LENOIR v. STATE (2025)

¶1. On February 24, 2023, Sherry Gates filed an affidavit against Ray Lenoir in the Monroe County Justice Court, charging Lenoir with “willfully and unlawfully represent[ing] himself as an attorney” to Gates in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 73-3-55 (Rev. 2022).¹ Gates alleged that Lenoir said “he would represent her son” who had “charges pending in Monroe County Circuit Court.” The affidavit further alleged that Lenoir “requested a retainer in the amount of $1,250.00,” and Gates paid Lenoir “$850.00 of the $1,250.00 requested.” According to Gates's statement to the district attorney's office, Lenoir had prepared “paperwork” for her to sign, and he filed this paperwork on December 5, 2022, with the circuit court.² However, Gates later discovered when she went to circuit court “that Ray Lenoir could not represent my son because he is not an attorney.” On May 26, 2023, the justice court found Lenoir guilty of practicing law without a license. Lenoir was ordered to serve four months in jail and to pay $387.75 in costs and fines.

¶2. Lenoir, pro se, appealed the justice court's judgment to the Monroe County Circuit Court on June 20, 2023.³ On October 31, 2023, Lenoir filed a motion to dismiss the charging affidavit, claiming it was “fatally defective” for failing “to conclude with ‘against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.’ ”

¶3. A circuit court held a bench trial on December 20, 2023, before Judge John White, with Lenoir representing himself pro se. Gates testified that Lenoir told her that he worked for a law firm. Lenoir took $850.00 from Gates as part of her retainer. He gave her “paperwork ․ showing that it had been filed” with the circuit court. However, when she was at court in February 2023, she observed Lenoir before Judge White. She testified, “And, at that time, [the judge] was letting [Lenoir] know then if you're still practicing law and have people's impression, then I'm going to put you in jail at that time.” Gates said she immediately informed the district attorney that she had paid Lenoir to represent her son. The motion that Lenoir had filed on behalf of Gates's son was entered into evidence. Gates allegedly was not aware Lenoir was not an attorney until that day in court in February 2023.

¶4. Lenoir cross-examined Gates, who admitted she had known him “[a]ll of [her] life.”⁴ When Lenoir asked Gates if she ever knew him to be a lawyer, she responded, “Yeah, for years so-called to be.” But Gates later clarified:

Everybody knows you've never been an attorney[;] you always stated to people that you were connected to an attorney. Let's correct that. You state to everyone that you talk to that ․ you're affiliated with an attorney out of Tupelo.

Lenoir asserted that Gates had presented no evidence that she gave him money for a retainer, although she claimed that she had asked Lenoir to give her a receipt. On redirect, Gates testified that Lenoir “always states to anyone ․ that he works with this law firm.” She had also been contacted by others “caught up in the prison system” who had “been through the same ordeal, said the same fee is [$]1,250.”

¶5. Chip Benjamin, a criminal investigator with the district attorney's office, testified that he met with Gates and her daughter. From the conversation, Benjamin gathered that “Lenoir had approached them representing himself as an attorney with the Martin Law Firm out of Tupelo.” Gates told Benjamin that she gave Lenoir $850 in cash as part of the $1,250 retainer. Benjamin testified that it was his opinion that Lenoir “was absolutely representing hi[m]self as an attorney.”

¶6. After the prosecution rested, Lenoir argued:

The only thing I heard today was hearsay, she said this, hearsay. She had nothing to support it. She ha[s] no receipts. She [kept] saying that I was [an] attorney, she been knowing me my whole life. Never been [an] attorney in my life, never represented [any]body. She [has] no evidence whatsoever to support anything she said but a[n] affidavit that is defective and full of lies.

The prosecution responded that Lenoir had held himself out “saying here's this documentation, sign this and I'll file this, I'll get [your son] out of jail, pay me $850․ You pay me money, I draft the paperwork. By that very definition, that's what he did, he practiced law without a license.”

¶7. Judge White then made the following bench ruling:

Mr. Lenoir, you're finally representing yourself, which you have an absolute right to do.

I was the Judge that -- I'm going to go on and say all this on the record because I know you're probably going to appeal and I want you to if that's what you want to do. Okay? So, I'm going to say it on the record, because I want the appeals court and everybody to know what's going on.

I was in the middle of the Christopher Smith trial right here in Aberdeen, Mississippi, and Lord knows, it took me forever to get to that trial. You were in here. I was told by the clerks that you were filing paperwork in the very case which I was trying at the time. And I said, let him do it, you know, you were filing paperwork.

That's why I brought you in front of me, put you under oath, you swore under oath, and I explained to you the problems with what you were doing․ And you told me you weren't practicing law․

And that's when I assume Ms. Gates, the description she gave in her direct testimony, she saw me swearing you in and you swore under oath that you were not practicing law.

And so she saw that and she went, wait a minute, he represents me. And that's when she went up to the District Attorney's office and the District Attorney's office got involved. Now, what does that make me? Look, I'm a Judge. You stood in front of me and swore under oath that you were not practicing law. In my opinion, I could probably hold you in contempt of court for swearing to me under oath that, or ask the District Attorney's office to charge you with perjury, but I'm not going to do that. I'm not a prosecutor․

I know, I know in my heart of hearts, I know, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but in my heart of hearts, you've been practicing law for years in Monroe County. I know it. It's beyond the burden that I have.

So I find you guilty of practicing law without a license and there ain't no doubt in my mind of what's been happening.

On January 3, 2024, the circuit court entered an order nunc pro tunc to December 20, 2023, finding Lenoir guilty of practicing law without a license. The court sentenced Lenoir to one year in the Monroe County jail, with six months to serve in custody and six months suspended.⁵ The court also ordered Lenoir to pay $850 in restitution to Sherry Gates and to pay the circuit court a fine of $200 and assessments of $187.75.⁶

¶8. Lenoir appeals from the circuit court's judgment, arguing that (I) the charging affidavit was “fatally defective”; (II) his “right to a fair trial before an impartial judge was denied”; and (III) his constitutional rights to a trial by jury and to trial counsel were violated.

¶9. The State has not filed an appellee's brief. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that although “[a]n appellee's failure to file a brief on appeal ‘is tantamount to confession’ of the errors alleged by the appellant[,] ․ automatic reversal is not required if [we] can say with confidence that the case should be affirmed.” Chatman v. State, 761 So. 2d 851, 854 (¶9) (Miss. 2000) (quoting Muhammad v. Muhammad, 622 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (Miss. 1993)). Thus, “[i]n order to merit reversal, the appellant's argument should at least create enough doubt in the judiciousness of the trial court's judgment that this Court cannot say with confidence that the case should be affirmed.” In re Est. of Dabney, 69 So. 3d 71, 73 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

¶10. We determine that the circuit court did not err in denying Lenoir's motion to dismiss the charging affidavit. However, we hold that the circuit judge's comments at trial create a reasonable doubt as to his impartiality, supporting a finding of plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial before a different judge. We address Lenoir's remaining claims, as they are likely to reoccur on remand.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Lenoir's motion to dismiss the charging affidavit.

¶11. After appealing to the circuit court, Lenoir filed a motion to dismiss the charging affidavit because it failed to conclude with the phrase “against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.” At trial, Lenoir asked the court for a ruling on his motion to dismiss, and the circuit court summarily denied the motion. Lenoir argues that the court's denial of his motion was error.

¶12. Article 6, section 169 of the Mississippi Constitution states that “all indictments shall conclude ‘against the peace and dignity of the state.’ ” The charge against Lenoir was instituted by a charging affidavit that Gates filed with the justice court. See MRCrP 2.1 (stating “[a]ll criminal proceedings shall be commenced either by charging affidavit, indictment, or bill of information”). The affidavit does not contain the language “against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.”

¶13. Lenoir cites the Mississippi Supreme Court's holding in Clingan v. State, 135 Miss. 621, 100 So. 185 (1924), in which the supreme court stated:

We must believe that the provision we are considering means that all indictments and informations, and affidavits upon which criminal prosecutions are based, must conclude ‘against the peace and dignity of the state of Mississippi.’ It is true, even then, the provision appears to us to be idle and meaningless, but we find it in the fundamental law, and we cannot disregard it. The affidavit in the case at bar wholly neglects and contemns this requirement, and is fatally defective.

Id. at 624, 100 So. at 185 (emphasis added) (quoting Love v. State, 8 So. 465 (Miss. 1891)). Although in agreement with Love’s “criticism of this constitutional requirement,” the Clingan court nevertheless held that “the affidavit charging appellant with the crime” for possession of intoxicating liquor was defective and reversed and remanded the case. Id.

¶14. However, in Stidham v. State, 750 So. 2d 1238 (Miss. 1999), which is procedurally similar to our case, the supreme court clarified its application of this constitutional provision. The defendant in Stidham had been charged, found guilty, and fined for the misdemeanor of speeding. Id. at 1240 (¶1). Like Lenoir, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the affidavit (a uniform parking ticket) on appeal to the circuit court because it “did not conclude with the words ‘against the peace and dignity of the State,” as required by the state's Constitution. Id. at 1244 (¶24). The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss as well as his motion to amend the affidavit. Id.

¶15. On appeal, the supreme court reasoned:

The constitutional provision at issue only requires the language, “against the peace and dignity of the State,” to be in all indictments: “The style of all process shall be ‘The State of Mississippi,’ and all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by the authority of ‘The State of Mississippi,’ and all indictments shall conclude ‘against the peace and dignity of the state.’ ” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 169 (1890) (emphasis added).

The intent and plain wording highlighted in our previous constitution requiring the quoted language for all prosecutions is as follows: “The style of all process shall be ‘The State of Mississippi,’ and all prosecutions shall be carried on in the name and by the authority of ‘The State of Mississippi,’ and shall conclude ‘against the peace and dignity of the state.’ ” Miss. Const. art. 6, § 18 (1869) (emphasis added).

The construction of a constitutional section is of course ascertained from the plain meaning of the words and terms used within it. Ex parte Dennis, 334 So. 2d 369, 373 (Miss. 1976). If there be no ambiguity, there of course exists no reason for legislative or judicial construction. Id. There is no ambiguity as to the meaning of “indictment.” In contrast to other charging instruments such as affidavits and information, an indictment is an accusation presented on oath by a grand jury. 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 4a at 316 (1991).

․

If we were to interpret the 1890 constitutional provision at issue as having the same meaning as the 1869 constitutional provision, then the change in language from all prosecutions to all indictments would be rendered meaningless. “Where the words or provisions of a statute differ from those of a previous statute on the same subject, they are presumably intended to have a different construction or meaning, and to denote an intention to change the law.” 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316 at 553 (1953) (footnotes omitted).

Stidham, 750 So. 2d at 1244-45 (¶¶24-30). Therefore, the Stidham court overruled its prior holding in Powell v. State, 196 Miss. 331, 17 So. 2d 524 (1944), “that an affidavit in a misdemeanor case is subject to the requirement of art. 6, § 169 that the words ‘against the peace and dignity of the State,’ should be included.”

¶16. Accordingly, we find no merit to Lenoir's argument that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charging affidavit.

II. Whether Lenoir was denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial judge.

¶17. Lenoir contends that “[d]uring the trial it became evident that the trial judge had knowledge of dispute[d] evidentiary facts relevant to the case and conviction.” He claims that the judge's “personal knowledge” of the other case (with defendant Christopher Smith) “influenced his decision and caused him to be bias[ed] against [Lenoir].”

¶18. Lenoir did not seek recusal of Judge White prior to trial. Our Court has “indicated many times that a defendant can waive an objection to the trial judge if there is no motion to recuse or motion to continue filed or if the defendant never raises the issue at any other point during the trial.” Price v. State, 361 So. 3d 105, 118 (¶52) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Day v. State, 285 So. 3d 171, 179 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). However, we may review the recusal issue under the plain-error doctrine if Lenoir presents “sufficient evidence to warrant such review.” See Faerber v. Faerber, 13 So. 3d 853, 865 (¶48) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). In this instance, we find that he has.

¶19. In Price, 361 So. 3d at 118 (¶54), our Court held that “a trial judge is presumed to be ‘qualified and unbiased.’ ” (Quoting Kinney v. S. Miss. Plan. & Dev. Dist. Inc., 202 So. 3d 187, 194 (¶20) (Miss. 2016)). To overcome this presumption, “the party must produce evidence of a reasonable doubt about the validity of the presumption.” Id. “Reasonable doubt may be found when there is a question of whether a reasonable person, knowing all of the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.” Id.

¶20. In reviewing Lenoir's claim, we find the record contains “evidence of a reasonable doubt” as to the circuit judge's impartiality. Judge White acknowledged that while presiding over the underlying (Smith) case, he had admonished Lenoir that he better not be practicing law. The judge also commented that he could charge Lenoir for contempt based on that prior exchange. What this Court finds most bothersome is the judge's commentary during the pronouncement of the guilty verdict:

I know, I know in my heart of hearts, I know, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but in my heart of hearts, you've been practicing law for years in Monroe County. I know it. It's beyond the burden that I have.

So I find you guilty of practicing law without a license and there ain't no doubt in my mind of what's been happening.

(Emphasis added). The Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(5), states: “A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice[.]” We find Judge White's comments at trial create “a reasonable doubt about the validity of the presumption” and support a finding of plain error.

III. Whether Lenoir was denied his rights to a jury trial and to be represented by trial counsel.

¶21. Although the prior issue is dispositive to the appeal, we find Lenoir's remaining claims—that he was deprived of his right to a jury trial and his right to be represented by counsel—are meritorious. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970), the United States Supreme Court established that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for which he is charged carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months. As Lenoir notes, he “was convicted for a misdemeanor that carried a maximum sentence of [one] year, which exceeded six months.”

¶22. Regarding Lenoir's right to trial counsel, Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.1(b) provides that “[a]n indigent defendant shall be entitled to have an attorney appointed in any criminal proceeding which may result in punishment by loss of liberty, in any other criminal proceeding in which the court concludes that the interests of justice so require, or as required by law.” MRCrP Rule 7.1(b) (emphasis added). Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-15-15 also provides, “When any person shall be charged with ․ misdemeanor punishable by confinement for ninety (90) days or more ․ the court or the judge in vacation, being satisfied that such person is an indigent person and is unable to employ counsel, may, in the discretion of the court, appoint counsel to defend him.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-15 (Rev. 2020). “The accused shall have such representation available at every critical stage of the proceeding against him where a substantial right may be affected.” Id.; see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-374, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979) (holding “that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense”).

¶23. Furthermore, the record does not indicate that Lenoir expressly waived his right to a jury trial or his right to trial counsel—let alone that he waived those rights knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. In Longs v. State, 388 So. 3d 630 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), our Court recognized that before a defendant may waive his right to a trial by jury, the trial court “shall address the defendant personally, advise the defendant of the right to a jury trial, and ascertain that the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 633 (¶12) (quoting MRCrP 18.1(b)(1)). The Supreme Court has held in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975),

Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.

Id. at 835; see also Dunn v. State, 693 So. 2d 1333, 1339 (Miss. 1997) (“Absent a valid waiver of [the right to counsel], if an uncounseled defendant is sentenced to prison, the conviction itself is unconstitutional.” (quoting United States v. Haymer, 995 F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1993)).

¶24. We find that the circuit court failed to comply with Rule 7.1(b) and Rule 18.1(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as the United States Constitution and the Mississippi Constitution, which require that a waiver of these rights must be express, knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. On remand, Lenoir should not be retried without a jury or trial counsel unless the trial judge makes an on-the-record determination that Lenoir has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived those rights.

¶25. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial before a different circuit judge in accordance with this opinion.

¶26. REVERSED AND REMANDED.

¶27. I agree with the majority opinion except the part holding the trial court in error and remanding for a jury trial when Lenoir never requested a jury trial. Lenoir was charged with a misdemeanor. In this country, the constitutional right to a jury trial is a significant protection for citizens’ liberties. “[A] defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for which he is charged carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months.” Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542, 109 S.Ct. 1289, 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) (citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970)). Lenoir was charged with practicing law without a license, which carries a maximum penalty of one year in prison. There is certainly no dispute that Lenoir was entitled to a jury trial. My concern, however, is Lenoir's failure to request a jury trial and our holding the trial court in error when the jury-trial issue was never raised in that court.

¶28. This Court has only recently declared the corollary that it is reversible error when a circuit court holds a misdemeanor trial without a jury even when a jury trial was never requested. See Melton v. State, No. 2024-KM-00337-COA, 2025 WL 1742140 *2-5 (¶¶11-18) (Miss. Ct. App. June 24, 2025). In accordance with Melton’s procedural posture and in tandem with Judge Emfinger's dissent in that case, I write here to preserve my disagreement with this new exception to the longstanding precedent holding that issues not presented to a trial court are procedurally barred on appeal.

¶29. In the past, this state has only been presented with issues regarding the denial of a defendant's request for a jury trial. See id. at *7 (¶28) (Emfinger, J., dissenting) (citing Walls v. Spell, 722 So. 2d 566, 572 (¶25) (Miss. 1998) (stating that it was required by statute for one accused of criminal contempt to “request[ ] a jury trial” in order to receive one (emphasis added)); Harkins v. State, 735 So. 2d 317, 318 (¶2) (Miss. 1999) (recognizing that the “trial court erred in refusing Harkins’ request for a jury trial” (emphasis added)); Skinner v. State, 809 So. 2d 782, 784 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing and remanding a conviction after a trial judge “denied the request for a jury trial” (emphasis added)); Frazier v. State, 817 So. 2d 663, 664 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that “Frazier's assignment of error must fail because he does not preserve his request for a jury trial in the record” (emphasis added)); Ude v. State, 992 So. 2d 1213, 1217-18 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (finding error when “although Ude requested a jury trial, he did not receive one” and reversing the trial court's judgment in turn (emphasis added)).

¶30. To put it quite plainly, I do not support declaring a trial judge in error concerning a matter that was never presented to him to determine. Lenoir's alleged offense was a misdemeanor, and he never requested a jury trial. The trial judge never denied him a jury trial. Yet we tell the judge he is in error despite years of appellate jurisprudence indicating otherwise.⁷ Put differently, our state courts have held that defendants cannot engage in gamesmanship ⁸ by placing appellate bombs into the record as fail-safes for seeking reversal if their trial does not yield their desired result.⁹ Make no mistake about it, if Lenoir had requested a jury trial and that request had been denied, I would be in complete agreement with the majority opinion. That did not happen because Lenoir did not request a jury trial. Even more curious, Lenoir never indicated that he objected to the circuit court hearing the case. Lenoir sat through his entire trial without ever once requesting a jury. Instead, Lenoir raised the jury trial issue for the first time on appeal. Lenoir made an obvious decision for the trial judge to try his case since he never objected, and he now appeals on an issue he never raised when the trial judge's decision was not to his liking. Therefore, I respectfully dissent in part.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 73-3-55 provides in part:It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the practice of law in this state who has not been licensed according to law. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of Section 97-23-43. Any person who shall for fee or reward or promise, directly or indirectly, write or dictate any paper or instrument of writing, to be filed in any cause or proceeding pending, or to be instituted in any court in this state, or give any counsel or advice therein, or who shall write or dictate any bill of sale, deed of conveyance, deed of trust, mortgage, contract, or last will and testament, or shall make or certify to any abstract of title to real estate other than his own or in which he may own an interest, shall be held to be engaged in the practice of law.Miss. Code Ann. § 73-3-55.

2.   The “paperwork” was a motion to dismiss or to quash an indictment. Lenoir's name does not appear on the motion.

3.   See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-1 (Rev. 2020) (providing that a defendant may appeal a judgment of the justice court to the circuit court in counties where there is no county court).

4.   Gates explained on redirect that her recently deceased daughter was related to Lenoir and “was determined to use him” for representation; so Gates went along with her daughter's decision.

5.   See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-23-43 (Rev. 2020) (stating that a person practicing law without a license shall “be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred ($100.00) dollars or more than two hundred ($200.00) dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than three months or more than twelve months or both”).

6.   The circuit court entered an order on February 21, 2024, staying execution of Lenoir's conviction and releasing him from custody until the disposition of his appeal. However, our Court's records indicate that Lenoir has since been convicted and sentenced for drug possession and trafficking charges. See Appellant's Brs., Lenoir v. State, 2024-KA-01342-COA (July 7 & 17, 2025).

7.   See Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278, 342-43 (¶189) (Miss. 2014) (“A trial judge cannot be held in error for matters not presented to him or her.” (citing Neider v. Franklin, 844 So. 2d 433, 436 (Miss. 2003)); Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073, 1114 (¶139) (Miss. 2010) (“We will not hold a trial court in error for issues not presented to it for ruling.” (citing Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. 1985)); Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 232 (¶57) (Miss. 2010) (“The trial court cannot be held to err on an issue not presented to it for decision.” (citing McCurdy v. State, 511 So. 2d 148, 150) (Miss. 1987)); Smith v. State, 729 So. 2d 1191, 1226 (¶172) (Miss. 1998) (“A trial judge will not be found in error on a matter not presented to him for decision.” (quoting Jones v. State, 606 So. 2d 1051, 1058 (Miss. 1992)).

8.   In other words, “[o]ur trial courts are not dusty streets at high noon where one gunslinger hopes to get the drop on another.” Butler Snow LLP v. Est. of Mayfield, 281 So. 3d 1214, 1220 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019). Although referring to the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court stated our rules “were adopted and implemented and will continue to be enforced so as to minimize gamesmanship and ambush.” Id. Here, a trial judge is told he erred when the defendant never requested a jury trial in front of that judge, but it certainly could be argued Lenoir engaged in gamesmanship with that non-decision on appeal.

9.   The Journal of Appellate Practice and Process published the following:Preservation serves important purposes. A timely and specific objection alerts the trial court and the adversary to the alleged error, giving both an opportunity to correct the problem or take ameliorative action, thus potentially obviating the need to raise the issue on appeal. It thus encourages truth-seeking, the efficient resolution of the case, and the conservation of appellate resources. Preservation also discourages gamesmanship by preventing a party from saving a “trump card” argument until appeal.Larry Cunningham, Appellate Review of Unpreserved Questions in Criminal Cases: An Attempt to Define the “Interest of Justice,” 11 J. App. Prac. & Process 285, 285-86 (2010) (emphasis added). This tactic is also known as “sandbagging,” which Judge Emfinger referenced in the Melton dissent. Melton, 2025 WL 1742140 at *8 (¶29) (Emfinger, J., dissenting). “A party who fails, through wil[l]ful ignorance or otherwise, to timely apprise itself of such critical information waives the right to have the issue addressed on the merits.” Id. at *8-9 (¶30) (citing Order, Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So. 2d 1140, 1175 (Miss. June 12, 1991)). “This principle of well-entrenched law is designed particularly to nullify the rewards of ‘sandbagging’ through employment of dilatory tactics.” Id. (other quotation marks omitted); see also Read v. State, 430 So. 2d 832, 841 (Miss. 1983) (“ ‘[S]andbagging’ by definition assumes a meaningful opportunity to present the point to the trial court, coupled with a deliberate, cynical refusal to do so.”); Byrd v. State, 741 So. 2d 1028, 1032 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (stating a defendant “could not ‘sandbag’ the trial court by sitting idly by without filing a speedy trial demand until the day of trial”) (citing Walton v. State, 678 So. 2d 645, 650 (Miss. 1996)).

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, McCARTY AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. LAWRENCE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY CARLTON, P.J., AND EMFINGER, J. WEDDLE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.