STRICKLAND v. STATE (2025)

¶1. On August 30, 2023, Frank Strickland entered a guilty plea to the aggravated assault of LaVada Strickland. He was sentenced to a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with eleven years suspended and nine years to serve, and five years of post-release supervision. On April 25, 2024, Strickland filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief (PCR). The circuit court denied Strickland's PCR motion, and he appealed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2. On September 21, 2022, a Madison County grand jury indicted Strickland for the alleged offense of aggravated assault, and Strickland pled guilty. The following exchange occurred at the plea hearing:

THE COURT: What's the factual basis here?

MS. ALLEN: On July 23rd, 2022, in Madison County, Mississippi, this defendant did cause bodily injury to LaVada Strickland, a human being, by hitting her in her face.

THE COURT: Do you have any disagreement with this factual basis?

STRICKLAND: No, I don't.

․

THE COURT: What's the recommendation?

MS. ALLEN: Your Honor, before I do that, I would like to just make sure that I'm clear on what the facts were in this case just so they're on the record and everything is clear going forward. In this case, the State is alleging that this defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim. When he hit her in the face, she suffered several injuries to her eye that is now required her to have multiple surgeries on her eye and bones around the eye. That serious bodily injury is the basis for that. There's no allegation that he intentionally went over there to do that, but once they were there, the fight occurred; and she did suffer that serious injury. That's the basis for the plea ․

¶3. After the trial court ensured Strickland's plea was freely and intelligently made, he sentenced Strickland to twenty years in MDOC's custody, with nine years to serve and five years of post-release supervision. Strickland filed a PCR motion asserting that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He further contended that the trial court lacked authority to sentence him due to an inadequate factual basis supporting his plea. Additionally, Strickland argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, as it was disproportionate to the crime of aggravated assault. Lastly, he claimed that his indictment was defective for failing to specify the alleged offense. The circuit court denied Strickland's PCR motion, and he appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶4. We review a circuit court's findings of fact for clear error in PCR proceedings. Stokes v. State, 199 So. 3d 745, 748 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). “When issues of law are raised, the proper standard of review is de novo.” Id. “The issue of whether an indictment is fatally defective is an issue of law and deserves a relatively broad standard of review by this Court.” Russell v. State, 924 So. 2d 604, 607 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

ANALYSIS

¶5. The outcome-determinative issue in this appeal is whether Strickland's indictment was legally defective. Strickland was charged with aggravated assault pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2)(a)(ii) (Rev. 2020). The indictment read:

FRANK STRICKLAND, on or about the 23rd day of July, 2022, in the county aforesaid and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did purposely, knowingly, feloniously and intentionally cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to LaVada Strickland, a human being, by hitting LaVada Strickland several times on her neck and her face, which incident occurred in Madison County, Mississippi, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a)(ii).

(Emphasis added).

¶6. The indictment specifically states Strickland was “in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a)(ii),” which reads as follows:

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he or she ․ attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.

This particular subsection commonly applies when a deadly weapon is used in committing some bodily injury during an aggravated assault. In this case, no deadly weapon was used or even alleged by the State. The additional element from the statute, “a means likely to produce death or serious bodily injury,” has been held to be an essential element for aggravated assault if no deadly weapon was used. See Boyd v. State, 47 So. 3d 121,124 (Miss. 2010). That essential element was not included in the indictment or mentioned at the plea hearing.

¶7. The following description of the factual basis of the plea was mentioned twice at the plea hearing. First, the court asked the State, “What's the factual basis here?” The State responded:

On July 23rd, 2022, in Madison County, Mississippi, this defendant did cause bodily injury to LaVada Strickland, a human being, by hitting her in her face.

Later during the plea hearing, the court asked the State for the sentencing recommendation for Strickland. The State responded:

Your honor, before I do that, I would like to just make sure that I'm clear on what the facts were in this case just so they're on the record and everything is clear going forward. In this case, the State is alleging that this defendant caused serious bodily injury to the victim. When he hit her in the face, she suffered several injuries to her eye that is now required her to have multiple surgeries on her eye and bones around the eye. That serious bodily injury is the basis for that. There's no allegation that he intentionally went over there to do that, but once they were there, the fight occurred; and she did suffer that serious injury. That's the basis for the plea.

¶8. The State did not include the essential element of “a means likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.” The question presented in this appeal is whether the indictment lacking the phrase, “a means likely to produce death or serious bodily injury,” is fatally defective. The Supreme Court has answered the question.

¶9. The primary purpose of an indictment is to notify a defendant of the charges against him so he may prepare an adequate defense. Evans v. State, 916 So. 2d 550, 551 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Lewis v. State, 897 So. 2d 994, 996 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). It is required that the indictment provide “a concise and clear statement of the elements of the crimes charged.” Id. (quoting Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 804 (Miss. 1984)).

¶10. In Boyd, 47 So. 3d at 123 (¶9), the defendant argued that for an aggravated assault instruction, the jury must determine whether the instrument used by the defendant qualified as a deadly weapon. The jury instruction stated the defendant used “a knife” to injure the victim. Id. at 124 (¶12). However, the instruction failed to include the term “a deadly weapon” when describing the knife. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in failing to include the term “a deadly weapon” and centered its analysis on the absence of the phrase “with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.” Id. at (¶13). The Supreme Court held that this language constitutes “an essential element of the [aggravated-assault] statute.” Id. The Supreme Court emphasized that Mississippi precedent does not “require[ ] that an instruction mirror the exact language of a criminal statute” but rather that the jury “be correctly and fully instructed regarding each element of the offense charged.” Id. at 124-25 (¶13).

¶11. This Court reiterated the Mississippi Supreme Court's point in Kivinen v. State, 314 So. 3d 167 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). In Kivinen, the defendant was charged with aggravated assault for beating the victim with a baseball bat. Id. at 169 (¶7). The indictment did not specify the exact subsection under which Kivinen was indicted. Id. at 171 (¶26). This Court construed the language in the indictment to charge Kivinen with violating section 97-3-7(2)(a)(i). However, the jury instruction omitted the word “serious” from the essential element “serious bodily injury,” which was required under section 97-3-7(2)(a)(i). Kivinen, at 314 So. 3d 170-71 (¶17). This Court found that by omitting the word “serious” from the phrase “serious bodily injury,” the State failed to adequately instruct the jury on all elements of aggravated assault and reversed Kivinen's conviction and remanded for a new trial. This Court held that the omission “broaden[ed] the grounds upon which [the defendant] was convicted.” Id. at 171 (¶26) (quoting Washington v. State, 298 So. 3d 430, 436 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)).

¶12. The Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently held that an indictment charging a statutory offense must include all the essential elements of the crime, and the failure to do so renders the indictment void. See Spears v. State, 253 Miss. 108, 116, 175 So. 2d 158, 161-62 (1965); Rogers v. State, 198 Miss. 495, 22 So. 2d 550, 551 (1945); May v. State, 209 Miss. 579, 47 So. 2d 887, 888 (1950); Crosby v. State, 191 Miss. 173, 2 So. 2d 813,815 (1941). “This failure to charge [the defendant] with a crime cognizable under Mississippi law is a plain, constitutional error and requires dismissal of the indictment and reversal of the conviction[.]”¹ Thomas v. State, 126 So. 3d 877, 880 (¶8) (Miss. 2013).

¶13. Here, Strickland was only indicted for causing “bodily injury” to LaVada, and the indictment specifically referred to section 97-3-7(2)(a)(ii). The statute for aggravated assault requires that the bodily injury is caused by “a means likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.” That is an essential element according to Boyd. The State's clarification at the plea hearing that the factual basis was “that [Strickland] caused serious bodily injury to the victim” does not cure the defect in the indictment. Since Strickland's indictment failed to include all essential elements of the crime, his guilty plea to aggravated assault must be set aside, and this case is remanded.

CONCLUSION

¶14. We hold that Strickland's indictment is void. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying the PCR motion and remand this case to the circuit court to set aside the guilty plea and for further action consistent with this opinion. Since this issue is dispositive, we do not address Strickland's remaining issues.

¶15. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In this case, the indictment was missing an essential element required to charge aggravated assault, but it still sufficiently alleged the offense of simple assault. Therefore, dismissal is not appropriate.

LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. EMFINGER, J., NOT PARTICPATING.