GOMBAKO AMOS v. AMOS (2025)

¶1. Louise Gombako-Amos appeals from a judgment finding her in contempt for failing to comply with a provision of her property settlement agreement that required her to “be responsible for [certain] marital debt and ․ hold [her ex-husband Corey Amos] harmless from liability thereon.” For the reasons discussed below, we find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. In August 2019, Louise Gombako-Amos and Corey Amos consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce and entered into a property settlement agreement (PSA) that the Pike County Chancery Court approved and incorporated into the parties’ judgment of divorce. The PSA provided in relevant part that Louise “shall be responsible for” and “shall hold [Corey] harmless from liability” for certain marital debt, including a judgment that Trustmark National Bank had obtained against Louise and Corey.¹

¶3. Louise did not satisfy the Trustmark judgment after the divorce, and in September 2020, Trustmark attempted to collect on the judgment through a writ of garnishment to Corey's employer. Corey filed a petition in the chancery court to find Louise in contempt for failing to hold him harmless from the debt. However, in February 2021, he agreed to dismiss the petition without prejudice after Trustmark apparently agreed or decided to garnish Louise's salary instead of Corey's wages.

¶4. In 2021 and 2022, Trustmark garnished $51,480.34 of Louise's salary. However, as of March 2022, $50,518.33 was still owed on the judgment.

¶5. In March 2022, Corey decided to sell a property that he had received under the PSA. Prior to closing, Corey learned the Trustmark judgment had been enrolled as a lien against the property and that he would be required to pay off the judgment in order to complete the sale. Corey paid the balance of the judgment ($50,518.33) at closing.

¶6. In June 2022, Corey filed a petition in the chancery court to find Louise in contempt for not paying off the judgment. Corey sought to recover the payoff amount plus attorney's fees.

¶7. At the hearing on Corey's petition, Louise asserted that she had complied with the PSA because Trustmark garnished her salary each month to pay the judgment “[u]p until the date [Corey] sold his property.” In April 2022, Trustmark informed Louise that the judgment had been “released.” According to Louise, she “didn't know why” Trustmark had released the judgment because she “had no idea [Corey] had sold his property.” Louise said she thought “maybe [Trustmark was] giving [her] a gift.” She later learned that Corey had satisfied the judgment and expected her to repay him.² However, Louise asserted that she had “no obligation to pay [Corey] back” because the PSA required her to pay “the Southern District Court,”³ not Corey.

¶8. Louise is a medical doctor. Her Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05 disclosure stated that her monthly salary was $26,846.96. On cross-examination, Louise acknowledged that in September 2022, she and her current husband purchased an 82-acre waterfront property for $550,000 and that she personally paid the $110,000 down payment. In 2021, Louise and her husband purchased a commercial property for $290,000. Louise testified that she did not disclose either property in her Rule 8.05 statement because she and her husband own them through a “holding company.” Louise was also questioned about a photograph of a new Porsche she had posted on Facebook. Louise testified that she did not disclose the Porsche in her Rule 8.05 statement because it was her husband's car. Louise stated that there was “no debt on” the Porsche and that she did not know how much her husband paid for it.

¶9. At the conclusion of the hearing, Louise's attorney moved to dismiss the contempt petition, arguing that Corey's payoff of the judgment was a “voluntary payment” and that Louise had complied with the PSA by making payments (via garnishment) until the judgment was released. However, the chancellor rejected this argument. The chancellor found that the PSA required Louise to reimburse Corey for the judgment payoff because the PSA provided that Louise “shall be responsible for” and “shall hold [Corey] harmless from liability” on the judgment. The chancellor then found Louise in contempt for refusing to reimburse Corey.

¶10. Following the hearing, the chancellor entered a judgment finding Louise in contempt and ordered her to pay Corey the payoff amount ($50,518.33) plus interest within ninety days. The chancellor also ordered Louise to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $4,000 within sixty days. Louise filed a notice of appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. The parties’ PSA requires Louise to reimburse Corey.

¶11. “We employ a limited standard of review in domestic relations cases.” Siders v. Zickler, 312 So. 3d 1224, 1228 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Gerty v. Gerty, 265 So. 3d 121, 130 (¶33) (Miss. 2018)). “We will not reverse the chancellor's findings of fact unless they are not supported by substantial evidence or the chancellor clearly or manifestly erred or abused [his] discretion.” Id. “We review issues of law, including the interpretation of a property settlement agreement, de novo.” Id.

¶12. “A ‘property settlement agreement is no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character.’ ” Day v. Day, 28 So. 3d 672, 676 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931-32 (Miss. 1986)). “Once approved by the chancery court, it will be enforced absent fraud or overreaching.” Id. “A property settlement agreement that is incorporated into a divorce decree ‘must be interpreted by courts as any other contract.’ ” Siders, 312 So. 3d at 1228-29 (¶13) (quoting Dennis v. Dennis, 234 So. 3d 371, 376 (¶15) (Miss. 2017)). “When the agreement's language is ‘clear or unambiguous,’ we will enforce it as written.” Id. (quoting West v. West, 891 So. 2d 203, 210 (¶13) (Miss. 2004)). As with any other contract, we first “look to the ‘four corners’ of the agreement and review the actual language the parties used in their agreement.” West, 891 So. 2d at 210 (¶13).

¶13. Louise and Corey's PSA includes a section titled “Marital Debt” that in relevant part states as follows:

Wife shall be responsible for the following marital debt and shall hold husband harmless from liability thereon:

․

2. Trustmark National Bank Judgment ․

¶14. Louise argues Corey satisfied the Trustmark judgment “on his own volition and without being so compelled by Trustmark.” She argues that although the parties’ PSA required her to pay the Trustmark judgment, “[t]here is no provision within the [PSA] that requires [her] to pay [Corey] anything.” (Emphasis added). She further argues that the PSA “does not contemplate ANY payment from [her] to [Corey].” Finally, she argues that Corey's “voluntary payment of the debt, which he knew to be [her] responsibility, absolved the debt, and created an impossibility for [her] to be in contempt, because the debt had vanished.” These arguments are without merit.

¶15. The term “hold harmless” means “[t]o absolve (another party) from any responsibility for damage or other liability arising from the transaction[.]” Hold Harmless, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Here, the Trustmark judgment was enrolled as a lien on Corey's property. To obtain a release of the lien and close on his contract to sell the property, Corey had to satisfy the judgment. Clearly, Corey has experienced “liability” on the Trustmark judgment within the meaning of the parties’ PSA. Therefore, Louise was obligated to reimburse him—i.e., hold him harmless. See Moseley v. Smith, 180 So. 3d 667, 669 (¶¶1, 4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a provision of a PSA requiring the husband “to hold [the wife] harmless” for a debt obligated the husband to reimburse the wife after her wages were garnished to pay a judgment on the debt).

¶16. In arguing that Corey's payoff of the judgment was a “voluntary payment,” Louise is essentially invoking the “voluntary payment doctrine,” albeit without discussing the contours of the doctrine or citing any relevant authority.⁴ Regarding this doctrine, our Supreme Court has stated:

Mississippi law provides that a voluntary payment cannot be recovered back. A voluntary payment is one which is made without compulsion or fraud, and without any mistake of fact, of a demand which the payor does not owe, and which is not enforceable against him. A voluntary payor is a stranger or intermeddler who has no interest to protect and is under no legal or moral obligation to pay.

Colony Ins. v. First Specialty Ins., 262 So. 3d 1128, 1132 (¶59) (Miss. 2019) (emphasis added) (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

¶17. Once the full doctrine is reviewed, it is evident that Corey's satisfaction of the judgment was not a “voluntary payment.” The Trustmark judgment was entered against Corey—he “owe[d]” the judgment, it was “enforceable against him,” and indeed it was enrolled as a lien on his property. Id. Corey was no “stranger” to the judgment or mere “intermeddler”—he had an “interest to protect” and a “legal obligation ․ to pay.” Id. Louise argues that Corey's payment was “voluntary” because the parties’ PSA made her “responsible” for the debt and because Trustmark was—apparently, for the time—content to collect by garnishing her salary. But neither of those circumstances changes the fact that Corey remained liable for and legally obligated to pay the judgment. The parties’ PSA could not cut off Trustmark's right to collect from Corey, and Trustmark was unwilling to release the lien against Corey's property until he satisfied the judgment. Corey's payment was in no sense “voluntary” within the meaning of this doctrine.

¶18. In summary, Corey's payment was not voluntary, and the parties’ PSA required Louise to “hold [Corey] harmless from liability” on the judgment. Therefore, the chancellor did not err by ordering Louise to reimburse Corey for his payoff of the judgment.

II. The chancellor did not clearly err or abuse his discretion by finding Louise in contempt.

¶19. “[T]he primary purpose” of civil contempt “is to enforce the rights of private party litigants or to enforce compliance with a court order.” Purvis v. Purvis, 657 So. 2d 794, 796 (Miss. 1994). “The failure of a party to comply with a divorce decree is prima facie evidence of contempt.” Weeks v. Weeks, 29 So. 3d 80, 86 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “The Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently held that the inquiry in a contempt proceeding is limited to whether or not the order was violated, whether or not it was possible to carry out the order of the court, and if it was possible, whether or not such violation was an intentional and willful refusal to abide by the order of the court.” Ellis v. Ellis, 840 So. 2d 806, 811 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). “The only defenses to a contempt violation include an inability to comply with the court order or that the court order was unclear.” Id. (citations omitted). “A citation for contempt is proper when the contemner has willfully and deliberately ignored the order of the court.” Doyle v. Doyle, 55 So. 3d 1097, 1110 (¶44) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

¶20. “Contempt is an issue of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” R.K. v. J.K., 946 So. 2d 764, 777 (¶39) (Miss. 2007). With respect to a finding of civil contempt, “the factual findings of the chancellor are affirmed unless manifest error is present and apparent.” Purvis, 657 So. 2d at 797. Moreover, “contempt matters are committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court which, by institutional circumstance and both temporal and visual proximity, is infinitely more competent to decide the matter than are we.” Cumberland v. Cumberland, 564 So. 2d 839, 845 (Miss. 1990).

¶21. Here, the parties’ PSA made clear that Louise was required to “hold [Corey] harmless from liability” on the Trustmark judgment. Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, it was also clear that Louise was required to reimburse Corey once he had to pay off the judgment in order to obtain a release of Trustmark's lien on his property. Moreover, it is clear that Louise was more than able to reimburse Corey. Indeed, months after Louise knew that Corey had paid off the judgment, she made a $110,000 down payment on a new 82-acre property rather than comply with the hold-harmless provision of the PSA. Finally, through years of proceedings in the chancery court and on appeal, Louise has continued to assert that she owes Corey nothing because he “voluntarily” paid $50,518.33 to satisfy the judgment. For the reasons explained above, this position is legally untenable. On these facts, we cannot say that the chancellor clearly erred or abused his discretion when he found that Louise was in contempt for failing to comply with the PSA and the divorce decree.

CONCLUSION

¶22. The PSA required Louise to hold Corey harmless from any liability on the Trustmark judgment. Therefore, Louise was required to reimburse Corey once he had to pay the judgment to obtain a release of Trustmark's lien on his property. In addition, we cannot say that the chancellor clearly erred or abused his discretion by finding Louise in contempt for failing to comply with the PSA and the divorce decree.

¶23. AFFIRMED.

¶24. I concur with the majority in affirming the chancery court's judgment requiring Louise to reimburse Corey the $50,518.33 he paid to Trustmark; however, I disagree that she should have been found in “willful contumacious contempt” and ordered to pay attorney's fees for several reasons. First, Louise was paying Trustmark through a garnishment until Corey voluntarily paid off the debt. Additionally, Corey gave her no notice of his payment and made no demand for reimbursement prior to filing the contempt action. Further, Louise should not be held in willful contempt for simply asserting a colorable defense in response to the petition for contempt. Finally, the property settlement agreement (PSA) did not specify how Louise was to retire the debt with Trustmark. Given that Louise was paying off the Trustmark judgment before Corey voluntarily satisfied the lien without notice to her, I would find the chancery court's finding of contempt unwarranted and unsupported by the record.

Additional Relevant Facts

¶25. The couple jointly owned two homes: one was located at 7509 Ebbtide Drive, New Orleans, Louisiana, and mortgaged to Riverland Credit Union, and the second home was located at 1015 Apache Drive, McComb, Mississippi. Louise and Corey separated in 2017 and ultimately fell into arrears on a debt owed to Trustmark. On August 2, 2019, Trustmark obtained a final judgment against both of them in the amount of $64,338.53. Ten days later, on August 22, 2019, the Chancery Court of Pike County granted the couple a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and incorporated the parties’ PSA into the judgment. In the PSA, Corey was granted sole use, possession, and ownership of the New Orleans home, and Louise was granted sole use, possession, and ownership of the McComb home. Under the PSA, Louise agreed to be responsible for the Trustmark judgment, and Corey would be responsible for the Riverland mortgage on the New Orleans home. Specifically, the PSA states:

VI. MARITAL DEBT

Wife shall be responsible for the following marital debt and shall hold husband harmless from liability thereon.

․

2. Trustmark National Bank Judgment

Husband shall be responsible and hold wife harmless from liability on the following debt:

1. Riverland Credit Union (Mortgage)

¶26. On August 19, 2020, Trustmark filed a writ of garnishment against Corey to collect $89,886.87 that Trustmark claimed was still owed on the judgment and ultimately Louise agreed to Trustmark garnishing her salary instead of Corey's income.⁵ Louise's paystubs from her position as a medical doctor showed that between $1,000 and $3,000 was deducted from her salary each pay period, based on the amount of hours Louise worked. The wage garnishment continued until April 2022, when Trustmark ceased the garnishments. Louise had paid approximately $51,480.34 toward the debt by that time.

¶27. In March 2022, Corey decided to sell the New Orleans home. During the escrow period, Corey discovered that Trustmark had placed a judgment lien on the house. Corey decided to pay the balance owed to Trustmark ($50,518.33) and on April 6, 2022, Corey sold the New Orleans home. Corey said he paid the remaining debt because he received “a lucrative deal on the home.” It is undisputed that he never informed Louise of this transaction.

¶28. On April 8, 2022, Trustmark's counsel informed Louise that her debt was released and filed a notice of the debt's cancellation. The majority emphasizes Louise's testimony that she thought this might be a gift. But from a closer reading of the record, Louise stated that she was unaware of why the debt was released, and she attributed it to the years of prior negotiations she had with Trustmark to reduce the interest rate, in order for her to make a lump sum payment. On April 29, 2022, Trustmark terminated Louise's garnishment. While the garnishment was in effect, Louise never missed a payment. Louise only discovered that Corey had sold the New Orleans home later through her contact with Riverland. Louise and Corey testified they never discussed the New Orleans home sale or the debt that Corey satisfied. Corey never told Louise that he had paid the Trustmark debt, nor did he make a demand for reimbursement. Instead, two months after the sale, he filed a contempt action against her.

Analysis

A. Louise was not in willful contempt.

¶29. Contempt matters are committed to the substantial discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse where the chancellor's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence. Davis v. Davis, 761 So. 2d 936, 939 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

¶30. Contempt is defined as “[c]onduct that defies the authority or dignity of a court or legislature.” Contempt, Black's Law Dictionary 397 (11th ed. 2019). “The purpose of civil contempt is to compel compliance with the court's orders, admonitions, and instructions, while the purpose of criminal contempt is to punish.” Macvaugh v. State, 385 So. 3d 443, 451 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Graves v State, 66 So. 3d 148, 151 (¶¶11-12) (Miss. 2011)). “To be found in contempt, a party has to willfully and deliberately violate a court order.” Jones v. Jones, 265 So. 3d. 195, 203 (¶41) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting McKnight v. Jenkins, 155 So. 3d 730, 732 (¶7) (Miss. 2013)). “[O]ur inquiry into civil contempt challenges is limited to whether or not the order was violated, whether or not it was possible to carry out the order of the court, and if it was possible, whether or not such violation was an intentional and willful refusal to abide by the order of the court.” McPhail v. McPhail, 357 So. 3d 602, 610 (¶40) (Miss. 2023) (citing A.M.L. v. J.W.L., 98 So. 3d 1001, 1019 (Miss. 2012)). Although a record may indicate that a party did not always comply with a property settlement agreement, to be held in contempt, the evidence should suggest that the party willfully and deliberately violated the court's order. Jones, 265 So. 3d at 203 (¶41). “Contempt is an issue of fact to be decided on a case-by-case basis.” McPhail, 357 So. 3d at 610 (¶54) (citing Mizell v. Mizell, 708 So. 2d 55, 64 (Miss. 1998)).

¶31. Jones is instructive in several aspects: Shanda and Thomas divorced and agreed in a property settlement agreement that, among other things, Shanda would refinance the marital home within two years of the divorce and remove Thomas's name from the home. Jones, 265 So. 3d at 203 (¶37). The parties also agreed to equally divide all medical expenses not covered by insurance or reimburse the other party within ten days of submitting invoices, including the deductible. Id. Shanda filed a “Complaint for Contempt of Court and Other Relief” and claimed Thomas had, among other things, failed to pay his portion of the children's medical and school expenses. Id. at 197 (¶5). Thomas filed a counterclaim for contempt, inter alia. Id. The chancellor held that Shanda was not in contempt for failure to comply with the PSA but Thomas was, and Thomas appealed. Id. at 200 (¶21). This Court noted that Shanda admitted that the refinancing did not occur within two years of her divorce, but she explained her reason. Id. at 202 (¶38). She said she didn't have the thousands of dollars required to refinance and she testified that she had discussed it with Thomas. Id. We affirmed the chancellor's decision to not hold Shanda in contempt, stating that while the record indicates that Shanda did not always comply with the property settlement agreement, there is no evidence that she willfully and deliberately violated the court's order. Id. at 203 (¶41). Indeed, there was no evidence in the record to suggest that Shanda's actions were done with the intent to frustrate the court's order. Id.

¶32. In the instant case, the court ordered the joint Trustmark debt to be paid by Louise, which she was doing through Trustmark's garnishment of her wages. When Trustmark terminated the garnishment, Louise did not know Corey had paid the balance. At trial, Louise was asked about these events:

Q: The Garnishment stopped, didn't it?

A. Well, Susan Steadman's office called me around April and said that your Judgment is released, and I didn't know why. I thought that the amount of funds that was initially old [sic] was paid because I paid to the tune of like $55,000 that they had taken out of my check for that period of time. So, I said, well maybe they are giving me a gift. I had no idea Mr. Amos had sold his property.

Q: Well, today, you know, and your lawyer has been advised, and you were served with a Complaint of Contempt advising you that you had not paid that debt; isn't that correct?

A. I do. I am aware of the Summons about Contempt, but, again, I was paying the debt. The Courts in the Southern District [sic] was getting money every month out of my checking account for that debt. So, when the debt was resolved they stopped. I didn't stop it.

Q: My question simply was you didn't think it appropriate to say, Corey, they have stopped garnishing my check for the New Orleans home? What's going on?

A. ․[W]hen Trustmark, Susan Steadman's office, called me to say that they were releasing the Judgment, I had been in negotiations with them for years trying to get this interest taken off and trying to get it to a suitable point where I can make a lump sum payment ․ When I reached a certain amount at the $55,000, I in my heart thought that, well, maybe they are going to excuse all the rest because I did cover most of what the initial loan was. ․ So, he didn't – I mean, why can't you ask your client why he didn't let me know that he was selling his property. Because maybe I could have said, well, I am trying to work something out, this Judgment will come out on you, and he did that willingly. He didn't communicate with me either. It's two ways.

(Emphasis added). Louise's conduct was not evidence of a willful and deliberate attempt to violate a court order. Looking at the undisputed facts of the case, Louise was abiding by the court order by paying the Trustmark garnishment through her salary deductions. It appears from the record that neither party was aware that Trustmark had placed a lien on the New Orleans home. Trustmark terminated the garnishment as a result of Corey's conduct, not Louise's.

¶33. In addition, Louise had not refused to pay the Trustmark debt prior to Corey filing the contempt action. In fact, Corey's cause of action for contempt had not accrued prior to the filing. Louise's counsel brought this to the attention of the court. It has been long established that “a cause of action must exist and be complete before an action can be commenced, and, when a suit is begun before the cause of action accrues, it will generally be dismissed if proper objection is made.” Owens-Illinois Inc. v. Edwards, 573 So. 2d 704, 706 (Miss. 1990). In answering the contempt petition, Louise raised a colorable defense for the court to consider—namely that Corey's voluntary assumption of the debt may have relieved her of further responsibility for it. She should not have been punished and held in contempt for exercising her right to raise an affirmative defense.⁶

¶34. In summary, Louise was not in willful, contumacious contempt because she was faithfully paying the debt, and when accused of contempt, her response was simply raising a colorable defense, which does not give rise to a finding of willful contempt. Louise did not receive any request for reimbursement from Corey before being hauled into court two months after he voluntarily paid the debt.

B. The PSA was vague.

¶35. I agree that the PSA stated Louise was to hold Corey harmless, yet the chancery court inferred this meant that when the contempt action was filed, Louise was required to pay Corey immediately through a lump sum payment. However, the PSA does not require this immediate reimbursement.

¶36. “Before a party may be held in contempt for failure to comply with a judgment, ‘the judgment must be complete within itself[,] leaving open no matter or description or designation out of which contention may arise as to meaning.’ ” Lindsay v. Lindsay, 303 So. 3d 770, 779 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Wing v. Wing, 549 So. 2d 944, 947 (Miss. 1989)). “To rebut a prima facie case of contempt, [the non-moving party] must show an inability to pay, that the default was not willful, that the provision violated was ambiguous, or that performance was impossible.” Jones, 265 So. 3d at 198 (¶11) (emphasis added) (quoting Evans v. Evans, 75 So. 3d 1083, 1087 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). “[I]f the judgment or decree giving rise to the contempt action is overly vague or nonspecific, a finding of contempt is improper.” Smith v. Mull, 250 So. 3d 1271, 1274 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added). Viable defenses to contempt include “that the court order was unclear.” A.M.L., 98 So. 3d at 1019 (¶37) (emphasis added) (quoting Ellis v. Ellis, 840 So. 2d 806, 811 (¶37) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003)). One cannot be held in contempt of court for something he has not been specifically, clearly, and unambiguously ordered to do or not do. Davis, 761 So. 2d at 941 (¶12).

¶37. Jones is also instructive on this issue: Thomas also argued that the chancellor erred by holding him in contempt for failing to pay his portion of the medical expenses and unpaid school or extracurricular expenses. Jones, 265 So. 3d at 200 (¶21). Shanda and Thomas's property settlement agreement required an invoice to be paid or reimbursed within ten days of submission, but their agreement failed to clarify a time limitation for each party “to submit” the invoice. Id. at 199 (¶13). Because of this lack of clarity, a party could wait months or even years to submit various invoices and then demand payment within ten days of submission, after the invoices have reached a substantial amount, which Shanda did. Id. While picking up her child on a Friday, Shanda handed Thomas's wife a “big huge folder” of unpaid bills going back years and demanded $5,000 reimbursement by Sunday, or she was taking him to court. Id. at (¶15). In considering Thomas's appeal of the chancery court's finding him in contempt for non-payment, we stated, “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.” Id. at 199 (¶17) (quoting Restatement (2d) of Contracts § 205 (1981)). Thus, in all divorce actions, the parties are obligated to act in good faith and to treat each other with common courtesy and decency. Id. (quoting In re E.C.P., 918 So. 2d 809, 816 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). We held that the chancery court erred in finding Thomas in contempt for his failure to pay his portion of expenses due to the lack of specificity in the property settlement agreement, combined with Shanda's untimely submission of invoices, making it impossible for Thomas to meet his obligation under the property settlement agreement (i.e., to afford to pay his half of all expenses). Id.; see Evans, 75 So. 3d at 1087 (¶14).

¶38. In the instant case, the Amos PSA is vague or silent as to how Louise was to pay the Trustmark judgment in order to hold Corey harmless. It did not require her to make a lump sum payment to Trustmark. It did not prohibit her paying through garnishment or even by entering into a separate refinancing agreement with Trustmark. And it also contained no instructions as to how the parties should proceed if Corey paid the Trustmark judgment instead of Louise. Compounding the agreement's ambiguity, Corey failed to communicate any request to Louise telling her how he would like to proceed, either when he learned of the Trustmark lien or after voluntarily paying it. I agree that Louise is required to reimburse Corey for the amount he paid to release the lien on the New Orleans home. However, in the absence of specific directions in the PSA as to how to proceed, Louise should not be held in willful contempt for failing to hold Corey harmless.

¶39. In summary, I would find that in this case Louise was not in willful and contumacious contempt of the court's judgment that incorporated the PSA. Louise faithfully paid Trustmark over $51,000 through garnishments from February 2021 through April 2022, when Trustmark terminated the garnishments. It is undisputed that Corey unilaterally decided to pay the lien and failed to inform Louise before or after. Indeed, Corey never requested or demanded reimbursement prior to filing a contempt action. Nevertheless, even if Corey had, the PSA was silent and ambiguous on how Louise was required to hold him harmless (i.e., method of payment, timeline for repayment, etc.). It is obvious that Louise remained compliant with the court's order to pay off the Trustmark debt. Accordingly, I would affirm the chancery court's finding that Louise was required to reimburse Corey for the remaining debt of $50,518.33. However, I disagree with the chancery court's finding that Louise was in willful contumacious contempt and would not require her to pay any attorney's fees.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties’ agreement also covered child custody, visitation, and support; however, those subjects are not relevant to this appeal.

2.   At the hearing, Corey admitted that he did not discuss the issue with Louise prior to paying off the judgment or filing the petition for contempt. Louise and Corey both testified that they do not communicate well and do not talk much.

3.   It is not clear why Louise referred to “the Southern District Court.” Although the record is not clear, it appears the judgment was entered by the County Court of Pike County.

4.   In an ore tenus motion to dismiss in the chancery court, Louise's attorney did expressly invoke and briefly discuss the “voluntary payment doctrine.”

5.   Corey had filed a contempt action but voluntarily dismissed it when Louise agreed to take on the garnishment.

6.   One affirmative defense she did not raise was inability to pay, which the majority seizes upon. Arguably, she had several other financial obligations: a $200,000 IRS debt, childcare expenses, automobile payments, and housing costs. Notably, Corey was in default on his $275 monthly child support obligation, and she raised the affirmative defense of unclean hands, which the court failed to properly consider.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, P.J., AND WESTBROOKS, J., CONCUR IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.