JACKSON v. STATE (2025)

¶1. A jury convicted Brandon Jackson of three counts of trafficking controlled substances. On appeal, Jackson argues that although law enforcement obtained a warrant to search his residence, the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Therefore, he argues that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence seized during the search and dismissed the indictment. Although we agree with Jackson that probable cause was lacking, we conclude that law enforcement reasonably relied on a facially valid warrant. Therefore, the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule applies, and the trial court did not err by denying Jackson's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm Jackson's convictions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Around 9:45 p.m. on November 17, 2020, pursuant to a search warrant, Investigator Ryan Stachura and other officers with the Pearl River County Sheriff's Department (PRCSD) searched Jackson's residence in Pearl River County. The officers seized approximately ten pounds of marijuana, eighty-three Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) pills, half a pound of Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) edibles, and twenty-one Amphetamine pills. They also seized digital scales, a vacuum sealer, a Gilboa Snake AR-15 rifle, and a satchel containing approximately $8,000 in bundles of $1,000. Jackson was charged with trafficking marijuana (Count I) and MDMA (Count II), aggravated trafficking of THC (Count III), and possession of Amphetamines with the intent to sell (Count IV). Following a one-day jury trial, Jackson was acquitted of Count IV but convicted of Counts I, II, and III. The court sentenced Jackson to serve concurrent terms of ten years, ten years, and twenty-five years day-for-day in the custody of the Department of Corrections. Jackson filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which was denied, and a notice of appeal. On appeal, Jackson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or allege that any error occurred during his trial. Rather, he alleges that the trial court erred by denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the indictment. Therefore, we will focus the remainder of our discussion on the search and the evidence presented at the pretrial suppression hearing.

¶3. Stachura signed the affidavit for the search warrant, setting out the following facts and circumstances in support:

For approximately one-month Investigators with the [PRCSD] Narcotics Unit have been receiving intelligence on 10A and 10B Luther Walker Rd. in reference to the sale and distribution of controlled substances. On October 7th, 2020 Investigators received a crime stoppers tip in reference to an unknown white male selling “marijuana, pharmaceutical pills, and other controlled substances.” Investigators were also informed from another source that one trailer on the property was being renovated, and one was being lived in. Investigators were informed that both trailers were controlled and occupied by the same individual. Around the same time, Investigators also received intelligence from a source that has proven reliable in the past that wishes to remain confidential.

The source informed Investigators that there may be narcotics being delivered to that address through parcel services. Investigator Stachura is familiar with these types of investigations as he has seen several in the past. Typically, when conducting package interdiction, one would look for packages originating in California, Oregon, Colorado, or other states with legalized marijuana or other known drug distribution hubs. Also, an indicator is paying excessive amounts for overnight air, as the sender and receiver wish to have the package in the mail system for the shortest amount of time to prevent discovery by employees or law enforcement. Based upon training, experience, and previous investigations, Inv. Stachura knows that voluminous amounts of controlled substances are being delivered through the mail daily, unbeknownst to the carrier.

On Tuesday, November 17, 2020 Investigators Stachura, Giadrosich, and Quave were on routine narcotics patrol when they traveled down Luther Walker road, which is a dead-end road. Upon coming to the end of the roadway near 10 Luther Walker Rd., Investigators observed a motorcycle leaving the residence. The motorcycle almost struck investigators, and ․ Investigators followed the motorcycle ․ to a safe distance away from the residence as to not alert the suspects to law enforcement presence in the area, and conducted a traffic stop on the motor vehicle.

Upon making contact with the driver of said motorcycle, investigators observed bulges coming f[ro]m the suspect's jacket. Investigators conducted a pat down, commonly referred to as a [Terry] frisk, upon the driver, at which point the driver spontaneously uttered “I have some weed on me.” Investigators recovered the marijuana from the driver's front right jacket pocket and furthered their Investigation. The driver did not wish to cooperate with law enforcement on the source of his marijuana, however investigator Stachura examined the packaging and took note of its condition. The outside temperature at that time of night was approximately 51 degrees Fahrenheit. The clear plastic ziplock bag was contained within a jacket pocket, and the driver was exposed to extremely cold air on a motorcycle. There was no condensation located within the clear plastic bag of marijuana even though it had been held next to the driver's body, and also exposed to cold weather from riding the motorcycle.

Investigators have reason to believe, and do believe that marijuana is being sold and stored at 10A and 10B Luther Walker Rd. Investigators believe that both residences that are located on the same property are being controlled by the same suspect. Investigators further believe that controlled substances, packaging material that would be consistent with the bag of marijuana recovered on the traffic stop, drug ledgers and other common implements associated the sale of controlled substances will be held within both residences․

¶4. At the suppression hearing, Stachura testified that it was difficult to blend in and conduct surveillance on Jackson's residence because Luther Walker Road is “a relatively short dead-end road [with] a cul-de-sac at the end.” Consistent with his affidavit, Stachura testified that on the night in question, he stopped a motorcycle leaving Jackson's residence for careless driving, and the driver admitted to having “a little weed,” which he voluntarily turned over to Stachura. According to Stachura, certain characteristics of the bag of marijuana “indicated to [him] that it had come from [Jackson's] residence”:

So the first thing is the plastic bag looked very clean, very fresh. In my experience, if marijuana jostles around in a clear plastic bag for a time, the buds of marijuana are typically very sticky and they have resin, which is the active ingredient for THC that everybody wants to consume. That will typically leave a small film of residue within the bag on there. The bag didn't appear that it had been old, yellowed, or anything thereof.

What was also significant to me was it was relatively a cool night. It was approximately 51 degrees. The gentleman was operating a motorcycle and having driven motorcycles, the windchill goes up through the roof as you're driving, as well as it was contained in an inner pocket. And one of the things that I know from training and experience is that marijuana is a vegetative substance, so it will leave a -- it will produce water condensation from within if it's held in a warm spot for too long because of -- it's a vegetative substance. That's why a lot of times when we submit evidence to the crime lab it will be come back lower than the initial field weight because it dries up in storage waiting for the lab to test it.

THE COURT: There was no condensation within the clear plastic bag?

THE WITNESS: No, sir.

THE COURT: And with your training, that told you something?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. It had been placed there freshly. It had not been riding around for hours, in my opinion.

¶5. Stachura testified that the unnamed motorcyclist would not disclose the source of his marijuana. Stachura seized the marijuana but did not arrest the motorcyclist or issue a citation. Instead, Stachura allowed the motorcyclist to leave because he was worried that someone might alert Jackson that the motorcyclist had been stopped leaving Jackson's residence. Stachura was concerned that Jackson might “move [his] drugs” before Stachura could obtain and execute a search warrant.

¶6. Because Stachura felt he needed to act quickly, he prepared the application for the search warrant at the PRCSD's office in Picayune, which was closer than his own office at the PRCSD's headquarters. Stachura testified that he had previously identified Jackson as the resident of 10 Luther Walker Road, but that information was in his files at his office. Stachura “didn't want to place the wrong person's name on the search warrant,” so he referred to Jackson as an “unknown white male” in his affidavit.

¶7. Stachura took the warrant application to the home of Pearl River County Justice Court Judge John Mark Mitchell. Stachura testified that he did not remember giving Judge Mitchell any information that was not in his affidavit. Stachura and Judge Mitchell both testified that if Stachura had told Judge Mitchell anything significant that was not in the affidavit, Judge Mitchell would have required Stachura to add it to the affidavit.¹ Judge Mitchell issued a warrant to search the two trailers on the property for controlled substances, paraphernalia, proceeds, and guns. Officers immediately returned to the property, executed the warrant, and seized the above-described evidence from Jackson's residence.

¶8. Prior to trial, Jackson filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search and dismiss the indictment. Jackson argued that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. Following a hearing at which Stachura and Judge Mitchell testified, the trial court denied Jackson's motion, and the case proceeded to trial. As described above, Jackson was convicted and sentenced and filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. Probable Cause

¶9. The United States Constitution and the Mississippi Constitution both protect the people against unreasonable searches of their homes and provide that no search warrant may be issued “without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23. Therefore, before a search warrant may be issued, a judge must determine that there is probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. See MRCrP 4.1 & 4.2.

¶10. Here, a justice court judge found that probable cause existed and issued a warrant to search Jackson's residence. Our “standard of review for this probable cause determination is whether the justice court judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed based on the totality of the circumstances.” Manning v. State, 726 So. 2d 1152, 1193 (¶170) (Miss. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So. 2d 158, 162-63 (¶¶12-13) (Miss. 1999). “Our review is guided by the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis established by the United States Supreme Court.” Sutton v. State, 238 So. 3d 1150, 1155 (¶13) (Miss. 2018) (citing Lee v. State, 435 So. 2d 674, 676 (Miss. 1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). In Gates, the United States Supreme Court stated:

The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted).

¶11. In this case, four sources of information were presented to the issuing judge:

• an anonymous “crime stoppers tip” that “an unknown white male [was] selling ‘marijuana, pharmaceutical pills, and other controlled substances’ ”;

• a report from “another source that one trailer on the property was being renovated, [that] one was being lived in,” and “that both trailers were controlled and occupied by the same individual”;

• “intelligence from a source that has proven reliable in the past that wishes to remain confidential,” who “informed [i]nvestigators that there may be narcotics being delivered to that address through parcel services”; and

• the questioning of the unnamed motorcyclist.

¶12. By itself, the anonymous “crime stoppers tip” “did not constitute probable cause.” Terry v. State, 252 Miss. 479, 485, 173 So. 2d 889, 891 (1965) (holding that an anonymous tip that the defendant would deliver illegal whiskey at a certain time and place “did not constitute probable cause”); Pickle v. State, 172 Miss. 563, 566, 160 So. 909, 910 (1935) (holding that an anonymous tip that the defendant was operating a still on his property did not “constitute probable cause”). However, under Gates’s totality-of-the-circumstances test, probable cause may be established through “personal observations of police officers involved in the case [that] corroborate[ ] the information received from anonymous sources.” Phinizee v. State, 983 So. 2d 322, 328 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).

¶13. The second unnamed “source” mentioned in Stachura's affidavit merely advised that one trailer on the property “was being lived in,” that a second trailer “was being renovated,” and that “both trailers were controlled and occupied by the same individual.” This information, while perhaps relevant to the scope of the warrant, is clearly irrelevant to the probable cause determination.

¶14. Next, according to Stachura, a confidential source who had “proven reliable in the past” stated “that there may be narcotics being delivered to that address through parcel services.” Under Gates’s totality-of-the-circumstances test, the issuing judge was required to consider “the veracity and basis of knowledge of” the confidential source as part of the judge's probable-cause determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Indeed, these factors are “highly relevant in determining the value of [the source's] report.” Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Stachura's affidavit did state that this source had “proven reliable in the past,” which we have accepted as minimally sufficient to show some degree of reliability. See Jones, 257 So. 3d at 288 (¶6). However, Stachura provided the issuing judge with no information regarding the source's basis of knowledge. Indeed, the wording of the affidavit only serves to cast doubt and raise questions regarding the basis for the source's assertion. Again, this source only stated “that there may be narcotics being delivered to that address through parcel services.” (Emphasis added). As far as we know, the source could provide no additional details. And as Stachura conceded on cross-examination, the source did not claim that he had actually seen any drugs at Jackson's residence and could only report that there “may” or “may not” have been deliveries of drugs to that address.

¶15. In Gates, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[s]ufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (emphasis added). In this case, the issuing judge was presented with information that a source said that drugs might or might not have been delivered to the address to be searched. While we accept that this unnamed source had “proven reliable in the past,” what he told Stachura or some other officer was, at best, hedging speculation that drugs might have been delivered to Jackson's residence. Moreover, there was not even an explanation for the basis of the source's speculation.

¶16. “It is critical to a showing of probable cause that the affidavit state facts sufficient to justify a conclusion that evidence or contraband will probably be found at the premises to be searched.” United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 140 (9th Cir.1988)). Therefore, “there is no doubt that [‘probable cause’] means more than bare suspicion or a mere possibility.” United States v. McManus, 719 F.2d 1395, 1399 (6th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). In the present case, the source had not personally observed drugs at Jackson's residence and could only say that it was possible that drugs had been delivered there. Moreover, the issuing judge was presented with no information concerning the basis of the source's suspicion. For all we know, this source was merely passing along a rumor he or she had heard on the street. A confidential source's unexplained statement that contraband may be found at the place to be searched is, by definition, insufficient to constitute probable cause.²

¶17. We come finally to the unnamed motorcyclist who was stopped with a “little weed” in his pocket shortly after he pulled out of Jackson's driveway. While this incident may have added to the officers’ suspicions, we fail to see how it established probable cause for the search of Jackson's residence. For example, in United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2006), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the fact that the defendant himself had cocaine in his pocket when he was arrested in the front doorway of his own house did not establish probable cause to search the house for additional drugs and paraphernalia. Id. at 524-25. As the court explained, the fact that drugs are found on an individual's person, even while he is in the immediate vicinity of his house, does not, by itself, constitute probable cause to search the house. Id. It necessarily follows that possession of drugs by an unnamed third party who was merely seen leaving a property's driveway also does not constitute probable cause to search the buildings on the property.

¶18. Stachura's affidavit also stated that he “examined the packaging” of the motorcyclist's marijuana “and took note of its condition.” Stachura observed that the temperature was “approximately 51 degrees Fahrenheit” at the time, that “[t]he clear plastic ziplock bag was contained within [the motorcyclist's] jacket pocket,” that the motorcyclist “was exposed to extremely cold air on a motorcycle,” and that “[t]here was no condensation located within the clear plastic bag.” At the suppression hearing, Stachura offered additional opinions regarding the supposed significance of these observations. See supra ¶4. However, there is no evidence that these opinions were conveyed to Judge Mitchell, and, as noted above, we do not consider information that was not provided to the issuing judge. See supra note 1. The mere absence of condensation in the ziplock bag did not establish probable cause to search Jackson's residence.

¶19. We are mindful that probable cause depends on the totality of the relevant circumstances, not any one circumstance in isolation. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317. But the circumstances here, in totality, are merely one anonymous “crime stoppers tip,” another source who could only say that drugs might have been delivered to Jackson's address, and one motorcyclist who had “a little weed” in his pocket after he pulled out of Jackson's driveway. As stated above, probable cause may be established in some cases if “personal observations of police officers involved in the case ․ corroborate[ ] the information received from anonymous sources.” Phinizee, 983 So. 2d at 328 (¶20). But there were no such corroborating personal observations in this case. Moreover, the record contains no information regarding the basis of the confidential source's assertion that drugs may have been delivered to the address. All we know is that the assertion was not based on personal knowledge, and it may have been nothing more than a rumor. Probable cause “may be based on hearsay,” but “[u]ncorroborated and unsubstantiated hearsay will simply not suffice.” Conerly v. State, 760 So. 2d 737, 740 (¶6) (Miss. 2000). Accordingly, we conclude that probable cause for the search warrant was lacking.

II. The Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

¶20. When evidence is obtained in violation of Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution or the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, “the exclusionary rule is implicated.” Sutton v. State, 238 So. 3d 1150, 1155 (¶16) (Miss. 2018). “The exclusionary rule prohibits introduction into evidence of tangible materials seized during an unlawful search ․” Id. at 1159 (¶34) (quoting Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 536, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)). However, “[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred—i.e., that a search ․ was unreasonable—does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009). “Indeed,” the United States Supreme Court has stated that “exclusion has always been [that Court's] last resort, not [its] first impulse, and [its] precedents establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary rule.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

¶21. One limitation on the exclusionary rule is the good-faith exception. Sutton, 238 So. 3d at 1155 (¶35) (citing White v. State, 842 So. 2d 565, 571 (Miss. 2003); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). Summarizing the “good-faith exception,” the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained that

the exclusionary rule should not be applied to suppress evidence if the evidence was obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. However, this good faith exception does not apply if: (1) in issuing the warrant the magistrate is misled by information in the affidavit that the affiant knows is false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth; (2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandons his judicial role; (3) the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in its existence is entirely unreasonable; or, (4) the warrant is so facially deficient in failing to particularize the place to be searched and things to be seized that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.

Id. (quoting White, 842 So. 2d at 571).

¶22. “Under the ‘good faith exception’ to the exclusionary rule, if police officers relied on a facially valid search warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, and the officers’ reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable, a later finding that the warrant was invalid will not require exclusion of the evidence obtained as a result of the search.” Holloway v. State, 282 So. 3d 537, 544 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing White, 842 So. 2d at 570-72 (¶¶14-23)). “In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, 104 S.Ct. 3405. “In most cases, the ‘mere existence of a warrant’ will be sufficient to show that the officers conducted the search in objectively reasonable (i.e., ‘good faith’) reliance on the validity of the warrant.” Holloway, 282 So. 3d at 544 (¶21) (quoting Moore v. State, 160 So. 3d 728, 734 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)).

¶23. Although the State raised the good-faith exception in its appellate brief, Jackson failed to directly address the issue in his reply brief. However, Jackson does make some arguments that could be relevant to the exception. Jackson emphasizes that Stachura testified he had obtained warrants from Judge Mitchell “probably ․ over 40 or 50 times,” and he could not “specifically recall an incident” in which Judge Mitchell had denied a warrant. Stachura testified that he typically utilizes whichever justice court judge is “on call” or nearby. Judge Mitchell similarly testified that he had “signed many ․ search warrants” for Stachura, and although he had “turned down search warrants” in some cases, he did “not remember turning down any for [Stachura].”

¶24. This testimony does not show that Judge Mitchell “wholly abandoned his judicial role.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. In Leon, the Supreme Court explained that this exception to the good-faith exception applies “in cases where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979).” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. In Lo-Ji Sales Inc., a town justice “allowed himself to become a member, if not the leader, of the search party which was essentially a police operation․ [H]e conducted a generalized search under authority of an invalid warrant; he was not acting as a judicial officer but as an adjunct law enforcement officer.” Lo-Ji Sales Inc., 442 U.S. at 327, 99 S.Ct. 2319. The justice accompanied officers to the place to be searched, ordered them to seize items he personally deemed “obscene,” and then “instructed [them] to seize all ‘similar’ items as well.” Id. Here, in contrast, all that Jackson alleges is that Stachura had a history of obtaining warrants from a local justice court judge. This unexceptional fact falls far short of showing that Judge Mitchell wholly abandoned his judicial role.

¶25. Indeed, this Court rejected a similar argument in Mitchell v. State, 931 So. 2d 639 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). There, the defendant argued that the issuing judge “was not detached and neutral because her son [was] the ․ only investigator” for the sheriff's department that applied for the warrant. Id. at 642 (¶7). The defendant also pointed to the sheriff's testimony that he could not “recall [the judge] ever refusing to sign a search warrant that he presented to her.” Id. Nonetheless, this Court held that such evidence was insufficient to call the judge's “detachment” or “neutrality” into “question.” Id. The same is true with respect to Judge Mitchell in this case.³

¶26. In addition, there is no evidence that Stachura was “dishonest or reckless in preparing [his] affidavit,” nor can we say that Stachura “could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” Holloway, 282 So. 3d at 544 (¶21) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405). Although Stachura's affidavit fell somewhat short of establishing probable cause, there is no evidence that Stachura misrepresented any of the information in his affidavit. In addition, Stachura apparently recognized that the anonymous tip and his confidential source were insufficient to establish probable cause. Accordingly, Stachura and his fellow officers attempted to conduct surveillance to obtain additional evidence to support a warrant. Stachura sought the warrant only after he stopped the motorcyclist leaving the property in possession of illegal narcotics.

¶27. The United States Supreme Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have held that the “exclusionary rule should not be applied to bar the use ․ of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be invalid.” White, 842 So. 2d at 570 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677). As the United States Supreme Court explained, the exclusionary rule “cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405. “Typically, the mere existence of a warrant suffices to prove that an officer conducted a search in good faith and justifies application of the good faith exception.” Magee v. State, 73 So. 3d 1183, 1189 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). In such cases, the exclusionary rule will apply if the “warrant [was] based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” White, 842 So. 2d at 572 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405). Here, we cannot say that Stachura's affidavit was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render [officers’] belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude that although probable cause was lacking, the exclusionary rule does not apply.

¶28. Jackson's convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.

¶29. I agree with the majority that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause; however, I would not find that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies. The exception does not apply when “the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in its existence is entirely unreasonable[.]” White v. State, 842 So. 2d 565, 571 (¶15) (Miss. 2003) (quoting United States v. Russell, 960 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Sutton v. State, 238 So. 3d 1150, 1159 (¶35) (Miss. 2018); Eaddy v. State, 63 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (¶24) (Miss. 2011); Roebuck v. State, 915 So. 2d 1132, 1140 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). The standard we apply does not ask whether official belief in the existence of suspicion is entirely unreasonable; instead, we ask whether official belief in the existence of probable cause is entirely unreasonable. See White, 842 So. 2d at 571 (¶15).

¶30. The deficiencies of the affidavit are well described by the majority in its probable cause analysis. See Maj. Op. ¶11. Authorities received an anonymous tip about an unknown white male selling drugs. An anonymous source said that there “may” be narcotics being delivered to this address through parcel service but did not represent that the person had actually seen drugs at that address. An unnamed source described the property as having two trailers on it, and someone lived in one. It was difficult for the police to observe the residence itself because the road had a dead end. The motorcyclist did leave from Jackson's house, but he would not disclose the source of his marijuana.

¶31. As the majority suggests, the officer “apparently recognized that the anonymous tip and his confidential source were insufficient to establish probable cause.” Maj. Op. ¶26. I would submit that the subsequent stop of the motorcyclist did not add to a reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. See United States v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 2005) (looking at whether a “reasonably well[-]trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization”). As the majority acknowledged, “the fact that drugs are found on an individual's person, even while he is in the immediate vicinity of his house, does not, by itself, constitute probable cause to search the house․ It necessarily follows that possession of drugs by an unnamed third party who was merely seen leaving a property's driveway also does not constitute probable cause to search the buildings on the property.” Maj. Op. ¶17; see United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 527 (6th Cir. 2006).

¶32. The lack of facts showing a nexus between the property to be searched and the criminal activity supports that the good faith exception should not apply. See Gonzales, 399 F.3d at 1231 (“For good faith to exist, there must be some factual basis connecting the place to be searched to the defendant or suspected criminal activity.”); United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining “the arrest and search inquiries ask different questions: whether there is a fair probability that a person has committed a crime versus whether there is a fair probability that the person's home will contain evidence of one”).

¶33. Here, the nexus is particularly attenuated. We have the vague representations of unnamed sources, and we have a third party (not the defendant) in possession of marijuana off the premises. This Court is in agreement that the affidavit was insufficient to support probable cause to search Jackson's home. I further take the position that the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable on these facts, and the trial court therefore erred in denying Jackson's motion to suppress.

¶34. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We have held that an officer's testimony at a suppression hearing or trial about “additional facts” that might have “bolstered the case for probable cause ․ cannot be considered” if those facts were not disclosed to the issuing judge. Jones v. State, 257 So. 3d 285, 291 n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasis added). “[A]n otherwise insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony concerning information possessed by the affiant when he sought the warrant but not disclosed to the issuing magistrate.” Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971).

2.   Stachura's affidavit also identified “packages originating in California, Oregon, Colorado, or other states with legalized marijuana or other known drug distribution hubs” and “paying excessive amounts for overnight air” as potential red flags in a narcotics investigation. However, there is no evidence that Jackson received any packages from other states via overnight delivery or otherwise. Accordingly, as it relates to the issue of probable cause, this additional information is simply irrelevant filler material.

3.   Jackson also asserts that, “[r]egrettably, the trial court openly admit[ted] prejudging [his] [m]otion to [s]uppress before the [suppression] hearing was even conducted.” This is an unfair characterization of the trial judge's remarks. Prior to the suppression hearing, the judge stated that he had read Jackson's motion and “carefully reviewed the underlying facts in support of the search warrant, the warrant itself, and the affidavit.” The judge stated that he did not know whether Jackson would “prevail[ ] or not” and that he would allow Jackson to “put[ ] on any witness” and “put on [his] case, as long as [there was] not too much redundancy.” Finally, the judge stated that, having read Jackson's motion and the underlying facts and circumstances, he had “pretty much made up [his] mind what [he was] going to do.” In context, the judge did not prejudge the motion but merely offered his tentative views based on his careful review of the most important evidence related to that motion—the supporting affidavit and underlying facts and circumstances. In any event, our decision does not turn on the trial judge's rulings or any findings he made. Rather, we hold that the exclusionary rule does not apply because the officers’ reliance on the issuing judge's probable cause determination was objectively reasonable.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McDONALD, J.