BOYD v. JONES COUNTY (2025)

¶1. Bradley Boyd served as a deputy with the Jones County Sheriff's Department. He arrested a driver for a suspected DUI. The next day, Chief Deputy Mitchell Sumrall instructed him to drop the charges. Boyd refused and was fired. According to Boyd, Sheriff Joe Berlin approved the firing. He also believed Sumrall and Berlin later disparaged him to other law enforcement entities in an effort to thwart him from attaining other employment.

¶2. Boyd filed a lawsuit against Jones County, Sumrall, and Berlin. He alleged he was wrongfully terminated for refusing to comply with an unlawful act, citing Mississippi Supreme Court precedent that “an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal act ․ shall not be barred by the common law rule of employment at will from bringing an action in tort for damages against his employer[.]” McArn v. Allied Bruce-Terminix Co., 626 So. 2d 603, 607 (Miss. 1993). He further asserted that Sumrall made “false, slanderous, libelous, and defamatory” statements, and that all three defendants “are guilty of defamation, libel, and slander[.]”

¶3. All three defendants sought dismissal, arguing the matter should not proceed forward. The defendants invoked, in part, our recent decision affirming summary judgment where a police officer alleged he was fired for refusing to drop DUI charges after determining his “wrongful termination claim does not fit within either of the McArn exceptions to the common law rule of employment at will.” Frank v. City of Flowood, 203 So. 3d 786, 794 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

¶4. As to Boyd's complaint, the trial court granted a partial dismissal, finding that Frank justified dismissal of any wrongful discharge or breach of contract claim. It also found Jones County was wholly immune from liability for claims of malice, libel, and emotional distress.

¶5. However, the trial court ruled that “since the [c]ourt is not presently able to determine that the Plaintiff would be unable to prove any set of facts to support the causes of action for slander, libel, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Motions to Dismiss are denied as to Defendants Berlin and Sumrall in their individual capacities as to those causes of action.”

¶6. All claims against Jones County were dismissed. Conversely, all claims against Sumrall and Berlin were dismissed except for “[t]he causes of action for defamation, libel and slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress in their individual and personal capacities[.]”

¶7. Boyd appealed, despite these pending claims remaining before the lower court. Jones County did not address jurisdiction on appeal. However, Sumrall included a caveat in his appellee's brief that the trial court's order “granted only partial relief and was not dispositive of this case,” meaning the appeal was interlocutory in nature and should “be dismissed.” Berlin argued the same. During oral argument, this Court asked all parties whether the ruling Boyd appeals from was final.

¶8. “Regardless of whether the parties raise jurisdiction, the Court is required to note its own lack of jurisdiction[.]” Smith v. Parkerson Lumber Inc., 890 So. 2d 832, 834 (¶12) (Miss. 2003). Appellate courts “must address this question on our own initiative.” M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So. 2d 897, 899 (¶4) (Miss. 2006).

¶9. “An appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.” Blaney v. Black Jack Oil Co., 325 So. 3d 1204, 1206 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). “This Court will dismiss uncertified interlocutory appeals.” Id. And “[w]ithout the entry of a Rule 54(b) certificate, a trial court order which disposes of less than all of the claims against all of the parties in a multiple party or multiple claim action, is interlocutory.” M.W.F., 926 So. 2d at 900 (¶4).

¶10. The question we must determine now is whether there is a final judgment upon which an appeal may rest. “Generally, a final judgment is one that adjudicates the merits of the controversy and settles all issues between all parties.” LaFontaine v. Holliday, 110 So. 3d 785, 787 (¶8) (Miss. 2013) (emphasis added). “In other words, an order is considered final if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).

¶11. In this case, there is a judgment dismissing all the claims Boyd asserted against Jones County. Likewise, the trial court dismissed many claims Boyd alleged against Sumrall and Berlin in their official and individual capacities. Crucially though, the trial court ruled that “[t]he causes of action for defamation, libel and slander and intentional infliction of emotional distress against the Defendants Berlin and Sumrall in their individual and personal capacities are NOT DISMISSED, and the Motions to Dismiss are denied to that extent.”

¶12. Accordingly, we find that the order did not resolve all of Boyd's claims against all three of the defendants. No steps were taken to certify the order as final under Rule 54(b). Therefore, it is interlocutory in nature.

¶13. Because the trial court's order does not dispose of all of Boyd's claims against Sumrall and Berlin, the order granting summary judgment in favor of Jones County, Sumrall, and Berlin is not a final judgment. “Therefore, we lack appellate jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.” Blaney, 325 So. 3d at 1208 (¶13).

¶14. APPEAL DISMISSED.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.