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Charles WEST, Appellant v. GULF RELAY LLC and Technology Insurance Company, Appellees
¶1. Charles West appeals from the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission's (Commission) order finding that he was entitled to permanent partial and temporary total disability benefits for an admittedly compensable injury he suffered while employed by Gulf Relay LLC. The Commission found that West sustained an eighty-percent loss of industrial use of his left upper extremity. However, the Commission found that West had a preexisting condition that was a material contributing factor to his current injury, and the Commission accordingly apportioned West's loss-of-use benefits by ninety-five percent.
¶2. On appeal, West argues that (1) the Commission's decision was not based on substantial evidence; (2) Gulf Relay LLC and its insurance carrier, Technology Insurance Company, (collectively, Gulf Relay) failed to meet their evidentiary burden to rebut the presumption that West sustained a total occupational loss; (3) the Commission erred by ordering an apportionment based on a prior injury; and (4) the Commission erred by failing to consider West's compensable neck injury.
¶3. After our review, we find that the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and, accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
¶4. In August 2019, Gulf Relay hired West as a truck driver. At the time, West was forty-nine years old. On November 20, 2019, West suffered a work-related injury to his left upper extremity while opening and closing the trailer door on his truck. West initially sought medical treatment due to the “pulling sensation” in his left shoulder. While receiving treatment, an MRI revealed that West also sustained a neck injury. West subsequently filed a workers’ compensation claim against Gulf Relay.
¶5. In March 2023, an administrative judge (AJ) held an evidentiary hearing on West's claim. The parties stipulated the following: (1) West's date of injury was November 20, 2019; (2) West's average weekly wage at the time of injury was $807.39; (3) Gulf Relay has already paid $44,700.99 in indemnity benefits—specifically, temporary total disability benefits at a rate of $494.48 per week from November 21, 2019, through July 1, 2021, totaling $41,734.11 and permanent partial indemnity benefits for a period of six weeks, totaling $2,966.88. The only contested issues were (1) the nature and extent of West's temporary disability, if any; (2) the nature and extent of West's permanent disability, if any; (3) the extent of West's industrial loss of use, if any, to the left upper extremity; and (4) whether apportionment is applicable in this claim, and if so, the degree of apportionment applicable to West's November 20, 2019 injury.
¶6. West's medical records were admitted into evidence at the hearing. These records and his testimony at the hearing reflect that in 2012 West suffered a work-related injury to his left shoulder. West sought medical treatment for this injury, which included surgery. West filed a workers’ compensation claim for this injury and ultimately settled the claim.
¶7. After receiving treatment for his 2012 injury, West participated in a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) in 2015. The results of the FCE showed that West had the capacity to perform light duty work, with maximum lifting of twenty-five pounds from floor to waist. West was placed at maximum medical improvement (MMI) on September 15, 2015, with a thirteen-percent left upper extremity impairment rating and a permanent restriction of light duty work.
¶8. The record reflects that despite West's permanent restriction to light duty work, he applied for a truck driver position with Gulf Relay in August 2019. According to the job description, drivers “[m]ust be able to lift at least 50 [pounds] consistently[.]” On his post-hire questionnaire, West disclosed his 2012 shoulder injury and that he had had surgery on his left shoulder. However, West did not disclose that he was restricted to light duty work with maximum lifting of twenty-five pounds from floor to waist or that he had had four surgeries on his left shoulder since 2012. West also did not provide any answer or explanation to the question of whether he had been hurt on the job or filed a workers’ compensation claim in the past. In November 2019, approximately three months after Gulf Relay hired him, West suffered the injury at issue to his left upper extremity.
¶9. After receiving treatment for his 2019 injury, West underwent a functional capacity exam (FCE) in June 2021 that indicated West could perform medium duty work with the ability to lift up to twenty-eight pounds. In July 2021, West's treating physician, Dr. William McCraney, placed West at maximum medical improvement (MMI) with regard to his left shoulder, with a fifteen-percent left upper extremity impairment rating. Dr. McCraney clarified that this impairment rating included West's prior thirteen-percent impairment rating from his 2015 FCE. Dr. McCraney released West to return to work with permanent restrictions of medium duty work and limited overhead work.
¶10. The record shows that when West returned to work at Gulf Relay after reaching MMI, Gulf Relay was unable to rehire West due to his medical restrictions. David Izard, a representative for Gulf Relay, testified that when West returned to work after reaching MMI, Gulf Relay did not have any available positions within West's work restrictions. Izard explained that the position of truck driver requires the ability to lift fifty pounds.
¶11. After the hearing, the AJ entered its order finding that West “sustained a compensable injury to his left upper extremity that prevented his return to his pre-injury employment as a truck driver.” The AJ cited Meridian Pro. Baseball Club v. Jensen, 828 So. 2d 740, 747-48 (¶21) (Miss. 2002), and acknowledged that
where a permanent partial disability renders a worker unable to continue in the position held at the time of injury, ․ such inability creates a rebuttable presumption of total occupational loss of the member, subject to other proof of the claimant's ability to earn the same wages which the claimant was receiving at the time of injury. The presumption arises when the claimant establishes that he has made a reasonable effort but has been unable to find work in his usual employment, or makes other proof of his inability to perform the substantial acts of his usual employment.
The AJ explained that the presumption of total occupational loss of the member can be rebutted by “evidence concerning wage-earning capacity, including education and training which the claimant has had, his age, continuance of pain, and any other related circumstances.” Id. After reviewing the evidence, the AJ found that “the medical and vocational proof has overcome the rebuttable presumption of total occupational loss.”
¶12. The AJ ultimately found that West had sustained eighty-percent loss of industrial use of his left upper extremity and was entitled to temporary total disability benefits in the amount of $494.48 for a period of eighty-four weeks. However, the AJ apportioned West's benefits for the loss of industrial use of his left upper extremity by ninety-five percent based on his 2012 injury, which the AJ found to be a preexisting condition that materially contributed to West's 2019 injury. After applying the ninety-five-percent apportionment to the $494.48 compensation rate, the AJ determined that West was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits of $24.72 per week for 160 weeks beginning on July 2, 2021, with proper credit for all benefits previously paid.
¶13. West appealed to the full Commission, arguing that the AJ ignored and failed to consider credible evidence and medical records; that Gulf Relay failed to meet its evidentiary burden of rebutting the presumption that West suffered a total occupational loss; that the AJ erred by ordering an apportionment of ninety-five percent; and that the AJ failed to address West's compensable neck injury.
¶14. On June 4, 2024, the Commission entered its order incorporating the AJ's findings and affirming the AJ's order. The Commission clarified that “the medical findings provided from [West's] 2012 injury and 2019 injury indicate that his preexisting occupationally disabling condition from 2012 was a material contributing factor in the results following his 2019 injury[.]” The Commission accordingly found that “the apportionment was appropriate.”
¶15. As for West's neck injury, the Commission stated that although West filed a statement prior to his hearing before the AJ, West “did not make it clear that the existence and extent of temporary and permanent disability for his neck injury were issues to be decided by the AJ.” Regardless, the Commission found that while the AJ did not explicitly state that he found no permanent disability for West's neck injury, the AJ “did indeed reference evidence that supported a [zero percent] anatomical impairment rating to the body for [West's] neck injury[.]” The Commission found that “the evidence supports the holding of no permanent disability resulting from [West's] neck injury” and accordingly held that West is not entitled to permanent disability benefits for his neck injury.
¶16. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶17. In a workers’ compensation case, “[t]he Commission is the ultimate fact-finder[,]” and this Court must give deference to the Commission's decisions “on issues of fact and [the] credibility [of witnesses.]” Kroger Co. v. Pybus, 327 So. 3d 678, 683 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). “Because the Commission is the ultimate fact-finder and judge of the credibility of the witnesses, this Court may not reweigh the evidence before the Commission.” Curry v. Ashley Furniture Indus., 296 So. 3d 193, 197 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). Accordingly, reversal is only proper when the Commission's decision “lacks the support of substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, is beyond the Commission's scope or its power, or violates constitutional or statutory rights.” Kroger, 327 So. 3d at 683 (¶15).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
¶18. West argues that the Commission's decision was not based on substantial evidence because the Commission failed to consider certain credible evidence and medical records that were entered into evidence. Specifically, West argues that the Commission failed to consider the following: (1) West's 2015 FCE relating to his 2012 work-related injury; (2) medical records and testimony reflecting that at the time of his 2019 injury, West was not experiencing any issues from his 2012 injury; (3) medical records from Dr. Jack Moriarty, a neurosurgeon who treated West and diagnosed him with cervical spinal stenosis relating to his 2019 injury; (4) medical records from Dr. Jeff Summers, a pain management physician who treated West and diagnosed him with cervical radiculopathy; (5) the January 2021 questionnaire sent to Dr. Moriarty by Gulf Relay wherein Dr. Moriarty opined that West's diagnosis, “as it relates to his work injury and from a neurosurgical perspective, would be left-sided cervical radiculopathy[ ]”; and (6) West's testimony at the hearing regarding the lack of conservative treatment he received for his neck injury.
¶19. The record reflects that the parties submitted West's medical records, which spanned approximately a decade, into evidence, as well as relevant documents related to West's employment and job search. At the hearing, the AJ advised the parties that he would “be reading every document that's been submitted.” After reviewing the AJ's order, the medical records, and the documents entered into evidence, we find that the AJ provided a concise yet very thorough summary of West's medical treatment after his 2012 injury and after his 2019 injury. We find that it is clear from the AJ's summary of West's medical treatment that he considered all of West's medical records.
¶20. The Commission later affirmed the AJ's order and incorporated those findings in its order. The Commission also clarified that apportionment was appropriate and that West was “not entitled to permanent disability benefits for his neck injury.”
¶21. After our review of the record, we find no merit to West's claim that the AJ and Commission failed to consider certain evidence and medical records. Based on our review of the record, we find that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence.
II. Whether Gulf Relay failed to rebut the presumption of West's total occupational loss.
¶22. West next argues that Gulf Relay failed to produce sufficient evidence to overcome the rebuttable presumption that West sustained a total occupational loss. West asserts that the record contains “undisputed and uncontradicted evidence” showing that West reported back to Gulf Relay after reaching MMI, but Gulf Relay refused to reinstate or rehire West.
¶23. “For purposes of workers’ compensation law, there are two classes of disability: (a) functional disability, otherwise called ‘medical’ disability, and (b) industrial disability, otherwise called ‘occupational’ disability.” Union Camp Corp. v. Hall, 955 So. 2d 363, 372 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). At issue before us is industrial/occupational disability, which refers to the manner in which a claimant's physical impairment “affects the claimant's ability to perform the duties of his employment.” Id. In a scheduled-member claim, like the one before us, a worker is “entitled to the higher of the two types of losses”—(1) functional loss or (2) occupational loss. Meridian Prof'l Baseball Club, 828 So. 2d at 745 (¶14). “The claimant has the burden of proving disability and the extent thereof.” Lifestyle Furnishings v. Tollison, 985 So. 2d 352, 359 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
¶24. Here, West maintains that he met his burden of proving that he sustained a total occupational loss. “[W]here a permanent partial disability renders a worker unable to continue in the position held at the time of injury, such inability creates a rebuttable presumption of total occupational loss of the member, subject to other proof of the claimant's ability to earn the same wages which the claimant was receiving at the time of injury.” Mueller Indus. Inc. v. Waits, 283 So. 3d 1137, 1142 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). To establish a prima facie case for total disability, the claimant must show that he “has been unable to find work in the ‘same or other employment.’ ” Tollison, 985 So. 2d at 359 (¶21) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-3(i)).1 A claimant can establish that he has been unable to find work in the same or other employment by showing that he has made “reasonable efforts to find other employment.” Id. Relevant to the case before us, the claimant must persuade the Commission “that the job search was conducted as a good faith, diligent, and reasonable attempt to secure other employment.” John R. Bradley & Linda A. Thompson, Mississippi Workers’ Compensation § 5:30, at 197 (2024-2025 ed.). A claimant can also establish that he has been unable to find work in the same or other employment “if the claimant, after reaching MMI, reports back to the employer for work and the employer refuses to reinstate or rehire her.” Tollison, 985 So. 2d at 359-60 (¶21).
¶25. “Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of total disability by showing that the claimant only suffered a partial disability or no loss of wage-earning capacity.” Id. at (¶22). An employer can show this by presenting “all the evidence concerning wage-earning capacity, including education and training which the claimant has had, his age, continuance of pain, and any other related circumstances.” Mueller Indus. Inc., 283 So. 3d at 1142-43 (¶17) (internal quotation marks omitted). An employer can also “present evidence (if any) showing that the claimant's efforts to obtain other employment were a mere sham, or less than reasonable, or without proper diligence.” Tollison, 985 So. 2d at 360 (¶22).
¶26. Turning to examine whether West met his burden of proving total disability, the evidence before us reflects that after West reached MMI, he reported back to Gulf Relay for work, and Gulf Relay refused to reinstate or rehire him. As stated, Izard testified that Gulf Relay was unable to rehire West due to his medical restrictions, explaining that the truck-driver position required the ability to lift fifty pounds. Izard further stated that Gulf Relay did not have any available positions within West's work restrictions. West also submitted into evidence documents showing that he had conducted an unsuccessful job search over the internet for other trucker jobs.
¶27. The Commission, as “[t]he trier of fact[,] must determine whether the claimant has made out a prima facie case [of permanent total disability] based on the evidence presented.” Lott v. Hudspeth Ctr., 26 So. 3d 1044, 1048 (¶13) (Miss. 2010) (citing Thompson v. Wells-Lamont Corp., 362 So. 2d 638, 641 (Miss. 1978)). Although the AJ stated that “the medical and vocational proof has overcome the rebuttable presumption of total occupational loss,” the AJ's order shows that he ultimately determined West failed to establish a prima facie case of total disability. After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the AJ held that “the facts of this claim do not support a finding of total industrial loss to West's left upper extremity.” In making his determination, the AJ considered West's age and education, as well as the fact that West “owned and operated his own business and is currently limited to medium duty employment.”
¶28. The AJ also assessed West's job search. The AJ acknowledged West conducted a “limited job search over the internet,” but he found that West's search over the course of only seven days “does not appear to be a robust search.” The AJ further found that West “applied for truck driver jobs, which leads this [AJ] to find the job search to be invalid since it was comprised of positions outside of [West's] current restrictions.” As stated, the claimant must persuade the Commission “that the job search was conducted as a good faith, diligent, and reasonable attempt to secure other employment.” Bradley & Thompson, Mississippi Workers’ Compensation § 5:30. Upon review, the Commission affirmed the AJ's decision.
¶29. After our review, and keeping in mind that the Commission is the finder and trier of facts, we cannot say that the Commission's finding that West did not sustain a total occupational disability was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
III. Whether apportionment was appropriate.
¶30. West argues that the Commission improperly ordered apportionment based on its finding that West's 2012 injury constituted a preexisting condition that was a material contributing factor to his current injury. West submits that the Commission ignored the medical evidence that his physical capacity had improved since his 2012 injury and the uncontradicted evidence and testimony that West had returned to truck driving without a problem since his 2012 injury.
¶31. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-7(2) provides as follows:
Where a preexisting physical handicap, disease, or lesion is shown by medical findings to be a material contributing factor in the results following injury, the compensation which, but for this subsection, would be payable shall be reduced by that proportion which such preexisting physical handicap, disease, or lesion contributed to the production of the results following the injury. The preexisting condition does not have to be occupationally disabling for this apportionment to apply.
Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-7(2) (Supp. 2022) (emphasis added). “Section 71-3-7(2) ․ requires that the preexisting condition be shown by medical findings to be a material contributing factor in the results following injury.” Eichhorn v. Kroger Co., 325 So. 3d 692, 701 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021).
¶32. Here, the AJ determined that West sustained an eighty-percent industrial loss of use of his left upper extremity. After reviewing West's medical history, the AJ found that West had a preexisting physical handicap—his 2012 injury—and that this preexisting condition was a material contributing factor in the results after the injuries he suffered in 2019. The AJ observed that West's restrictions assigned after his 2015 FCE “were nearly identical to the restrictions assigned after the 2019 injury[.]” The AJ accordingly apportioned West's loss-of-industrial-use benefits by ninety-five percent, which the AJ determined was “the proportion which the preexisting condition contributed to the result of the present injury.”
¶33. The Commission affirmed this finding and further clarified that apportionment was appropriate because the medical findings from West's 2012 injury and 2019 injury “indicate his preexisting and occupational disabling condition from 2012 was a material contributing factor in the results following his 2019 injury[.]”
¶34. In an early apportionment case, our supreme court recognized that “[i]n many instances apportionment of benefits according to the contribution of the preexisting disease may be difficult.” Se. Constr. Co. v. Dodson's Dependent, 247 Miss. 1, 15, 153 So. 2d 276, 283 (1963); see also Bradley & Thompson, Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Law § 5:59. The supreme court clarified that the degree to which the preexisting disease or disability contributes in the results following the current injury “is not often susceptible of exact proof, with mathematical accuracy.” Se. Constr. Co., 247 Miss. at 15, 153 So. 2d at 283. Accordingly, “[t]he [C]ommission has a reasonable discretion in apportioning the contribution of the preexisting condition. That percentage is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of the [C]ommission, to be exercised in view of all the circumstances, and upon a fair view of all of the facts.” Id. The Commission's finding as to “the degree of contribution is a determination of a question of fact, and will not be changed unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, or is manifestly wrong.” Id.
¶35. After our review, we hold that the Commission's findings as to the degree of contribution of West's 2012 injury in the results of his 2019 injury (and the resulting apportionment) are supported by West's medical records. Notably, the medical records reflect that when Dr. McCraney placed West at MMI in July 2021 regarding his left upper extremity, he assigned West a fifteen-percent left upper extremity impairment rating—and Dr. McCraney indicated that this impairment rating included West's prior thirteen-percent impairment rating from his 2015 FCE. Accordingly, we find that the Commission did not reversibly err in its apportionment of West's 2019 injury.
IV. Whether the Commission failed to properly address West's neck injury.
¶36. Finally, West argues that the AJ and Commission failed to address West's compensable neck injury in their orders or make any determination regarding the existence or extent of temporary disability or permanent disability. West asserts that throughout the hearing before the AJ, he testified about the continuation of his neck pain and the contradictory statements he received from his physicians. West maintains that despite the contradictory opinions entered into evidence, the AJ did not provide any analysis in his order as to why he considered only Dr. Rahul Vohra's opinion.2
¶37. This Court will only reverse a Commission's decision if it “lacks the support of substantial evidence, is arbitrary or capricious, is beyond the Commission's scope or its power, or violates constitutional or statutory rights.” Kroger, 327 So. 3d at 683 (¶15). “Substantial evidence consists of sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to accept as adequate to support the Commission's conclusion.” Sheffield v. S.J. Louis Constr. Inc., 285 So. 3d 614, 618 (¶8) (Miss. 2019). Stated differently, “the evidence must afford a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). In determining whether substantial evidence supports the Commission's decision, “this Court may not reweigh the evidence before the Commission.” Curry, 296 So. 3d at 197 (¶13). Our deferential “standard of review means that this Court cannot set aside a Commission's decision that is supported by substantial credible evidence, even if conflicting evidence exists and even if this Court may have found the facts otherwise if it were the trier of facts.” Sheffield, 285 So. 3d at 618 (¶8).
¶38. As addressed above, the AJ's order contains a concise but thorough summary of West's lengthy medical history and treatment. The AJ's order referenced West's evaluations and treatments related to his neck injury and cervical spine. West appealed the AJ's order and argued, in part, that the AJ failed to address his neck injury.
¶39. Upon review, the Commission found that although the AJ “did not explicitly state ․ that there was no permanent disability for the neck injury,” the AJ “did indeed reference evidence that supported a [zero percent] anatomical impairment rating to the body for the Claimant's neck injury ․” After reviewing the record, the Commission found substantial evidence to support the finding of no permanent disability resulting from West's neck injury. In making its determination, the Commission stated that it relied on West's medical records from Dr. Rahul Vohra, specifically noting that Dr. Vohra placed West at MMI for his neck injury on April 5, 2020, released West without impairment or restrictions, and assigned West a zero-percent anatomical impairment rating to his body. The Commission noted Dr. Vohra's opinion that West's upper extremity complaints were unrelated to the cervical spine.
¶40. In determining whether the Commission's finding is supported by substantial evidence, we turn to review West's medical records relating to his neck pain and cervical spine. The records show that after West's 2019 work injury, he received treatment from Dr. McCraney. At an appointment with Dr. McCraney on April 6, 2020, West complained of neck pain and numbness in his left hand, in addition to his continued shoulder pain. Based on these complaints, Dr. McCraney ordered an MRI of West's cervical spine. The April 2020 MRI results showed that West had “significant bilateral foraminal stenosis” at C5 and C6, so Dr. McCraney referred West to Dr. Moriarty, a neurosurgeon.
¶41. Dr. Moriarty examined West and reviewed his April 2020 MRI results. Dr. Moriarty diagnosed West with left-sided cervical radiculopathy,3 and he concluded that West's diagnosis was the result of his 2019 work injury. Based on Dr. Moriarty's findings, West received a cervical epidural spinal injection in September 2020 to help with his pain. According to West's records from NewSouth NeuroSpine, the injection ultimately failed to provide West with relief from his pain.
¶42. On October 16, 2020, West underwent a cervical myelogram. Dr. Moriarty reviewed the results of the myelogram, which showed mild to moderate bilateral foraminal stenosis. Dr. Moriarty ordered upper electrical studies with Dr. Vohra to determine if West clearly had cervical radiculopathy.
¶43. On November 16, 2020, Dr. Vohra examined West and noted West's complaints of neck and left shoulder pain as well as left hand numbness. Dr. Vohra performed an EMG and nerve conduction studies, which revealed mild left ulnar neuropathy at West's elbow. Notably, Dr. Vohra found “no evidence of left cervical radiculopathy” or “brachial plexopathy.”4
¶44. On January 15, 2021, Dr. Moriarty filled out a questionnaire Gulf Relay sent to him regarding West's medical care. In the questionnaire response, Dr. Moriarty opined that his diagnosis “for Mr. West, as it relates to his work injury and from a neurosurgical perspective, would be left-sided cervical radiculopathy.” Dr. Moriarty acknowledged, however, that West's electrical studies did not show clear electrical evidence of cervical radiculopathy.
¶45. As for whether West had reached MMI, Dr. Moriarty stated that it would be difficult for him to answer. Nevertheless, Dr. Moriarty opined that if West's symptoms were stable, then West was at MMI. Dr. Moriarty ultimately referred to Dr. Vohra for a determination of whether West had reached MMI, explaining, “[I]f Dr. Vohra had further nonsurgical treatment recommendations, then I would defer to Dr. Vohra in terms of [MMI]. If not, then I would say [West] is at his point of [MMI]. For an impairment rating, I would defer to Dr. Vohra for that determination.”
¶46. On April 5, 2021, West returned to Dr. Vohra and saw his nurse practitioner, Alice Messer. West indicated that in December 2020, Dr. McCraney performed surgery on West's left shoulder. West informed Messer that when he lifted two-pound weights in physical therapy, he felt tingling in his fingers that radiated up to his elbow, possibly even his neck.
¶47. After a physical exam, Messer and Dr. Vohra opined that West's symptoms were not related to his cervical spine. Dr. Vohra placed West at MMI and released him to return to work at full duty with a zero-percent permanent partial impairment rating to his body as a whole. Messer then referred West to Dr. McCraney for treatment for his shoulder and elbow issues. Based on West's complaints of tingling in his fingers and elbow during physical therapy, Messer recommended that West not use any weights in physical therapy until Dr. McCraney could see him.
¶48. On April 28, 2022, at the AJ's request, Dr. Vohra examined West and reevaluated West's cervical spine. Dr. Vohra acknowledged West's complaints of neck pain, but Dr. Vohra stated that West's cervical examination “continues to be normal.” Dr. Vohra restated his opinion that from the perspective of West's neck pain complaints, West “is at MMI without impairment or restrictions.”
¶49. Keeping in mind our standard of review, we find that the record contains substantial evidence to support the Commission's finding that West sustained no permanent disability as a result of his neck injury and that West is not entitled to permanent disability benefits for his neck injury.
CONCLUSION
¶50. After reviewing the record, we find that the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm.
¶51. AFFIRMED.
FOOTNOTES
1. Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-3(i) (Rev. 2021) defines disability as “incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or other employment, which incapacity and the extent thereof must be supported by medical findings.”
2. Dr. Rahul Vohra was a specialist in physical medicine and rehabilitation.
3. “Cervical radiculopathy” is known as a pinched nerve in the neck. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, OrthoInfo, https://orthoinfo.aaos.org/en/diseases--conditions/cervical-radiculopathy-pinched-nerve/ (last visited July 28, 2025).
4. “Brachial plexopathy” is known as damage to the group of nerves that sends signals from the spinal cord to the shoulder, arm, and hand. Mayo Clinic, Brachial Plexus Injury, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/brachial-plexus-injury/symptoms-causes/syc-20350235 (last visited July 28, 2025).
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
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Docket No: NO. 2024-WC-00816-COA
Decided: July 29, 2025
Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
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