JOHN FREDRICK MARTIN APPELLANT v. CHRISTY ANN MARTIN APPELLEE (2025)

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶1. In November 2018, John Fredrick “Rick” Martin filed for a divorce against Christy Martin after eight months of marriage. The parties appear to have had a short-lived and tumultuous relationship, as they met online in 2017, moved in together in February 2018, married a month later on March 3, 2018, and just one month after the marriage, the parties separated for the first time. They reconciled for a brief period four months later, and during that time, Christy became pregnant.¹ Several weeks after Christy became pregnant, the parties separated again, which eventually led to Rick filing for a divorce. Following a series of filings by both parties, including several contempt petitions, the Warren County Chancery Court entered a final judgment awarding the couple a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The final judgment also noted that Christy had previously been found in contempt on three separate occasions “due to her denials and/or interference with Rick's visitation.”

¶2. The court's final judgment ² included an agreement of the parties, who stipulated that there “is no real or personal property that would be subject to equitable distribution and that the only marital debt was medical bills related to Christy's pregnancy/birth delivery.” On the other hand, the parties were unable to agree upon any provisions related to alimony or the custody, support, maintenance, and visitation of their minor child, V.E.M. They also disputed who would claim V.E.M. as a dependent for tax purposes.

¶3. In order to resolve the issues related to custody, the chancellor performed a “best interest of the child” analysis utilizing the Albright ³ factors and concluded:

While the custody analysis was a very close call, after analyzing the Albright factors, the Court awards primary physical custody to Christy Martin. The parties shall have joint legal custody of the minor child. Legal custody means that the parents share the decision-making rights, the responsibilities and the authority relating to the health, education and welfare of a child. An award of joint legal custody obligates the parties to exchange information concerning the health, education and welfare of the minor child and to confer with one another in the exercise of decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority.

¶4. The chancellor also expressed grave concern about the hostile interactions between the parties, noting that significant problems arose during the court-ordered pickup and drop-off at the Franklin County Sheriff's Department. The chancellor feared the effect this animosity could have on V.E.M. and therefore ordered that

[n]either party shall speak in derogatory terms or language of the other parent in the presence of the minor child, nor shall either parent say anything derogatory of the other parent where the minor child could perchance overhear said statements or conversation. Further, neither parent shall exhibit any conduct whatsoever in the presence of the minor child which would in any manner be detrimental to the minor child. It being the specific agreement of the parents that neither of them shall by any actions or statements alienate the feelings of the minor child against the other parent.

¶5. The final judgment also outlined a schedule for Rick's visitation with V.E.M. and ordered him to pay child support in the amount of $935 per month. After an Armstrong ⁴ analysis was performed, neither party was awarded alimony. Additionally, the court found that Christy had not worked in at least the past five years, so Rick was entitled to claim V.E.M. as a dependent for all federal and state tax purposes from 2020 onward. Lastly, the chancellor found that Christy owed Rick $21,040.72 because she “intentionally and knowingly damaged Rick's personal property.”

¶6. Furthermore, the final judgment addressed the various cross-petitions for contempt filed by the parties. The parties had filed petitions seeking to hold the other in contempt for interference with the court's visitation parameters, withholding money, and failing to abide by the court's previous orders. In the final order, the chancellor declined to find Rick in contempt. However, the chancellor found Christy in “wanton, willful, and contumacious contempt.” The chancellor noted that this was the fourth time Christy was found in contempt as she had previously been “found in contempt on three (3) separate occasions due to her denials and her efforts and/or interference with Rick's visitation.” The chancellor did not impose sanctions on Christy but noted that “Christy [has] a generally contemptuous spirit” and cautioned that “[she] will get very ‘little benefit of the doubt’ should she be found in contempt again.”⁵

¶7. Following the September 2021 final judgment, Christy filed a Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment. See M.R.C.P. 59. In her motion, Christy criticized the chancellor's decision to allow Rick (and not Christy) to claim V.E.M. for tax purposes. Her Rule 59 motion was granted in part on November 24, 2021, when the chancery court issued an amended final judgment finding “it to be equitable that the parties shall jointly share the tax dependency exemption during alternating years.”

Contempt Petitions

¶8. Subsequent to the amended final judgment, Christy filed a contempt petition alleging that Rick had failed to comply with various aspects of the amended final judgment, including a FaceTime visitation procedure outlined in the amended final judgment.⁶ Rick filed a petition for contempt and modification of custody in which he argued that Christy's behavior had strained his relationship with V.E.M. to the point that she was committing “parental alienation.”⁷

¶9. In September 2022, a hearing was held to address the issues of custody and contempt. During the hearing, the chancellor broached the idea of family counseling, and both parties testified that they would be willing to participate in court-ordered counseling and agreed that counseling would be beneficial. The chancellor believed that counseling would “enable the parties to co-parent without (or at least with significantly less) conflict, acrimony, and hostility, which would benefit the parties and, greatly benefit the child.” Therefore, in October 2022, the chancellor declined to rule on Rick's petition for modification of custody and, instead, ordered “that family (or other necessary) counseling” be conducted by Tobias Riley.

¶10. In April 2023, the court issued a series of orders ruling on the parties’ contempt petitions. Both Rick and Christy were found in contempt. In the April orders, the court focused largely on Rick's claim of parental alienation. The court stressed that “what matters most to the court and what the court believes is most important is the issue of parental alienation.”

¶11. The chancellor expressed grave concern about Christy's behavior and the impact it would have on V.E.M.’s development, reasoning that “given the child's tender age [of four], there is no plausible explanation for this consistent, ongoing course of conduct.” The chancellor stated that “a child who is a victim of parental alienation is more likely to be at risk for drugs, alcohol problems, oppositional defiance, ineffective relationships with others, depression, low self-esteem, exploitation and other issues ultimately harming a child as they grow into adulthood.”

¶12. The chancellor further opined that “Christy's conduct, coupled with her well documented proclivity for vindictiveness, extreme retaliation and out right disdain for Rick, which fluctuates depending on whether they are experiencing a short-term period of volatility and co-parenting and/or an extended period [of] volatility, rises to the level of contempt of this [c]ourt's order.” Christy was found in contempt of the amended final judgment, and the chancellor held that Christy had committed parental alienation.⁸ As a result of her contempt, Christy was required to pay $7,500 in attorney's fees to Rick.

¶13. On the other hand, the chancellor found Rick was in contempt for failing to comply with the court-ordered FaceTime visitation procedure. The court determined that from December 2020 until June 2021, Rick had not adequately allowed Christy to utilize her allotted fifteen-minute FaceTime visitation with V.E.M. while in Rick's custody. As a result of his contempt, Rick was ordered to pay Christy's attorney's fees in the amount of $1,500.

Petition for Custody Modification

¶14. One month after the April orders were issued, a hearing was held on May 23, 2023, to address Rick's petition to modify custody. At the hearing, both Christy and Rick testified about their experience with the court-ordered counseling and their thoughts on the effectiveness of the counseling. Additionally, their counselor and court-appointed expert Riley gave extensive testimony.⁹ The chancellor found Riley's insight into parental alienation, and his professional opinion about the parties’ co-parenting style, extremely valuable.

¶15. Following the hearing, on January 17, 2024, the court issued an order denying Rick's request for a modification of custody. Additionally, the court declined to find either party in contempt, or to modify the current custody arrangement, reasoning that “the parental alienation [had not] risen to such an extreme level [as] to warrant a change of custody.” The chancellor held that the only reason a change of custody was not warranted, “and perhaps the only reason,” was because V.E.M. was “too young to be fully indoctrinated to a point that whatever alienation that has occurred has not fully manifested itself.” However, the court did note that a change in custody may very well be warranted should Christy not change her conduct.¹⁰

¶16. The chancellor continued by reminding the parties that the court has only so many options with regard to contempt proceedings and that although Mississippi precedent supports the notion that contempt is best addressed through the award of attorney's fees, court-ordered incarceration would be a possibility should either party continue to be found in contempt of court.¹¹ On February 16, 2024, Rick filed the instant appeal challenging the denial of his petition to modify custody.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶17. “We will not reverse a chancellor's findings of fact or discretiona[ry] ruling unless the chancellor abused [his] discretion, committed a manifest or clear error, or applied the wrong legal standard.” Townsend v. Townsend, 859 So. 2d 370, 371-72 (¶7) (Miss. 2003). We review issues of law de novo. Id. at 372 (¶7). Furthermore, “[i]n child custody modification cases, unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, abused his discretion, or applied an erroneous legal standard, we must uphold his decision.” Ellis v. Ellis, 952 So. 2d 982, 989 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

DISCUSSION

¶18. Rick's argument is that the trial court abused its discretion and manifestly erred by failing to modify the existing custody arrangement “after incessant contempt by means of parental alienation of the appellee.” Rick takes issue with the chancellor's holding that “because the child is of such a tender age,” Christy's parental alienation had not risen to such an extreme level as to warrant a change in custody because “whatever alienation that has occurred has not fully manifested itself.” Rick acknowledges that the chancellor addressed Christy's parental alienation in the order denying the modification, but Rick argues that it was manifest error to deny a change in custody since the chancellor did not disagree that a present harm to V.E.M. existed while in Christy's custody, just that the harm from the parental alienation had “not fully manifested itself.”

¶19. In essence, Rick's claim of error is that since the chancellor found “Christy guilty of parental alienation,” that finding should have been considered a material change in circumstances that adversely affected V.E.M., and Rick contends that it was in her best interest to modify custody. Finding no error, we affirm.

¶20. In Mississippi, a three-prong test is used to determine whether a modification of custody is warranted. Hammons v. Hammons, 289 So. 3d 1214, 1218 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). First, “there must be a material change in circumstances of the custodial parent.” Id. The burden of proving the claimed material change in circumstances rests on the party seeking the modification. Id. Second, “the moving party must show that the change in circumstances has an adverse effect on the minor child.” Id. at (¶17). If the previous two steps have been satisfied, then the chancellor will consider the final prong of the test, which requires that the modification “must be in the best interest of the minor child.” Id. at (¶18). The child's best interest is determined “based on an application of the Albright factors to the facts of the case.” Id. However, the totality of circumstances must also be considered, as “not every change in circumstances warrants a change in custody.” Ash v. Ash, 622 So. 2d 1264, 1266 (Miss. 1993).

¶21. Additionally, as our Supreme Court eloquently stated forty years ago, a change in custody “that uproot[s] a child ․ [i]s a jolting, traumatic experience. It is only that behavior of a parent which clearly posits or causes danger to the mental or emotional well-being of a child (whether such behavior is immoral or not), which is sufficient basis to seriously consider the drastic legal action of changing custody.” Ballard v. Ballard, 434 So. 2d 1357, 1360 (Miss. 1983).

¶22. Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude that the chancellor erred by failing to modify the custody arrangement. We accept Rick's contention that the finding of parental alienation was a finding of a material change in circumstances. Yet Rick presented no evidence to the chancellor to show that the alienation had an adverse impact on V.E.M. Furthermore, because there was no finding of an adverse impact, the chancellor was not required to reevaluate the Albright factors to determine whether a change of custody would be in V.E.M.’s best interest. Therefore, it cannot be said that the chancellor abused his discretion by failing to modify the custody arrangement.

I. Material Change in Circumstances

¶23. The threshold consideration for a modification of custody is a material change of circumstances. Hammons, 289 So. 3d at 1218 (¶16). Here, the chancellor found that Christy had committed parental alienation and appeared to treat that finding as a material change of circumstances. Rick does not challenge that finding but rather argues that because of this finding, the chancellor should have modified custody.

¶24. But a material change in circumstances is not the only requirement for a modification of custody. In one case, our Supreme Court reasoned that even if the chancellor found “a material adverse change in circumstances, a change in custody is not automatic. That finding is merely the first step, the one which then authorizes and indeed challenges the chancellor to then go forward and determine whether the best interests of the child justify a change of custody.” Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So. 2d 1294, 1297 (Miss. 1984).

¶25. It is true the chancellor found Christy was “guilty of parental alienation” in the April 2023 order, but in accordance with Tucker, that finding “authorized” the chancellor to consider a change in custody; it did not require him to enact a change in custody. The chancellor was still required to consider what, if any, adverse impact parental alienation was having on V.E.M.

II. Adverse Impact

¶26. As previously stated, if the chancellor finds a material change, he must then determine if the change had an adverse impact on the child. However, not all categories of an adverse impact were created equally. As stated above, “[i]t is only that behavior of a parent which clearly posits or causes danger to the mental or emotional well-being of a child (whether such behavior is immoral or not), which is sufficient basis to seriously consider the drastic legal action of changing custody.” Ballard, 434 So. 2d at 1360. At no point in his brief does Rick identify a specific action of Christy's that “clearly posits or causes danger to the mental or emotional well-being” of V.E.M. or explain how exactly Christy's behavior is adversely impacting V.E.M. Instead, Rick relies on Ellis for the proposition that parental alienation can have adverse effects on a child.

¶27. In Ellis, this Court affirmed a modification of custody based on the expert testimony of two physicians who concluded that the mother's conduct had resulted in alienation of the child from her father. One expert testified that the child suffered from “parental alienation syndrome and [that the mother] was the major cause of the alienation.” The child's depression and decreased social skills were a result of the syndrome. Ellis, 952 So. 2d at 992 (¶24). The other expert agreed, noting that the child's emotional development had been stunted by her mother's actions and concluded that as a result, the child was “slightly immature for her age, depressed, anxious, easily tearful, and fragile.” This Court noted that the combined effects of the mother's action had shown “an effect on the emotional well-being” of the child and concluded that the chancellor did not err by finding that the mother's conduct had an adverse impact on the child.

¶28. On the other hand, in this case, there is no evidence that Christy's action had an adverse effect on V.E.M. Unlike the experts in Ellis, the expert in the instant case, Riley, never testified that he saw any impact on V.E.M. at this point in time. Moreover, he stated that V.E.M. was “a typical three or four year old” and that he had seen nothing to suggest V.E.M. was not “grounded and emotionally healthy.” Furthermore, Riley explained that the contentious relationship between Rick and Christy could have negative effects on V.E.M., but he never said that V.E.M. had experienced the adverse effects of parental alienation. In fact, Riley said that “[V.E.M. was] not showing the typical behaviors of abuse.”

¶29. Rick suggests that Riley's testimony that “as long as ․ the attacking parent is involved in the child's life[,] that poison [against the other parent] is going to continue to be give[n],” shows that Christy's behavior would have a continued negative effect on V.E.M. and that the chancellor should modify custody for that reason. However, the expert in this case did not testify that V.E.M. was experiencing a present adverse effect because of Christy's actions. On the contrary, Riley suggested that both parties contributed in some way to the issues they experienced while co-parenting; whereas the experts in Ellis clearly identified one parent as “affecting the emotional well-being” of the child. Riley testified that after meeting with the parties and hearing their argumentative history, he believed “there [would] always be some level of contention” between the two and that “where there's such high contention and when the personal stuff starts interrupting the parenting, it – that's when it becomes detrimental to the child.”

¶30. Rick notes that Riley, much like the experts in Ellis, explained that the effects of parental alienation can be adverse to the best interests of a child. Yet “some effect” that is “usually detrimental” is not the same as clinically diagnosing depression, anxiety, or delayed emotional development, as the experts did in Ellis.

¶31. Since there was no evidence of adverse effects of parental alienation on V.E.M., we cannot say that the chancellor reversibly erred by denying a modification of custody. This is true even if the April 2023 finding of parental alienation constituted a material change in circumstances. This Court has previously held that “[t]he concept [of a material change in circumstances that adversely affects the child] is intended to encompass its broadest possible meaning in order to protect children,” including but not limited to changes that adversely affect that “child's mental and emotional well-being.” Barbaro v. Smith, 282 So. 3d 578, 595 (¶75) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis added). In short, an adverse impact is required for a modification of custody, and Riley's testimony, on which Rick substantially relies, did not clearly identify the adverse effects of parental alienation on V.E.M.

III. The Child's Best Interest

¶32. Because the chancellor determined that V.E.M. was not suffering from the adverse effects of parental alienation, there was no need for him to address the final aspect of the rules for modifying custody—the best interest of the child—as the first two elements must be met before the chancellor proceeds to the final element.

¶33. Additionally, this Court has repeatedly held that it is only “[once] an adverse change has been shown [that] the moving party must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the best interest of the child requires the change of custody.” Barbaro, 282 So. 3d at 595 (¶72). Moreover, “[i]n a custody modification case, if the chancellor finds a material and adverse change in circumstances, the chancellor must then perform an Albright analysis to determine whether modification of custody is in the child's best interest.” Id. (emphasis added).

¶34. Essentially, since the chancellor did not find an adverse effect or impact on V.E.M., there was no need to perform an Albright analysis.

¶35. Stated differently, when there is no finding of an adverse impact, custody cannot and should not be modified. This is the exact situation in which Rick finds himself. Since there was no finding of an adverse impact on V.E.M., the chancellor properly determined that a change in custody was not warranted at this time. Thus, we cannot conclude that the chancellor abused his discretion or committed manifest error by failing to modify the existing custody arrangement.

CONCLUSION

¶36. For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the chancery court's order denying the petition for custody modification.

¶37. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties’ child was born in May 2019. We refer to the child by the initials V.E.M. for privacy purposes.

2.   This final judgment was also referred to as the parties’ initial “Divorce Decree.”

3.   Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).

4.   Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993).

5.   The chancellor explained that he declined to sanction Christy for two reasons. “First, it happened before this court ever found her in contempt. Secondly, it is important that the parties start with a clean slate from this point forward.”

6.   The FaceTime visitation procedure stated that “[t]he parties are entitled to FaceTime with the minor child when the minor child is not in their physical care on each and every Tuesday and Thursday at 6:30 p.m. for fifteen (15) minutes.”

7.   One doctor has testified that “[p]arental alienation syndrom is a systematic programmed alienation of a child from one parent brought upon by the other parent.” Ellis v. Ellis, 952 So. 2d 982, 992 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

8.   The chancellor also ordered “that all activities concerning the activities of Christy so far as parental alienation cease and desist and that such acts or actions on the part of Christy will no longer be allowed.”

9.   Riley has a master of science degree in counseling psychology and is a licensed professional counselor. Riley met with Rick “five or six times,” with Christy “four or five times,” and once individually with V.E.M.

10.   The order states, “The court finds, however, this [c]ourt is mindful that both Dr. Etheridge and Mr. Riley have opined that based on statistics, based on their education and experience and training and involvement in this case there is a strong likelihood that this course of conduct by Christy will continue which if it is in fact the case may very well warrant an eventual change in custody.”

11.   On February 5, 2024, the court issued an order finding Christy in contempt, first ordering her to be incarcerated for six months for her failure to comply with the amended final judgment of divorce, which required her to pay $21,040.72 to Rick within one year. However, the court suspended her incarceration on the condition that she made a payment of $7,135.00 to Rick no later than March 1, 2024. This issue has been appealed separately in appellate case number 2024-CA-00222-COA, and as such, it will not be addressed further here.

ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR.