MARTIN v. MARTIN (2025)

¶1. The Warren County Chancery Court entered an order finding that Christy Ann Martin (Christy) willfully failed to pay her ex-husband, John Fredrick Martin (Rick), $21,040.72 that had been awarded to Rick in the parties’ final divorce judgment. After holding Christy in contempt for failing to comply with the divorce judgment, the chancellor ordered her to be incarcerated for six months but suspended the incarceration on the condition that Christy make timely payments to Rick to satisfy the monetary award.

¶2. On appeal, Christy argues that (1) the chancellor erred by holding her in contempt for failing to pay the monetary judgment; (2) the chancellor erred by finding she had the financial ability to pay the monetary judgment; and (3) incarceration was an improper contempt sanction for the nonpayment of the monetary judgment.

¶3. Upon review, we find no error in the chancellor's findings that Christy was in contempt of the divorce judgment and that she failed to prove her inability to comply. We also find no error in the chancellor's use of the contempt powers available to him to enforce Christy's compliance with his prior order. As a result, we affirm the chancellor's order holding Christy in contempt.

FACTS

¶4. The parties were married in March 2018 but separated the following month. They reconciled in August 2018 but again separated in November 2018, with Rick filing a complaint for an irreconcilable-differences divorce. Christy was pregnant at the time of the parties’ November separation.

¶5. In February 2019, Rick filed his first amended divorce complaint. He requested a divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, alternatively, irreconcilable differences. Rick also requested DNA testing to confirm whether he was the father of Christy's unborn child. If DNA testing showed Rick was the baby's father, Rick asked that the chancellor grant him custody of the minor child once he or she was born.

¶6. Following confirmation of Rick's paternity and the birth of the parties’ minor child, Rick filed a second amended divorce complaint in October 2019. He asserted adultery as an additional fault-based ground for divorce and again raised issues regarding the care, custody, and support of the parties’ minor child. Rick also asserted that since the date of his prior divorce complaint, he had been forced to take action against Christy in the County Court of Warren County. Rick stated in his second amended divorce complaint that Christy had damaged or destroyed some of his personal property located in the marital home when she vacated the property in July 2019. Rick further stated that Christy had removed his household furnishings from the marital home to a storage facility.

¶7. Rick provided the chancellor with the county court's order requiring that all the furnishings remain in the storage facility until the chancellor “render[ed] a final ruling on the equitable distribution and disposition of said property.” The county court also ordered Christy not to enter the marital home and prohibited the parties from contacting each other. The county court provided that its order would “remain in full force and effect until the final hearing in the ․ [c]hancery [c]ourt.”

¶8. After discussing the county court action in his second amended divorce complaint, Rick asked that the chancellor order Christy to reimburse him for the cost of moving his furnishings back to the marital home. In addition, Rick asserted that the damage Christy had caused to his personal property and the marital home when she vacated the residence had required over $15,000 to repair. As a result, Rick also asked the chancellor to order Christy to reimburse him for these expenses.

¶9. Following a hearing, the chancellor entered a temporary order on January 24, 2020. The chancellor awarded Christy temporary custody of the parties’ minor child, granted Rick visitation, and ordered Rick to pay temporary child support to Christy. The chancellor assigned each party the responsibility of retrieving and removing his or her own personal items from the storage facility.

¶10. On May 11, 2020, Rick filed a third amended divorce complaint. Rick alleged that the county court had previously ordered Christy to pay for the return of his household furnishings to the marital home. As proof of his claims, Rick attached as an exhibit the county court's order entered on October 4, 2019. As Rick asserted, the county court had stated in its October 4, 2019 order that Christy had thirty days to arrange and pay for the costs of transporting the household furnishings from the storage facility to the marital home. The county court provided that all property returned to the marital home was to “remain in the home until the final hearing on the merits of the parties’ pending divorce matter” before the chancellor.

¶11. In his third amended divorce complaint, Rick stated that Christy had refused to pay for the household furnishings to be returned to the marital home. Rick provided a detailed report of all the damages caused to the marital home from the time of the parties’ separation until Christy vacated the residence. He also provided the chancellor with information regarding the $32,154.57 in expenses he had incurred to transport the household furnishings back to the marital home and repair the damage caused to the marital home and his personal property.

¶12. In May 2020, the county court judge and the chancellor both signed an order to transfer the county court matter to chancery court and consolidate the matter with the parties’ divorce proceedings. The chancellor entered a final judgment in the matter on September 8, 2021. The parties had withdrawn all fault-based grounds for divorce and agreed to an irreconcilable-differences divorce. In addition, the parties had stipulated that no real or personal property was subject to equitable distribution and that the only marital debt encompassed medical bills related to Christy's pregnancy and the birth of the parties’ minor child. The parties agreed that the only remaining issues before the chancellor were alimony and child custody, support, maintenance, and visitation.

¶13. In reaching a determination as to child custody, the chancellor analyzed each of the relevant factors set forth in Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).¹ The chancellor determined that the age, health, and sex of the parties’ child, who was a healthy one-year-old girl, was a neutral factor. Although the chancellor found that continuity of care favored Christy, the chancellor also noted that visitation issues had arisen because Christy denied Rick visits with their daughter until the court intervened. The chancellor further noted that after he had established a temporary visitation schedule, he held Christy “in contempt on three separate occasions due to her denials and/or interference with Rick's visitation.” With regard to the parties’ parenting skills and their willingness and capacity to provide primary childcare, the chancellor appeared to conclude this factor was neutral.

¶14. As to the parties’ employment and related responsibilities, the chancellor remarked on Christy's lack of gainful employment for the five years prior to the marriage and during the marriage. The chancellor also noted that since the parties’ separation, Christy had not worked consistently. Other than claiming she was awaiting to see the impact that the chancellor's custody and visitation determinations would have on her potential work schedule, Christy provided no meaningful explanation for her lack of employment since the parties’ separation. The chancellor did note, however, that Christy had an expired life and health insurance license and that she could work for her stepfather's insurance business. By contrast, the chancellor noted that Rick, who was self-employed, owned in whole or in part two home-healthcare businesses. Rick's responsibilities with the businesses allowed him to work remotely if needed and provided a great deal of flexibility. As a result, the chancellor concluded that this factor favored Rick.

¶15. Although the chancellor found both parties were in good health, he concluded that this factor (their physical health, mental health, and age) slightly favored Christy (38 years old) over Rick (55 years old) due to the age difference between Rick and the parties’ one-year-old daughter. The chancellor also found that the emotional ties existing between each parent and the minor child favored Christy. In discussing the parties’ moral fitness, the chancellor found Rick had presented sufficient proof to establish that Christy had engaged in two extra-marital relationships. The chancellor concluded that the factor favored Rick and found that Christy's relationship with one of the men provided “another example of her not being truthful or credible” with the court. Because the parties’ daughter was only one year old at the time of the chancellor's order, the chancellor found the factor regarding any preference of the child failed to apply to his analysis.

¶16. The chancellor next considered the stability of each party's home environment and employment. After vacating the marital home, Christy and the parties’ daughter had moved in with Christy's mother, stepfather, sixteen-year-old niece, and fifteen-year-old son from a previous relationship. At the time of the hearing, Christy did not express to the chancellor “any definitive plans of relocating to her own home.” The chancellor stated that Christy was largely reliant on assistance from her mother and stepfather and had been “unable to provide a solid plan on how she would live and provide for the minor child in the event that her mother and stepfather became unwilling ․ or involuntarily ․ unable to assist her.” By contrast, the chancellor found that Rick owned his own home in Mississippi and at least one other residence elsewhere, had stable employment, and was financially stable. Despite these findings, the chancellor concluded this factor was neutral. As a final consideration, the chancellor discussed trying to avoid separating siblings whenever possible. The chancellor concluded this consideration favored Christy since her son from a prior relationship lived with her and the parties’ daughter.

¶17. The chancellor found the custody determination to be “a very close call[,]” but after analyzing all the relevant factors, he awarded legal custody to both parties, primary physical custody to Christy, and visitation to Rick. Based on the parties’ testimony and evidence, the chancellor ordered Rick to pay Christy $935 each month in child support. Turning next to the issue of alimony, the chancellor discussed each of the relevant factors. The chancellor noted that after the parties’ separation, Christy could have worked for her stepfather's insurance company but had simply chosen not to do so. The chancellor found that Christy had not maximized or explored her earning potential and that the Rule 8.05 financial statement she had provided to the court did not indicate such expenses as rent, mortgage, or utility payments. See UCCR 8.05. Rick, meanwhile, had more income and assets, but the chancellor found that he also had more expenses and financial responsibilities than Christy. Given that the parties only lived together as husband and wife for about four months, the chancellor found that the length of their marriage strongly disfavored an award of alimony. The chancellor also found that the evidence of Christy's adultery on at least two occasions and the intentional and significant damage she caused to Rick's personal property when she vacated the marital home also strongly disfavored awarding alimony. Thus, based on his review of the relevant factors, the chancellor denied alimony.

¶18. The chancellor ordered that Rick could claim a yearly income-tax credit for the parties’ minor child. The chancellor also ordered each party to assume responsibility for half the total amount of Christy's outstanding medical bills accrued during her pregnancy and the birth of the parties’ daughter. With regard to Rick's claims against Christy for property damage and removing his furnishings from the marital home, the chancellor found Rick had presented sufficient proof “to establish that Christy intentionally and knowingly damaged Rick's personal property.” Based on his findings, the chancellor awarded Rick a total judgment of $21,040.72, which the chancellor ordered Christy to pay within twelve months of the date of entry of the divorce judgment.

¶19. Christy moved to alter or amend the chancellor's final judgment, which the chancellor partially denied and granted. The chancellor acknowledged a scrivener's error in the final judgment regarding the grant of a yearly income-tax credit to Rick alone. The chancellor intended to allow the parties to alternate the right to claim the minor child for tax purposes. As a result, on November 24, 2021, the chancellor entered an amended final judgment that reflected the parties’ were to alternate claiming their daughter for income-tax purposes. All other material provisions of the chancellor's original final judgment remained in effect. Christy unsuccessfully moved to amend the chancellor's amended final judgment or for a new trial and to stay the proceedings in the chancery court.

¶20. On September 9, 2022, the chancellor held a hearing on Rick's petition for a citation of contempt against Christy and for modification of custody. In his order entered on April 21, 2023, the chancellor found Christy had committed parental alienation, and he held her in contempt. The chancellor also ordered Christy to pay Rick $6,000 in attorney's fees related to her prior contemptuous conduct. The chancellor held his ruling as to custody modification in abeyance so the parties could attempt to resolve their parenting conflicts through counseling.

¶21. On May 11, 2023, Rick filed another contempt petition against Christy. Rick asserted that Christy had failed to comply with the prior orders to pay him the $6,000. He therefore asked the chancellor to incarcerate Christy until she purged herself of contempt and paid him the $6,000. On May 23, 2023, the chancellor held a hearing on Rick's most recent request to hold Christy in contempt and on his previous request to modify child custody. The chancellor found that Christy's attempts to alienate Rick from the parties’ minor daughter had not yet risen to a level requiring a change in custody. Although the chancellor denied Rick's requests for a citation of contempt and modification of custody, the chancellor warned that if Christy's actions continued, her conduct might make a future modification necessary.

¶22. On February 5, 2024, the chancellor held a hearing on Rick's newest contempt petition alleging that Christy had failed to pay the monetary judgments awarded to him in the divorce judgment and a subsequent contempt order. On the morning of the hearing, Christy paid Rick the $6,000 she owed him in attorney's fees. With regard to the provision in the original divorce judgment that had awarded Rick $21,040.72 in damages, the chancellor noted that Christy had been aware of the outstanding monetary judgment for several years but had still failed to make any payments in compliance with that part of the prior judgment. Despite Christy's claims that she lacked the financial ability to pay the monetary judgment, the chancellor found her assertions were inconsistent with caselaw and the parties’ testimony and evidence. The chancellor determined Christy had voluntarily chosen to remain unemployed in the years following the entry of the divorce judgment and had presented no evidence to show that anything prohibited her from working or that she was unable to work for any reason. Rather, the chancellor found the evidence clearly established that Christy had a prior work history, had indicated she could work when she chose to do so, and remained in good overall health. As a result, the chancellor concluded Christy had not shown a good-faith basis for her failure to pay the prior monetary judgment.

¶23. After holding Christy in contempt for her failure to pay the prior divorce judgment of $21,040.72, the chancellor awarded Rick $7,500 in attorney's fees related to “the aggravated expenses of repeated continuances, evading service of process[,] and gamesmanship exhibited by Christy.” The chancellor also ordered that Christy be incarcerated for six months. The chancellor suspended Christy's incarceration on the condition that Christy pay $7,135 no later than March 1, 2024, and then continue to make regular payments until she satisfied the outstanding balance. Aggrieved by the chancellor's contempt order entered on February 5, 2024, Christy appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶24. On appeal, Christy asserts that her monetary obligation to Rick constitutes an ordinary civil judgment. She further asserts that contempt proceedings are more appropriately reserved for a party's failure to pay alimony or child support rather than an ordinary civil judgment. As a result, Christy contends that the chancellor erred by holding her in contempt for failing to pay the provision in the final divorce judgment that awarded damages to Rick. Alternatively, Christy argues that even if contempt was a proper remedy for her nonpayment of the monetary obligation, the chancellor erred by finding she had the financial ability to make payments. Moreover, Christy asserts that incarceration was not a proper contempt sanction for her failure to pay the alleged ordinary civil judgment.

¶25. As Christy correctly notes, our caselaw holds “that contempt is not a proper mechanism for execution upon [an ordinary] money judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a) ․” Pierce v. Sorrells, 376 So. 3d 1257, 1262 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). While the purpose of Rule 69(a) and certain relevant statutes is to provide a procedure for enforcing and collecting on an ordinary civil judgment, “[t]he primary purpose of a civil-contempt order is to enforce compliance with a court order.” Bozant v. Nguyen, 296 So. 3d 254, 261 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Chism v. Chism, 285 So. 3d 656, 666 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). Upon review, though, we disagree with Christy's contention that the chancellor held her in contempt for failing to pay a mere ordinary civil judgment.

¶26. Although Rick initially filed his replevin action in county court, the chancellor eventually consolidated the matter with the parties’ ongoing divorce proceedings. In addition, the chancellor heard and considered Rick's proof regarding the damage Christy had caused to the marital home and his personal possessions. Along with the other matters raised by the parties, the chancellor addressed Rick's claims as part of the final divorce judgment. In incorporating the issue into the provisions of the divorce judgment, the chancellor concluded that Rick had presented sufficient proof to substantiate his claims and awarded Rick $21,040.72 in damages.

¶27. The chancellor not only incorporated Rick's monetary award into the divorce judgment, but like the other disputed matters before him (such as child custody and child support), the chancellor also placed conditions on Christy's duty to satisfy the financial obligation. Specifically, the chancellor gave Christy twelve months to fulfill her obligation.

¶28. Thus, despite Christy's argument on appeal, we conclude that her financial obligation to Rick is distinguishable from a mere ordinary civil judgment. As with all the other determinations the chancellor made on the issues before him, he incorporated Rick's award of damages into the final judgment of divorce. The chancellor therefore vested the provision with the full force of a lawful court order that was subject to enforcement through the application of his coercive contempt powers. Cf. Bozant, 296 So. 3d at 261-62 (¶13) (affirming the chancellor's finding of contempt for the ex-husband's failure to pay his part of the parties’ tax debt and the professional fees associated with the preparation of their taxes as set forth in the final divorce judgment); Allred v. Allred, 735 So. 2d 1064, 1069 (¶¶18-20) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the ex-husband was in contempt for failing to retitle a vehicle in his ex-wife's name and obtain insurance for the parties’ children as directed by the final divorce judgment and that the chancellor abused his discretion by not using the coercive contempt powers available to him to compel the ex-husband's compliance with a lawful order).

¶29. Although our caselaw authorizes the chancellor to compel the parties’ compliance with the provisions of the divorce judgment through the use of his contempt powers, we still must determine if sufficient evidence supported the chancellor's finding that Christy was in willful noncompliance. As we previously have explained when discussing matters of contempt,

[c]ivil contempt orders enforce a private party's rights or compel compliance with a court's order. Failure to comply with a court order is prima facie evidence of contempt. A contempt citation is proper only when the contemner has wilfully and deliberately ignored the order of the court. Further, this Court will not reverse a contempt citation where the chancellor's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence.

Bozant, 296 So. 3d at 260 (¶10) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶30. Here, Christy raises no dispute that she failed to pay the monetary damages that the chancellor awarded Rick as part of their divorce judgment. Thus, the record demonstrates by “substantial credible evidence” that Christy failed to comply with a prior court order. Id. (quoting Witters v. Witters, 864 So. 2d 999, 1004 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)). Accordingly, we find the record contains “prima facie evidence of contempt” and that the burden then shifted to Christy to prove “an inability to pay, that the default was not willful, that the provision violated was ambiguous, or that performance was impossible.” Siders v. Zickler, 312 So. 3d 1224, 1230 (¶¶18-19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citations omitted).

¶31. As discussed, Christy challenges the chancellor's findings that she had the ability to comply with the divorce judgment but had willfully failed to do so. In her appellate brief, Christy relies on her testimony at the hearing before the chancellor to demonstrate that her failure to comply was not actually willful. Christy stated during the hearing that since the entry of the parties’ divorce judgment, she had worked from home only a little as an insurance agent. Even though she knew of her financial obligation to repay Rick, Christy acknowledged that she had elected to instead spend the majority of her time since the divorce as a stay-at-home mother. Christy also acknowledged that she had no plans to change her financial status until the parties’ daughter began school.

¶32. Due to her decisions regarding employment, Christy testified that she made very little income after the divorce. She further testified that she relied mainly on the child support she received, residual income she received when clients renewed their insurance policies, and money her mother and stepfather provided to support herself. Christy explained that in addition to receiving money from her mother and stepfather, she lived with them, which made it possible for her to greatly reduce her monthly expenses.

¶33. While Christy relies on these statements to show that her failure to comply with the divorce judgment was not willful, the chancellor found Christy's testimony established the opposite. The chancellor concluded that Christy's claims of financial inability lacked credibility. In reaching this determination, the chancellor emphasized Christy's repeated prior contemptuous conduct throughout the parties’ litigation. The chancellor also stated that although Christy had known about the monetary award owed to Rick since the entry of the initial divorce judgment, she still voluntarily chose not to work. The chancellor found that Christy made this choice even though she had a prior work history, had the ability to work when she chose, and was in overall good health. Christy herself admitted that she could work as much as she wanted to as an insurance agent and could make as much money as she wanted if she were willing to put in the work. Considering these factors and the lack of evidence showing Christy was in any way prohibited from working or unable to work, the chancellor concluded that Christy had failed to establish a good-faith basis for not paying the monetary judgment awarded to Rick.

¶34. “The chancellor, by his presence in the courtroom, is best equipped to listen to witnesses, observe their demeanor, and determine the credibility of the witnesses and what weight ought to be ascribed to the evidence given by those witnesses.” Morland v. Morland, 396 So. 3d 501, 507 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Mabus v. Mabus, 890 So. 2d 806, 819 (¶56) (Miss. 2003)). “This Court ‘will accept a chancellor's findings of fact as long as the evidence in the record reasonably supports those findings.’ ” Baur v. Ribelin, 395 So. 3d 1258, 1265 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Franco v. Ferrill, 342 So. 3d 1176, 1188 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). Upon review, we find sufficient credible evidence supported the chancellor's determination that Christy possessed the present ability to make payments on her debt to Rick but voluntarily, and therefore willfully, chose not to fulfill her monetary obligation as set forth in the divorce judgment.

¶35. We next address Christy's contention that incarceration was an improper sanction to apply to enforce her compliance with the divorce judgment. The contempt sanctions available to a chancellor include “fine, imprisonment, both, or neither ․” Gebetsberger v. East, 627 So. 2d 823, 826 (Miss. 1993). Moreover, Mississippi caselaw establishes that “what sanction to impose for contempt belongs to the chancery court's sound discretion.” McPhail v. McPhail, 357 So. 3d 602, 614 (¶66) (Miss. 2023).

¶36. Similarly to the present circumstances, in Paxton v. Paxton (Paxton I), 222 So. 2d 834, 835 (Miss. 1969), the chancellor held the ex-wife in contempt of the divorce decree for failing to timely return her ex-husband's personal property to him and for causing damage to both the marital home and certain marital property. As part of the divorce decree, the chancellor had granted the ex-wife temporary use of the marital home but had ordered her to deliver possession of the home to her ex-husband by a specified date. Id. The divorce decree stated “that the property was to be returned in good order and repair and substantially in the same condition as it was at the date of the decree.” Id. The decree further “provided that the title to certain personal property located in the house and on the premises was vested in Mr. Paxton[,] and Mrs. Paxton was directed to deliver the possession of this property to Mr. Paxton.” Id.

¶37. A few months after the deadline had passed, the ex-husband filed a petition for contempt and alleged that his ex-wife had failed to return his personal property as ordered and had caused over $13,000 in damages to the marital property and home. Id. The chancellor held the ex-wife in contempt of the divorce decree and ordered her incarcerated “until she purged herself by complying with the terms and provisions of the decree by restoring the home to substantially the same condition” as it had been at the entry of the divorce decree. Id. at 835-36. The chancellor's contempt holding failed, however, to “fix any amount of damage that [the ex-wife] could pay in order to purge herself of contempt.” Id. at 836. Both parties appealed from the chancellor's contempt decree. Id.

¶38. Upon review, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with the ex-husband's claim on cross-appeal that the chancellor erred by failing to specify an amount the ex-wife could pay to purge herself of contempt. Id. In her direct appeal, the ex-wife asserted for the first time that she could not be guilty of contempt because she had been insane when she failed to comply with the divorce decree. Id. The supreme court reversed and remanded the matter to allow further proceedings to determine the ex-wife's mental state at the time of her alleged contempt. Id. at 837. As a result, the supreme court did not discuss whether sufficient evidence supported the chancellor's finding of contempt or indicate if incarceration constituted a proper remedy for the ex-wife's conduct. Id.

¶39. On remand, the chancellor held an extensive evidentiary hearing. Paxton v. Paxton (Paxton II), 305 So. 2d 106, 107 (Miss. 1974). The chancellor determined that the ex-wife had been competent when she failed to comply with the divorce decree. Id. Thus, the chancellor once again found the ex-wife guilty of contempt, and he set an exact amount she could pay to purge herself of her contempt. Id. The chancellor's decision acknowledged that since he had first considered the ex-husband's contempt petition, lunacy proceedings had occurred, which resulted in the appointment of a guardian for the ex-wife. Id. As a result, although the chancellor held the ex-wife in contempt, he “concluded, as suggested in [the supreme court's] former opinion, that Mrs. Paxton should not be jailed for failure to purge herself of contempt by paying the sum mentioned, unless and until she should have been restored to sanity.” Id.

¶40. The parties again appealed and cross-appealed from the chancellor's decision. Id. The supreme court held “that the case was fairly and fully heard[,] and the evidence was sufficient to support the chancellor's findings of fact.” Id. In affirming the chancellor's finding that the ex-wife was in contempt at the time she failed to comply with the divorce decree, the supreme court again declined to indicate that incarceration was an improper sanction for the ex-wife's contempt. Id. Rather, the supreme court simply affirmed the chancellor's qualification that any incarceration should not occur “unless and until” the ex-wife had regained her sanity. Id.

¶41. A review of Mississippi caselaw clearly demonstrates that incarceration is among the available sanctions for a chancellor to use to enforce a party's compliance in civil contempt actions. Gebetsberger, 627 So. 2d at 826. As discussed, when considering the chancellor's findings regarding similar contemptuous conduct by the ex-wife in Paxton, the supreme court ultimately concluded there was no reversible error. Paxton II, 305 So. 2d at 107. After considering the record and relevant caselaw, we also find no reversible error here. We therefore affirm the chancellor's use of incarceration to compel Christy's compliance after he found that she was in willful contempt of the divorce judgment.

¶42. The public court filings in Warren County show that since the entry of the chancellor's February 5, 2024 order holding Christy in contempt, the parties have filed additional petitions of contempt against one another.² Taking into consideration the chancellor's decision to suspend Christy's incarceration and the parties’ ongoing litigation, we address one final matter related to Christy's contempt. The supreme court previously has emphasized that an “[i]nability to pay to avoid incarceration is a continuing defense as imprisonment does not accomplish the [remedial] purpose of the civil contempt decree.” Riser v. Peterson, 566 So. 2d 210, 211 (Miss. 1990). Although “a litigant may be incarcerated for civil contempt for failure to pay a judgment[,] THAT LITIGANT IS ALWAYS ENTITLED TO OFFER EVIDENCE OF INABILITY TO PAY AS A DEFENSE, NOT TO THE CONTEMPT, but to the incarceration.” Id. at 212 (emphasis in original). Thus, as the Riser court explained, “even if [a party] was already committed to jail, she would still be entitled to be discharged on proof of inability to pay” should she present sufficient evidence of her present financial inability to pay at a future hearing on the issue. Id. at 211-12.

CONCLUSION

¶43. Finding no error in the chancellor's determination that Christy was in willful contempt of the divorce judgment's requirement to pay Rick $21,040.72 and should be incarcerated if she failed to timely repay the monetary obligation, we affirm the chancellor's order of contempt.

¶44. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Along with his claims of contempt against Christy, Rick raised the issue of modification of child custody for the chancellor to consider. In the order of contempt from which Christy now appeals, the chancellor determined that no present modification was warranted, but he cautioned Christy that continued contemptuous conduct on her part might eventually require reconsideration of the issue. We also note that in appellate case number 2024-CA-00228-COA, Rick has separately appealed from the chancellor's order entered on January 17, 2024, in which the chancellor denied Rick's petition for citation of contempt and to modify child custody. We therefore find that although the parties do not dispute the initial child-custody determination the chancellor reached in the divorce judgment, the chancellor's findings on the Albright factors still provide helpful background context about the parties’ relationship as well as relevant insight into and support for the findings the chancellor made in his final order of contempt.

2.   Although the parties’ subsequent contempt filings are not included in the appellate record presently before us, they are public record, and appellate courts are “authorized to take judicial notice of any information ‘helpful and appropriate, including official public documents, records[,] and publications.’ ” Jourdan River Ests. LLC v. Favre, 278 So. 3d 1135, 1145 (¶37) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Enroth v. Mem'l Hosp. at Gulfport, 566 So. 2d 202, 205 (Miss. 1990)).

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.