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IN THE INTEREST OF J.S., A MINOR, AND I.S., A MINOR: P.S. APPELLANT v. PEARL RIVER COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES AND MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION SERVICES APPELLEES
¶1. P.S. appeals from a Pearl River County Youth Court permanency order involving his minor children, J.S. and I.S., that modified a permanency plan from reunification to adoption and ordered the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services (MDCPS) to commence termination-of-parental-rights proceedings.1 The youth court adjudicated the children as neglected and abused because of the actions of the children's mother, “Jane Doe,” and her boyfriend.2
¶2. On appeal, P.S. argues that (1) there was no material change in circumstances to warrant a modification of the permanency plan, and (2) the grounds for termination of parental rights were not established by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no substantial credible evidence to support the modification of the youth court's permanency order, we reverse and remand for MDCPS to make reasonable efforts to reunify P.S. with his children, J.S. and I.S.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. According to testimony during the shelter hearing, in July 2022, an officer responded to a call about a vehicle sitting in a parking lot in Pearl River County. When the officer approached the vehicle, he noticed it was occupied by a woman, Doe, and four children. The officer also noticed that the children were in soiled, soaked-through diapers and were not wearing shoes. Doe had slurred speech, smelled of alcohol, and was surrounded by urine and vomit in the driver's seat of the vehicle. Doe's blood-alcohol-content level was three times the legal limit. She admitted to the officer that she had been drinking earlier that day but claimed that she left her home and headed to her mother's house because her boyfriend had abused her children. A report was made to MDCPS after Doe and her four children were taken to the hospital. There, the children were found to have bruising and marks on their necks, faces, and legs. Following their discharge from the hospital, the children were removed from Doe's custody. At the conclusion of the shelter hearing, the youth court ordered all four children to remain in the custody of the Pearl River County MDCPS until a full adjudicatory hearing could be held.
¶4. On November 3, 2022, after considering witness testimony, forensic interviews of all the children, and their medical records, the youth court found that all four children were abused and neglected. At the first permanency hearing on December 7, 2022, Doe and her boyfriend were found to have subjected the children to aggravated circumstances, and the youth court ordered MDCPS to bypass reasonable efforts to reunify them with the children and to terminate their parental rights. During these proceedings, P.S. was incarcerated in the Concordia Parish Correctional Facility in Ferriday, Louisiana. P.S.’s incarceration was not related to any allegations before the youth court, which determined P.S. was the non-offending parent with respect to the events that gave rise to MDCPS and youth court involvement. The youth court ordered a plan of reunification for I.S. and J.S., with adoption as the concurrent plan. The youth court also ordered MDCPS to continue working on a family service plan with the goal of reunifying P.S. with I.S. and J.S.3
¶5. The next permanency hearing was held on December 14, 2022. After considering the testimony and recommendations by the MDCPS caseworker and the guardian ad litem, the youth court held that the plans of reunification for I.S. and J.S. would remain in effect. At that hearing, Julie Page, an MDCPS caseworker, was questioned about the reasonable efforts the agency was making toward the permanent plan of reunification for J.S. and I.S. She testified that the agency had a family team meeting with P.S. through remote video conferencing, and P.S. completed some programs while incarcerated. She added that, upon release, P.S. was expected to provide a stable home, obtain employment, and he would submit to random drug testing. Page asserted that the agency only has to provide reasonable efforts to reunify J.S. and I.S. for six months. She added that if P.S. was not making progress after six months, the plans with MDCPS would change. When Page was asked if P.S. was following his service plan to her satisfaction, she responded, “Yes. He's been doing his part.”
¶6. Another permanency hearing was held on June 28, 2023. At the hearing, Mary Thornhill, another MDCPS caseworker, was asked about the reasonable efforts the agency made toward the children's current permanent and concurrent plans. Thornhill testified that the agency maintained regular contact with the children to ensure their safety and well-being. She also stated that the agency was working toward relative placement for J.S. and I.S. Thornhill testified that P.S. was offered a service agreement and that they had held family team meetings, but she claimed that P.S. had been unable to make any progress toward that service agreement. Thornhill also stated that P.S. had not had any visitation with J.S. and I.S. since they had been in custody. Due to the length of time that the children had been in custody, P.S.’s incarceration, and his lack of progress on the service plan, she recommended that J.S. and I.S.’s permanency plan change to adoption with a concurrent plan of durable legal custody.
¶7. At the same June 2023 permanency hearing, Thornhill was questioned about whether P.S. was ever provided a service plan and if he had the opportunity to sign it. She maintained that she did not believe he signed it, but she believed that P.S. was mailed a service plan because it was documented by the previous caseworker. However, Thornhill acknowledged she had no personal knowledge as to whether P.S. received a service plan. When asked about when the last time J.S. and I.S. contacted P.S., Thornhill responded that she knew J.S. sent a letter to P.S. the month prior, but P.S. had not had any face-to-face visits with the children. She was then questioned about whether the lack of face-to-face visits with the children was held against him. Thornhill responded, “I mean, he's incarcerated. So I guess there's so much he can do, but no, he hasn't seen the children.” P.S.’s attorney asked, “Is that due to his own fault?” to which Thornhill replied, “Yes. He's the reason he's incarcerated.”
¶8. Further, P.S.’s attorney questioned Thornhill about how reunification works when someone is incarcerated. Thornhill testified that a service plan would not look different for an incarcerated person, and P.S. could complete some objectives on the service plan while he was incarcerated and other objectives once he was released, but he could not have custody of the children while incarcerated. When asked whether it might be in the best interest of the children to delay termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings until P.S. had a chance to complete the service plan, she said, “No. The children have been in custody almost a year now.” When asked if P.S. was given the chance to work a service plan, Thornhill replied, “It was mailed to him by the previous case worker.” She admitted that the only proof she had was that the mail was sent off and “wasn't returned to sender.”
¶9. At the conclusion of the June 2023 permanency hearing, the court found that MDCPS had not documented extraordinary and compelling reasons for extending the time period in which to meet the requirements of the service agreement. The court also held that MDCPS made reasonable efforts over a reasonable period to diligently assist P.S. in complying with the service plan. The court found that P.S. failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the service plan and that “reunification with a neglectful parent is not in the best interest of the children at this time.” The court held that MDCPS no longer had to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the minor children with P.S., and MDCPS was to initiate the termination of P.S.’s parental rights. P.S. filed a notice of appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10. “With respect to proceedings in youth court, this Court's standard of review is limited.” In re L.C., 394 So. 3d 517, 530 (¶38) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting In re S.A.M., 826 So. 2d 1266, 1274 (¶17) (Miss. 2002)). The youth court's “findings of fact will not be overturned where they are supported by substantial evidence in the record, unless manifestly wrong.” Id. However, “if reasonable men could not have found as the youth court did by a preponderance of the evidence, then the appellate court must reverse.” Id. We review issues of law de novo. Id. (citing L.B.C. v. Forrest Cnty. Youth Ct., 339 So. 3d 111, 113 (¶7) (Miss. 2017)).
DISCUSSION
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶11. MDCPS argues that P.S.’s issue with the youth court's finding to terminate his parental rights is not properly before this Court. Specifically, MDCPS contends that the issue is premature and this Court should decline to decide it. However, we have exercised appellate jurisdiction over appeals from similar orders. “Generally, an order or judgment is final ‘if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’ In other words, ‘[a] final, appealable, judgment is one that adjudicates the merits of the controversy and settles all the issues as to all the parties and requires no further action by the lower court.’ ” In re L.C., 394 So. 3d at 528 (¶29) (citations omitted). In the case before us, the permanency order finding that reasonable efforts to reunify were not required and ordering MDCPS to begin terminating P.S.’s parental right is a final, appealable order because it settles all the issues as to all the parties and requires no further action by the trial court. See id. at 528 (¶29). Further, this Court has held that this issue may not be “re-litigated in a subsequent TPR proceeding.” Id. at 529 (¶33) (citing R.B. v. Winston Cnty. Dep't of Child Prot. Servs., 291 So. 3d 1116, 1120-22 (¶¶10-15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-115(c) (Rev. 2021). Therefore, we find that we have jurisdiction over P.S.’s appeal.
II. Youth Court Error in Changing Permanency Plan and Ordering Termination of Parental Rights
¶12. P.S. asserts that the Pearl River County Youth Court erred in changing the permanency plan of reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption to a permanency plan of adoption with a concurrent plan of durable legal custody. We agree. This Court has held that the youth court is required to find that MDCPS made reasonable efforts to achieve the original permanency plan of reunification before modifying the permanency plan to adoption and terminating parental rights. In re L.C., 394 So. 3d at 531 (¶39). Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-21-105(gg) (Rev. 2023) defines reasonable efforts as
the exercise of reasonable care and due diligence by the Department of Human Services, the Department of Child Protection Services, or any other appropriate entity or person to use services appropriate to the child's background, accessible, and available to meet the individualized needs of the child and child's family to prevent removal and reunify the family as soon as safely possible consistent with the best interests of the child. Reasonable efforts must be made in collaboration with the family and must address the individualized needs of the family that brought the child to the attention of the Department of Child Protection Services and must not consist of required services that are not related to the family's needs.
In the case before us, the youth court found that MDCPS made reasonable efforts over a reasonable period to diligently assist P.S. in complying with the service plan. However, the record does not reflect any substantial credible evidence to support that finding.
¶13. MDCPS is statutorily required to develop a service plan for the reunification of the parent and the child, obligated to identify the necessary requirements to achieve reunification, and must help the parent meet those requirements. In re L.C., 394 So. 3d at 531-32 (¶42). Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-15-115 (Rev. 2021) states in part:
When reasonable efforts for reunification are required for a child who is in the custody of, or under the supervision of, the Department of Child Protection Services pursuant to youth court proceedings, the court hearing a petition under this chapter may terminate the parental rights of a parent if, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: ․ (b) The child has been in the custody and care of, or under the supervision of, the Department of Child Protection Services for at least six (6) months, and, in that time period, the Department of Child Protection Services has developed a service plan for the reunification of the parent and the child[.]
Again, there is no service plan in the record on appeal. The youth court found that P.S. failed to substantially comply with the terms and conditions of the service plan after seven months of working toward reunification. Yet, the transcript from the permanency hearing on December 14, 2022, reveals that the caseworker for MDCPS admitted to receiving certificates of completion for some of the programs that P.S. completed while incarcerated. She also testified that he was doing his part as it pertained to the service plan.
¶14. MDCPS caseworkers are required to follow certain policy guidelines when a permanency plan for reunification has been ordered. See 18 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 6, D VII (Apr. 2015). MDCPS's policy is replete with requirements for the preparation and execution of a written service plan in cases such as the one currently before this Court. Despite multiple references to a service plan throughout the hearings, including testimony from P.S. acknowledging that he met with caseworkers about a service plan, our review does not reveal the existence of one (either by way of written document or testimony regarding its content). The record instead reveals, based on the testimony of the various caseworkers assigned to this case, that MDCPS arranged a single meeting by remote video conferencing during the first six months of the children's placement in MDCPS's custody. We would be remiss in omitting the observation that MDCPS failed its own policy requirements. We take this into consideration in determining MDCPS's failure to make reasonable efforts toward the reunification of J.S. and I.S. with P.S. as legally required by statute and developed case law.
¶15. This Court recognizes the unique challenges associated with reunification when a parent is incarcerated. Thornhill testified that she recommended the service-plan change “[d]ue to the length of time the children have been in custody and due to the father's incarceration, he has no way to provide for them at this time.” However, MDCPS's policy provides that parental incarceration is a reason for extending the time frame of a service plan beyond six months. 18 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 6, D VII. The policy continues with specific actions the caseworker can take to facilitate interaction between the children and the incarcerated parent.4 It is clear from the record that MDCPS did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification but heavily relied on the fact that P.S. was incarcerated to change J.S. and I.S.’s permanency plan.
¶16. In addition to no evidence of a service plan for P.S. to follow, Thornhill testified that she had no personal knowledge as to whether P.S. received a service plan. MDCPS's policy requires that the caseworker mail or deliver to the incarcerated parent a copy of the “Parents Rights and Responsibilities” and obtain information from the caseworker or social worker at the parent's facility regarding the procedure in place for securing signatures on this document and the process for returning the signed service plan to the assigned caseworker. However, during the June 2023 permanency hearing, Thornhill admitted that her only proof that P.S. received a service plan was documentation that the previous caseworker sent one in the mail. Throughout the course of these proceedings, the testimony showed that P.S. was “offered” a family service plan, and Thornhill testified that she “did not believe he signed it, but he has a service plan.”
¶17. Lastly, when a parent is incarcerated, MDCPS's policy requires its personnel to work with the case manager or social worker at the parent's facility to find out about services the prison offers and rules about visitations. According to MDCPS's policy, the caseworker is required to make every effort to arrange visitations with incarcerated or institutionalized parents or primary caretakers in accordance with the prison's guidelines. Nevertheless, Thornhill testified that P.S. did not have visitation with I.S. and J.S. while they were in MDCPS's custody. No substantial credible evidence in the record shows that MDCPS made reasonable efforts to help P.S. arrange visitations with his children.
¶18. After reviewing the record and transcripts, and considering statutory requirements and MDCPS's policies, we find the record does not contain sufficient credible evidence to support the youth court's determination that MDCPS made reasonable efforts to achieve the permanency plan of reunification with a concurrent plan of adoption.
CONCLUSION
¶19. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the youth court to order MDCPS to make reasonable efforts for the reunification of P.S. and the minor children, J.S. and I.S.
¶20. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FOOTNOTES
1. Since the record is confidential, we use initials and pseudonyms to protect the identities of the children and their guardian.
2. At the time of the proceedings in youth court, P.S. was presumed to be the father of two additional children, A.S. and K.E.S., who were born during his marriage to Jane Doe, the mother of all four children. P.S.’s appeal only requests relief from the youth court permanency orders involving his biological children, J.S. and I.S. Doe's boyfriend was determined to be the biological father of A.S. and K.E.S. during the youth court proceedings.
3. There is no family service plan in the record.
4. The full policy can also be found on the MDCPS website: https://www.mdcps.ms.gov/sites/default/files/Foster%20Care%20Policy.pdf (last visited July 10, 2025).
WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.
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Docket No: NO. 2023-CA-00932-COA
Decided: July 15, 2025
Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
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