MICHAEL SCOTT HOWARD APPELLANT v. CORRIE LEA WILLIAMS HOWARD APPELLEE (2025)

¶1. This appeal stems from the DeSoto County Chancery Court's grant of divorce to Michael Howard and Corrie Howard. On appeal, Michael argues that the chancellor erred in his determination of equitable distribution and periodic alimony and by failing to take into consideration the supplemental security income benefits received by the minor child in determining child support. After a review of the record, we find that the chancellor did not err in his findings, nor did he abuse his discretion. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Michael and Corrie married on December 13, 1997. During the course of the marriage, Michael adopted Corrie's son, C.G., and Michael and Corrie had two children together, E.H. and H.H.¹ C.G. and E.H. were emancipated at the time of the divorce trial, and H.H. was a minor. The chancery court noted that H.H. is a minor with autism spectrum disorder who would turn twenty-one years of age in less than ten months from the divorce hearing.

¶3. Michael and Corrie separated in April 2021. Michael initially filed for a divorce on fault grounds in light of Corrie's admitted adultery, but the couple ultimately agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce. The couple agreed that Corrie would retain custody of H.H., and Michael agreed to continue paying for H.H.’s health insurance until the son reaches the age of twenty-six. The couple submitted for the court's determination the questions of equitable distribution of the marital property, alimony, child support, and attorney fees.

¶4. Following a hearing, the chancellor issued a bench opinion. The chancellor first addressed the classification and division of marital assets and debts, applying each of the factors established in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994). The chancellor found that both parties substantially contributed to the marital estate throughout the twenty-year marriage, and the chancellor noted that at the conclusion of the marriage the parties fell apart mainly due to Corrie's infidelity. The chancellor determined that $99,990, representing the proceeds from selling the marital home, would be split evenly. The chancellor further found that Michael acquired a retirement account during the marriage through his employer, at no cost to or contribution by Michael. Therefore, the chancellor found that Corrie was entitled to 50% of that account. The chancellor assigned a vehicle and associated $8,667 of debt to Corrie. He assigned a credit card used primarily for reimbursed work purchases to Michael.

¶5. The chancellor determined that Michael would pay $1,050 of child support per month, to terminate ten months from the divorce hearing when H.H. turns twenty-one. The chancellor noted that the court was authorized under Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-103 (Rev. 2021) to vary from the guideline under certain criteria such as extraordinary medical, psychological, education, or dental expenses. While noting that the needs of a minor with autism might trigger this criteria, the chancellor declined to deviate from the guideline in light of Michael's voluntary agreement to pay for H.H.’s health insurance until the age of twenty-six. H.H. also receives a Supplemental Security Income (SSI) check of $216 per month.

¶6. Next the chancellor conducted an Armstrong analysis and determined that Corrie would receive periodic alimony in monthly payments of $2,000.² See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993). Corrie has a net income of $2,500 a month,³ and Michael has a net income of $7,500 per month.⁴ The chancellor recognized that post-divorce, Corrie would assume a car payment of $590 and an increase in $700 for insurance, and that the $1,050 child support payment would terminate by operation of law in ten months. The court also noted, “I'm to look at fault or misconduct, and, clearly, that falls against the wife for her adulterous relationship.”

¶7. Next the chancellor addressed the issue of attorney fees. He stated that “attorney fees are generally not awarded ․ in situations where there is not an inability to pay shown.” He found that in the current instance, Michael could not show his inability to pay his attorney fees and was denied being awarded attorney fees. Likewise, he found that because Corrie was employed and receiving liquid assets in the divorce, she was also not entitled to an award of attorney fees.

¶8. Finally, the chancellor permitted Corrie to claim the tax exemption for H.H. as long as she has custody of him. The chancellor explained to Michael and Corrie that it appeared to him “that if there was no award of periodic alimony, which is income reportable, there would be little need for that tax exemption on the part of the wife, and because of his income, the husband should get that exemption.” The chancellor continued on to say that “[h]owever, because that amount is being ordered, [he] will stay with the guidelines of the Internal Revenue Service, and that tax exemption may be claimed from this day forward [by Corrie] as long as [Corrie] has custody of the child.”

¶9. The chancery court entered its final judgment on August 28, 2023. The court later entered an amended order on October 10, 2023, to account for distribution of an additional marital vehicle. Michael now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. “When reviewing a decision of a chancellor, this Court applies a limited abuse of discretion standard of review.” Castle v. Castle, 266 So. 3d 1042, 1048 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Mabus v. Mabus, 890 So. 2d 806, 810 (¶14) (Miss. 2003)). When the chancellor's opinion is supported by substantial evidence, we will not disturb the opinion “unless the chancellor abused his discretion, was manifestly wrong [or] clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. at 1048-49 (¶24). This is because a chancellor “enjoys wide discretion in fashioning the financial aspects of the dissolution of a marriage.” Spriggs v. Buechler, 149 So. 3d 517, 521 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Avery v. Avery, 864 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). “We will not disturb the chancellor's decision on alimony on appeal unless it is found to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence or manifestly in error.” Anderson v. Grabmiller, 394 So. 3d 493, 502 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So. 2d 513, 517 (Miss. 1995)).

DISCUSSION

¶11. On appeal, Michael argues that the chancellor failed to adequately weigh Corrie's adultery in determining equitable distribution and periodic alimony. He also argues that the chancellor had an erroneous understanding of the tax accounting for periodic alimony, and that the chancellor did not consider the SSI payments in setting child support.

I. The chancellor did not err in the determination of equitable distribution.

¶12. Michael argues that the division of property was unfairly favorable to Corrie, particularly in light of her adultery. “This Court has a ‘limited standard of review of property division and distribution in divorce cases.’ ” Montgomery v. Montgomery, 339 So. 3d 819, 820 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 2 So. 3d 720, 725 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). “We will not reverse a chancery court's distribution of assets absent a finding that the decision was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Chapman v. Chapman, 395 So. 3d 447, 455 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). “The intent of equitable distribution is to assure that after taking into account all relevant factors, including the separate estates of the parties, the contributions of each party toward the accumulation of the marital estate, and the needs of each party, to the extent reasonably possible, each party is given sufficient assets to accommodate his needs.” Wideman v. Wideman, 909 So. 2d 140, 144 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).

¶13. Under Ferguson, chancellors are to consider the following factors in the equitable distribution of marital property:

1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows:

a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property;

b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and

c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets.

2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise[;]

3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution[;]

4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse;

5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution;

6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties;

7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and;

8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered.

Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928. “[M]arital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.” Billingsley v. Billingsley, 240 So. 3d 422, 427 (¶9) (Miss. App. 2017) (quoting Bond v. Bond, 69 So. 3d 771, 773 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)).

¶14. Here, the primary marital assets to be divided were the proceeds from the marital home, Michael's retirement account accumulated during the marriage, and vehicles. The court divided the assets and debts as they stood at the time of the couple's separation. At that time, the primary marital debt was $8,667 owed on a vehicle. This vehicle and the associated debt was assigned to Corrie. In his brief, Michael points to debts he incurred after the separation, including a hospital bill and a personal loan. Corrie rebuts this by pointing out that the court used the date of separation to demarcate the division of the retirement account, and that if the line of demarcation was after Michael had incurred the additional debt, Corrie's portion of the retirement account would have been approximately twenty to thirty thousand more than was awarded her.

¶15. Ultimately, the chancellor divided the proceeds of the marital home and the retirement account equally between Michael and Corrie, noting in particular the contributions of both to the twenty-year marriage, including Corrie's contribution of raising the minor children. The court also noted that the parties did not have sufficient marital assets to use equitable distribution as a way to avoid periodic alimony. We do not find that the division of assets was manifest error requiring reversal.

II. The chancellor did not commit reversible error in the award of periodic alimony.

¶16. Michael argues that the chancellor failed to give appropriate weight to Corrie's marital fault when determining alimony. He requests that the award of periodic alimony be reversed entirely. He also argues that the award of alimony should be reversed because the chancellor misunderstood the alimony tax consequences.

¶17. Under Armstrong, the factors for a chancellor to consider when determining an award of alimony include:

1. The income and expenses of the parties;

2. The health and earning capacities of the parties;

3. The needs of each party;

4. The obligations and assets of each party;

5. The length of the marriage;

6. The presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide, child care;

7. The age of the parties;

8. The standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determination;

9. The tax consequences of the spousal support order;

10. Fault or misconduct;

11. Wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or

12. Any other factor deemed by the court to be “just and equitable” in connection with the setting of spousal support.

Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280.

¶18. “Alimony awards are within the discretion of the chancellor”; therefore, this Court will not reverse an alimony award on appeal unless the chancellor was manifestly in error in his findings of fact and abused his discretion. Id. at 1280. Alimony should only be considered when the distribution of assets, considering both separate and marital property, leaves a deficit to the payee spouse. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1287 (Miss. 1994). The term “deficit” used by the courts in this context does not mean that “one spouse[ ] [has received] assets with a lesser net value than those allocated to the other spouse.” Layton v. Layton, 181 So. 3d 275, 282 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). “Rather, the question is whether the spouse seeking alimony is left ‘with a deficit with respect to having sufficient resources and assets to meet his or her needs and living expenses.’ ” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Jackson, 114 So. 3d 768, 777 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)).

¶19. Our supreme court has held that “adultery should not per se preclude a spouse from receiving alimony․” Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 904 (Miss. 1994); see also Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So. 2d 653, 655 (Miss. 1992) (“[A]dultery should not stand as an absolute bar to alimony[.]”). “[W]hile fault is certainly a factor that may be considered in determining the appropriate solution in alimony proceedings, the chancellor is not required to specifically mention a certain factor, nor is he required to put special weight on one consideration over the other.” Gable v. Gable, 846 So. 2d 296, 301 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Moore v. Moore, 803 So. 2d 1214, 1219 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). Furthermore, “we must bear in mind that a chancellor ‘is presumed to have taken into consideration all of the relevant factors affecting the question of alimony[,] and his decision will not be disturbed, unless [it is] manifestly wrong.’ ” Phang v. Phang, 350 So. 3d 1154, 1161 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Pickering v. Pickering, 51 So. 2d 740, 741 (Miss. 1951)).

¶20. Here, the chancellor conducted a detailed analysis of Michael's and Corrie's respective incomes and financial obligations. When looking at each party's expenses versus their income, the chancellor found that Corrie was set to leave the hearing with “monthly payments of $1,210 more so than what she is paying at this point in time.” Subsequently, the chancellor found that the amount of $2,000 should be paid to Corrie by Michael in periodic alimony beginning on September 1, 2023. This is approximately $500 more than what Corrie testified she would be short every month. However, before setting the alimony amount, the chancellor also acknowledged that even though Corrie was set to receive an additional $1,050 in child support, “that [would] terminate by operation of law in less than ten months” from the time of the hearing. The approximate $500 difference in what Corrie testified she would be shy every month on expenses compared to her income is roughly the same amount she was receiving in child support that was scheduled to end in less than ten months.

¶21. The chancellor directly acknowledged Corrie's fault and stated that he weighed it against her. But the chancellor also explicitly considered and weighed the other Armstrong factors, including the entirety of the twenty-year marriage and Corrie's financial and non-financial contributions. He stated he made his decision by “looking at all of those factors, particularly the income and expenses of the parties and the needs of each party.” Michael points out that after he pays child support of $1,050 and alimony of $2,000, he will be left with $1,100 less cash flow than Corrie each month. However, the chancellor took into consideration that Michael's child support obligation would end in less than ten months from the trial, and that due to H.H.’s diagnosis on the autism spectrum he might require care and other expenses beyond that time. Therefore, in less than ten months, Michael would go from $1,100 less cash flow than Corrie to having at least $1,000 more compared to Corrie. The chancellor's thorough bench opinion demonstrates a careful consideration of the relevant factors; we therefore hold that the chancellor did not manifestly err by awarding Corrie periodic alimony, even in light of her adultery.

¶22. Michael argues that the chancellor incorrectly stated that the award of periodic alimony would be a tax benefit to Michael and a tax detriment to Corrie, and that this misunderstanding improperly impacted the award calculation. Michael argues that the award of alimony was $500 more than what Corrie testified to being short every month and that the appropriate inference is that the increased amount was based upon the chancellor's misunderstanding that Corrie would be required to pay income taxes on the periodic alimony, while Michael would receive a deduction. Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), enacted in 2017, “payments to a spouse of alimony or separate maintenance payments shall not be treated as a payment by the payor spouse for the support of any dependent.” 26 U.S.C. § 152(d)(5)(A)(i).

¶23. The parties agree that the chancellor was incorrect when he stated that “[i]f the [c]ourt awards, as it intends to, periodic alimony, the tax consequences will be favorable to the husband as it will be deductible; however, will be reportable as income to the wife.” In Prestwood v. Prestwood, 285 So. 3d 1213, 1218 n.10 (Miss. Ct. App. 2019), the chancellor demonstrated a misunderstanding of tax implications, yet this Court declined to reverse the award of alimony because the record did not support that the mistake had an impact on the award.

¶24. Here, while the chancellor misstated the tax implications of alimony, the record does not indicate that this misunderstanding impacted the amount of alimony awarded to Corrie in light of the other considerations, including the twenty-year marriage and financial positions of each party. The chancellor's decision to grant Corrie an $800 difference in the alimony award compared to Corrie's expenses was influenced by other considerations, including that child support payments for H.H. were scheduled to end in less than ten months. Therefore, any error in the chancellor's understanding of the tax consequences does not rise to the level of a reversible error.

III. The chancellor did not err in his consideration of the minor's supplemental security income payments in calculating child support.

¶25. Michael's final argument is that the chancellor erred in failing to take into consideration the supplemental security income benefits H.H. was receiving in determining child support. He argues that affording him “credit by reducing the amount of child support is only logical and equitable” and that otherwise, Corrie would receive a windfall because the money received by H.H., yet paid to Corrie, reduced the money that Corrie would have otherwise spent to support H.H.

¶26. Our supreme court directly addressed this issue in Hammett v. Woods, 602 So. 2d 825, 828 (Miss. 1992). “SSI benefits received by a minor child based on his parent's disability or retirement are considered an alternative source of payment which should be credited toward satisfaction of child support obligations.” Id. (citing Bradley v. Holmes, 561 So. 2d 1034, 1035 (Miss. 1990)). However, the minor's receipt of SSI benefits does not reduce parental support obligations. Id. at 829. “Not wanting to burden the public when the parents are more than able to provide for the child's support, we find this to be a sound policy.” Id.

¶27. The SSI benefits H.H. was receiving were due to his own medical diagnosis, not any disability of Michael. Thus, as our supreme court clarified in Hammett, it was appropriate for the chancellor to decline to reduce the amount that Michael was paying in child support each month for the remaining ten months of H.H.’s minority even though H.H. was receiving SSI benefits. Therefore, we find that the chancellor did not err in failing to reduce the amount of child support due to the SSI benefits H.H. was receiving.

CONCLUSION

¶28. For all of the foregoing reasons, we find the chancellor did not err or abuse his discretion in his determination of equitable distribution, alimony, and child support. Accordingly, we affirm the divorce judgment and amending order.

¶29. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We use initials in the interest of privacy.

2.   Earlier when conducting the equitable distribution analysis, the court noted that the assets available for equitable distribution were insufficient to eliminate the need for periodic alimony.

3.   The chancellor noted that Corrie “holds a high school diploma and has been employed throughout the marriage in various jobs, including server and bartending, cleaning houses, as a teacher's assistant, and as a clerk in retail stores.”

4.   The chancellor rounded down from Michael's net income of $7,657 per month after considering the impact of recent bonuses, state income tax, and Medicare taxes.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.