BRIGGS v. JACKSON (2025)

¶1. Israel Briggs appeals the Jackson County Chancery Court's judgment awarding Seantay Jackson physical care, custody, and control of their two minor children and granting him visitation rights. The judgment also gave the parties joint legal custody of the minor children.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. According to Jackson, in 2016 she accessed a website “to find fathers that were willing to donate their sperm” because she wanted to have a baby. That is how she and Briggs met. Although the couple never married, they decided to have a baby and co-parent a child.¹ Jackson testified that in the beginning, Briggs was not going to have “any particular rights.” Jackson told the chancellor that she was “going to call the shots” and that it was going to be a “loose kind of relationship,” and Briggs would be some type of “uncle or family friend.” At some point, Jackson testified that Briggs insisted that the child have his last name and that Jackson sign a contract that absolved Briggs of all financial responsibility for the child.

¶3. When their baby C.I.B. was born in November 2017, Jackson lived in Richmond, Virginia, and Briggs was living in Ocean Springs, Mississippi.² Briggs testified that during the time C.I.B. was in Virginia, he visited about eight times. After C.I.B. and Jackson moved to Mississippi to live with Briggs in February 2019, C.A.B. was conceived and born in April 2020.

¶4. Jackson, C.I.B., and C.A.B. lived in Mississippi with Briggs for approximately two years. Jackson described her time in Mississippi as miserable. She testified that the home was in disrepair, Briggs would not allow her to work, and he was mentally abusive. While in Mississippi, Jackson testified that she changed all the diapers, prepared all the meals, washed the clothes, did the grocery shopping, and took the girls to doctors’ appointments. According to Jackson, neither C.I.B. nor C.A.B. has ever been out of her custody and control.

¶5. On January 9, 2021, Jackson filed a complaint to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and other relief in Jackson County Chancery Court. Her complaint requested sole physical and legal custody of the girls, subject to regular visitation for Briggs.³ On January 27, 2021, Jackson took the girls to visit her parents in Virginia.

¶6. On January 27, 2021, Briggs filed a pro se emergency counterclaim to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and for temporary relief, and he also sought sole legal and physical custody of the girls with liberal visitation for Jackson. Briggs’ petition was amended on January 28, 2021, alleging a “heightened risk” of the girls’ safety if Jackson were awarded unsupervised visitation and requested a psychiatric evaluation of Jackson to determine whether it would be safe for her to be alone with the girls.

¶7. The chancellor heard Briggs’ emergency motion on February 5, 2021. Briggs was present on his own behalf, and Jackson was represented by counsel. The chancellor found that Briggs had “failed to establish any emergency circumstances justifying his request for relief,” and the matter was scheduled for a temporary hearing on February 19, 2021, before Family Master Gary Roberts.

¶8. At that temporary hearing, the only witnesses were the parties. Briggs appeared pro se, and Jackson was represented by counsel.⁴ After hearing from the parties, the Family Master entered a temporary order awarding Briggs and Jackson joint legal custody of the girls and awarding Jackson physical custody. The temporary order also provided for visitation for Briggs and ordered both parties to submit a proposed additional visitation schedule to the Family Master within thirty days of the hearing. The temporary order further set out rules for insurance, expenses, removal of Jackson's belongings from Briggs’ home, telephonic visitation, child support, and other issues. A supplemental temporary order was entered on April 13, 2021, granting Briggs additional visitation. On August 30, 2022, Briggs filed his answer to Jackson's complaint and a counterclaim for custody and other relief. Jackson filed her answer to Briggs’ counterclaim on September 29, 2022.

¶9. The parties continued their custody battle, and the trial began on March 13, 2023. At trial, Briggs appeared pro se, and Jackson was represented by counsel. The chancellor entered his judgment on July 27, 2023. In the judgment, the chancellor went through an Albright ⁵ analysis and found that Jackson should be awarded “physical care, custody and control of the minor children.” The judgment awarded Briggs and Jackson joint legal custody and also provided for child support and visitation.

¶10. On August 7, 2023, Briggs filed a pro se motion to amend the findings, to adopt additional specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to amend the judgment accordingly. On September 12, 2023, Briggs filed a pro se motion for relief of the judgment due to alleged clerical errors and also due to what Briggs alleged was Jackson's fraud upon the court. On October 18, 2023, the chancellor issued his final judgment denying both motions and finding that his July 27, 2023 judgment “constitutes the findings of fact, the Albright analysis, the conclusions for custody, child support and visitation, and constitutes a Judgment as contemplated by Mississippi law.” Aggrieved, Briggs appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11. In Hendrix v. Whitt, 373 So. 3d 778, 787 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), we explained:

In custody cases, we are bound by the limits of our standard of review and may reverse only when the decision of the trial court was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was employed. Wright v. Stanley, 700 So. 2d 274, 280 (Miss. 1997); Williams v. Williams, 656 So. 2d 325, 330 (Miss. 1995). Our standard of review in child custody cases is very narrow. Like the chancellor, our polestar consideration must be the best interest of the child. However, it is not our role to substitute our judgment for his.

Hensarling v. Hensarling, 824 So. 2d 583, 586-87 (¶8) (Miss. 2002). “Where the chancellor has applied the correct legal standard, and makes finding of facts, which are supported by substantial evidence, this Court will not reverse his decision.” Sturgis v. Sturgis, 792 So. 2d 1020, 1023 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). All questions of law are reviewed de novo. Townsend v. Townsend, 859 So. 2d 370, 372 (¶7) (Miss. 2003).

ANALYSIS

¶12. Before beginning our analysis, we address Jackson's failure to file a responsive brief.⁶ We explained in Ndicu v. Gacheri, 381 So. 3d 371, 375 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023):

In a circumstance such as this, the reasoning in Jay Foster PLLC v. McNair, 175 So. 3d 565, 571 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), controls:

[T]his Court has two options. First, we may take the appellee's failure to file a brief as a confession of error and reverse. This option is favored when the record is complicated or of large volume and the case has been thoroughly briefed by the appellant with apt and applicable citation of authority so that the brief makes out an apparent case of error. However, if the record can be conveniently examined and such examination reveals a sound and unmistakable basis or ground upon which the judgment may be safely affirmed, we may disregard the appellee's error and affirm.

(quoting Hatton v. Hatton, 323 So. 3d 1149, 1153 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)). More specifically, we further explained in Briggs, 396 So. 3d at 1254-55 (¶35), regarding matters involving minor children:

“In matters of child custody and support, ․ in the absence of an appellee's brief, our practice is to make a special effort to review the record for support for affirmance.” Edwards v. Edwards-Barker, 875 So. 2d 1126, 1128 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Barber v. Barber, 608 So. 2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1992)). When child custody is at issue, “this Court is compelled to review the record” despite the appellee's failure to file a brief. Shows v. Cross, 238 So. 3d 1224, 1232 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Vassar v. Vassar, 228 So. 3d 367, 374 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)). We do this because “when matters on appeal touch the welfare of a minor child, ․ regardless of whether a party filed a brief, this Court will reach the merits of the issues in this appeal, though we proceed unaided by a brief from the appellee.” N.E. v. L.H., 761 So. 2d 956, 962 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

(Footnote omitted).

I. Whether the chancellor's custody determination was flawed.

¶13. Briggs claims that the chancellor's Albright analysis and custody decision constitute error; specifically, he contends that the custody decision was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.⁷ He also argues that the chancellor failed to specifically find the award of custody to Jackson in the girls’ best interest.

¶14. Briggs further argues that the chancellor clearly abused his discretion by placing undue weight upon the “continuity of care” factor, citing Borden v. Borden, 167 So. 3d 238 (Miss. 2014), and Hollon v. Hollon, 784 So. 2d 943 (Miss. 2001). In Smith v. Smith, 206 So. 3d 502, 512-13 (¶24) (Miss. 2016), the supreme court explained:

The foremost consideration in any custody decision is “the best interests and welfare of the minor child.” Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1004-05 (Miss. 1983). In Albright, we gave a list of factors for chancellors to consider when “navigating” the “labyrinth of interests and emotions” involved in custody battles. Lee v. Lee, 798 So. 2d 1284, 1288 (¶15) (Miss. 2001) (citing Albright, 437 So. 2d at 1005). While there is an established list of Albright factors, these factors are not variables in a mathematical formula. Nor is an Albright analysis “premised solely on a scoring system” where findings on each factor are added and later compared to see which parent “wins.” O'Briant v. O'Briant, 99 So. 3d 802, 805-06 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). Rather, the “factors exist to ensure the chancellor considers all the relevant facts” before making a decision. Id. (citations omitted). This is why our manifest-error review “is not a mechanical check [on] the chancellor's score card” to decide if he or she “ ‘tallied’ each parent's score correctly.” Id. at 806. We instead ask whether the chancellor considered all relevant facts, giving deference to the weight he or she assigns each factor.

¶15. With that instruction in mind, we review the chancellor's consideration of each of the Albright factors:

1. The Child's Age, Health, and Sex

¶16. Briggs cites his own affidavit regarding the girls’ health to bolster his argument that “the failure to award this factor to [Briggs] is not only a misapplication of the Albright factors, but also a substantial misjudgment that undermines the children's health and developmental needs.” After hearing testimony from both parties, the chancellor found this factor neutral, noting that both girls suffer from asthma and that C.A.B. has a speech issue. The chancellor found the girls were otherwise in good health. This Court finds no clear error or abuse of discretion in the chancellor's finding.

2. The Parent with Continuity of Care Prior to the Separation

¶17. Briggs argues that the chancellor's “incorrect application of legal standards and statutory protections significantly contributed to the erroneous awarding of sole physical custody to [Jackson].” Briggs specifically argues that the chancellor failed to consider the Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act based on his allegation that Jackson had “abducted” the girls when she relocated to Virginia. At the February 5, 2021 hearing, Jackson's counsel explained that Jackson had not run away. She was simply visiting her parents, and no custody order was in place at the time.⁸ The chancellor found this factor favored Jackson because the girls had always lived with Jackson, whether Jackson was living independently or with Briggs. Substantial evidence supported the chancellor's finding that this factor favored Jackson.⁹

3. The Parent with the Best Parenting Skills and Willingness and Capacity to Provide Primary Child Care

¶18. The chancellor considered the testimony of both parties and found this factor to favor Jackson. Jackson testified that she cared for the girls, changed diapers, did the cooking, purchased the groceries, took care of the household, communicated with the school, and took the girls to all their health-related appointments. The chancellor's order recognizes Briggs’ testimony “that he is constantly interacting with the children, plays games with them, and does other parenting responsibilities.” Nonetheless, the evidence in the record supports the chancellor's finding.

4. The Parents’ Employment and Responsibilities of that Employment

¶19. The chancellor found this factor neutral because both Jackson and Briggs had been employed by the same employer for two years or more and worked remotely from home.

5. The Parents’ Physical and Mental Health and Age

¶20. The chancellor found this factor neutral. Jackson is forty-two years old, takes several medications, and testified that she was in perfect health. She has no criminal convictions. Briggs is thirty-nine years old and is in good health. He also takes medication for ADHD and was recently weaned off medication for mild anxiety. Briggs has also never been convicted of any crime. Briggs’ appellate brief makes much of the fact that Jackson takes several medications that he alleges make Jackson dangerous to the girls. When questioned by the chancellor, Jackson testified that the medications made her better and that she took them as prescribed. Nothing in the record supports the allegations Briggs makes in his brief. We can find no clear error or abuse of discretion in the chancellor's finding that this factor was neutral.

6. Emotional Ties of the Parent and Child

¶21. Finding both parents reported that they had good relationships with the girls, the chancellor found this factor was neutral. We find no error.

7. The Parents’ Moral Fitness

¶22. The chancellor found that “[b]oth parties presented in an appropriate fashion. Both parties displayed common courtesies, were well-dressed, and appeared presentable. No other testimony was offered by either parent concerning moral fitness. Both seemed appropriate in all manners.” Accordingly, the chancellor found this factor neutral. Briggs accuses Jackson of submitting a false Rule 8.05 statement,¹⁰ giving false testimony under oath, making false statements to medical providers, providing false information to childcare providers, and submitting false information in her application for public assistance. No evidence in the record, other than Briggs’ accusations, supports his argument.¹¹

8. The Children's Home, School, and Community Record

¶23. The chancellor found this factor favored Jackson because the girls had been in Jackson's home for the past two years. C.I.B. had been enrolled in the Fulton Montessori School since February 2021, was involved in soccer, had been involved in swimming, and assisted Jackson in her volunteer work on school and church projects. At the time of the chancellor's judgment, C.A.B. was only three years old and too young to be involved in any activities. We can find no clear error or abuse of discretion in the chancellor's finding that this factor favored Jackson.

9. The Child's Preference at the Age Sufficient to Express a Preference by Law

¶24. The chancellor found that the children were not old enough to express a preference.

10. The Stability of the Parents’ Home Environment

¶25. The chancellor found that both parents were steady in their employment and in their home environment. Thus, this factor was neutral.

11. Any Other Factor Relevant to the Parent-Child Relationship

¶26. For this factor, the chancellor found that both Jackson and Briggs were “active, engaged parents.” He noted that Briggs testified to his close relationships with family members, which would benefit the girls if he were awarded custody. Briggs believes the girls contracted asthma when they moved to Virginia as a result of the girls being exposed to smoky houses and cars. Briggs asked Jackson to relocate to Jackson County in Mississippi and offered to assist with her living expenses for a year.

¶27. The chancellor noted that except for scheduled visitation sessions, the girls have been with Jackson almost exclusively. The chancellor further noted that Jackson felt that Briggs did not treat her well during her time in Mississippi. Jackson described Briggs’ home as “nasty, has mold, and remains under renovation.” The judgment also recognized that due to Jackson's current residency, she could lose access to the Montessori school, and the girls could have to transfer to public school. The chancellor ended his analysis of this factor by finding that “[t]he continuity of care factor heavily favors [Jackson].” (Emphasis in original).

¶28. The chancellor clearly considered each of the Albright factors, and based upon our standard of review, we find no clear error or abuse of discretion in his findings or his award of physical custody of the children to Jackson, with visitation rights to Briggs.

II. Whether the custody order was incomplete.

¶29. Briggs argues on appeal that the custody order issued by the chancellor was incomplete for two reasons: (1) the final judgment does not provide for medical insurance for the girls, and (2) the final judgment does not provide for visitation for Briggs after the girls reach mandatory school age.

Medical Insurance

¶30. We held in Osing v. Osing, 392 So. 3d 442, 451 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024):

Mississippi Code Annotated section 43-19-101(7) (Rev. 2021) provides that “[a]ll orders involving support of minor children, as a matter of law, shall include reasonable medical support․ In any case in which the support of any child is involved, the court shall make ․ findings either on the record or in the judgment” as to “[t]he availability to all parties of health insurance coverage for the child(ren)” and “[t]he cost of health insurance coverage to all parties.” “The requirements of section 43-19-101[(7)] are mandatory and apply in all cases involving child support.” Savell v. Manning, 325 So. 3d 1208, 1224 (¶57) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021). Here, the final judgment included no discussion about “reasonable medical support” for the parties’ minor son. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(7). Thus, as a matter of law, we must reverse this part of the chancellor's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(Emphasis added).

¶31. As in Osing, the chancellor's judgment in this case fails to make the required findings regarding health insurance for the minor children, and as a result, we reverse this part of the chancellor's judgment and remand for his consideration on this issue.

Visitation

¶32. In his order, the chancellor provided detailed visitation for Briggs; however, the visitation was only “[u]ntil the children are of mandatory school age.” Briggs argues that this limitation leaves him “with zero court ordered visitation rights after both children turn 6.” Although it is true that the chancellor's judgment could have provided for visitation after the girls reached mandatory school age,¹² it is not unusual for visitation orders to be modified when a child starts school. See Rose v. Upshaw, 69 So. 3d 74, 76-77 (¶¶4, 12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (affirming judgment set to remain in effect until the child reached school age or further order when the judgment itself recognized that the order would have to be modified when the minor reached school age); Jones v. Curtis, 394 So. 3d 511, 517 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (“[T]he advent of school age [is] a material change in circumstances that render[s] the split custody of the child useless and even harmful to the child.” (citing Torrence v. Moore, 455 So. 2d 778, 780 (Miss. 1984)); Solangi v. Croney, 118 So. 3d 173, 179 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (involving visitation schedule prior to child starting school that was no longer possible after child reached school age).

¶33. Briggs’ remedy, if he and Jackson cannot agree to a schedule, is to petition the chancery court for a modification of visitation. In Hills v. Manns, 391 So. 3d 822, 826 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), we explained that “to modify a visitation order, it must be shown that the prior decree for reasonable visitation is not working and that a modification is in the best interest of the child.” Moreland v. Spears, 187 So. 3d 661, 666 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). This Court has recognized that a child “beginning school, by itself, can be deemed to be a material change in circumstances.” Jones, 394 So. 3d at 517 (¶31). At that time, the chancellor can fashion a visitation schedule that will accommodate the school schedules of the girls as they reach school age.¹³

¶34. Briggs also argues that the “limited visitation period awarded to Mr. Briggs is far below the ‘five-week’ period during summer vacation,” which Briggs contends is required by the Mississippi Supreme Court, citing Crowson v. Moseley, 480 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Miss. 1985), and Mixon v. Mixon, 724 So. 2d 956 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). This argument is flawed. In Strange v. Strange, 43 So. 3d 1169, 1172 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010), we explained:

[T]here has not been created by statute or court decision any standard schedule of visitation. Since there is no standard visitation, it cannot be said that the chancellor abused his discretion by not requiring standard visitation. “Visitation should be set up with the best interests of the children as the paramount consideration, keeping in mind the rights of the non-custodial parent and the objective that parent and child should have as close and loving a relationship as possible, despite the fact that they may not live in the same house.” Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So. 2d 1277, 1286 (Miss.1992); see Clark v. Myrick, 523 So. 2d 79, 83 (Miss.1988) (citations omitted). How best to accomplish this goal is a matter in which the chancellor is accorded great discretion. See Faris v. Jernigan, 939 So. 2d 835, 839 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006).

¶35. We repeated that holding in Fortner v. Bratcher, 394 So. 3d 452, 459-60 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024):

This Court has stated, “Standard visitation includes two weekends a month until Sunday afternoon and at least five weeks of summer visitation, plus some holiday visitation. Awarding less is an abuse of discretion unless there is concrete proof of actual harm to a child.” Michael v. Smith, 237 So. 3d 183, 190 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). However, we have also held that “our case law does ‘not mandate a five-week summer visitation,’ and a ‘chancellor has discretion to fashion a visitation order to suit the child's best interest.’ ” Smith v. Smith, 379 So. 3d 954, 964 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Marshall v. Harris, 981 So. 2d 345, 350 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)); accord Horn v. Horn, 909 So. 2d 1151, 1162 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that our caselaw does not “mandate five week summer visitation for non-custodial parents” but “recognizes the chancellor's discretion to determine whether [such visitation is in] the best interest of the child”).

(Emphasis added). Briggs’ arguments regarding visitation are without merit.¹⁴

III. Whether the chancellor's order of child support was excessive.

¶36. Briggs argues that the chancellor did not consider the statutory guidelines or “other material facts” pertaining to child support. Section 43-19-101(4) provides:

In cases in which the adjusted gross income as defined in this section is more than One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) or less than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), the court shall make a written finding in the record as to whether or not the application of the guidelines established in this section is reasonable. The court shall take into account the basic subsistence needs of the obligated parent who has a limited ability to pay.

Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(4) (Rev. 2023). Noting that Briggs’ income exceeded $100,000, the chancellor then found that the application of the guidelines in section 43-19-101 were reasonable in this case, as required by the statute. Id.

¶37. He first argues that the chancellor erroneously included his rental income in the calculation of his adjusted gross income (AGI) for the purposes of determining child support. Briggs contends that the chancellor should have deducted the expenses associated with those rental properties, citing section 43-19-101(3), which he argues “clearly requires the consideration of income ‘reasonably expected to be available.’ ”

¶38. Contemporaneously with the present case, Briggs was in other litigation concerning a modification of custody, support, and visitation with M.B., his other child. See supra note 1. On appeal in that case, Briggs raised the same argument concerning expenses associated with his rental income. In fact, the amount of child support in that case was calculated based upon the Rule 8.05 financial statement filed in the chancery court in the present appeal. See Briggs, 396 So. 3d at 1253 (¶28).¹⁵ This Court held that Briggs was entitled to a deduction for expenses incurred in generating rental income:

Further, on remand, the chancery court must request the updated Rule 8.05 financial statements and make a detailed calculation of the child support to be paid by either or both parties. In addition, the court should make findings regarding Israel's gross rental income minus his business expenses to arrive at net rental income for purposes of calculating child support, if any.

Thus, we must reverse in part and remand the present case for the chancellor to conduct the same analysis in calculating the amount of child support to be awarded.

¶39. Second, Briggs argues that the chancellor failed to consider the expenses associated with M.B., pointing out that his Rule 8.05 statement shows $725 for expenses for M.B. while she is in his custody. In Dunn v. Dunn, 911 So. 2d 591, 601 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), this Court explained:

David contends that the chancery court erred in refusing to award him child support for the benefit of Karen, the child in his custody. He seeks a reduction, or in the alternative, an elimination, of his monthly child support payments in consideration of the fact that he is also expending money for Karen's benefit. Section 43-19-101(3)(d) of the Mississippi Code empowers the chancellor to take into consideration the fact that a parent retains custody of a child, allowing him to make adjustments to child support payments reflecting such circumstances. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(3)(d) (Rev. 2004). However, whether an adjustment is to be made, and if so, how much, is left to the chancellor's discretion. Magruder v. Magruder, 881 So. 2d 365, 368 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Bailey v. Bailey, 724 So. 2d 335, 338 (¶11) (Miss. 1998)).

While the chancellor deducted the amount of child support for M.B. awarded in that separate case to calculate Briggs’ AGI, the chancellor did not address those expenses Briggs claimed while M.B. was in his custody. However, as noted above, the issue of child support in Briggs was remanded for further consideration. Briggs, 396 So. 3d at 1257 (¶42). As a result, the chancery court must revisit the amount of deductions allowed in the present case on remand.

IV. Whether the chancellor erred in denying Briggs’ post-trial motions.

¶40. Briggs argues that the chancellor abused his discretion in denying his post-trial motions pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and 60(b).

Rule 52

¶41. On August 7, 2023, Briggs filed his “motion to amend findings, adopt additional specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and to amend the judgment accordingly” pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52. We review the chancellor's denial of a Rule 52 motion for abuse of discretion. Landrum v. Livingston Holdings, LLC, 396 So. 3d 1026, 1040-41 (¶54) (Miss. 2024). Rule 52(a) provides that “[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury the court may, and shall upon the request of any party to the suit or when required by these rules, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and judgment shall be entered accordingly.” M.R.C.P. 52(a). In denying the motion on October 18, 2023, the chancellor incorporated his July 27, 2023 judgment in full and found that it “constitutes the findings of fact and conclusions of law from the previous hearing. While possibly not identified as ‘findings of fact’ or ‘conclusions of law,’ the document, in its entirety, constitutes the findings of fact, the Albright analysis, the conclusions for custody, child support and visitation and constitutes a Judgment as contemplated, and required by Mississippi law.”

¶42. In Smith v. Anderson, 397 So. 3d 899, 910 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), this Court explained:

[T]his Court has noted “that the main purpose of Rule 52(a) was to provide the appellate court with a sufficient record to review, and to guarantee that the trial court carefully reviews the evidence provided at trial.” Delta Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Taylor, 112 So. 3d 11, 22 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Pilgrim Rest Missionary Baptist Church v. Wallace, 835 So. 2d 67, 74 (¶18) (Miss. 2003)). Thus, “a trial court has technically complied with the mandate of Rule 52 where it makes general findings of fact and conclusions of law, even though a party has made a request for specific findings.” Swiderski v. Swiderski, 18 So. 3d 280, 284 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Century 21 Deep S. Props. Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 367 (Miss. 1992)).

¶43. Here, the chancellor issued a judgment that conveyed the basis for his decision and was sufficient for this appellate review. As we stated in Smith, our Court concluded in Stowe v. Edwards, 331 So. 3d 24, 32 (¶31) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021), “Rule 52(a) does not require anything more.” Smith, 397 So. 3d at 910 (¶35). The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying Briggs’ Rule 52 motion.

Rule 60(b)

¶44. On September 12, 2023, Briggs filed his motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).¹⁶ Briggs argues that the chancellor did not consider what he alleges is “compelling evidence of [Jackson's] fraud on the court.” The chancellor denied Briggs’ Rule 52 motion and Rule 60 motion in one order and, as stated earlier, ruled that his July 27, 2023 judgment had already resolved all the issues Briggs presented.

¶45. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 60 explain:

A party moving for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) based upon fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party ․ must prove the fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. See Stringfellow [v. Stringfellow], 451 So. 2d [219,] 221 [(Miss. 1984)]. Relief from a final judgment based upon fraud upon the court may be sought pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6). See In re Estate of Pearson, 25 So. 3d 392, 395 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “[R]elief based on ‘fraud upon the court’ is reserved for only the most egregious misconduct, and requires a showing of ‘an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.” ’ Id. (citing Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1989)).

¶46. Briggs did not offer clear and convincing evidence of fraud on the part of Jackson. The chancellor had already heard Briggs’ numerous allegations of fraud throughout the course of the litigation, including at the September 22, 2023 hearing on his Rule 52 and Rule 60 motions. In Entergy Mississippi Inc. v. Richardson, 134 So. 3d 287 (Miss. 2014), our supreme court held that “Rule 60(b) motions should be denied where they are merely an attempt to relitigate the case.” Id. at 291 (¶10) (quoting Stringfellow, 451 So. 2d at 221). The chancellor did not err in denying Briggs’ Rule 60(b) motion.

CONCLUSION

¶47. After review of the record, we reverse the October 18, 2023 and July 27, 2023 judgments in part and remand this case to the chancery court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion as to the provision for coverage of the medical expenses of the children and for the calculation of the amount of child support in conformity with this opinion. We also remand in part for the court to consider the visitation schedule in light of the fact that at least one child has now reached mandatory school age. We affirm the judgments in all other respects.

¶48. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At that time, Briggs was in a relationship with another woman. Briggs had a daughter, M.B., with this woman, and custody and support litigation was ongoing concerning that child contemporaneously with this litigation. See Briggs v. Weary, 396 So. 3d 1246 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024).

2.   We use initials to protect the identity of the minor children.

3.   Briggs filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and for temporary relief on December 2, 2020, while Jackson and the girls were still living in his home, but Briggs voluntarily dismissed that petition on January 4, 2021.

4.   A copy of the transcript from this hearing does not appear in the record.

5.   Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983).

6.   We use the term “responsive brief” because Jackson filed what she titled “Response to Brief of Appellant,” but it consists of only a letter to the Court containing photos and various other documents. The filing cites no authority and is not responsive to Briggs’ appellate arguments. See M.R.A.P. 28(a), (c).

7.   Briggs contends that the chancellor's analysis of the Albright factors was merely “superficial” since it consisted of “a mere 55 sentences dwarfed by over 700 pages of testimony.”

8.   We do note, however, over two years later, at the time of trial, Jackson and the children were still living in Virginia.

9.   Briggs makes other arguments regarding “procedural irregularities and due process concerns” regarding the appointment of a family master. His arguments fail to address the factor of continuity of care or to specifically detail how the appointment of a family master was a “procedural irregularity” or somehow violated his right to due process.

10.   See UCCR 8.05.

11.   During the September 22, 2023 hearing on Briggs’ motion to alter or amend the judgment, Briggs brought up the allegation of fraud again, to which the chancellor replied, “[T]hat was addressed in the judgment.” The chancellor obviously considered those allegations by Briggs and did not find them credible.

12.   See Miss. Code Ann. § 37-13-91 (Supp. 2024) (defining “compulsory school-age child”).

13.   It should be noted that at the time of this appeal, C.I.B. had already reached mandatory school age.

14.   Since we are remanding this case to the chancery court for other reasons, the chancellor should also address visitation because at least one of the children has now reached mandatory school age.

15.   This opinion was issued on November 26, 2024, which was after briefing was complete in the present case.

16.   Briggs’ motion also presented arguments concerning Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 60(a), but he does not address those on appeal.

EMFINGER, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.