BRODIE v. BRODIE (2025)

¶1. This case stems from a divorce complaint filed by James Brodie against Marilyn Brodie on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, or desertion. James also sued for separate maintenance, claiming Marilyn was guilty of conversion and exploitation of him as a vulnerable adult. Initially, the DeSoto County Chancery Court ruled in favor of Marilyn, finding no grounds for James's divorce claims. In response, James filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and after “thorough consideration,” the chancery court found the motion well-taken. The court granted James a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and awarded James the marital house in Olive Branch, Mississippi, a vehicle, and the value of James's liquidated retirement fund.

¶2. On appeal, Marilyn argues that the chancery court failed to provide a sufficient rationale for changing its ruling. Additionally, she claims there was insufficient evidence to grant the divorce, taking issue with James's competency, hearsay evidence at trial, an alleged lack of corroborating evidence, and inaccurate findings of fact. Further, Marilyn contends the chancery court did not adequately categorize and value the property and erred in awarding the Olive Branch house to James. Finally, Marilyn argues that the chancery court erred in failing to determine whether there was a confidential relationship between James and Marilyn.

¶3. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶4. James is an Englishman who was seventy-eight years old when he married Marilyn, who was sixty-six years old. James had worked at FedEx for several years and retired in the Germantown, Tennessee area. Over the years, James had accumulated significant assets from his career and investments. Marilyn first met James while they were both working at FedEx in 1993. She also retired from FedEx. Marilyn claimed James had asked her to marry him years ago, but she declined.

¶5. In May 2019, Marilyn tracked down James's whereabouts and reconnected with him because she “still loved him.” James had been recently diagnosed with lung cancer, but nevertheless, on August 28, 2019, he and Marilyn obtained a marriage license. Both parties had been married several times. James had no children. Marilyn has two grown sons and had adopted her disabled grandson two months before her marriage to James.¹ She and her adopted son resided at a house on Elizabeth Circle in Olive Branch, Mississippi, which Marilyn stated was formerly owned by her and her latest ex-husband, Tommy Coulter (Coulter). Before marrying Marilyn, James bought out Coulter's interest in the house and then deeded it to Marilyn alone. Marilyn testified ² that James did not want any assets due to tax debt from asset dividends in London, as well as his diagnosis of lung cancer. Sometime in the fall of 2019, James had hernia repair surgery and recuperated in the marital home. He also had lung surgery, and his health started to decline.³ Marilyn testified that James had not driven since March 2020 after a minor accident.

¶6. By at least July 2020, but maybe earlier, the parties separated. James had recovered from his lung cancer but was living alone in a rental house Marilyn owned in Hernando, Mississippi. On September 25, 2020, local police contacted the Mississippi Department of Human Services about James after he was found in a ditch in Hernando. Police said James was exhibiting dementia symptoms and reported to them he had been living alone. Human Services interviewed James's home-health care nurses who reported that James was “often found alone in the home with no food,” and “no phone in the home to call for help if something happened.” The nurses felt James was “not safe to live on his own.” Human Services stated that when Marilyn was called about the situation, she “did not seem concerned” about James.

¶7. After their investigation, Human Services reported that there was no living room or dining room furniture in the house, but it was clean. There was milk and sandwich ingredients. James claimed to be satisfied, but Human Services stated, “[T]hings could be better,” especially in light of his dementia. Marilyn told them that when James “became argumentative and boisterous, she moved him [to] her rental property with her son.” Marilyn stated that her sons were supposed to be looking after James, but they were not very “committed.” Marilyn performed James's grocery shopping but stated she could no longer care for him due to her own health issues. Adult protective services interviewed James on October 6, 2020. They called Marilyn the next day and told her James could not live by himself. Marilyn took James to a nearby hospital where he was evaluated. The hospital records show James had “advanced dementia” and behavioral issues, as well as chronic medical issues. On October 14, 2020, he was transferred from the hospital to an assisted living facility in Southaven, Mississippi, now known as The Goldton.

¶8. At the facility, James was provided a furnished room. Nursing records entered into evidence and nurse testimony indicated that the facility had difficulty getting Marilyn to provide them James's prescriptions, and she refused to use their onsite pharmacy. In November 2020, Marilyn accused a nurse of harassing her about this issue. James continued to have cognitive and behavioral issues, as documented in the facility nurse records. Also documented was an incident in December 2020 when Marilyn brought month-old medication to James, and he called her a “bloody thief” after learning she was liquidating his assets.

¶9. Another incident began on February 2, 2021, when the nurses’ notes show Marilyn asked “several nurses and aides to write a note” for James to sign that would relinquish his European assets. The staff had been “educated” on this situation and instructed that no documents were to be signed without the facility manager's knowledge. The next day, the staff reported that James was on a three-way phone call with Marilyn and a London broker's secretary. Marilyn “was yelling at him, instructing and insisting that he tell this lady that it's OK to liquidate his European assets to her.” The secretary hung up, and Marilyn started yelling at James, “[W]e will try this again tomorrow and if you don't tell them to do it, you [are] going to jail! You [are] going to prison!” James was visibly upset and told Marilyn, “I'll just kill myself and you can have it all.”

¶10. After this incident, the facility called ombudsman Elgalene Close, who met with James. He told Close that Marilyn “wants to liquidate my assets,” and while he liked “to share his stuff ․ this is out of control.” He complained to Close that Marilyn “took his checking account,” telling him they had to combine accounts because they were married. Close had also been called in December 2020, when Marilyn had disconnected her telephone and would not leave James any money. Since then, things had progressively worsened, with Marilyn's “locking him out of accounts.” Close explained to James that Marilyn's actions could result in criminal charges. Close informed James that his sister and family in England were “very concerned.”

¶11. Close referred James to local legal services to advise him about his legal rights and change his power of attorney from Marilyn to his sister. She also advised the facility to call the Southaven Police Department so James could file a police report due to Marilyn's threats, which they did. Close also testified that James told the facility he wanted no further contact with Marilyn because it upset him. Nurse records indicate that once contact with Marilyn ceased, James's mood improved.

 House at Elizabeth Circle in Olive Branch

¶12. Marilyn claims that the house at 7656 Elizabeth Circle in Olive Branch was formerly owned by herself and Coulter. She had lived there “off and on” since 1999. By July 2019, or within two months of Marilyn's rekindling a relationship with James but before the parties married, Marilyn contacted a law firm to prepare a warranty deed where Coulter granted James an interest in the Olive Branch house. In August 2019, Marilyn contacted a different attorney, Rees Hodges, about preparing a will,⁴ power of attorney, and quitclaim deed. They went to Hodges's office, where James signed the documents.

¶13. Hodges testified at trial about the meeting and quitclaim deed. He knew the couple was getting married and testified that James had acquired property in Olive Branch from Marilyn's ex-husband. He prepared the quitclaim deed at their request, transferring the house from James to Marilyn. Hodges testified that the deed did not note the property was a gift. Funds from James's Vanguard retirement account were transferred to his checking account, and on July 25, 2019, $214,000 was withdrawn from it for him to purchase the house. Marilyn claimed the house was not marital property but, rather, a pre-marital gift from James.⁵ Marilyn testified that they wanted to renovate the house and “finish” the upstairs for her grandson to live. At trial, Marilyn's friend Melanie Gholson testified to this plan as well. Several expensive repairs and renovations were made to the house both before and after this transaction.

 Accountant Stephen DeMartini's Deposition

¶14. Stephen DeMartini, James's former certified public accountant in California, testified he had been James's tax accountant for the last ten years but had not spoken with James since 2018. In 2020, Marilyn called him, introducing herself as James's wife. DeMartini informed her that even though she was James's wife, he could not speak with her about James's finances unless she had a power of attorney. Marilyn obtained one a few weeks later, and they resumed telephone discussions about James's 2019 tax returns. Marilyn told DeMartini that James was “incapacitated.” DeMartini never spoke with James and did not know he had cancer.

¶15. DeMartini testified that Marilyn did not mention to him certain 2019 tax implications, such as cashed-in savings bonds, sold stocks and bonds, bought and sold property, liquidated retirement funds, or gifts made of over $15,000. DeMartini testified that in 2018, James's income was $137,886, with $70,788 in taxable pensions. In 2019, however, James's income increased to $371,757 due to a large pension distribution, with $323,025 in taxable pensions. DeMartini also testified James's tax rate from 2018 to 2019 dramatically increased. At the end of one conversation, Marilyn asked him “how to access his overseas accounts.” DeMartini told Marilyn he had “no clue,” but she kept questioning him. Marilyn called him several times after that conversation, but he never returned her calls because “he did not want to do business with her.” DeMartini concluded his deposition by testifying that he “was very uncomfortable talking to [Marilyn]” and labeled her a “gold digger.”

 Marilyn's Deposition

¶16. Marilyn explained that she received the proceeds of James's former domestic partner's house of $82,000, which was to be used to “finish” the second floor of her Olive Branch house for her grandson. Marilyn maintained that James “insisted” she take over his finances but denied she did so before they were married. She admitted to signing his name on checks “because he told her to.” Marilyn testified that she was a part of conference calls between James and DeMartini, who instructed her to liquidate James's bank accounts and assets due to his cancer diagnosis. She testified that James did not want any assets because of taxes, but she had no documents to prove this assertion. She testified, “I did exactly what my husband told me to do ․ and evidently he's forgotten now. But I have witnesses.” These witnesses included Gholson, her housekeeper, and two attorneys—Hodges and Kevin O'Brien—who prepared the deeds on the Olive Branch house. Marilyn testified that James understood the transactions she made—she claimed he was not diagnosed with dementia at the facility and could make decisions for himself.

 James's Assets

¶17. At trial, Ed Maxwell, a certified public accountant, testified for James as an expert in accounting. His firm reviewed the parties’ multiple bank accounts, especially James's accounts. An exhibit Maxwell created, entitled “Summary of Stolen Funds,” totaled $990,183.96, and listed funds James alleged Marilyn stole from him. Also admitted was a transactional timeline that listed dates and financial transactions attributed to Marilyn's expenditures. Maxwell relied on the parties’ bank statements to create the documents. Due to the unique facts of this case, Maxwell analyzed financial information before the parties married as well.

¶18. Maxwell testified that before May 2019, James had routine bank transactions—“nothing exorbitant.” However, “all of a sudden,” at the end of May 2019 (the month Marilyn and James reconnected), there was a $35,000 wire withdrawal from one of James's bank accounts. In July 2019, approximately $195,000 was deposited from James's Vanguard retirement account into his checking account for the purchase of the Olive Branch house. Maxwell testified that due to the liquidation of retirement accounts, James had a significant tax burden in 2019.

¶19. Maxwell explained significant figures in his “Summary of Stolen Funds” document occurring from January 2019 through May 2021. There were $169,552 in checks over $1,000 drawn from the account, cash withdrawals totaling approximately $16,000, over-the-counter withdrawals of nearly $120,000, transfers to Marilyn's savings account of $100,000 and to her checking account of $182,673, and wire transfers of nearly $40,000. Additionally, from February through December 2020, Maxwell accounted for $12,714 in casino transactions at Tunica, Mississippi casinos.

¶20. Maxwell pointed out significant individual expenditures that he attributed to Marilyn, which were included in the list of stolen funds. In August, September, October, and December of 2019, James wrote checks to Marilyn for $6,000; $7,330; $5,000; and $6,700. By November 2019, Marilyn was listed on James's SunTrust Bank account as a joint owner, but she also had a separate SunTrust account in her name only. In January 2020, James wrote a $10,000 check to “Lexus Memphis.” In February 2020, Marilyn made two “over the counter withdrawals” of $9,800 each. In March 2020, there was a transfer and over-the-counter withdrawal to Marilyn of $25,000 each and a deposit from a savings bond owned by James of approximately $50,000. In April and May 2020, there were two transfers of approximately $50,000 each to Marilyn's SunTrust account, as well as a bank check of $54,000 to a pool company. In September 2020, there was a $221,130 deposit from James's FedEx retirement account to his bank account and a $59,584 payment to Toyota Financial from James's account. In October 2020, $100,000 and $50,000 were transferred from the parties’ joint checking account to a newly established savings account in Marilyn's name only.⁶

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶21. In April 2021, after being married for less than two years, James filed for a divorce from Marilyn. James claimed he had suffered habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and had been deserted by Marilyn. He also alleged exploitation of a vulnerable adult, undue influence, conversion of assets, breach of fiduciary duty, and self-dealing. Marilyn denied all the claims.

¶22. In June 2021, the chancery court entered an agreed temporary order to freeze the parties’ financial accounts except their retirement income. In August 2021, the court amended the order, instructing the bank to deposit directly into James's account his monthly FedEx retirement pension of $5,663.38 and each party to pay his and her own expenses. Further, the parties were ordered to “produce an accounting of all funds taken by either party from any account” and show all deposits made, as well as provide receipts and an itemization of all funds spent since January 2019. The court also enjoined Marilyn from contacting James's assisted living facility in any way.

¶23. In February 2022, the chancery court appointed James's nephew, Henry Brodie, as James's guardian and conservator. Henry resides in Massachusetts. The conservatorship was based upon two psychiatric evaluations performed in October 2021 by two forensic psychiatrists. Dr. Frank Perkins found James's “cognitive functioning is severely impaired.” Due to memory impairment, James would be unable “to provide a complete and reliable history.” Further, James was unable to manage his finances or personal care, though he could “voice his immediate needs” and remember that he requested them. The other psychiatrist stated similar concerns.

¶24. In October and November 2022, trial was held on two days separated by a month. Neither James nor Marilyn testified. On January 9, 2023, the chancery court issued its one-page opinion, ruling in favor of Marilyn. The court found no grounds for divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment, or any other claims by James. The court did not elaborate on its findings. On February 2, 2023, the court entered a judgment dismissing James's complaint but also finding Marilyn in contempt for refusing to provide an accounting to the court, granting a $79,500 judgment against Marilyn.⁷

¶25. On February 8, 2023, James's conservator filed a nine-page detailed motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Nearly six months later, on August 17, 2023, the chancery court found James's motion well-taken. In a seven-page opinion, the court granted James a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The court granted him the Olive Branch house, a vehicle he paid for, and the value of his liquidated FedEx retirement of $221,130.⁸ All other marital assets were deemed Marilyn's property.⁹ Regarding the divorce, the court found:

Clearly, beginning before the marriage, [Marilyn] began taking control and ownership of all assets of [James] that she could, and would finally leave him without access to any funds to provide for his care. Marilyn Brodie appropriated $990,183.96 of the estate of James Brodie by threats, intimidation, emotional or verbal abuse, and forced isolation.

As evidence, the court cited Maxwell's “Summary of Stolen Funds” totaling $990,183.96, trial testimony, and the nurses’ notes at James's assisted living facility. The chancery court, citing trial testimony, explained:

Although James Brodie briefly lived in the marital home which he bought and paid for with his pre-marital assets immediately prior to the marriage, by sometime in 2020 they began living separately, with James Brodie living alone. Suffering from dementia, he was brought to an assisted-living facility on October 14, 2020, after he left the hospital, and it was there that Marilyn Coulter Brodie threatened him with prison if he did not sign over the assets he held in Britain. James Brodie exclaimed that Marilyn Coulter was “a bloody thief” and no longer wanted to see her. Marilyn cut off James Brodie's access to all his accounts; he did not know where his assets had gone; he had no money available to him personally, leaving him to ask his sister in England for assistance. Initially his family did not know where James Brodie was.

The court also pointed to the difficulty the facility had in getting Marilyn to deliver James's prescriptions in a timely manner.

¶26. The chancery court found James proved by a preponderance of evidence grounds for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment by Marilyn. “Suit had to be filed to enjoin any further dissipation of assets by [Marilyn] and to protect [James] from threats and conduct by [Marilyn].” The chancery court summarized the conservator Henry's testimony that James was “angry with Marilyn for taking his money” and did not even “consider them as a married couple.” Henry testified that Marilyn “basically took all of his money and abandoned him in a state of disarray.” Henry concluded it was in James's “best interest to be divorced.” Henry claimed that James “wants to retrieve his assets, though he lacked understanding about his finances.”

¶27. The chancery court noted that while corroborating evidence was not required in this case, it was “ample.” The court pointed to the evidence of when Marilyn “threatened James with incarceration if he didn't tell her how to get his assets in England transferred to her.” Further, she left James “alone to fend for himself when he obviously was incapable of caring for himself.” The court stated, “[A] full review of the transcript more than details Marilyn's mental cruelty of James that adversely affected his mental health.”

¶28. Regarding marital assets, the chancery court noted that since Marilyn did not provide an accounting as ordered, and she did not testify on her own behalf—both of which “would have assisted this [c]ourt in determining the marital assets”—the court had “no choice but to accept James's description of assets.” The court found the marital assets were “funds put into the marital home of $28,825,”¹⁰ Marilyn's vehicle James paid for of $59,584, the house in Olive Branch, and “transfers made to her/by her directly during the marriage of $589,699.96.” The court found all of James's assets in the United Kingdom were his separate property. The court listed but did not address every Ferguson ¹¹ factor for equitable distribution. Regarding contribution to property accumulation and family stability, the court found that “[a]lmost all of the marital assets were James's or came from his prior efforts.” There was no testimony about Marilyn's contributing to family stability. Further, there was no testimony as to the market and emotional value of assets. The court found James was entitled to complete ownership and title of the Elizabeth Circle house, which was paid for by his funds. The penalty against Marilyn of $79,500 for her failure to produce an accounting remained, with the penalty of $500 per day. In response, Marilyn filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), which the chancery court denied. Marilyn then appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶29. In domestic-relations matters, the standard of review in analyzing the chancellor's determinations is limited. Roley v. Roley, 329 So. 3d 473, 491 (¶49) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Gilmer v. Gilmer, 297 So. 3d 324, 331 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). “Chancellors are afforded wide latitude in fashioning equitable remedies in domestic-relations matters.” Id. (quoting Dickinson v. Dickinson, 293 So. 3d 322, 326 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). “This Court will not disturb a chancellor's judgment when it is supported by substantial credible evidence unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Id. (quoting Gilmer, 297 So. 3d at 331 (¶13)). On questions of law, the standard of review is de novo. Id.

¶30. The grant or denial of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Journeay v. Berry, 953 So. 2d 1145, 1160 (¶51) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Clark v. Columbus & Greenville Ry. Co., 473 So. 2d 947 (Miss. 1985)). “In order to succeed on a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant must show: (1) an intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available, or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (citing Brooks v. Roberts, 882 So. 2d 229, 233 (¶15) (Miss. 2004)).

ANALYSIS

I. The Chancery Court's Reversal of the Initial Ruling under Rule 59(e)

¶31. Marilyn argues that the chancery court erred in reversing the initial opinion, granting James's motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e). Marilyn complains that the court did not sufficiently explain the change in opinion. Further, Marilyn contends the court should have voluntarily made findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, even though neither party made this request.

¶32. Rule 52(a) provides: “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury the court may, and shall upon the request of any party to the suit or when required by these rules, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and judgment shall be entered accordingly.” M.R.C.P. 52(a). In support of her argument, Marilyn cites Baggett v. Baggett, 246 So. 3d 887, 894 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), where this Court affirmed a chancery court's dismissal of the wife's complaint for divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. In Baggett, however, this Court found no error in the chancellor's failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a) because the wife did not request the findings, and the case lacked complexity. Id. at 893-94 (¶19). However, Marilyn adopts the wife's argument in Baggett that if a case is “hotly contested and the facts greatly in dispute,” the chancellor's “failure to make findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law will generally be regarded as an abuse of discretion.” Id. at 894 (¶19) (citing Tricon Metals & Servs. Inc. v. Topp, 516 So. 2d 236, 239 (Miss. 1987)). Marilyn admits, however, that as in Baggett, here neither party requested such findings under Rule 52(a).

¶33. First, Marilyn cites no authority to support her proposition that a trial court must provide a “why” if the court does in fact “alter or amend” the judgment under Rule 59(e). The rule's purpose is to provide the trial court an opportunity to reconsider its ruling before appeal, which the court did. Second, neither party requested findings under Rule 52(a), and Marilyn cites no authority that the trial court must make such findings sua sponte. Moreover, there was no lack of factual findings to support the chancery court's much more detailed second opinion, issued six months after James's nine-page Rule 59(e) motion was filed. With the benefit of the trial transcript, James's detailed motion to alter or amend judgment, and Marilyn's two-page response, the chancellor was able to thoroughly review the case.¹² The chancellor made substantial, detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law in his second opinion. He cited extensively to the record and trial transcript, as well as provided applicable authority to show why James was entitled to a divorce and property division. We find no error. Accordingly, the chancery court did not abuse its discretion in granting James's Rule 59(e) motion.

II. Divorce on the Grounds of Habitual Cruel and Inhuman Treatment

¶34. Marilyn argues that the chancery court erred in granting James a divorce based on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment by spousal domestic abuse, although she challenges the form of the evidence more than its substance. Marilyn takes issue with James's competency, the hearsay evidence at trial, and the lack of corroborating evidence. Marilyn also notes some findings of fact made by the chancellor that she alleges were erroneous. We shall discuss each argument in turn.

¶35. In Potts v. Potts, 700 So. 2d 321, 322 (¶10) (Miss. 1997), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a chancellor's determination of whether a spouse's conduct rose to the level of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment is a determination of law. Id.; see also Smith v. Smith, 90 So. 3d 1259, 1262 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). In her treatise Bell on Mississippi Family Law, Professor Deborah Bell recognizes disagreement on this standard of review between this Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court. Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 4.03[8][f], at 97 (3d ed. 2020). In cases after Potts, this Court has “applied an abuse of discretion standard, noting that the case in which the de novo standard was established [(Potts)] relied on cases that did not stand for that proposition.” Id. (citing Gwathney v. Gwathney, 208 So. 3d 1087, 1091 n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). Potts held that “[w]hile the chancellor's determinations of the events that preceded the divorce are findings of fact, finding that [the] conduct rose to the level of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment ․ is a determination of law, and is reversible where the chancellor has employed an erroneous legal standard.” Potts, 700 So. 2d at 322 (¶10) (citing Bland v. Bland, 629 So. 2d 582, 586 (Miss.1993)). In this case, the result is the same under either standard.

¶36. Mississippi statutory law allows the chancery court to grant a fault-based divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2021). Mississippi caselaw has long established that the defendant's conduct either:

(1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger, rendering the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or

(2) is so unnatural and infamous as to make the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse and render it impossible for that spouse to discharge the duties of marriage, thus destroying the basis for its continuance.

Gilmer, 297 So. 3d at 331 (¶15) (quoting Baggett, 246 So. 3d at 892 (¶13)). The offended spouse must show proof of this conduct by a preponderance of evidence. Id. “There is a dual focus on the conduct of the [defendant] and the impact of that conduct on the [plaintiff].” Smith, 90 So. 3d at 1263 (¶11) (quoting Bodne v. King, 835 So. 2d 52, 59 (¶24) (Miss. 2003)). The impact of the offending conduct on the plaintiff is a “subjective inquiry” with the focus “on the effect the conduct has on the particular spouse, not its effect on an ordinary, reasonable person.” Gilmer, 297 So. 3d at 332 (¶15) (quoting Baggett, 246 So. 3d at 892 (¶13)).

¶37. Additionally, “[i]n 2017, the Mississippi Legislature amended the habitual, cruel, and inhuman treatment ground to include a new subset of habitual cruelty—spousal domestic abuse.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 4.03[8], at 91 (3d ed. 2020). Section 93-5-1 provides:

Spousal domestic abuse may be established through the reliable testimony of a single credible witness, who may be the injured party, and includes, but is not limited to:

That the injured party's spouse attempted to cause, or purposely, knowingly or recklessly caused bodily injury to the injured party, or that the injured party's spouse attempted by physical menace to put the injured party in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; or

That the injured party's spouse engaged in a pattern of behavior against the injured party of threats or intimidation, emotional or verbal abuse, forced isolation, sexual extortion or sexual abuse, or stalking or aggravated stalking ․ if the pattern of behavior rises above the level of unkindness or rudeness or incompatibility or want of affection.

(Emphasis added). The chancellor, as trier of fact, “evaluates the sufficiency of proof based on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of their testimony.” Roley, 329 So. 3d at 492 (¶53) (quoting Littlefield v. Littlefield, 282 So. 3d 820, 827 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). “Divorces based upon habitual cruel and inhuman treatment are necessarily fact-intensive and require a case-by-case analysis.” Id.

¶38. Here, the chancery court's findings of habitual cruelty were met by evidence of nonviolent spousal abuse. The court found Marilyn appropriated nearly one million dollars of James's funds by “threats, intimidation, emotional or verbal abuse, and forced isolation,” especially threats to have him put in prison if he did not transfer his foreign accounts to her control. Also, Marilyn forced isolation upon James by leaving him alone in her rental house with a deteriorated mental state, little food, no vehicle, and no phone for communication. There was substantial, proper evidence to support the divorce regardless of the applicable standard of review.

A. James's Competency

¶39. Marilyn claims that James cannot “have it both ways” regarding his competency, meaning he cannot be found incompetent to enter into a marriage, convey his assets to Marilyn in 2019 and 2020, and not testify at trial; yet be competent to sign an affidavit for divorce and an affidavit changing his power of attorney from Marilyn to his sister. Marilyn, however, makes no specific argument about how the chancery court erred.

¶40. First, Marilyn provides no legal authority on the issue. “Our caselaw clearly provides, the failure to cite supporting legal authority precludes consideration of an issue on appeal.” Schaubhut v. Schaubhut, 373 So. 3d 802, 806 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Green v. Green, 349 So. 3d 1187, 1200 (¶47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). Second, the issue regarding whether James was incompetent to enter into the marriage was never raised before the chancery court and thus never ruled upon. We have no evidence as to exactly when James became unable to handle his affairs. We do know that by February 2, 2022, a conservator was appointed about a year after James's complaint for divorce was filed.

¶41. The chancery court opinion noted that James suffered from dementia in 2020 when the parties separated. Medical records from an October 2020 hospital emergency room visit showed he had a history of “advanced dementia” with behavioral problems (agitation and verbal aggression). Once in the assisted living facility, records from 2021 show a nurse practitioner was performing psychiatric evaluations on James approximately every week. In April 2021, James executed an affidavit for his complaint, where he was described as a “vulnerable adult.” In her answer, Marilyn did not raise competency issues. Importantly, through an agreed order, the chancery court appointed a conservator for James after he had filed for divorce but before trial. At trial, Dr. Perkins testified that James did not have the capacity to be a witness due to his impaired memory and inability to provide a complete and reliable history. At that time, Marilyn did not object.

¶42. We conclude the chancery court's findings regarding James's mental decline are based on substantial evidence.

B. Hearsay Evidence

¶43. Marilyn argues that the chancery court improperly allowed numerous instances of hearsay testimony into evidence at trial. She claims the “allegations of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment were all offered solely through hearsay testimony,” and thus the claim fails. We disagree.

¶44. Marilyn points to only one instance at trial where her counsel objected to hearsay: when ombudsman Close testified about how she became involved with James's case. She testified the facility had called her because James “was upset,” and the facility was “trying to figure out how to help [James] make sure his resident's rights were not violated.” When Close was asked, “How did you do that?” defense counsel objected because it was not in her “personal knowledge.” The court allowed Close's testimony, stating the court would “revisit” the objection but never did. Close proceeded to testify about how she helped make sure James's “resident's rights” were not violated; she gave him information about legal services and discussed that with him. Close also testified about James's concerns about his wife's making online withdrawals from his assets, the fact that “he [did not] know how he ended up in assisted living,” and Marilyn's threatening James with prison if he did not sign some documents. Defense counsel made no further objections.

¶45. First, certain portions of Close's testimony were not hearsay because the testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., that James would go to prison. The nurses and staff had overheard Marilyn's making these threats, and it was the fact of the threat, not its truth, that mattered. Further, Close's testimony that James was “upset” is not hearsay because the staff could observe James's demeanor after his encounter with Marilyn and relay this fact to Close. The nurses’ notes corroborated what the staff told Close.

¶46. Lastly, this Court has held that “unobjected-to hearsay evidence, once received by the court and presented to the jury, becomes competent evidence and may aid in supporting a verdict the same as any other competent evidence.” Veal v. State, 585 So. 2d 693, 697 (Miss. 1991) (citing Burns v. State, 438 So. 2d 1347, 1350 (Miss. 1983)); Citizens Bank of Hattiesburg v. Miller, 194 Miss. 557, 566, 11 So. 2d 457, 459 (1943). Such is the case here. There were several instances of hearsay evidence from various witnesses to which Marilyn's counsel did not object. Further, the chancellor did not err in failing to revisit his ruling on Close's testimony. Under Rule 3.04(D) of our Uniform Chancery Court Rules, “[i]f the chancellor shall reserve his ruling, counsel interposing the objection shall make a note thereof and renew their objection at the conclusion of the testimony; otherwise, the objection shall be deemed waived.” Here, Marilyn's counsel did not renew her objection; thus, it was waived, and the evidence was competent to be considered by the court.

C. Corroborating Evidence

¶47. Marilyn argues that the chancery court erred in ruling there was corroborating evidence to prove the divorce. The chancery court found the “[g]rounds for divorce were uncontested at trial,” and although corroborating evidence was not required for spousal domestic abuse, “there was ample corroborating evidence.” Marilyn claims that under the statute, the abuse must be established by at least one witness, but the chancery court failed to cite one witness who had personal knowledge of Marilyn's offending behavior. Further, she claims the chancery court should have identified and specified the “ample corroborating evidence.”

¶48. Generally, “the party alleging habitual cruel and inhuman treatment ‘must corroborate his or her own testimony.’ ” Roley, 329 So. 3d at 492 (¶52) (quoting Smith, 90 So. 3d at 1263 (¶12)). However, the 2017 amendment to the habitual cruelty statute “does away with the requirement of corroborating evidence for domestic spousal abuse.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 4.03[8], at 91 (3d ed. 2020). The statute now provides: “Spousal domestic abuse may be established through the reliable testimony of a single credible witness, who may be the injured party.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1.

¶49. Because the statute does not require corroborating testimony, Marilyn's argument fails. However, numerous witnesses and documentation evidenced spousal domestic abuse, as the chancery court found, including: Marilyn left James alone in her rental house in a deteriorated mental state, with no phone and very little food; the assisted living facility's personnel and medical records verified that Marilyn admitted him there with dementia; she did not timely provide James with his medications; and she frequently came with papers for James to sign. Further, Marilyn made threats to James, which she admits, and this upset him. Proof showed James had no access to his monthly retirement funds and was upset about Marilyn's taking his money. The conservator, Henry, also testified that Marilyn had taken over James's finances, was spending a great deal of his money, had sold his vehicle, and left him with a negative monthly balance to pay for his basic care. We agree with the chancery court that there was ample corroborating evidence even though none was required.

D. Findings of Fact

¶50. Marilyn claims the chancellor made erroneous findings of fact that require reversal when he stated in his opinion: “Marilyn Coulter Brodie left James Brodie in an assisted-living facility without even a bed to sleep on. She was not paying for his expenses nor seeing James Brodie at the assisted living facility he had lived at for two years.” This quote was the chancery court's summary of the conservator's testimony about Marilyn's treatment of James. After our review of the record, we find that while the conservator's comments appear to be somewhat inaccurate, any error is harmless and does not require reversal.

¶51. The record shows that when Marilyn moved James into the assisted living facility in October 2020, he was provided a furnished room. While Marilyn did not buy a bed, she contracted with the facility for James to have a bed. The conservator testified that a bed for James was purchased later by someone other than Marilyn. As far as payment for James's expenses at the facility, Marilyn was the responsible party and made rent payments until the chancery court ordered the bank accounts frozen in June 2021, and then the conservator took over payments. It was true that Marilyn had not visited James at the facility in two years, but she was prohibited from doing so by court order after the incident in February 2021, when Marilyn threatened James with prison if he did not sign paperwork conveying his European assets to her. Marilyn complied with the facility's request.

¶52. The chancery court's summary of the conservator's statements, some of which were erroneous, was harmless. See Johnson v. Johnson, 76 So. 3d 781, 785-86 (¶¶21-22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (In the grant of a divorce for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, the chancellor's erroneous finding that the husband had given a sexually transmitted disease to his wife was harmless because there was other substantial evidence supporting cruel and inhuman treatment.). Substantial evidence supports awarding James a divorce on the ground of spousal domestic abuse without this evidence, including authenticated bank statements and other documents, expert and lay witness testimony, nurses’ notes, medical records, and depositions. We find no reversible error here.

III. Division of Marital Property

¶53. Marilyn argues that the chancery court erred in the equitable division of property by failing to classify property as marital, separate, or a gift, and failing to determine the fair market value of the marital property. Additionally, she claims the court erred in awarding James the Olive Branch house.

¶54. “To equitably divide property, the chancellor must: (1) classify the parties’ assets as marital or separate, (2) value those assets, and (3) equitably divide the marital assets.” Randolph v. Randolph, 199 So. 3d 1282, 1285 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 914 (Miss. 1994)) (other citation omitted). To divide the marital property equitably, the chancellor applies the Ferguson factors. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928. “The chancellor's distribution of [the] marital assets will be affirmed as long as ‘it is supported by substantial credible evidence.’ ” Randolph, 199 So. 3d at 1284 (¶7) (quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 982 So. 2d 385, 393 (¶32) (Miss. 2008)).

A. Classification of Marital Property

¶55. Marilyn claims error because the chancery court failed to classify the parties’ assets into marital or nonmarital property when the court stated in the opinion, “[H]ad Marilyn provided an accounting as was ordered by this Court or even testified on her behalf it would

have assisted this Court in determining the marital assets. Since she did not, this Court has no choice but to accept James’[s] description of assets.” (Emphasis added).

¶56. Marilyn is incorrect; the court did classify the parties’ assets, just without her input, because she did not provide it. The court found marital assets were funds put into the marital home of $28,825, a vehicle registered in Marilyn's name but purchased by James for $59,584, transfers made to or by her directly during the marriage of $589,699.96, and the Olive Branch house. James's assets in the United Kingdom were found to be his separate property. Finally, the court found “[a]ll other marital assets (wherever found and wherever situated)” were Marilyn's separate property.

¶57. Even if the court had not classified the assets, “a failure to classify property does not automatically result in reversible error if the division of property is fair.” Foreman v. Foreman, 223 So. 3d 178, 182 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Branch v. Branch, 174 So. 3d 932, 944 (¶45) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015)). We find substantial evidence supports the chancery court's decision, which was fair under the Ferguson factors and the facts presented. Moreover, Marilyn offers no legal authority, only her own assertion, that it “is not the law,” that it was error for the court to accept James's “description of assets.” This argument is without merit.

B. Valuation of Marital Property

¶58. Marilyn argues that the chancery court failed to determine the fair market value of the marital property. However, the only asset subject to valuation was the Olive Branch house, which the chancellor did not value. In Marilyn's Rule 8.05 statement, she estimated the value at $210,456, without a mortgage balance. In James's Rule 8.05 statement, his conservator estimated the value from “Realtor.com” at $417,399. The evidence shows $214,000 was withdrawn from James's checking account to pay for the purchase of the Olive Branch house in July 2019. Neither party provided experts to prove the house's value.

¶59. “When this Court reviews a chancellor's judgment of property division we ‘are to review the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion.’ ” McKnight v. McKnight, 951 So. 2d 594, 596 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Wells v. Wells, 800 So. 2d 1239, 1243 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). “The usual requirement is for a chancellor to employ the Ferguson factors, which requires a determination of fair market value of the assets.” Aron v. Aron, 832 So. 2d 1257, 1260 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Drumright v. Drumright, 812 So. 2d 1021, 1025 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)).

¶60. Marilyn cites this Court's proposition that “where the chancellor failed to make findings on the fair market value of the various assets prior to division, we have reversed and remanded for such findings because ‘it is impossible for this Court to perform its oversight responsibility in the absence of such a valuation.’ ” Horn v. Horn, 909 So. 2d 1151, 1164 (¶47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Scott v. Scott, 835 So. 2d 82, 87 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). In Horn, both parties provided differing valuations for the marital property through testimony and financial disclosures, but the chancellor failed to make an adequate finding from the evidence presented to allow appellate review of the property division. Id. at (¶48). That is not the case here.

¶61. Marilyn provided no further evidence by testimony or documentation about the value of the marital house beyond her Rule 8.05 statement's estimated value of $210,456. James's value of $417,399 from Realtor.com was an estimate as well on his Rule 8.05 statement; however, in 2019 he paid $214,000 for Coulter's full interest in it. Marilyn argues that “it should be without dispute that [James] purchased only one-half interest in the house at 7656 Elizabeth Circle Drive․” To the contrary, the record clearly shows the opposite. James purchased the entire interest in the house from Marilyn's ex-husband Coulter. While Marilyn did at one time own a one-half interest in the house, the record shows she received the value for her half-interest in her divorce from Coulter, and she quitclaimed her interest to Coulter prior to the sale to James.¹³ Therefore, James did purchase the entire interest in the house for $214,000 in 2019. We cannot fault the chancellor for failing to make a valuation when the complaining party only offered an estimate and did not provide an expert's valuation.¹⁴ The chancery court's failure to determine a fair market value for the house does not prevent us from making a proper review of the equitable distribution of property.

¶62. Finally, any error does not require reversal, as the error does not impact the case's ultimate disposition. See Inge v. Inge, 227 So. 3d 1185, 1190 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (The chancery court's erroneous finding that a lump sum received by an ex-wife was from retirement account rather than disability payment was harmless, as the issue did not impact appellate court's final decision.); Hill v. Johnson, 27 So. 3d 426, 430 (¶14) & n.2 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding errors in the chancellor's findings of fact were “harmless error[s,] as they ha[d] no bearing on the ultimate disposition of this case” and were noted only for thoroughness). While James provided an estimated value for the house of $417,399 from Realtor.com, the record is clear that he paid Coulter $214,000 for the entire interest in the property, and $214,000 is so close to Marilyn's estimated value of $210,456 that it does not require the chancery court to make a separate finding on valuation. We find no error with the court's award of the house to James based on the Ferguson finding that “[a]lmost all of the marital assets were James's or came from his prior efforts.” We cannot say that the chancery court committed manifest error in failing to find a specific value for the house.

C. House in Olive Branch

¶63. Marilyn contends that the chancery court erred in awarding James the house located in Olive Branch. She claims to have owned a one-half interest in the house with her ex-husband Coulter. Because James “did not want any assets” due to his lung cancer, Marilyn testified that they put the house in her name only before the parties married. There was also testimony from Marilyn and her friend Gholson that the house was being renovated for Marilyn's grandson to live in and eventually own. Marilyn classified the house as a premarital gift to her from James, who never intended the house to become marital property. The chancery court, however, found the house was marital property, “originally owned by James and paid for with his funds,” and should be awarded to him.

¶64. Marital property is defined as “any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage.” Rhodes v. Rhodes, 52 So. 3d 430, 437 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 915). However, “there are several corollaries to the general rule.” Id. at (¶20). Property can lose its separate character by familial use or commingling. Id. at (¶21) (citing McKissack v. McKissack, 45 So. 3d 716, 720 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)). “Under the Mississippi family-use doctrine, any separate property used extensively by a family is converted to a marital asset. In addition, the commingling of separate and marital funds in the purchase and upkeep of a home usually converts the entire property to a marital asset.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 6.06[10], at 173 (3d ed. 2020); see also Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So. 2d 1216, 1221 (¶19) (Miss. 2002).

¶65. “There is a rebuttable presumption that all property is marital.” Rhodes, 52 So. 3d at 437 (¶23) (citations omitted). The burden of proof is on a spouse claiming separate property interest of a particular asset. This burden goes beyond a mere demonstration that the asset was acquired prior to the marriage. Id. Moreover, “[s]imply titling the property in one spouse's name does not create a presumption that the property is separate. Id. (citations omitted). In Hemsley, the Mississippi Supreme Court “emphatically held that title is no longer determinative in deciding a spouse's rights to the property.” Maslowski v. Maslowski, 655 So. 2d 18, 21 (Miss. 1995) (citing Hemsley, 639 So. 2d at 914). Chancellors must “look behind the formal state of title” in equitable division. Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 906 (Miss. 1994). “[F]airness is the prevailing guideline in marital division” of assets. Id. (quoting Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929).

¶66. Marilyn cites the Mississippi general rule that property acquired before marriage is separate, and since she acquired the house from James before marriage, she alleges it is hers. Her argument fails for several reasons.

¶67. Under the family-use doctrine, both parties resided at the home while married. The record is unclear about when James moved into the house, but at least by the time of their August 2019 marriage. They lived in the Olive Branch house for about one year. Marilyn admitted that James recovered from two surgeries in the house. Marilyn testified that the parties were no longer living together by July 2020, with James first living alone in her rental house, and then being transferred to the assisted living facility, while Marilyn stayed in the Olive Branch house. Further, both before and after marriage, checks and bank statements entered into evidence show thousands of dollars in James's funds were used for upkeep and renovations on the house, including the HVAC and plumbing repairs and pool expenditures addressed in the prior issue.

¶68. Further, Marilyn's simply titling the property in her name fails as well. The record shows James received the entire interest in the house. The chancellor properly found James was the sole owner after he bought Coulter's interest. Regardless of title, the Olive Branch house was marital property due to family use and commingling of funds used on the house. Marilyn's rental house in Hernando was deemed separate property even though James lived there briefly. It was equitable for the chancellor to award the entire Olive Branch house to James in light of his substantial financial contributions and Marilyn's dissipation of assets during the parties’ brief marriage.

D. Undue Influence

¶69. Marilyn argues that the chancery court erred in failing to determine whether there was a confidential relationship between James and Marilyn, and whether a presumption of undue influence arose regarding Marilyn obtaining James's assets. Further, Marilyn argues in her reply brief that the chancery court should have determined if and when James became a “vulnerable adult” under Mississippi law.

¶70. Marilyn claims the chancery court erred in “ignoring” two cases: Genna v. Harrington, 254 So. 2d 525 (Miss. 1971), and Estate of Langston v. Williams, 57 So. 3d 618 (Miss. 2011). Genna involved a will contest, holding that a confidential relationship between a husband and wife does not always raise a presumption of undue influence. Genna, 254 So. 2d at 529. “[T]he mere fact that there is a close relationship between the parties in a marriage does not mean that one's influence upon another is undue influence.” Id. at 528. Estate of Langston extended the holding in Genna to inter vivos gifts between a husband and wife in estate disputes. Est. of Langston, 57 So. 3d at 621 (¶13). Marilyn states James might “as well have been deceased since he had dementia” and, thus, reasoning these estate cases apply. Marilyn also argues that any presumption of undue influence would not arise before the parties were married, when the house and thousands of dollars were transferred to her.

¶71. In his complaint, James raises claims of undue influence and exploitation as a vulnerable adult when Marilyn accessed his funds and had the Olive Branch house put in her name alone. The court's initial opinion found the allegations were never proved. In the second opinion, the court made no findings regarding a confidential relationship, undue influence, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult, instead finding Marilyn “began taking control and ownership of all [James's] assets” by “threats, intimidation, emotional or verbal abuse, and forced isolation.” Regardless of not making a finding on undue influence, the chancery court could divide the marital property equitably, taking into account Marilyn's influence over James and her liquidation and appropriation of his accounts. The $990,183.96 in “stolen funds” were funds all made through James's efforts, not Marilyn's. She lived with him for approximately one year and then left him to live alone while she spent his retirement. We find no error. Moreover, even though the chancery court made no specific finding regarding James's being a “vulnerable adult,” all parties agreed to his conservatorship in February 2022, which undeniably means James was incapable of handling his own affairs and advocating for his own best interests at that time. Regardless of a confidential relationship, the record reflects that the chancellor's division of marital assets was more than fair considering how much Marilyn financially benefitted from her brief marriage to James and being awarded the $377,569.96 she had already appropriated from his accounts.

CONCLUSION

¶72. The chancery court did not err in altering and amending the first judgment in response to James's Rule 59(e) motion. Nor did the chancery court err in denying Marilyn's motion to alter or amend the August 2023 revised opinion and judgment. There was sufficient evidence to grant James a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment by domestic spousal abuse. While the chancery court cited a partially erroneous statement by the conservator regarding James's care, any error was harmless. The chancery court equitably distributed the marital property and properly granted the Olive Branch house to James. Accordingly, we find no reversible error and affirm.

¶73. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Marilyn stated that James paid the legal fees for the adoption.

2.   Marilyn did not testify at trial—any testimony by Marilyn was from her deposition.

3.   James was on hospice care for the duration of the marriage due to his numerous chronic medical conditions, but he recovered from the cancer.

4.   James's September 4, 2019 will left almost all his assets to Marilyn.

5.   In October 2019, Marilyn also received $82,000 of the sale proceeds from James's half interest in a house he owned with his former domestic partner in Tennessee.

6.   After separation, James's Rule 8.05 financial statement reported a total monthly income of $1,284 and expenses of $4,847, including rent at the assisted living facility of $3,175. See UCCR 8.05. He reported the value of his investment assets at $563,830.99 (not including his assets in London) before Marilyn liquidated them. Marilyn's Rule 8.05 financial statement reported a monthly income of $4,985, and expenses of $5,952.94, a 2019 Lexus, and her house in Hernando valued at $140,676.

7.   On June 27, 2022, the chancery court ordered Marilyn to provide an accounting by July 2022, and if not filed, she would incur a penalty of $500 per day, which resulted in a penalty totaling $79,500. Marilyn did not challenge this penalty on appeal.

8.   The total of James's award was $28,825 for renovations to the Olive Branch house, $59,584 for the vehicle for which he paid, and his FedEx retirement account of $221,130, which totals $309,539, plus ownership of the Olive Branch house, the value of which will be discussed in the second issue.

9.   The chancery court appeared to allow Marilyn to keep approximately $339,744.96 of James's funds she liquidated or transferred. This figure constitutes the chancery court's finding of marital assets totaling $589,699.96 for transfers made to or by her during the marriage, less James's liquidated FedEx retirement of $221,130 and less $28,825 for renovations to the house.

10.   This figure consists of money James paid for plumbing and HVAC services in September 2019 and a down payment on a pool Marilyn made in May 2020.

11.   Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994).

12.   While the record contains a notice of a hearing on the Rule 59(e) motion, there is no transcript of the hearing.

13.   The quitclaim deed states, “[B]y way of explanation, this Quitclaim Deed is being executed as an acknowledgment by the Grantor [Marilyn] that she has received the required equity as set forth in the Decree of Divorce․” Marilyn's continued claim of a half-interest ownership is without merit.

14.   Marilyn could have offered expert testimony in an attempt to support the Realtor.com value but did not do so.

BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT:

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.