BHATTI v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF COAHOMA COUNTY (2025)

¶1. Nanak Bhatti filed a complaint in the Coahoma County Circuit Court against Coahoma County's Board of Supervisors (the Board) and Sheriff Charles Jones (collectively, the Appellees). Bhatti's complaint requested the removal of a bust of Mahatma Gandhi that had been installed on the grounds of the Coahoma County courthouse. Bhatti alleged that the Board failed to follow proper legal procedures for approving the bust's installation and that Sheriff Jones lacked authority to permit the installation.

¶2. Both parties moved for summary judgment. After finding that Bhatti's requested relief amounted to a mandamus action and that Bhatti lacked standing to bring his claims, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees. On appeal, Bhatti argues that the circuit court mischaracterized his complaint as a mandamus action rather than one seeking injunctive relief and that he has a distinct personal stake in the matter that affords him standing to bring his claims. Finding no error, we affirm the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees and dismissing Bhatti's complaint.

FACTS

¶3. The bust of Gandhi that forms the basis of Bhatti's complaint was a gift from the Indian government and was intended to promote economic ties with India. Jon Levingston, Executive Director of Crossroads Economic Partnership, helped facilitate the bust's donation and installation. Sheriff Jones, who believed that he had the Board's support as well as authority under Mississippi Code Annotated section 19-25-69 (Rev. 2012),¹ approved the bust's installation. As a result, on October 8, 2021, the bust of Gandhi was installed on the courthouse's front lawn.

¶4. At the time of the bust's installation, Bhatti, a native of India, resided in Georgia. In March 2022, Bhatti rented an apartment in Coahoma County. That same month, on March 17, 2022, Bhatti filed a complaint objecting to the bust's installation. Bhatti's complaint stated that he was seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to have the bust removed. Bhatti asserted that Gandhi was a controversial figure whose legacy contributed to the partition of India, which in turn resulted in genocide and the displacement of Bhatti's family. Bhatti's complaint described the profound personal impact these events had on him, and he explained that he had lost many relatives due to these events. Bhatti stated that he experienced sleepless nights, emotional distress, and anguish as a result of the bust's installation on the lawn of the courthouse. Bhatti contended that the bust conveyed a false historical narrative that was offensive to those who suffered due to Gandhi's actions. In addition, Bhatti alleged that the Board violated procedural requirements by failing to take official action to accept the bust's donation and approve its installation.

¶5. Sheriff Jones stated in his deposition that he was unaware of Gandhi's controversial history at the time of the bust's approval. Sheriff Jones further stated that had he known about the controversy surrounding Gandhi, he would not have permitted the bust's installation. Prior to the bust's installation, the Board did not conduct a public hearing or record an official vote. According to Bhatti, these omissions violated section 19-25-69’s statutory requirements for accepting modifications to public property.

¶6. Upon considering the parties’ arguments, the circuit court found that although Bhatti's complaint purported to seek declaratory and injunctive relief, the complaint actually amounted to a mandamus action. The circuit court further found that Bhatti lacked standing to bring his claims for mandamus relief because he had no distinct legal interest separate from the general public. As a result, the circuit court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees and dismissing Bhatti's complaint. Aggrieved, Bhatti appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. “We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Morgan v. Riverboat Corp. of Miss., 395 So. 3d 1026, 1029 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Karpinsky v. Am. Nat'l Ins., 109 So. 3d 84, 88 (¶9) (Miss. 2013)). Summary judgment “shall be rendered” when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” M.R.C.P. 56(c). “In responding to a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Morgan, 395 So. 3d at 1029 (¶8) (citation and internal quotation mark omitted). “When the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the claim or defense, then all other facts are immaterial and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation mark omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The Characterization of Bhatti's Complaint

¶8. Bhatti argues that the circuit court mischaracterized his complaint as a mandamus action rather than one seeking injunctive relief. “A petition for writ of mandamus is a procedural tool through which a party can seek unilaterally to prompt officials to perform their required duties when they fail to act.” Pryer v. Gates, 312 So. 3d 741, 746 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Powell v. Mun. Election Comm'n of Town of Isola, 156 So. 3d 250, 254 (¶13) (Miss. 2014)). By contrast, an injunction is solely an equitable remedy used to prevent an action. Miss. Div. of Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Univ. of Miss., 269 So. 3d 1235, 1241 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

¶9. In Sons of Confederate Veterans, the petitioner objected to the implementation of a Mississippi university's diversity plan that involved removing, renaming, and recontextualizing on-campus monuments, streets, and buildings. Id. at 1238 (¶2). In addition to requesting that the university cease future implementation of its diversity plan, the petitioner requested that certain actions already taken be reversed. Id.

¶10. The chancellor concluded that the petitioner's request for injunctive relief was actually a mandamus action and transferred the case to the circuit court. Id. at (¶4). The circuit court subsequently found that the petitioner's complaint had elements of both injunctive relief and mandamus relief because the complaint sought not only to prevent the university from taking further action but also to force the university to undo the measures already taken. Id. at 1241 (¶13). After characterizing the matter as “a mandamus action and not simply a case for injunctive relief,” the circuit court dismissed the entire matter due to the petitioner's “lack of standing to bring a mandamus action.” Id. at 1238 (¶5).

¶11. On appeal, this Court explained that although the petitioner “did not explicitly apply for mandamus relief in its complaint, ‘the reviewing court must look to the substance, not the form, of a claim to determine whether that claim is legal or equitable.’ ” Id. at 1241 (¶14) (quoting Derr Plantation Inc. v. Swarek, 14 So. 3d 711, 716 (¶11) (Miss. 2009)). Upon review, we determined that “despite its argument to the contrary and the nomenclature used, [the petitioner] sought mandamus relief; as such, the circuit court was correct in dismissing the entire action.” Id. This Court found that the petitioner “had no interest separate from or in excess of that of the general public.” Id. at 1242 (¶16). Moreover, we held that the petitioner lacked any “private right that entitle[d it] to require that [the university] refrain from implementing its diversity plan” because a mandamus action affecting “the public interest may be brought, if at all, only by the Attorney General or a district attorney.” Id. Accordingly, we affirmed the circuit court's judgment finding that the petitioner lacked standing to bring a mandamus action. Id.

¶12. When a plaintiff petitions a court to require officials to reverse their actions, an assumption exists that the officials are not following their legal duty and therefore must be compelled to do so. See generally Pryer, 312 So. 3d at 746-47 (¶¶17-18). As previously discussed, the “procedural tool” a party can employ to unilaterally compel “officials to perform their required duties” is a mandamus action. Id. at 746 (¶17) (quoting Powell, 156 So. 3d at 254 (¶13)). Similarly to the petitioner in Sons of Confederate Veterans, Bhatti seeks to compel a government entity to reverse measures already taken. In requesting that Gandhi's bust be removed from the courthouse lawn, Bhatti does not seek to prevent future installation; rather, he seeks to force the Appellees to reverse a decision they have already made and to undo the permanent installation of the bust in its present location. We therefore find that no legal error or genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the circuit court's characterization of Bhatti's complaint as a mandamus action rather than one seeking injunctive relief.

II. Bhatti's Standing to Bring a Mandamus Action

¶13. After correctly determining that Bhatti's complaint amounted to a mandamus action, the circuit court next concluded that Bhatti lacked standing to bring such an action. Mississippi appellate courts review issues of standing de novo. Durrant Inc. v. Lee County, 344 So. 3d 291, 297 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-41-1 (Rev. 2019) provides that a mandamus action is adjudicated by the circuit court and may be brought “in any matter affecting the public interest” by the Attorney General, a district attorney, or any interested private person. A petitioner seeking to bring a mandamus action must (1) be authorized to bring the suit, (2) have a clear right to the relief sought, (3) have a legal duty to compel the defendant, and (4) not have other adequate legal remedies available. Pryer, 312 So. 3d at 746-47 (¶18). The petitioner also must show “an interest separate from or in excess of that of the general public.” Id. at 747 (¶18) (internal quotation mark omitted). Moreover, the petitioner's claimed separate and excess interest in the subject matter of an action “must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law․” Araujo v. Bryant, 283 So. 3d 73, 77 (¶14) (Miss. 2019) (quoting SASS Muni-V LLC v. DeSoto County, 170 So. 3d 441, 446 (¶13) (Miss. 2015)).

¶14. Here, Bhatti argues that his classification as an Indian American who has been offended by Gandhi's politics gives him a colorable interest distinct from that of the general public. The Appellees counter, however, that an individual's personal offense to government action is insufficient to make his or her interest separate and distinct from that of the general public. As in Sons of Confederate Veterans, where the petitioner lacked standing to bring a mandamus action despite the personal feelings its members had toward the university's diversity plan, we find here that Bhatti's personal reasons for opposing Gandhi's bust fail to confer an interest—and therefore standing—upon him to bring a mandamus action. See Sons of Confederate Veterans, 269 So. 3d at 1238 (¶¶2, 5). As a result, we conclude that Bhatti cannot meet the first element of the four-part test. Pryer, 312 So. 3d at 746-47 (¶18).

¶15. Moreover, a private citizen (such as Bhatti) with no separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of an action lacks the right to require government entities to take certain measures. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 269 So. 3d at 1242 (¶16). Instead, a matter of public interest may only be brought by a State's Attorney General or a district attorney. Id. Our holding in Sons of Confederate Veterans rejected the notion that a particular perspective on a government action or a particular reason for taking offense or experiencing an emotional response to a government action qualifies as a “separate and excess” interest sufficient to provide standing. Id. Thus, we conclude that Bhatti's concerns are not distinct from those of a member of the general public, and he is ineligible to bring his mandamus action. Because Bhatti has not suffered a legally recognized injury distinct from that of other citizens, the circuit court correctly found that he lacked standing to seek the removal of Gandhi's bust.

¶16. In his final argument to be addressed on appeal, Bhatti asserts that Gandhi's bust should be removed because the Board failed to host open meetings or take an action of public record before approving the bust's placement in front of the courthouse. Even if Bhatti's assertions are true, the record is clear that Bhatti did not reside in Coahoma County at the time that the Appellees agreed to the bust's installation. Thus, as already discussed, Bhatti is not the correct person to bring this mandamus action and lacks standing to bring his lawsuit.

CONCLUSION

¶17. Because Bhatti lacked standing to bring his mandamus action, we affirm the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees.

¶18. AFFIRMED.

¶19. I concur with the majority that the circuit court did not err in categorizing Bhatti's complaint as a mandamus action and that Bhatti lacked standing to pursue this claim. I write separately to acknowledge additional context of Bhatti's complaint against Mahatma Gandhi.

¶20. Bhatti, a native of India, objected to the bust's installation, arguing that Gandhi was a controversial figure whose legacy contributed to the partition of India, which resulted in genocide and the displacement of his family. Gandhi is best known as a nonviolent civil rights leader and Indian lawyer who led the country of India to independence from British colonial rule in 1947. While he is praised for his effort to lead to an independent India, his legacy has faced scrutiny and criticism from activists and legal systems around the world. For example, the High Court of Malawi issued a decision, which I believe is persuasive authority, criticizing Gandhi's dehumanizing views of Black South Africans, whom he regarded as subhuman. State v. Blantyre City Council, Civil Cause 137, at 34 (¶¶132, 136) (High Court of Malawi Apr. 29, 2021).

¶21. Bhatti's complaint and deposition testimony highlighted several critical issues concerning Gandhi, including the Indian Partition and the genocide of 1947. For historical context, in 1921, Gandhi openly supported a conservative religious group that sought to exert pressure on the British colonial government, known as the Khilafat movement.² At the time, this movement was regarded as unethical and dangerous due to its negative stance toward Hindu Indians, resulting in widespread violence.³ Further, the Indian Partition in 1947 further exacerbated religious tensions, as the British colonial rule came to an end, and the subcontinent was divided into two independent nation-states: Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan.⁴ In his complaint, Bhatti describes the profound personal impact of these events, sharing that he lost many relatives during this tragic period.

¶22. This context is important to understand why Bhatti strongly opposed the installation of the bust. Also, it is important to note that Sheriff Jones stated that if he had known the history of Gandhi, he would not have agreed to the installation of the bust. History and context matter and are always relevant when weighing on issues presented to this Court and should be expressed accordingly.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Section 19-25-69 grants a sheriff custodial responsibility over courthouse grounds.

2.   W. H. Roberts, A Review of the Gandhi Movement in India, 31 Pol. Sci. Q. 229 (Acad. of Pol. Sci., New York 1923).

3.   Id. at 233.

4.   Muhammad Sajid Khanet al., Gandhi's Reaction to the Partition of India: A Historical Analysis, 6 J. Hist. Stud. 126, 132, 145 (Jan. 2020).

WEDDLE, J., FOR THE COURT:

CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY McDONALD, J. BARNES, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.