LAURA HINES APPELLANT v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE (2025)

¶1. This appeal from the denial of Mississippi Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) retirement disability benefits presents the question of whether a police officer was on duty at the time she was in an automobile accident. The PERS Board of Trustees adopted the recommendation of the PERS Disability Appeals Committee (“Appeals Committee”) and found that the officer was on her commute prior to the start of her work day and was not yet on duty when the accident occurred. Therefore, PERS denied the officer on-duty disability retirement benefits under Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-11-114 (Rev. 2018). She unsuccessfully appealed to the Hinds County Circuit Court, which affirmed the Board of Trustees’ decision. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

¶2. Laura Hines was employed as the police chief of the small town of Walnut in Tippah County when she was involved in a single-car accident on the morning of August 30, 2018. At the time of the accident, Hines was in uniform driving her personal vehicle from her home in neighboring Benton County to Walnut Attendance Center to begin an 8:00 a.m. shift as a school resource officer (“SRO”). Hines's truck ran off of the road and hit a tree. The sheriff's office received a report of the accident at 7:39 a.m. Hines was air lifted to Regional One Health in Memphis where she received treatment for her injuries, including head trauma. She was unable to return to work after the accident and continued to have symptoms related to her head trauma, including migraines, confusion, and short-term memory loss. Her employment was eventually terminated following the expiration of her leave benefits.

¶3. Hines applied for PERS disability retirement benefits in 2021. The PERS Medical Board found that she was disabled and granted her non-duty disability retirement benefits.¹ However, it denied her application for on-duty disability retirement benefits. Hines appealed, stating as the basis of her appeal, “I was the Police Chief of Walnut, MS on call 24 hours a day and was in the course and scope of [employment] when injured.” The Appeals Committee conducted a hearing and heard the testimony of Hines, Walnut Mayor Vicki Skinner, Walnut Alderman Scott Pullium, and former Walnut police officer Richard Jones who had served at the same time as Hines.²

¶4. At the time of Hines's accident, Walnut employed two full-time certified police officers and several part-time officers.³ The town did not have a jail or dispatch office. Dispatch was handled by the Tippah County Sheriff's Office. Walnut police officers would log “on duty” with a “10-8” radio message to the sheriff's office. When the city did not have an officer on duty, the county responded to calls. For payroll, officers submitted time sheets reflecting the number of hours they had worked on their shifts.

¶5. Hines testified that she routinely worked outside of her official hours and was expected to be on call essentially 24/7. It was common for her to respond to calls made to her personal cell phone without first logging onto duty with the sheriff's office dispatch. This would include calls from citizens needing assistance with matters that varied from unlocking vehicles to responding to the behavior of mentally ill persons. Hines also testified that fellow municipal employees, including the mayor, would contact her outside of work hours, and that the mayor distributed Hines's cell phone number to others.

¶6. The town had a limited number of police vehicles in good condition, and Hines was required to leave her police chief vehicle inside the city limits at night. Hines testified that it was not unusual for her to use her personal truck when on duty or when driving to a call location from her home outside the city limits. She would also use her personal vehicle to travel out of town on official business, such as escorting students to all-state athletic events. She testified that she would routinely initiate work calls on her morning commute.

¶7. Hines has a master's degree in counseling. She testified that as part of her effort to reduce crime and serve the Walnut community in her capacity as police chief, she would assist citizens in gaining access to counseling and drug treatment programs. At the hearing before the Appeals Committee, Hines testified that immediately before the accident, she initiated a call to a young man whom she had recently arrested and was trying to encourage to enroll in a residential treatment for a meth addiction.⁴ She further testified that she spoke to the man sometime later and that he said he did see the call from her on his phone. The young man did not testify, and no phone records were submitted during the course of the administrative proceedings.

¶8. The other witnesses acknowledged that it was not unusual for Hines to work outside her official shift hours and that she was expected to respond to calls if needed at any time. They were also aware that she would sometimes use her personal vehicle while on duty, given the town's limited resources and the requirement to keep the police chief's vehicle within the city limits at night. They also confirmed that Hines routinely encouraged and facilitated residents’ access to counseling and drug treatment services.

¶9. The Appeals Committee recommended to the PERS Board of Trustees that Hines was not on duty at the time of the accident, noting that she had not logged onto her shift yet, that she was on her commute from her home in her personal vehicle, and that she did not receive a call from dispatch, her municipal colleagues, or a resident asking for assistance in her professional capacity. The Board of Trustees adopted the Appeals Committee's recommendation and denied Hines on-duty retirement disability benefits. The Hinds County Circuit Court affirmed. Hines now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶10. “Our review of an administrative agency's decision is limited in this Court. The conclusion of the agency withstands appellate review unless the decision is: ‘(1) not supported by substantial evidence; (2) is arbitrary and capricious; (3) is beyond the scope or power granted to the agency; or (4) violates one's constitutional rights.’ ” Carver v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss., 363 So. 3d 871, 874 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Marquez, 774 So. 2d 421, 425 (¶11) (Miss. 2000)). “An act is capricious if it is done without reason, ‘in a whimsical manner, implying either a lack of understanding of or a disregard for the surrounding facts’ and settled controlling principles. Id. (quoting Burks v. Amite Cnty. Sch. Dist., 708 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (¶14) (Miss. 1998)).

DISCUSSION

¶11. Hines argues that PERS erred in determining that she was not on duty at the time of her accident. In disability retirement claims proceedings, the claimant has the burden to prove that the disability was the “direct result of an accident or traumatic event resulting in a physical injury occurring in the line of performance of a duty.” Thompson v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 297 So. 3d 267, 272 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Walker, 126 So. 3d 892, 898 (¶13) (Miss. 2013)). “On appeal, [the Court] must determine whether there was substantial credible evidence to support [PERS decision] ․ not whether we might reach a different conclusion had we been sitting on the Appeals Committee.” Thomas v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 995 So. 2d 115, 119-20 (¶20) (Miss. 2008). “A decision by the PERS Board has a rebuttable presumption in favor of its ruling.” Carver, 363 So. 3d at 874 (¶10). The function of the appeals court is to determine what a statute does provide, not what a statute should provide. Id. at 876 (¶22).

¶12. Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-11-114(6) provides in relevant part:

Regardless of the number of years of credible service upon the application of a member or employer, any active member who becomes disabled as a direct result of an accident or traumatic event resulting in a physical injury occurring in the line of performance of duty, provided the Medical Board or other designated government agency after medical examination, certified that the members are mentally or physically incapacitated for the further performance of duty and such incapacities are likely to be permanent may be retired by the Board of Trustees ․

(Emphasis added). A review of recent appeals from the grant or denial of on-duty disability retirement benefits provides examples of “on-duty” incidents. See Buckhaults v. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 296 So. 3d 727, 729 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (health care worker slapped in the face by a patient at work); Carver, 363 So. 3d at 873 (¶¶1-2) (police officer suffered mental health issues after shooting and killing an individual while on duty as a patrolman); Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lee, 99 So. 3d 220, 222 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (Fire Academy instructor injured while on job preparing for training scenario).⁵

¶13. Hines argues that the nature of her job as police chief of a small town essentially placed her on duty at all times. She argues that unlike a larger metropolitan area like Jackson, with a significantly larger police force, the line between on duty and off duty is fundamentally blurred. Hines also argues that she transitioned to being on duty when she placed the call to the young man she was assisting getting drug treatment services.⁶ PERS acknowledges the testimony of the witnesses who said that Hines was available to respond to calls outside regular hours and that she sometimes used her personal cell phone and vehicle while attending to official duties or in exigent circumstances. However, PERS argues that the expectation of being available to respond to a call as necessary did not operate to make Hines on duty at all times, and argues that initiating a discretionary call while on her commute and prior to logging onto her shift was insufficient to place her on duty.

¶14. Hines's extensive medical records and testimony indicate that she had significant memory problems as a result of her neurological injuries, including trouble remembering the details surrounding the accident. Her testimony related to the day of the accident largely consisted of what other people told her had happened. During the course of her medical treatment following the accident, she underwent sessions of Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR) treatment to assist in memory recovery. The Appeals Committee's recommendation, adopted by the Board of Trustees, questioned the credibility of Hines's recollection that she made a call to the young man immediately before the accident. Based on our record on appeal, the phone call was not mentioned (including in notes of the EMDR session reconstructing the day of the accident), until Hines testified before the Appeals Committee several years after the accident. The only evidence of the phone call is Hines's testimony and hearsay assertion that the young man confirmed he saw the call.

¶15. Looking at the particular circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude PERS's decision that Hines was not on duty at the time of the accident was unsupported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Walker, 126 So. 3d at 895 (¶7). “The [agency's] fact-finding duty includes assessing the credibility of witnesses and determining the proper weight to give to a particular witness's testimony.” Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Cobb, 839 So. 2d 605, 609 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Hines was driving a personal vehicle from her home to the start of an 8:00 a.m. shift. She had not logged in “10-8” with the sheriff's office dispatch.⁷ She did not come upon an emergency that required her to respond in her capacity as a law enforcement officer. She did not receive a call from dispatch, municipal colleagues, or residents asking for assistance in her role as police chief. We also agree with PERS that Hines's initiating a discretionary call on her commute, unrelated to her arrest of the young man, was insufficient to place her on duty.

CONCLUSION

¶16. The decision to deny Hines on-duty disability retirement benefits was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's order upholding the PERS Board of Trustees’ decision.

¶17. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Hines was granted off-duty disability retirement benefits under Mississippi Code Annotated section 25-11-113(1)(a) (Rev. 2018).

2.   Pulliam and Jones testified in support of Hines's application. The mayor testified on behalf of the employer. The mayor testified that the town's Workers’ Compensation carrier did not approve a first report of injury on the ground that Hines was not on duty at the time of the accident.

3.   At the time of the administrative hearing, the Walnut Police Department had expanded personnel with nighttime shifts necessitated by a new 24-hour truck stop.

4.   The arrest had been in response to a domestic disturbance complaint. Hines recognized the young man from her previous work as a pool lifeguard, and was aware that he struggled with a methamphetamine addiction.

5.   None of these cases involve incidents that occurred on a commute to work. See also Thompson, 297 So. 3d at 273 (¶13) (declining to address whether carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related because court reporter failed to meet burden to demonstrate disability status).

6.   Hines cites two out-of-state cases for the proposition that the expectations of an officer's job can be so all-consuming as to qualify as being on-duty at all times. See Warg v. City of Miami Springs, 249 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1971); Sweat v. Allen, 200 So. 348 (Fla. 1941). These cases are not only non-binding on our courts, they have been both abrogated by statute and recognized as such in caselaw. See City of Ft. Lauderdale v. Abrams, 561 So. 2d 1294, 1295 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (citing Fla. Stat. § 440.091 (1982)).

7.   Hines's “Employee Activity Log,” which was maintained by the Tippah County Sheriff's Office, indicates that Hines was recorded as “10-8” for seventeen separate workdays prior to August 30, 2018, but not on August 30.

WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.