WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS (2025)

¶1. Elton Williams appeals the judgment of the Holmes County Chancery Court granting a divorce in favor of Virginia Williams on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Elton argues that the chancellor erred by ignoring the affirmative defense of condonation and by relying on unsubstantiated and uncorroborated testimony.

¶2. Upon review of the record, we find that the chancery court has not entered a final, appealable judgment in this case. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal in this divorce proceeding, and this appeal must be dismissed.

FACTS

¶3. Because we lack jurisdiction, we will only provide a brief recitation of the facts of the case. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 281 So. 3d 171, 173 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019); Walters v. Walters, 956 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Virginia filed for divorce from her husband, Elton, on the ground of adultery and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences.

¶4. The chancellor held a bifurcated trial—the first trial concerned the fault-based divorce grounds, and a second trial was scheduled to address the equitable distribution of the marital estate. After the trial on the fault-based divorce grounds, the chancellor entered a judgment finding that Virginia was entitled to a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The judgment of divorce was entered on August 3, 2023. On September 1, 2023, Elton's counsel filed a notice of appeal from the August 3, 2023 judgment of divorce.

¶5. The trial on the parties’ equitable distribution of the marital estate was set for October 30, 2023. A week before trial, Elton's counsel filed a motion to stay pending this appeal, asking the chancellor to stay the equitable-distribution trial until the appellate court rules on the appeal from the judgment of divorce.¹

DISCUSSION

¶6. As a procedural matter, we must address the issue of our jurisdiction over this appeal. The parties did not raise or acknowledge the issue of jurisdiction in their appellate briefs.² However, “this Court is required to note its own lack of jurisdiction.” Montgomery, 281 So. 3d at 173 (¶5). “Generally, only final judgments are appealable.” Id. “A final, appealable, judgment is one that adjudicates the merits of the controversy, settles all issues as to all the parties, and requires no further action by the lower court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶7. The judgment before us on appeal is the August 3, 2023 judgment of divorce, which grants Virginia a fault-based divorce. The issue of property settlement is still pending in the chancery court. This Court has held that “[a] judgment granting a fault-based divorce is a non-final order if issues attendant to the fault-based divorce, such as property division, remain before the lower court.” Id. at (¶6) (quoting Walters, 956 So. 2d at 1053 (¶9)); accord, e.g., M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So. 2d 897, 898-900 (¶¶3-6) (Miss. 2006) (holding that a “judgment of divorce” granting a divorce was not final because it did not resolve issues of property division, alimony, child custody, and child support); Ory v. Ory, 936 So. 2d 405, 408 (¶3) & n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that a “judgment of divorce” was not final because the chancery court reserved the division of the marital assets for a later date).

¶8. In Montgomery, 281 So. 3d at 173 (¶7), this Court explained that Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides one exception to the rule that only final judgments are appealable: “the [trial] court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment.” (Quoting M.R.C.P. 54(b)). The trial court's “expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay” must be stated “in a definite, unmistakable manner.” Id. In the case before us, the chancellor “did not make such an express certification. Indeed, the judge did not make any statement to the effect that there was ‘no just reason for delay’ of an appeal.” Id. at 174 (¶8) (quoting M.R.C.P. 54(b)).

¶9. As in Montgomery, the chancery court in the case before us “has not entered a final, appealable judgment[;] ․ [therefore,] this Court lacks jurisdiction, and this appeal must be dismissed.” Id. at (¶9).

¶10. APPEAL DISMISSED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not contain an order granting the motion to stay, but the parties have not had a trial addressing the equitable distribution of the marital estate, suggesting the chancellor granted the motion.

2.   On April 14, 2025, this Court, on its own motion, ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the judgment appealed is a final, appealable judgment. Although the supplemental briefs were ordered to be filed within thirty days from the date of the April 14, 2025 order, the parties did not submit supplemental briefs.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.