QUILANTAN v. STATE (2025)

¶1. Mario Quilantan appeals from the Rankin County Circuit Court's denial of his motion for post-conviction relief (PCR). Quilantan argues that when he pleaded guilty to drug trafficking, he was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel because, among other things, his attorney failed to request a pre-sentence investigation. Having considered the record, arguments of the parties, and applicable precedent, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court denying Quilantan's PCR motion.

Facts

¶2. On September 26, 2022, Quilantan, a Texas resident, was traveling through Mississippi with Julio Cesar Hernandez on their way to work in Alabama. Rankin County law enforcement stopped the truck for speeding. Hernandez gave them permission to search the truck, and law enforcement ultimately took it to a body shop and found five kilograms of cocaine in the bedliner and tailgate. Quilantan claimed he had no knowledge of the drugs, but nonetheless, he was arrested along with Hernandez.

¶3. On February 9, 2023, a Rankin County grand jury indicted Quilantan for one count of aggravated trafficking in a controlled substance in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-29-139(g) (Supp. 2022), which carried a mandatory twenty-five-year sentence.¹ Because Quilantan was indigent, on March 1, 2023, a public defender was appointed to represent him. That same day, Quilantan waived arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty. A scheduling order was entered setting an August 7, 2023 trial date and other dates for hearings on interim matters. Thereafter, the State and Quilantan exchanged discovery.²

¶4. On June 29, 2023, Quilantan signed and filed a petition to enter a guilty plea. He stated that he was forty years old, that he had sixteen years of education, and that he was a “college graduate.” In the petition, Quilantan stated that his lawyer had “thoroughly discussed all aspects” of his case with him and had made no threats or promises to Quilantan. The petition listed all the rights Quilantan was waiving. The petition set out the charge he was pleading guilty to (trafficking of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense to aggravated trafficking) and the minimum and maximum sentences he faced on that charge (ten to forty years).³ Attached to the petition was a letter from the district attorney to Quilantan's attorney communicating an offer that if Quilantan would plead guilty to a lesser included offense of simple trafficking, then the State would recommend a term of ten years in custody, along with fines and costs.

 Plea Hearing

¶5. At the beginning of Quilantan's plea hearing on July 18, 2023, the court swore in an interpreter who, throughout the proceedings, answered the court's questions after consulting with Quilantan.⁴ Although Quilantan went through high school and college, he could not understand English except basics like “good morning.” The court established in its questioning that Quilantan had reviewed the petition with his attorney and that its contents were true. The State told the court the elements of the lesser included offense that Quilantan was pleading guilty to, and Quilantan said he understood those elements. After covering the rights Quilantan was waiving, the court asked the State for its recommendation. Despite the letter attached to the petition, the State announced that it was “going to do an open plea.” The district attorney indicated that he was going to request a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and set a hearing for mitigation and for sentencing. The circuit court judge turned to Quilantan and said that “it was not too late to stop the hearing, but it will be if I accept your guilty plea.” Through the interpreter, Quilantan said he had no questions and proceeded to plead guilty to the charge. The court accepted the plea, entered a judgment of conviction, and stated, “We'll order a PSI and we will have sentencing August 1 at 9:00.”

 Sentencing Hearing

¶6. The transcript of the sentencing hearing, which was held on October 23, 2023, reflects that an interpreter was again sworn in. Although the court noted that Quilantan had pled guilty and that a pre-sentence investigation was ordered, the district attorney made no mention of the PSI and said only that Quilantan was allowed to plead guilty and that there was “nothing else to add to that, Your Honor. It's an open plea.” The court turned to the defense, which asked the court to “consider the statutory sentence mitigation that the legislator [sic] has included.” Counsel was referring to the sentence mitigation factors listed in section 41-29-139(h):

Sentence mitigation. (1) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a person who has been convicted of an offense under this section that requires the judge to impose a prison sentence which cannot be suspended or reduced and is ineligible for probation or parole may, at the discretion of the court, receive a sentence of imprisonment that is no less than twenty-five percent (25%) of the sentence prescribed by the applicable statute. In considering whether to apply the departure from the sentence prescribed, the court shall conclude that:

(A) The offender was not a leader of the criminal enterprise;

(B) The offender did not use violence or a weapon during the crime;

(C) The offense did not result in a death or serious bodily injury of a person not a party to the criminal enterprise; and

(D) The interests of justice are not served by the imposition of the prescribed mandatory sentence.

The court may also consider whether information and assistance were furnished to a law enforcement agency, or its designee, which, in the opinion of the trial judge, objectively should or would have aided in the arrest or prosecution of others who violate this subsection. The accused shall have adequate opportunity to develop and make a record of all information and assistance so furnished.

Defense counsel noted the four mitigation elements that he had the burden to prove. He stated that all he had as evidence was Quilantan's testimony. But, he argued, there was no allegation that Quilantan was the leader of any criminal enterprise and had been in the United States for only four months before his arrest. His attorney further argued that this was Quilantan's first felony charge and that Quilantan had a degree in industrial engineering. His attorney stated, “The Court can review the report in the PSI” and see that no weapon or violence was used. (Emphasis added). Furthermore, Quilantan had “four kids, a college degree, and for whatever reason, he made a really, really terrible mistake.”

¶7. Through the interpreter, the court asked Quilantan what he was doing at the time of his arrest. Quilantan replied that he had been working in Texas and that “they brought him to work in Alabama.” The co-defendant Hernandez had been released on bond but was “on the run” and had failed to appear for his court dates. The court considered how much cocaine was found (five kilos) and that the possible sentence for mere possession of that amount of drugs was forty years. The court ultimately sentenced Quilantan, a first-time offender, to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with two years suspended and eight years to serve, followed by five years of supervised probation upon release.

¶8. The court's sentencing order reflects that Quilantan and his attorney were present in court, that “questions and comments from all interested parties were invited[,] [that] those submitted were received and considered,” and that “the Defendant and Defendant's attorney were given an opportunity to address the court on all matters relevant to these proceedings[,] including the presentation of circumstances in extenuation and mitigation.”

 PCR Motion

¶9. On January 17, 2024, Quilantan filed a motion for post-conviction relief pro se, seeking to vacate his plea, conviction, and sentence. He argued that he had been denied the right to effective assistance of counsel for several reasons. First, he claimed his counsel failed to move the court for a dismissal of the charge on the ground that the proof was insufficient to establish his constructive possession of the drugs. Second, Quilantan argued that his right to due process was violated when he was not given a preliminary hearing. Third, Quilantan contended that his guilty plea was involuntary because his lawyer had promised him that he would only serve twenty-five percent of his ten-year sentence, when his sentence actually was a mandatory minimum sentence. Finally, Quilantan argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer failed to request a pre-sentence investigation. When he pled guilty, the State had made no recommendation for a sentence (i.e., an “open plea”); thus, Quilantan argued, the court was required to have a presentence investigation completed.⁵ Quilantan also filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion. Neither his motion nor his memorandum was verified or notarized, and he submitted no other affidavits to support his allegations.

¶10. On January 25, 2024, the court ordered that certified copies be filed of Quilantan's criminal file and transcripts of his guilty plea hearing on July 18, 2023, and the sentencing hearing on October 24, 2023. There is no PSI report in the criminal case record, nor does the record contain the docket of the criminal proceedings from which it could be definitively determined whether a PSI report was ever filed. In addition to the indictment, scheduling order, and hearing transcripts, Quilantan's criminal case file also included a motion Quilantan filed on December 26, 2023, requesting copies of the discovery in his case. On January 23, 2024, the circuit court in the criminal case denied that motion.

¶11. After reviewing Quilantan's criminal case file, on March 7, 2024, the circuit court summarily denied Quilantan's PCR motion and dismissed his case. The court found that the hearing transcripts revealed that a PSI was requested and ordered by the sentencing court. Moreover, Quilantan failed to support his motion with anything but his own allegations and provided no supporting affidavits, as required. See Crockett v. State, 334 So. 3d 1232, 1240-41 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). Finally, the court held that Quilantan's plea was freely and voluntarily given, as shown by Quilantan's statements during the plea hearing. The court then denied the PCR motion.

 Appeal

¶12. On March 14, 2024, Quilantan filed a notice of appeal.⁶ In his brief to this Court, he alleges that the circuit court's denial of his PCR motion was “invalid” because Quilantan was entitled to a PSI before he was sentenced. Moreover, he argues that he was entitled to “an effective hearing” on any PSI report. Although he mentions that his attorney told him to “sign the papers and take the pleas” and that the attorney promised to convince the judge to sentence him to twenty-five percent of the sentence term, Quilantan presents no argument or authority on the effectiveness-of-counsel issue on appeal. He further states that he did not have a certified interpreter, only an inmate housed with him, and that he was never explained his rights.

Discussion

¶13. A circuit court may summarily rule on a PCR motion “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.” Moore v. State, 400 So. 3d 515, 516 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2020); McConn v. State, 355 So. 3d 779, 782-83 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)). “Our review of the summary dismissal of a PCR motion, a question of law, is de novo.” Moore, 400 So. 3d at 516 (¶5). However, “this Court will not disturb the [circuit] court's factual findings unless they are ․ clearly erroneous.” Castillo-Valencia v. State, 396 So. 3d 1214, 1215 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024).

I. Whether the circuit court erred in denying Quilantan's PCR motion on the basis of the absence of a PSI report.

¶14. Quilantan argues that because he was denied a PSI and a hearing on it before he was sentenced, the circuit court should have granted his PCR motion. In support, he cites a federal case, United States v. Turner, 905 F. 2d 300 (9th Cir. 1990), which required a PSI report because federal guidelines required them. Id. at 301, abrogated as recognized by United States v Shehadeh, 962 F. 3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2020). However, we are not governed by federal law on this issue, and, in Mississippi, courts are not required to order a PSI or hearing. In Townsend v. State, 344 So. 3d 858, 863 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), we noted that

the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “a pre-sentence investigation may be conducted and a report thereof shall be required for cases where the court has discretion in imposition of sentence.” MRCrP 26.3 (emphasis added). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held “[t]he decision to conduct a pre-sentence investigation is within the discretion of the trial court and is not mandatory.” Ivory v. State, 840 So. 2d 755, 759 (¶11) (Miss. App. 2003).

See also Lawrence v. State, 780 So. 2d 652, 657-58 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). There is no “right” to a PSI. Roberson v. State, 595 So. 2d 1310, 1315 (Miss. 1992).

¶15. In any event, Quilantan is incorrect in stating that he was not afforded a PSI because the record reflects that a PSI report was prepared in his case. At the plea hearing, the defense requested, and the circuit court ordered, a PSI report on Quilantan. Moreover, the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates that a PSI report was prepared and submitted to the court for its review prior to sentencing Quilantan. Quilantan's attorney told the sentencing court, “The court can review the report in the PSI.” Thus, not only was a PSI report completed, the court had it to review prior to sentencing Quilantan at the sentencing hearing he was clearly afforded. Accordingly, we find no merit to Quilantan's claim of being denied a PSI and hearing.

II. Whether the circuit court otherwise erred by denying Quilantan's PCR motion.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶16. Quilantan's PCR motion dealt primarily with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his attorney failed to request a PSI, which the record clearly shows is not true. Quilantan further alleged that his trial attorney failed to present facts to refute the State's theory of constructive possession. However, the court, considering his PCR motion, correctly held that Quilantan had failed to submit any corroborating affidavits to support his accusations against his attorney.

An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must be pled with specificity and supported by affidavits other than the defendant's affidavit. McBride v. State, 108 So. 3d 977, 980 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Robertson v. State, 669 So. 2d 11, 13 (Miss. 1996)). “[W]hen the defendant fails to attach any supporting affidavits and relies solely on his own sworn motion, his ineffective-assistance claim must fail.” Evans [v. State], 237 So. 3d [1271,] 1275 (¶18) [(Miss. Ct. App. 2018)].

Castillo-Valencia, 396 So. 3d at 1216 (¶6). We have also held that “[f]ailure to attach affidavits of other persons may be excused upon a showing of good cause, specifically detailed in the motion, why they cannot be obtained.” Moore v. State, 250 So. 3d 521, 525 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). However, in the case at hand, Quilantan's PCR motion was not sworn, and he failed to provide any affidavits in support or show good cause why affidavits could not be obtained. Thus, his ineffective-assistance claim must fail.

¶17. In his appellate brief, Quilantan raises other complaints against his lawyer, claiming that his attorney told Quilantan to “sign the papers and take the pleas” and that the attorney promised to convince the judge to sentence him to twenty-five percent of the mandatory time. Assuming these allegations are raised to support an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on appeal, Quilantan's claim must fail because he did not raise these issues to the circuit court below. “Issues not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal.” Simpson v. State, 282 So. 3d 663, 665 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Austin v. State, 971 So. 2d 1286, 1288 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)).

¶18. In addition, Quilantan presents no legal authority or reasoning to support any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. When a party fails to cite authority to support an argument on appeal, the issue is procedurally barred. Hale v. State, 191 So. 3d 719, 728 (¶24) (Miss. 2016). “Our supreme court has emphasized that ‘[p]ro se parties should be held to the same rules of procedure and substantive law as represented parties.’ ” Robinson v. Burton, 49 So. 3d 660, 665 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). Although the pleadings of pro se litigants in criminal cases may be given some leeway, such review is limited to “self-evident errors for which no authority would be necessary.” Id. In this case, we see no self-evident error by Quilantan's trial attorney that would excuse Quilantan's failure to cite legal authority on that issue. Even if we were to consider the merits of Quilantan's claim, he stated in his plea petition and during his plea hearing that he was satisfied with his counsel's services, that his attorney had reviewed the case with him, and his attorney explained the elements of the crime charged. We have given such assertions great weight in similar cases and found no merit to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. E.g., Gill v. State, 269 So. 3d 207, 215 (¶¶31-32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

B. Failure to Provide a Certified Interpreter and to Explain His Rights at the Plea Hearing

¶19. Finally, on appeal, Quilantan alleges that his PCR motion should have been granted because he did not have a certified interpreter, only an inmate housed with him, and that he was never explained his rights during the plea hearing. These claims fail for two reasons. First, Quilantan did not raise the issue of a lack of a certified interpreter in his PCR motion to the circuit court. Thus, he is procedurally barred from raising that issue on appeal, as discussed above.⁷ Second, an examination of the plea petition and the transcript of the plea hearing confirms that the judge in the criminal proceeding, through an interpreter, adequately explained to Quilantan the rights he had and found that Quilantan freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waived them. Thus, there is no merit to these arguments on appeal.

Conclusion

¶20. Having considered the record of Quilantan's criminal case, the claims he raised in his PCR motion, the circuit court's ruling on the PCR motion, and the issues raised by Quilantan on appeal, we find that the circuit court did not err in denying Quilantan's motion.

¶21. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 41-29-139(g) provides:(g) Aggravated trafficking. Any person trafficking in Schedule I or II controlled substances, except marijuana and synthetic cannabinoids, of two hundred (200) grams or more shall be guilty of aggravated trafficking and, upon conviction, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than twenty-five (25) years nor more than life in prison and shall be fined not less than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) nor more than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). The twenty-five-year sentence shall be a mandatory sentence and shall not be reduced or suspended. The person shall not be eligible for probation or parole, the provisions of Sections 41-29-149, 47-5-139, 47-7-3 and 47-7-33, to the contrary notwithstanding.

2.   A letter in the criminal case file from the district attorney to Quilantan's attorney on April 26, 2023, referenced the State's responses to the discovery that defense counsel had requested.

3.   Section 41-29-139(f)(1) provides:(f) Trafficking. (1) Any person trafficking in controlled substances shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than ten (10) years nor more than forty (40) years and shall be fined not less than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) nor more than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). The ten-year mandatory sentence shall not be reduced or suspended. The person shall not be eligible for probation or parole, the provisions of Sections 41-29-149, 47-5-139, 47-7-3 and 47-7-33, to the contrary notwithstanding.

4.   Pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 9-21-79(1) (Rev. 2019),[a]n interpreter is needed and a court interpreter shall be appointed when the judge determines, after an examination of a party or witness, that: (a) the party cannot understand and speak English well enough to participate fully in the proceedings and to assist counsel; or (b) the witness cannot speak English so as to be understood directly by counsel, court and jury.

5.   Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.3 provides, in part:(a) In General. A presentence investigation may be conducted and a report thereof shall be made as required for cases where the court has discretion in imposition of sentence. Contents of this report shall be disclosed only to the parties. A copy of said report shall be delivered to both the prosecutor and the defendant or the defense attorney within a reasonable time prior to sentencing so as to afford a reasonable opportunity for verification of the material. Prior to the sentencing proceeding, each party is required to notify the opposing party and the court of any part of the presentence report which the party intends to controvert by the production of evidence.

6.   In his notice of appeal, Quilantan entered the wrong date of the final judgment he was appealing. The notice of appeal was filed in the civil PCR case on March 14, 2024, but Quilantan indicated that he was appealing the final judgment “entered in this case on October 24, 2024 [sic].” However, the appeal was clearly filed in his civil PCR case within seven days of the court's dismissal of his motion.

7.   Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 9-21-79, a party may request an interpreter, or the court on its own may appoint an interpreter if a party cannot understand and speak English well enough to participate fully in the proceedings or communicate directly with counsel. However, in the case at hand, Quilantan failed to raise this issue in his PCR motion and is procedurally barred from raising it on appeal. See Simpson, 282 So. 3d at 665 (¶5) (failing to raise an issue to trial court bars consideration on appeal). Notwithstanding the procedural bar, the record is inadequate for us to evaluate such a claim. See Hoffman v. Hoffman, 270 So. 3d 1121, 1130 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (not addressing issues when the record is inadequate). Only on appeal does Quilantan identify the interpreter as merely another bilingual inmate, which cannot be confirmed from the record presented. “Facts asserted to exist must and ought to be definitely proved and placed before us by a record, certified by law; otherwise, we cannot know them.” Courtney v. State, 275 So. 3d 1032, 1041 (¶22) (Miss. 2019). Moreover the Administrative Office of Courts does not prohibit the use of non-certified interpreters, and Quilantan does not provide any evidence of prejudice suffered because of the use of a non-certified interpreter. See Garcia-Lebron v. State, 323 So. 3d 1159, 1164 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (defendant failing to demonstrate any prejudice due to trial court's appointment of non-certified court interpreter). Accordingly, we decline to address this issue.

McDONALD, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. EMFINGER, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.