PATTERSON v. STATE (2025)

¶1. A Walthall County Circuit Court jury convicted Patrick O. Patterson of one count of aggravated assault in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2) (Rev. 2020) and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-5 (Rev. 2020). The trial court adjudged Patterson a habitual offender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-83 (Rev. 2020) and sentenced him to serve two concurrent terms of life imprisonment in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) without eligibility for parole. The trial court denied Patterson's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

¶2. Patterson appeals, asserting that (1) his fundamental rights to confrontation and to a fair trial were violated by the introduction of prejudicial testimonial hearsay; and (2) the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. For the reasons addressed below, we affirm Patterson's convictions and sentences.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶3. Patterson's two-day trial began on April 5, 2023. The State's first witness was Detective Justin Dyar of the Walthall County Sheriff's Office. On August 28, 2020, Detective Dyar was dispatched to a reported shooting on St. Paul Road. According to the 911 caller, the victim in the shooting was “Charles Trotter,” and the suspected shooter was “Patrick Patterson.” Trotter's girlfriend, Patricia Byrd, made the 911 call.

¶4. When Detective Dyar arrived at the scene, emergency personnel were treating Trotter, but Dyar was able to gather a brief statement from Trotter before he was taken to the hospital. Detective Dyar testified that Trotter told him that he had been walking from Hollis Jones Road toward St. Paul Road to an area known as Front Street. Near the intersection, Trotter saw Patterson and Patterson's girlfriend, Kyla Otis, involved in an argument. At some point, a “verbal altercation” developed between Trotter and Patterson, and Patterson “pulled out ․ a sawed-off shotgun [and] fired one round[,] striking ․ Trotter in the chest and left hand area.” Trotter told Detective Dyar that Patterson then ran in the direction of his brother's residence on St. Paul Road. Trotter tried to pursue Patterson for a short distance but stopped when he realized how badly he was hurt. Trotter told Detective Dyar that he then went to his girlfriend's home, and she (Byrd) called 911.

¶5. Detective Dyar testified that he knew he was dealing with an armed fugitive as well as a crime scene, so as additional officers arrived at the scene, he directed them to establish a perimeter and start processing the scene. Detective Dyar found one spent 20-gauge shotgun shell on St. Paul Road near Byrd's driveway, and shell wadding was found across the intersection on Hollis Jones Road. Detective Dyar and other officers at the scene also began trying to collect witness statements, but they were not able to find any witnesses willing to talk to them about the shooting. Officers did speak to Patterson's brother, who allowed them to search his trailer near the scene of the shooting.

¶6. Detective Dyar testified that as he canvassed the scene, a car drove by. When it came to a stop sign, Detective Dyar and other officers approached the vehicle and told the car's occupants that “they were in the middle of a manhunt and asked them if they had seen Patrick Patterson.” Otis was in the backseat of the car. She told Detective Dyar “that she used to date ․ Patterson but that she had not seen him in a while.” Following this encounter, Detective Dyar and other officers “followed a blood trail from Mr. Trotter” to Byrd's home. During Detective Dyar's testimony on this point, the following exchange occurred:

DETECTIVE DYAR: We spoke with [Patricia Byrd] briefly where she told us basically the same thing that Mr. Trotter had stated, which was that—

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Object to the hearsay.

DETECTIVE DYAR: She provided us a statement that was consistent with—

THE COURT: I'll—

DETECTIVE DYAR: Mr. Trotter's.

THE COURT: —sustain to hearsay.

DETECTIVE DYAR: She provided a statement that was consistent with Mr. Trotter's.

After this exchange took place, Detective Dyar's testimony continued.

¶7. A few minutes after speaking with Byrd, Detective Dyar received a call that Patterson had been spotted nearby. A short time later, Detective Dyar saw Patterson and ordered him to show his hands, but Patterson ran toward a wood line. Other officers were able to apprehend Patterson after a foot chase. The officers searched for the shotgun but did not find it.

¶8. Detective Dyar testified that he observed Patterson give a post-Miranda ¹ statement to Captain Adrien Fortenberry on September 4, 2020, at the sheriff's office. A copy of Patterson's recorded statement was admitted as an exhibit. Captain Fortenberry testified that Patterson told him that he had nothing to do with the incident and did not know anything about it. Patterson said he had an argument with his girlfriend (Otis) but denied any altercation with Trotter. Patterson said that the only reason he ran when he was told to show his hands was because he had parole violations. During questioning, Captain Fortenberry informed Patterson that Trotter told officers Patterson had shot him. Patterson said in response, “Jack can't read or write, he probably can't even come down here and tell you my name.”

¶9. About twelve days after the shooting, Detective Dyar received a notification that a trusty at the jail where Patterson was housed, Jesse Thomas, wanted to speak with him. Detective Dyar called Thomas, who told Detective Dyar that he had some information about Patterson from the night Patterson was brought in for booking. Detective Dyar then set up an interview with Thomas and interviewed him.

¶10. At trial, Thomas testified that he was arrested in September 2019 and charged with armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Thomas was a trusty at the Walthall County jail. He testified that on the night Patterson was booked, he (Thomas) and another trusty, Lorenzo Lee, talked to Patterson “to see what they had brought him in for,” and Patterson told them

he had got into a altercation with a man named Jack, and it eventually led to Jack being out in the street asking Pat to come out there and fight, and when Patrick came out there, he came out there with a shotgun and shot at him twice ․ After that he took off running and threw the gun in the woods.

The prosecutor asked Thomas, “Was [Patterson] telling you what he did, or was he telling you what he was accused of?” Thomas responded, “He was saying what he did.”

¶11. During his cross-examination, Thomas acknowledged that he pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of robbery five days after talking to Detective Dyar about Patterson. Thomas also testified, however, that he and Detective Dyar had already talked about the charges against him being reduced to robbery and Thomas “tak[ing] ․ eight years[.]” Thomas testified that he “agreed to that plea deal.” When asked why he told Detective Dyar what Patterson told him, Thomas said, “I just felt like it ․ was the right thing to do.” Thomas confirmed that he was not promised anything for supplying the information to Detective Dyar. Thomas also testified that he had given Detective Dyar information in other cases and that he had agreed to testify against his co-defendant in the robbery case if he were called to do so.

¶12. Trotter testified that on the afternoon he was shot, he was walking away from his home on Hollis Jones Road to his girlfriend's house when he saw Patterson and Otis arguing near a stop sign. Trotter testified that as he was walking by, “Pat” stopped him and said, “ ‘I'll shoot you.’ I said, ‘No, don't do that, man.’ ”² The two men got into an argument, and then Patterson shot him. Trotter said he saw that Patterson had a gun, but he did not know what kind of gun it was.

¶13. According to Trotter, he and Patterson did not have any “beef[ ]” with each other. Patterson started the argument between them. Trotter was asked, “When you got shot, was there anybody else around that saw what happened?” Trotter responded, “No, sir.” Trotter testified that after Patterson shot him, he tried to catch him but could not; so Trotter went to his girlfriend's house, and she called the police. Trotter said he did not have a gun.

¶14. Regarding Trotter's injuries, Dr. William Dixon, a general surgeon at Southwest Mississippi Regional Medical Center (SMRMC), testified that he treated Trotter in the emergency room at SMRMC that evening. Dr. Dixon testified that Trotter “had been shot with a shotgun, multiple missiles, and ․ some [had entered Trotter's] abdominal cavity, and that necessitate[d] an operation ․ [and] a hospital stay.” Trotter testified that he stayed in the hospital for three weeks.

¶15. Trotter testified that he'd known Patterson “ever since ‘90”; Patterson lived in a trailer near where the shooting took place that belonged to Trotter's stepson. During his direct examination, however, when asked if Patterson was in the courtroom, Trotter testified, “I don't see him.” Later, during cross-examination, defense counsel asked Trotter, “And when [the prosecutor] asked you to point out Patrick Patterson, the person who supposedly shot you, you couldn't do that, could you?” Trotter said, “I ain't seen him in a while. I ain't look really in the courtroom good enough.”

¶16. Near the end of Trotter's direct examination, the prosecutor questioned Trotter about who shot him, and although Trotter appeared confused at first about the prosecutor's questioning, Trotter ultimately identified “Pat” as the shooter. We discuss this exchange in further detail below.

¶17. The State rested its case-in-chief.

¶18. After unsuccessfully moving for a directed verdict, the defense presented two witnesses: Lorenzo Lee, the other trusty at the jail on the night Patterson was brought in, and Otis, Patterson's girlfriend.

¶19. During direct examination, Lee testified that he did not remember a time that he, Thomas, and Patterson had a conversation when they were in jail together. Lee said Patterson never confessed to him that he shot Trotter. During his cross-examination, however, Lee admitted that the prosecutor had met with him prior to trial. At that time, Lee told the prosecutor “that he didn't want to be involved in all of this.” Lee also testified that he “wouldn't wish nothing on no man to get life in jail, nobody.”

¶20. Otis testified that she had been dating Patterson, but in the late afternoon on the day of the shooting, she and Patterson had an argument and broke up. Otis said that Patterson is the father of her child, and now they normally get along fine, mainly talking about the baby. After their argument on the evening of the shooting, Otis said she left Patterson and walked to “Ms. Shirley's house” between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. She said that she knows Trotter, but she did not see Patterson and Trotter together that evening or hear any gunshots that evening.

¶21. The defense rested, and the State finally rested. The jury returned a verdict finding Patterson guilty of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a felon. The trial court found that Patterson was a habitual offender and sentenced him to serve two concurrent terms of life imprisonment in the custody of the MDOC without eligibility for parole. After the denial of his post-trial motion for an acquittal or a new trial, Patterson appealed.

DISCUSSION 3

I. Admission of Detective Dyar's Testimony about Byrd's Statement

¶22. Patterson asserts that he was “greatly prejudiced” and that his fundamental right to confront witnesses against him was violated when Detective Dyar testified that Byrd provided the police with a statement consistent with Trotter's statement. For the reasons addressed below, we find this assignment of error without merit.

¶23. To briefly summarize this portion of the trial, Detective Dyar testified, “We spoke with [Patricia Byrd] briefly where she told us basically the same thing that Mr. Trotter had stated, which was that—.” At this point, Patterson objected “to the hearsay,” and the trial court sustained the hearsay objection. Based upon our review of the trial transcript, it appears that the witness and the trial judge were talking at the same time, so despite the trial court's ruling, Detective Dyar then testified, “She [(Byrd)] provided [police with] a statement that was consistent with ․ Trotter's [statement to the police].”

¶24. Defense counsel did not ask for a curative instruction for the jury to disregard the testimony, and no curative instruction was given. Additionally, Patterson did not make a Confrontation Clause objection to the admission of Detective Dyar's testimony about Byrd's statement.

¶25. “This Court reviews the admission or suppression of testimony for an abuse of discretion.” Broome v. State, 402 So. 3d 152, 155 (¶10) (Miss. 2025). “We review de novo a Confrontation Clause objection.” Garlington v. State, 349 So. 3d 782, 807 (¶89) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotation mark omitted).

¶26. As an initial matter, the State asserts that Detective Dyar's testimony concerning Byrd was not hearsay, so it “could not have prejudiced Patterson.” We find that the State's assertion on this point is unconvincing. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling sustaining Patterson's hearsay objection.

¶27. “ ‘Hearsay’ means a statement that ․ the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and ․ a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” MRE 801(c). According to the State, Detective Dyar's testimony did not constitute hearsay because (1) he did not repeat Patricia's statement and “only testified that she gave one”; and (2) his testimony on this point was “not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but to explain the course of his investigation.” We disagree.

¶28. With respect to the State's first argument, we point out that in addition to stating that Byrd gave the police a statement, Detective Dyar also said that her statement was consistent with Trotter's statement. Although Detective Dyar did not repeat Byrd's statement, his testimony did effectively provide the jury with the gist of what she said (i.e., that she told the police essentially the same thing Trotter told them).

¶29. As for the State's course-of-investigation point, we recognize that “[o]ur Supreme Court and this Court have held repeatedly that out-of-court statements do not constitute hearsay when admitted not to prove the truth of the matter asserted but rather to explain an officer's course of investigation or motivation for the next investigatory step.” Course v. State, 396 So. 3d 1181, 1191 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 397 So. 3d 497 (Miss. 2024). In the case before us, however, although Detective Dyar's statement that the police obtained Byrd's statement may have been made to explain “the course of [Dyar's] investigation,” we find that Detective Dyar's other statements, such as, “[Byrd] told us basically the same thing that Mr. Trotter had stated,” were not. See id. at 1192 (¶37) (recognizing that although the police officers testifying in the State's case-in-chief “could testify that their investigations led them to believe [the defendant] was the shooter[,]” the State “went too far” when it asked [a particular officer], “ ‘Who was the shooter?’ to help [him] explain the course of his investigation”). In short, we find that the trial court properly sustained Patterson's hearsay objection.

¶30. Our review of the record, though, also shows that Patterson did not request any further action after the hearsay objection was sustained—such as requesting the trial court to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony. “[W]here an objection is sustained, and no request is made that the jury be told to disregard the objectionable matter, there is no error.” Jones v. State, 303 So. 3d 734, 738 (¶13) (Miss. 2020). Because Patterson failed to seek a curative instruction, no error on this point occurred. Id.

¶31. On appeal, Patterson asserts that Detective Dyar's testimony about Byrd's statement was not just hearsay but was testimonial hearsay, and admission of this testimony at trial violated Patterson's fundamental rights under the Confrontation Clause. Patterson seeks a new trial on this basis.

¶32. Patterson did not make a Confrontation Clause objection at trial or raise this issue in any way in his post-trial motion. Accordingly, this issue is procedurally barred. Ronk v. State, 172 So. 3d 1112, 1134 (¶51) (Miss. 2015) (“We have consistently applied the procedural bar to Confrontation Clause claims when the issue was not raised at trial.”).

¶33. Nevertheless, Patterson asks that we examine this issue for plain error. “For the plain-error doctrine to apply, there must have been an error that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Conners v. State, 92 So. 3d 676, 682 (¶15) (Miss. 2012); see also Phillips v. State, No. 2023-KA-01218-SCT, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2025 WL 798347, at *4 (¶22) (Miss. Mar. 13, 2025), mot. for reh'g filed (June 3, 2025) (discussing the plain-error doctrine in the Confrontation Clause context). We address Patterson's Confrontation Clause assertions utilizing the plain-error standard and find that no plain error occurred.

¶34. The Confrontation Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Mississippi Constitution both guarantee a defendant in a criminal prosecution the right to confront the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26. “Nontestimonial hearsay is subject to evidentiary rules concerning reliability rather than being subject to scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause․ However, testimonial hearsay must be filtered by the Confrontation Clause.” Smith v. State, 986 So. 2d 290, 296-97 (¶20) (Miss. 2008) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). “[T]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial can be admitted ․ only where the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Byrd did not testify at trial, Patterson had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her, and Patterson asserts that Byrd's statement (as described by Detective Dyar) was “testimonial” in nature. As such, Patterson claims that the admission of Detective Dyar's testimony on this point violated the Confrontation Clauses.

¶35. We need not address the nontestimonial versus testimonial nature of Byrd's statement, however, because we find that even if it were “testimonial,” its admission at trial was harmless. “Whether a violation of the confrontation clause in a particular case may be classified as harmless error depends upon a number of factors.” Stevenson v. State, 357 So. 3d 1141, 1155 (¶44) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023). “These factors include the importance of the witness’[s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.” Corbin v. State, 74 So. 3d 333, 338-39 (¶16) (Miss. 2011).

¶36. Here, the State presented ample evidence from other witnesses from which the jury could conclude that Patterson shot Trotter, including Trotter's own testimony about the shooting and that his girlfriend (Byrd) called 911, Lee's testimony about what Patterson told him while they were in jail together, and Detective Dyar's testimony given without objection that the 911 caller who reported the shooting was Trotter's girlfriend, Byrd. Further, the 911 caller stated that the victim in the shooting was Charles Trotter, that the suspected shooter was Patrick Patterson, that Trotter told him Patterson had shot him with a shotgun, and that he (Trotter) ran “to his girlfriend's house ․ and had her call 911 and advise law enforcement of the situation.” Also, when describing what Byrd told him, Detective Dyar did not repeat any specific circumstances relating to the shooting but, rather, just said that Byrd told him the same thing that Trotter had told him.

¶37. In sum, we find that Detective Dyar's testimony about Byrd's statement was cumulative of properly admitted evidence, and, as reviewed in context and in light of the evidence as a whole, the testimony was unimportant to the prosecution's case. As such, we find “no manifest miscarriage of justice” resulted in the admission of Detective Dyar's brief and general testimony about Byrd's statement in this case. See Course, 396 So. 3d at 1192 (¶40) (Although the police officer's testimony “crossed the line into inadmissible [testimonial] hearsay territory, this evidence was cumulative and weaker evidence than [other witnesses’] accounts of the murder, as well as [another witness's] similar, admissible testimony. The inclusion of [the officer's] testimony was harmless error.”); Stevenson, 357 So. 3d at 1157 (¶52) (finding harmless error in admitting testimonial hearsay evidence when “there was other sufficient evidence to support the jury's inference that the stab wounds resulted in [the victim's] death”); Sanders v. State, 228 So. 3d 888, 892 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that the admission of testimonial hearsay statements was harmless error when “the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the improper evidence was cumulative of properly admitted evidence, and no manifest miscarriage of justice resulted”).

II. Overwhelming Weight of the Evidence

¶38. Patterson asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the verdict against him is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. “Our role as [an] appellate court is to review the trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial for an abuse of discretion.” Mitchell v. State, 403 So. 3d 110, 117 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Little v. State, 233 So. 3d 288, 292 (¶21) (Miss. 2017)). “When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the State receives all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (quoting Young v. State, 236 So. 3d 49, 55 (¶22) (Miss. 2017)). “[We] will not order a new trial unless [we are] convinced that the verdict so contradicts the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow the verdict to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Sharkey v. State, 265 So. 3d 151, 155 (¶14) (Miss. 2019). Upon our review, we find that Patterson's weight-of-the-evidence argument is unpersuasive. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling denying a new trial.

¶39. In this case, Trotter told the jury at least four times that Patterson had shot him. On appeal, Patterson challenges Trotter's purported lack of credibility, noting that Trotter was unable to identify him in the courtroom, and also pointing out that Trotter “twice testified that he had doubts about who shot him[.]”

¶40. In addressing Patterson's assertions, we begin by observing that although Patterson points to “conflicts within the evidence, it is to no avail because the jury has the duty to determine the impeachment value of inconsistencies or contradictions as well as testimonial defects of perception, memory and sincerity.” Moore v. State, 773 So. 2d 984, 986-87 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

¶41. Applying this principle here, we begin by addressing Patterson's first point. Although Trotter did not identify Patterson in the courtroom, the jury also heard Trotter explain during cross-examination that this happened because he had not “seen [Patterson] in a while” and did not “look really in the courtroom good enough.” We also note that the jury viewed Patterson's videotaped interrogation. During that interrogation, Patterson remarked about Trotter's mental capability after Captain Fortenberry told Patterson that Trotter identified him as the shooter. Patterson said, “Jack can't read or write, he probably can't even come down here and tell you my name.” The jury heard Patterson's tone when making this remark and observed his demeanor during his interrogation; likewise, the jury also observed and listened to Trotter when he was on the witness stand. As stated, it is the jury's role to assess Patterson's and Trotter's demeanor, “perception, memory[,] and sincerity[,]” not ours. Moore, 773 So. 2d at 987 (¶8).

¶42. The same principle holds true with respect to Patterson's second point, that Trotter purportedly appeared to have doubts that Patterson shot him. A review of the entire exchange between Trotter and the prosecutor is necessary to understand the questioning that took place on this point. The exchange proceeded as follows:

THE STATE: Could it have been anybody other than Pat Pat that shot you?

TROTTER: No, sir.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection to leading.

THE COURT: I'll overrule.

THE STATE: Okay. Was there—do you have any doubt about who shot you?

TROTTER: Yes, sir.

THE STATE: You do have doubt about who shot you?

TROTTER: Yes, sir.

THE STATE: Who do you think shot you?

TROTTER: Pat.

THE STATE: Do you have doubt about that, or are you sure about that?

TROTTER: I'm sure about that.

¶43. Thus, at the end of this exchange, Trotter plainly told the jury that “Pat” shot him, and “[he was] sure about that.” Upon review of the exchange as a whole, we find that a jury could reasonably find that Trotter was confused by the prosecutor's initial questioning, which resulted in Trotter's initial responses. “[T]his Court ‘do[es] not make independent resolutions of conflicting evidence[,] ․ [n]or do we reweigh the evidence or make witness-credibility determinations.’ ” Price v. State, 361 So. 3d 105, 116 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Little, 233 So. 3d at 292 (¶20)). “Rather, ‘when the evidence is conflicting, the jury will be the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony.’ ” Id.

¶44. Regarding Patterson's culpability, the jury also heard Detective Dyar's testimony that the 911 caller (Byrd) reporting the shooting identified Trotter as the victim and Patterson as the shooter, and the jury heard Detective Dyar's testimony relaying what Trotter told him immediately after the shooting, which was essentially the same as Trotter's account at trial. Additionally, the jury heard Thomas's testimony that Patterson told him in jail that evening that he “came out there [into the street] with a shotgun and shot at [Trotter] twice.” To be sure, shortly after providing Detective Dyar with this information, Thomas pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of robbery and received a lesser sentence, but Thomas testified that he had already agreed to that plea deal before providing the information about Patterson to Detective Dyar.

¶45. We recognize that although Thomas said that Lee was present when Patterson told them about what he had done, Lee testified at trial that Patterson had never confessed to him that he shot Trotter. Later in his testimony, however, Lee admitted he had previously told the prosecutor “that he didn't want to be involved in all of this.” Again, Lee testified that he “wouldn't wish nothing on no man to get life in jail[.]”

¶46. As for Otis, she testified that in the late afternoon on the day of the shooting, she and Patterson had argued and broken up their relationship. She left Patterson at that point and went to a friend's home between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Otis said she did not see Patterson and Trotter together that evening or hear any gunshots. Otis acknowledged that although she and Patterson had broken up, Patterson was the father of her child, and they now got along well. To the extent Otis's testimony conflicted with Trotter's concerning that evening's events, we find that given the relationship between Otis and Patterson, a jury could reasonably infer that she may not have been entirely truthful about what she saw or heard that night. These inconsistencies are for the jury to consider, and the jury “is free to accept or reject all or some of the testimony given by each witness.” Diming v. State, 376 So. 3d 1231, 1239 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).

¶47. In sum, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the jury's verdict is not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Because we are not convinced “that to allow the verdict to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice,” Sharkey, 265 So. 3d at 155 (¶14), we affirm Patterson's convictions and sentences.

¶48. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2.   Trotter called Patterson “Pat” or “Pat Pat” throughout his testimony.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.