption of the standard in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). We need not consider either standard because, by any measure, J.G.F.’s counsel's representation was not ineffective.

¶23 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent or modify existing precedent. We decline to exercise plain error review of J.G.F.’s claim that his right to a jury trial was violated. J.G.F. was not denied his right to effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the Youth Court is affirmed.

JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur: LAURIE McKINNON INGRID GUSTAFSON JIM RICE