RASH v. STATE (2025)

¶1. A Tate County Circuit Court jury found Glenn Rash guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-5(1) (Rev. 2020). The firearm, a .40-caliber rifle, was discovered in the vehicle Rash was driving after a deputy stopped Rash for a traffic violation. The trial court sentenced Rash to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC).

¶2. Rash now appeals his conviction and sentence. On appeal, he asserts the following assignments of error: (1) the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury; (2) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) the deputy lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.

¶3. For the reasons addressed below, we find that Rash's assignments of error are without merit and, accordingly, affirm Rash's conviction and sentence.

FACTS

¶4. At approximately 11:10 p.m. on the evening of January 17, 2021, Deputy Ben Bryok of the Tate County Sheriff's Office initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle for failing to use a turn signal. Deputy Bryok approached the vehicle, and the driver identified himself as Rash. Rash's girlfriend, Anna Rook, owned the vehicle. Rook was in the passenger seat of the vehicle during the traffic stop.

¶5. Deputy Bryok testified that upon approaching the vehicle, the first thing he noticed was a rifle with an extended magazine sticking out from underneath a blanket in the backseat. Deputy Bryok questioned Rook and Rash about the gun. According to Deputy Bryok, Rash said that the gun belonged to Rook. Rook, however, told Deputy Bryok that the gun belonged to her cousin James Howard.

¶6. After communicating with dispatch, Deputy Bryok learned that Rash was a felon. Deputy Bryok detained Rash and secured the weapon for further investigation. Captain Lisa Sanders, an investigator for the Tate County Sheriff's Office, conducted an investigation into the ownership of the gun. Captain Sanders testified that the gun was last registered to Mr. A. Kelly of Memphis, Tennessee.

¶7. A grand jury ultimately indicted Rash for one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of section 97-37-5(1). Rash pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial.

¶8. At trial, Rook testified regarding the events that occurred surrounding the traffic stop. According to Rook, Rash picked her up from work at approximately 11:00 p.m. Rook explained that Rash's vehicle was not working, so she allowed Rash to drive her car. Rash got off work earlier than Rook, and Rook estimated that Rash was in possession of her car for approximately five hours before he picked her up that night. Rook testified that when she entered the vehicle after work, she did not notice any unusual items inside it.

¶9. Regarding the gun recovered from the backseat, Rook testified that the gun belonged to Rash. Rook also testified that she had seen the gun at Rash's house on prior occasions. Rook admitted that during the traffic stop, she lied to Deputy Bryok regarding the ownership of the gun. Rook explained that before Deputy Bryok approached the vehicle, Rash had asked her to claim ownership of the gun. According to Rook, Rash assured her that she would not get in trouble for claiming ownership of the gun but that if he claimed it, he would go to jail. Rook admitted she lied to Deputy Bryok when she told him that the gun was hers and that she had gotten it from Howard; she told the jury she said that because she wanted to prevent Rash from getting in trouble.

¶10. Rash did not testify in his own defense, nor did the defense put on any other witnesses.

¶11. The jury returned a verdict finding Rash guilty of one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the trial court sentenced Rash to serve ten years in the custody of the MDOC. Rash filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. After the denial of his post-trial motion, Rash appealed.

DISCUSSION 1

I. Jury Instructions

¶12. “Jury instructions are generally within the discretion of the trial court, and the settled standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Diming v. State, 376 So. 3d 1231, 1245 (¶50) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).

A. Rash's Right to Remain Silent

¶13. Rash asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that Rash had a right to remain silent and that his choice to do so could not be used against him. We find that Rash waived this issue and also that this issue is without merit.

¶14. We find that Rash failed to preserve this assignment of error for appeal because he never submitted a written right-to-remain-silent jury instruction for the trial court's consideration. Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(b)(1) provides that “[a]t least twenty-four (24) hours before trial, or at such other time during the trial as the court directs, each party must file with the clerk and deliver to all counsel jury instructions on the forms of verdict and the substantive law of the case.” Similarly, Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-17-35 (Rev. 2020) requires that “[a]ll instructions asked by either party must be in writing[.]”

¶15. In this case, Rash submitted three proposed jury instructions in writing. None of these instructions addressed Rash's right to remain silent in any way. The trial court made this very point when denying Rash's motion for a new trial after Rash asserted that the trial court erred by not giving a right-to-remain-silent jury instruction. The trial court rejected that argument: “[T]he [c]ourt held a jury instruction conference, [and] the defendant can submit up to six jury instructions, he submitted three. He did not submit a defendant not testifying, do not hold it against him, jury instruction.” The trial court further noted that “[i]f [Rash] had, the [c]ourt would have granted it.” After review, we find no error. The trial court “has no duty to instruct a jury sua sponte,” Davis v. State, 347 So. 3d 1205, 1214 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), nor, in general, “[may an] error ․ be predicated upon the [c]ourt's refusal to give an instruction defense counsel never requested.” Westbrook v. State, 29 So. 3d 828, 832-33 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Williams v. State, 566 So. 2d 469, 472 (Miss. 1990)).

¶16. Rash asserts that he orally requested such an instruction, but there is no record of such a request because it was made in an off-the-record bench conference just before the parties were to present their closing arguments. Even if Rash had made such a request, it was untimely,² and, more importantly, Rash still failed to submit any written proposed jury instruction on this point. “An oral instruction will be treated by this Court on appeal as a nullity.” Traylor v. State, 582 So. 2d 1003, 1008 (Miss. 1991) (discussing section 99-17-35). “It is the appellant's duty to make sure a claimed error is properly preserved on record.” Ballenger v. State, 667 So. 2d 1242, 1252 (Miss. 1995).

¶17. Our Supreme Court has explained that an assignment of error based upon a jury instruction that “does not appear anywhere in the record ․ is not properly before the Court. We cannot review the bare assertions in the parties’ briefs, but must look to the record.” Rogers v. State, 796 So. 2d 1022, 1029 (¶¶23-24) (Miss. 2001). The record is simply insufficient for Rash's assignment of error on this point; he failed to ever submit a written proposed jury instruction addressing his right to remain silent. Nor did Rash preserve any record that he made an oral request for such an instruction. Without that in the record to review, Rash is “preclude[d] ․ from complaining now that the instruction was not given,” Ballenger, 667 So. 2d at 1252, and the issue is barred from consideration on appeal. Alford v. State, 238 So. 3d 11, 16 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (“Failure to make an adequate record bars the issue from consideration on appeal.”).

¶18. As noted, the trial court specifically stated at Rash's post-trial motion hearing that if Rash had requested a right-to-remain-silent jury instruction, “the Court would have granted it.”³ In short, Rash's failure to request the instruction prevents our finding that any error occurred here. Further, in light of the other instructions given, any purported error was harmless because Rash cannot show he was prejudiced. “In considering a challenge to the granting of a jury instruction on appeal, we do not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, we read them as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed.” Adame v. State, 401 So. 3d 204, 207 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025) (internal quotation mark omitted); see Grant v. State, 788 So. 2d 815, 820 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (finding no error in failure to give an instruction where “jury was adequately instructed on the applicable law ․ [, and defendant] ․ show[ed] no prejudice”).

¶19. The trial court instructed the jury “that the defendant[ ] at the outset of the trial is presumed to be innocent. The defendant[ ] is not required to prove his[ ] innocence or to put in any evidence at all upon the subject.” (Emphasis added). The jury was further instructed:

In considering the testimony in the case you must look at the testimony and view it in the light of that presumption which the law clothes the defendant with: that he[ ] is innocent and it is a presumption that abides with him[ ] throughout the trial of the case until the evidence convinces each and every one of you to the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt.

(Emphasis added). In another instruction, the trial court reminded the jurors that “[they] are to presume the defendant is not guilty unless and until the defendant is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added).

¶20. Thus, before beginning deliberations, the jury was clearly instructed that they must “presume [Rash is] not guilty,” that Rash is “presumed to be innocent,” and that Rash “is not required to prove his[ ] innocence or to put in any evidence at all upon the subject.” (Emphasis added).

¶21. On this record, we find that any purported error based on the fact that no right-to-remain-silent instruction was given was harmless; the jurors were specifically instructed that Rash was presumed innocent and was not required to put on “any evidence at all” to prove he was not guilty.

B. Jury Instruction 8

¶22. Rash asserts the trial court erred in giving jury instruction 8, which was the court's instruction concerning the jury's duty to “apply ․ the written instructions given by the Court.” Jury instruction 8 read as follows: “The Court instructs the jury that all of the law which you are allowed to consider or apply in this case is in the written instructions given by the Court and you are duty bound to follow these instructions as the law in this case.” Rash asserts that because the jury was not instructed that he had a right to remain silent, the trial court erred in giving jury instruction 8. We find that Rash has waived this issue on appeal. We also find that Rash's assertions on this point are without merit.

¶23. During the jury instruction conference, Rash's counsel confirmed that he had reviewed the court's jury instructions. The trial court then specifically asked him, “[D]o you have any questions about those?” Rash's counsel responded, “No questions, Your Honor. We have no objections to those instructions.”

¶24. Because Rash agreed to and did not object to the trial court giving jury instruction 8, he has waived this issue on appeal. Terry v. State, 324 So. 3d 753, 757 (¶16) (Miss. 2021) (“We do not consider matters on appeal that were not placed first before the trial judge for decision. A trial judge cannot be put in error on a matter which was not placed before him for decision.”); Neal v. State, 15 So. 3d 388, 397 (¶13) (Miss. 2009) (“[A]n offended party's failure to object to jury instructions at trial procedurally bars the issue on appeal.”); MRCrP 22(d) (“A party who objects to any portion of the instructions or to a failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court, on the record, of the specific objection and the grounds therefor before the instructions are presented to the jury.”).

¶25. Waiver aside, we are also unconvinced by Rash's assertion that the trial court erred in giving jury instruction 8. As we have already addressed above, the jury instructions as a whole adequately instructed the jury on the applicable law. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court instructing the jurors that it was their duty to apply the law as given in the instructions, as jury instruction 8 provided. Indeed, it is the trial court's duty to instruct the jury, Newell v. State, 292 So. 3d 239, 243 (¶13) (Miss. 2020), and it is the jurors’ sworn duty to apply the law as given to the facts of the case. See Dickerson v. State, 175 So. 3d 8, 40 (¶100) (Miss. 2015) (Dickinson, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing the jury's “responsibility ․ to apply the law to the facts of a particular case”).

C. Constructive Possession

¶26. Rash asserts that the trial court “err[ed] by failing to give a complete jury instruction setting forth the elements of proof” for constructive possession. For the reasons addressed below, we find that this assignment of error is without merit.

¶27. Rash submitted jury instruction D-2 concerning constructive possession:

The Court instructs the jury that there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that Defendant was aware of the presence and character of the firearm, and that he was intentionally and consciously in possession of it. It need not be actual physical possession. Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the firearm was subject to his dominion or control. Proximity is usually an essential element, but by itself is not adequate in the absence of other incriminating circumstances.

(Emphasis added). During the jury instruction conference, the State objected to D-2, noting that constructive possession was covered by the State's instruction S-3, other than the sentence concerning proximity (indicated by italics above). The trial court asked defense counsel for “any case law, any authority, to back up the sentence [about] proximity,” but counsel did not provide any. The trial court modified Rash's proposed instruction D-2 by redacting the final sentence of the instruction regarding proximity, and the court gave the modified instruction to the jury. The trial court also gave S-3 to the jury, which was the instruction that Rash acknowledged was “almost verbatim” to D-2.⁴ Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court giving D-2 as modified.

¶28. Rash asserts that because the trial court omitted the final sentence from D-2 concerning proximity, “the jury was not instructed correctly,” and thus the trial court erred in giving the modified instruction. We disagree.

¶29. “Constructive possession is established by showing that the contraband was under the dominion and control of the defendant. The State must show the defendant had knowledge of the firearm and intentionally and consciously possessed it.” Perkins v. State, 392 So. 3d 690, 696 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Roney v. State, 294 So. 3d 1268, 1272 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).

¶30. In Terry, 324 So. 3d at 757 (¶¶16-17), the supreme court found that a jury instruction nearly identical to D-2 properly instructed the jury on constructive possession, though the decision did not specifically state that mere proximity is insufficient. The supreme court found that “the jury instructions did inform the jury that a person ‘must be aware of the nature and quality of the item’ and that a person must be ‘intentionally and consciously in possession of it’ to be convicted of constructive possession”; thus, this language “did inform the jury that more than proximity was required for [the defendant] to be convicted of constructive possession.” Id. at (¶17); accord Mosley v. State, 89 So. 3d 41, 49 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that an instruction nearly identical to D-2 “clearly stated the required elements of constructive possession, [thus] the ‘proximity’ language ․ was unnecessary”); see also Bates v. State, 952 So. 2d 320, 324 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (examining a jury instruction similar to D-2 and determining that it was “unnecessary to state that proximity alone is insufficient, because the instructions clearly state all of the elements required”).

¶31. Like the jury instructions at issue in Terry, Mosley, and Bates, although D-2 did not specify that mere proximity is insufficient, the instruction did inform the jury that it must find “that [Rash] was aware of the presence and character of the firearm, and that he was intentionally and consciously in possession of it” in order to find constructive possession. Under the authorities we have discussed above, we find that the jury was properly instructed on constructive possession in this case.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

¶32. In his supplemental pro se brief, Rash claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to object to certain testimony, (2) failing to suppress evidence, and (3) failing to timely file his JNOV motion.⁵ As we address below, we find that the record is not adequate to address Rash's first claim, so we dismiss this issue without prejudice so as to preserve Rash's right to raise this claim in a properly filed motion for post-conviction collateral relief. However, we find that the record is adequate to address Rash's two other ineffective assistance claims and, for the reasons discussed below, we find that neither claim constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶33. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Rash, as the defendant, bears the burden of proving that (1) his “counsel's performance was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). This Court examines the totality of the circumstances when determining whether the counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. Williams v. State, 228 So. 3d 949, 952 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017). In this regard, there is “a strong but rebuttable presumption ․ that a counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. Accordingly, this Court will find that a counsel's assistance was ineffective “where it is reasonably probable that, but for the attorney's errors, the outcome would have been different.” Id.

¶34. Traditionally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims should be raised in a motion for post-conviction relief and not on direct appeal “because there is usually insufficient evidence within the record to evaluate the claim.” Blocton v. State, 340 So. 3d 384, 393 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Battle v. State, 269 So. 3d 325, 330 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018)). Given that “an appellate court is limited to the trial record on direct appeal, issues of ineffective assistance of counsel are more appropriate in a motion for post-conviction relief.” Id. “We may address such claims on direct appeal only if the issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record.” Id. If the record is insufficient to do so, “[we] should dismiss the claims without prejudice, preserving the defendant's right to raise the claims later in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief.” Id.

¶35. We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal only when “[(1)] the record affirmatively shows ineffectiveness of constitutional dimensions,” “[(2)] the parties stipulate that the record is adequate and the Court determines that findings of fact by a trial judge able to consider the demeanor of witnesses, etc., are not needed,” or “[(3)] the record affirmatively shows that the claims are without merit.” Robinson v. State, 400 So. 3d 527, 531 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025). In this case, the parties do not stipulate that the record is adequate for this Court to make a finding on direct appeal. Upon review, we find that the record is inadequate to allow us to address Rash's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain testimony, but the record affirmatively shows Rash's two remaining claims are without merit. We address each claim in turn.

A. Inadequate Record: Alleged Failure to Object to Certain Testimony

¶36. According to Rash, Rook and Deputy Bryok told “lies” during their testimonies, and “in [Rash's] opinion,” portions of Rook's testimony “fall[ ] under a hearsay rule.” Rash claims his trial lawyer was ineffective because he did not object to this testimony. In making his “lies” assertion, Rash points out purported inconsistencies in or between Rook's and Deputy Bryok's testimonies that, if anything, may go to the credibility of the witnesses, which is an issue for the jury to evaluate. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 396 So. 3d 1207, 1212 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (recognizing that it is the jury's responsibility to “evaluat[e] the credibility and veracity of witnesses”). As for his “hearsay” assertion, Rash offers no explanation supported by relevant authority showing how the testimony he addresses constitutes hearsay.

¶37. But even if Rash had adequately explained his assertions, we decline to address this issue on direct appeal. To the extent we understand Rash's assertions, it appears that his claim concerns his lawyer's trial strategy. In general, “counsel's choice of whether or not to ․ call witnesses, ask certain questions, or make certain objections fall within the ambit of trial strategy and cannot give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Carr v. State, 873 So. 2d 991, 1003 (¶27) (Miss. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's actions were consistent with a chosen trial strategy and was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Robinson, 400 So. 3d at 532 (¶18). Because we do not know defense counsel's trial strategy with respect to approaching the testimonies of these witnesses, we dismiss Rash's request for relief on this point without prejudice to his discretion to raise this claim in a properly filed motion for post-conviction relief.

B. Without Merit

1. Alleged Failure to Suppress Evidence

¶38. Rash asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress evidence. The basis for Rash's assertion is that his lawyer failed to timely file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop.⁶ Rash claims that if his lawyer had done so, “maybe the judge would've granted it.” We are not convinced by Rash's argument.

¶39. As an initial matter, although the motion to suppress was untimely, Rash's counsel preserved this issue for appeal by twice objecting at trial to the admission of evidence from the traffic stop—first when the prosecutor introduced a photograph of the weapon, and later, when the prosecutor introduced the weapon itself. The trial judge overruled the objections. Nevertheless, the issue was preserved for appeal. As such, Rash was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged deficiency on this point.

¶40. Additionally, as we address below, we find that there was probable cause for the traffic stop, and thus the evidence was admissible. Rash cannot show any resulting prejudice for his trial counsel failing to timely file a motion to suppress for this additional reason. Because we find that there is not “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” Williams, 228 So. 3d at 952 (¶13), we find that this issue is without merit.

2. Alleged Failure to Timely File Rash's JNOV Motion

¶41. Rash claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his JNOV motion was untimely filed. We are unpersuaded by Rash's assertion. To be sure, during the hearing on Rash's post-trial motion, the trial judge noted that Rash's motion was untimely. But regardless of timing, our review of the hearing transcript shows that the trial court plainly denied the motion on its merits.

¶42. In particular, the trial judge “[went] through the motion issues raised one at a time,” analyzing each issue in detail, and issuing a bench ruling denying the motion on the merits. Likewise, the trial court's order denying Rash's motion provides that “the Court after review of the pleadings and hearing argument of counsel, does hereby find that the Motion is not well taken and should be denied.” (Emphasis added). So even if the motion was filed in an untimely manner, it is clear that the trial court nevertheless considered and denied Rash's motion on the merits. As such, Rash was not prejudiced by any purported untimeliness. We therefore find that Rash's claim on this point is without merit.

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶43. In his supplemental pro se brief, Rash alleges that the prosecutor relied on purported “lies” by some of the State's witnesses, “even us[ing] the lie(s) of ․ at least one of [the prosecutor's] witness[es] in the closing argument to the jury.”⁷ We are unpersuaded by Rash's argument for the reasons discussed below.

¶44. “Though attorneys are generally allowed a wide latitude during closing remarks, prosecutors cannot ‘use tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury.’ ” Curry v. State, 202 So. 3d 294, 299-300 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Sheppard v. State, 777 So. 2d 659, 661 (¶7) (Miss. 2000)). “The standard of review [we] ․ must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created.” Sheppard, 777 So. 2d at 661 (¶7).

¶45. Upon our review of the opening and closing arguments, we observe that both the prosecutor and defense counsel referred to “lies” told by Rook to Deputy Bryok when he stopped Rash and Rook on January 17, 2021 (i.e., that the gun was hers and owned by Howard), as compared to Rook's testimony at trial that the gun belonged to Rash and that Rook had seen the gun at Rash's house on prior occasions.

¶46. In particular, after reminding the jury of Rook's trial testimony on this point, the prosecutor also reminded the jury that Rook admitted she lied to Deputy Bryok on January 17, 2021. The prosecutor stated, “[Rook told you (the jurors) that] Glenn Rash asked her, ‘please, please, say that's your gun,’ ” and she did. Continuing, the prosecutor said, “Ladies and gentlemen, Anna Rook is not a convicted felon. She doesn't get in trouble for having that weapon. Glenn Rash is, and Glenn Rash would.” “And she told y'all, I lied. I lied for him, I told the officers that was my gun, and I got it from my cousin.”

¶47. During his closing argument, defense counsel also pointed out that Rook admitted she lied to Deputy Bryok on January 17, 2021. Defense counsel then stated, “[Rook] lied to the officer, but the State says believe her now. Why should you believe her now ․ [w]hen two and a half years ago she told the officer something totally different than what she's telling you now.”

¶48. In rebuttal, the State told the jurors, “I'm not going to tell you that someone's a liar and that someone else is not․ You are the only persons in this room that make that determination. I don't get to make it for you. Counsel opposite doesn't get to make it for you.”

¶49. We find nothing “inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury” in the prosecutor's remarks on this issue or, upon review, in the prosecutor's opening and closing statements in their entirety. Accordingly, we find that Rash's prosecutorial misconduct assertions are without merit.

IV. Probable Cause for the Traffic Stop

¶50. Rash asserts in his supplemental pro se brief that Deputy Bryok lacked probable cause to conduct the traffic stop, so the evidence obtained during that stop is inadmissible. For the reasons addressed below, we are not persuaded by Rash's assertions on this point.

¶51. We review de novo the trial court's “[d]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause”; “[h]owever, we are bound by the trial judge's findings as to the underlying historical facts unless those findings are clearly erroneous.” Boler v. State, 306 So. 3d 846, 848 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶52. In addressing this issue, we recognize that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Woods v. State, 175 So. 3d 579, 581 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 23). “And the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine ‘makes inadmissible tangible evidence obtained incident to an unlawful search or seizure.’ ” Fogleman v. State, 311 So. 3d 1221, 1240 (¶50) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Cameron v. State, 175 So. 3d 574, 577 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)). “Traffic stops are Fourth-Amendment seizures.” Cameron, 175 So. 3d at 577 (¶8).

¶53. Rash's lack-of-probable-cause argument fails because Deputy Bryok's traffic stop was not “unreasonable.” “Typically, a stop is reasonable if a law-enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. “Section 63-3-707 requires [that] a driver turning right or left give a continuous signal for a reasonable distance before turning in the event any other vehicle may be affected.” Johnson v. State, 228 So. 3d 933, 936 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017); see Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-707 (Rev. 2022). This statute “clearly requires a signal when other vehicles may be affected by a turn—even when no accident is likely to occur as the result of the driver's failure to give a proper signal.” Id. “[T]he proper inquiry is whether the officer[ ], under the totality of the circumstances and objective facts available, had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred.” Mosley v. State, 89 So. 3d 41, 46 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011).

¶54. Here, Deputy Bryok testified that he stopped Rash for “[f]ailure to use a turn signal.” In particular, the trial judge heard Deputy Bryok testify that he “was posted at the intersection of Peyton [Road] and [U.S. Highway] 51” when he saw Rash's “direction of travel” and saw Rash not use his turn signal at this intersection. We find that this is probable cause for the traffic stop. See Johnson, 228 So. 3d at 936 (¶6) (finding probable cause for traffic stop where officer “personally observed” the violation, recognizing that “[i]t is well settled that a police officer personally observing a traffic violation is sufficient to meet the requisite cause for a stop”); Woods, 175 So. 3d at 581-82 (¶¶13-14) (finding probable cause for traffic stop where the officer testified he believed the defendant violated section 63-3-707 by making a right turn just after going through a major intersection without signaling and rejecting the defendant's assertion that probable cause was lacking because the officer did not testify that “any other driver was actually affected by [his] signal-less turn”).

¶55. Rash argues that there is no probable cause because Deputy Bryok did not give him a ticket for the traffic offense, but this assertion is without merit. “There is no requirement that an officer issue a citation for the predicate traffic violation to have a valid stop or search.” Mosley, 89 So. 3d at 47 (¶18). In short, because Deputy Bryok observed Rash commit a traffic violation, there was probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.

CONCLUSION

¶56. For all the reasons we have discussed, we affirm Rash's conviction and sentence.

¶57. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   See MRCrP 22(b)(1).

3.   Indeed, we recognize that a trial court cannot refuse to give such an instruction in a criminal case. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do so.”); Richardson v. State, 402 So. 2d 848, 852 (Miss. 1981).

4.   Jury instruction S-3 provided:In order to find the Defendant guilty of Possession of a Weapon by a Convicted Felon, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding by the jury that the Defendant was aware of the presence and character of the weapon and was intentionally and consciously in possession of the weapon. It need not be actual physical possession. Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the weapon was subject to the Defendant's dominion or control.

5.   Different counsel represents Rash on appeal.

6.   Rash's lawyer filed the motion to suppress two weeks after the deadline for preliminary motions.

7.   Rash also asserts that there were other “cumulative errors by the State” that constitute prosecutorial misconduct. According to Rash, these purported errors include the prosecutor allegedly improperly “commenting on a defendant's right to remain silent,” “intentionally eliciting improper hearsay,” ’ and “asking highly inflammatory questions.” Rash, however, provides no specific record cites to these alleged instances of misconduct in any discernible way, nor does he provide argument or relevant authority explaining how any particular comments or questions from the prosecutor were improper. Accordingly, we find that Rash's general “cumulative error” assertion is waived. “Arguments made on appeal ‘shall contain the contentions of appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.’ ” Gilmore v. State, 282 So. 3d 601, 608 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7)). “In the absence of meaningful argument and citation of authority, this Court generally will not consider the assignment of error.” Randolph v. State, 852 So. 2d 547, 558 (¶29) (Miss. 2002). For this reason, we decline to consider this particular assignment of error.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WESTBROOKS, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.