WILLIAM GARRETT MANGUM WILLIAM MANGUM APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE (2025)

¶1. A mother turned in a camera's memory card containing sexually explicit pictures of an adult male and her minor daughter to local authorities. The man was indicted on multiple counts of touching a child for lustful purposes and sexual battery. A jury found him guilty of all counts. On appeal, he claims he was entitled to an alibi instruction and that admitting the memory card's contents was plain error. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶2. In July 2021, the mother of twelve-year-old Jane ¹ went to the Smith County Sheriff's Department to report “that her child had given her an SD card” from a camera. The storage device contained sexually explicit images of her minor daughter and an adult man. After speaking with an investigator and making clear that she “had not gone through all the photos” on the memory card, Jane's mother turned it over to law enforcement.

¶3. The investigator “cycled through the photos” and “observed a juvenile female and a male adult.” Based on the investigator's observations, he would later testify that he believed a crime had occurred. But after determining that the photos had actually been taken in neighboring Jasper County, the investigator “contacted [the] Jasper County Sheriff's Department and notified them” of the situation. Investigator Joseph White of the Jasper County Sheriff's Department then took over the investigation.

¶4. Authorities suspected William Garrett Mangum, the fiancé of Jane's mother, as the perpetrator. Soon after, the investigator obtained an arrest warrant for Mangum, and he was brought in for an interview.

¶5. During the interview, Investigator White informed Mangum of the allegations against him. After some back-and-forth conversation in an effort to build rapport, the investigator asked Mangum whether he owned a gun and holster. Mangum disclosed that he owned a 9mm Ruger pistol, which he kept in a leather holster; the holster had a cross embossed in the leather. Investigator White also inquired about the type of wallet Mangum carried, which he disclosed was a wallet with a chain.

¶6. Prior to the interview, the investigator had selected a series of photographs from the camera's memory card and printed them out. The investigator then carefully folded one of the photos and showed it to Mangum. He asked Mangum whether the holster, pistol, and wallet visible in the photo belonged to him.

¶7. Mangum confirmed they were his items. Clarifying, Investigator White asked, “[I]s that you? With your pistol and your leather holster and your braided chain [wallet] with the cross on your holster?” Mangum responded, “That's my gun, that's me.”

¶8. The investigator then unfolded the photograph, which revealed the entirety of the image: Mangum with Jane. Mangum was later indicted on two counts of touching a child for lustful purposes (Counts I and III)² and three counts of sexual battery (Counts II, IV, and V).³

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶9. The State made a pretrial motion seeking to address a Rule 404(b) matter under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The motion focused on including Jane's maternal aunt as a witness after allegations surfaced that Mangum had “performed similar sexual acts with her” while she lived in the home. The State made clear that testimony from this witness “would be for the limited purpose of proving motive, intent, and lack of mistake.”

¶10. Finding “that the probative value substantially outweigh[ed] any prejudicial effect that it may have and vice versa that the prejudicial effect does not substantially outweigh the probative value to show intent, [or] absence of mistake,” the trial court overruled the defense's objection and granted the State's motion. The trial court clarified that it “would issue a limiting instruction if the [d]efense wishe[d] to have such” and invited Mangum to “renew [his] motion” on the day of trial, should he feel the need.

¶11. Six days before trial, Mangum filed a “Notice of Alibi,” informing the State that he “claims to have not been in Jasper County, Mississippi,” on the dates listed in the indictment. Specifically, Mangum “claims he was out of town working at the time of the alleged crimes.” The notice listed five witnesses Mangum intended to rely on in support of his defense: Annette Mangum, Leigh Gilbert, Denise Wallace, Joe Graves, and William Mangum. Only three of the five witnesses were called.

The State's Proof

¶12. At trial, the State called four witnesses: two investigators, the victim, and the victim's maternal aunt. Investigator Mullins testified about his interactions with Jane's mother after she reported the abuse and the subsequent steps that ultimately led to the involvement of the proper sheriff's department. Investigator Mullins confirmed that this was the extent of his involvement in this case.

¶13. Jane took the stand next. She testified that when she “was about five or six” years old, her mother's fiancé began sexually abusing her “in the bedroom and bathroom” of the home they lived in. When asked whether she told her mother, Jane responded, “No, ma'am,” recounting to the jury how Mangum said “he would kill me and make it like I ran away” if the abuse she suffered were to be disclosed. And although she was unable to recall the exact number of times Mangum violated her, Jane disclosed it was “more than five.”

¶14. Jane recounted one of the first instances of abuse occurring when she “was seven in the bathtub.” She testified that while “taking a bath,” Mangum “came in and was trying to touch me.” Despite her protests and “moving away from him,” Jane told the jury how Mangum put his hand “between my legs.”

¶15. Another instance of abuse occurred on Jane's eighth birthday. She recalled that Mangum “called me back there to the room” and “took off my pants and panties and was messing with me.” When asked what parts of the body she was referring to when saying ‘messing,’ Jane clarified, “My privates.” And when asked the same question but in relation to Mangum's body, she responded, “His privates and his hand.” The child further testified that Mangum put both his hand and his penis inside her vagina.

¶16. Jane explained that after Mangum's repeated threats claiming “no one would ever believe me,” she made a decision. She knew his hunting camera was “already in the[ ] bedroom,” so she “put it on the desk” so “it faced towards the bed” and “turned it on.” This, she testified, was “so I would have proof” of the abuse. After some time, Jane took the memory card out of the camera and eventually gave it to her mother.

¶17. Jane was then shown nine different photographs taken by the camera. Using the photographs for identification purposes only, the State walked Jane through each of them and asked her to identify what she saw. Of the nine total, Jane identified that she and Mangum had been alone in the bedroom in at least five of the photographs she was shown. She also confirmed that the photographs depicted the abuse she endured.

¶18. Then the jury heard from Jane's aunt, who recounted her experience during her short stint in the home with her sister, Jane, and Mangum. After disclosing she was only fourteen years old at the time of her stay, the State asked whether anything had happened between her and Mangum during that time. Through tears, Jane's aunt confirmed that Mangum “touch[ed] my vagina ․ and he ․ use[d] his fingers.” She recalled how Mangum said “he could do what he wanted with me” and threatened to “get rid of me and make it look like I ran away” if the abuse was disclosed. Scared and believing Mangum's threats to be true, Jane's aunt testified that “he continued to put his penis in my vagina” for the time she remained in the home. At the conclusion of her testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that

[t]he acts testified to by [Jane's aunt] are related to charges for which [Mangum] is not presently on trial and are to be considered only for the limited purpose of showing proof of motive, intent, common scheme or plan. You cannot and must not simply infer that [Mangum] acted in conformity with his previous acts and that he is, therefore, guilty of the charges for which he is presently on trial.

¶19. Investigator White testified for the State last. After disclosing that he viewed the contents of the memory card, the State moved to admit it into evidence. The defense objected, arguing that the chain of custody had not been properly established. The trial court overruled the objection, and the card was admitted.

¶20. When asked what he observed when viewing the contents, the investigator responded, “I observed ․ a middle aged white male between the legs of what appeared to be a juvenile female.” After determining the individuals in the photos were Mangum and Jane, respectively, the investigator disclosed that Mangum was “approximately 26” years old at the time the photos were taken. He further explained that because of Jane's age and the sheriff department's protocol with child victims, he did not interview Jane. Instead, he “set up an interview with the Child Advocacy Center in Meridian, and they interviewed her.” The investigator did, however, interview Mangum, and the video recording was admitted into evidence and subsequently played for the jury.

¶21. The State walked the witness through the same nine photographs shown to Jane, which he confirmed he was familiar with since he selected them and printed copies from the memory card given to him. The State then moved to enter the photos into evidence, and all nine photographs were admitted and published for the jury to see.

¶22. After the State rested its case-in-chief, the defense moved to “exclude all the evidence and direct a verdict in favor of” Mangum, arguing that the State “wholly failed to prove the charges in the indictment.” The trial court denied the motion.

The Defense Witnesses

¶23. Mangum presented three witnesses to testify in his defense: his aunt, his aunt's boyfriend, and his mother. Denise Wallace, Mangum's aunt, testified that in 2018, she traveled to Texas alongside Mangum, who worked on a pipeline. According to Wallace, they arrived in Texas on August 17 and did not return to Mississippi until December 24 that same year.

¶24. But on cross-examination, when asked about the same time frame, Wallace claimed that she did not “remember the dates exactly when [Mangum] came home and when he, you know, was gone.” She testified that she did not become aware of the allegations against Mangum until his attorney made her aware of the time frame in which the abuse supposedly occurred. Nonetheless, Wallace disclosed that she did not believe the allegations against him. The State elicited the following testimony:

The State: And have you seen the photographs of this?

Wallace: No, I have not.

The State: So how do you know that's not him in the photographs?

Wallace: I don't know that it's not, but I know he didn't do anything to her.

The State: So if I showed you those photographs, and it's a picture ․ that's him standing in between her legs while she's naked, you still would not believe he did it?

Wallace: No, I wouldn't.

The State: Is there anything that would convince you he did it?

Wallace: If he told me he did, I would believe it.

The State: And that's the only way?

Wallace: That's the only way.

The State: And again, you are his aunt, right?

Wallace: I am.

¶25. Likewise, her boyfriend Joe Graves—who worked with Mangum—testified that in 2018, he and Mangum were in Texas for work. Graves disclosed that although he and Wallace “left [for Texas] around August 17th, [and] got back Christmas Eve night,” Mangum departed for Texas “two weeks before we left.” When pressed on what else he may know, Graves clarified that he “wasn't with [Mangum] pipeline working except [o]n August 17th of 2018 to the 24th, Christmas Eve night of 2018.” After revealing that he was not aware of the allegations or charges against Mangum, Graves testified that no amount of evidence would convince him that Mangum committed a crime.

¶26. Finally, the jury heard from Mangum's mother, Annette. She also worked on the pipeline with her son, which required them to “go all over the country.” Annette testified that in 2015, “we went to Virginia” and remained there for “approximately 14 months.” She clarified that this time frame included November 25, 2015. Then, she disclosed that in 2016, she and Mangum were in North Carolina for “about six months.” According to Annette, she returned to North Carolina with Mangum and her husband for work from November 25, 2017, until November 25, 2018. When asked about November 25, 2018, to November 25, 2019, she testified that she was in Texas for work with Mangum, Wallace, Graves, and “the kids.”

¶27. On cross, Mangum's mother confirmed that her son was with her on every job and that she knew where he was. As a result, the State elicited the following testimony:

The State: Okay. And so when was he in Jasper County? Because it sounds like from your testimony he wasn't [in Mississippi] for four or five years?

Annette: He wasn't, not much.

The State: So your testimony is that you know where he was each and every day from the 25th of 2015 to 2019?

Annette: Oh, I wouldn't say every day.

¶28. When asked whether she noticed anything unusual about the interactions between Mangum and Jane, Annette avoided giving a binary answer, instead responding with, “They were father and daughter,” and Mangum was “the only father she ever had.”⁴ After confirming investigators had shown her some of the photographs taken by the camera and identifying Jane in the photos, when asked whether she believed if her son had sexually abused Jane, Annette responded, “Hell, no.”

Jury Instruction Conference

¶29. After the defense rested its case-in-chief, the trial court excused the jury and proceeded to hear arguments regarding what instructions the jury should be given. Mangum requested that the jury be given an alibi instruction (D-13). Instruction D-13 included the language, “ ‘Alibi’ means elsewhere or in another place” and that Mangum was “asserting the defense of alibi by saying he was out of state.” The instruction would have also informed the jury:

“Alibi” is a legal and proper defense in law. The Defendant is not required to establish the truth of the alibi to your satisfaction, but if the evidence or lack of evidence in this case raises in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendant was present and committed the crime, then you must give the Defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt and find the Defendant not guilty.

¶30. The State objected, arguing that caselaw requires more than simply claiming the defendant was not present for a portion of the time he stands accused of committing the crime or in general. Highlighting the witnesses for Mangum, the State argued that they not only testified to specific portions of time—which in turn failed to cover the entire time period listed in the indictment—but Mangum had previously made a statement to the investigator that effectively contradicted that very same testimony. The trial court ultimately refused Mangum's proposed jury instruction.

¶31. The jury found Mangum guilty of all five counts: two counts of touching a child for lustful purposes (Counts I and III) and three counts of sexual battery (Counts II, IV, and V). He was sentenced to serve two separate 15-year sentences for Counts I and III and three separate life sentences for Counts II, IV, and V, all to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and to run consecutively to each other. He was further ordered to register as a sex offender. Mangum moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, which the trial court denied. Aggrieved, Mangum appeals, raising two issues.

DISCUSSION

I. It was not an abuse of discretion to refuse Mangum's requested alibi instruction.

¶32. On appeal, Mangum argues that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury “on his alibi defense after three alibi witnesses testified,” claiming that testimony was “unrebutted by the prosecution.” Specifically, Mangum contends that the trial court “rejected [his] submitted alibi instructions, not based on any inaccuracy in the instructions, but on weakness of the evidence which supported [his] alibi[ ].”

¶33. “The standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Archie v. State, 387 So. 3d 963, 968 (¶18) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (¶20) (Miss. 2010)). “A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722, 738 (¶45) (Miss. 2008)).

¶34. Importantly, “an alibi defense involves something more than a simple denial by the defendant that he was present at the precise time the crime was committed.” Body v. State, 394 So. 3d 1048, 1055 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Hamlin v. State, 306 So. 3d 843, 844 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020)). “An alibi defense requires evidence that the defendant's location at the relevant time was so removed therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.” Id. Therefore, “if the evidence presented at trial does not support an alibi defense, the instruction should not be granted.” Mootye v. State, 287 So. 3d 270, 277 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Roper v. State, 981 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)).

¶35. In a recent case, we analyzed whether an attorney should have requested an alibi instruction for a client on trial for multiple counts of statutory rape and sexual battery. Hamlin, 306 So. 3d at 844 (¶¶1-2). The defendant argued that because he was in Chicago for a fragment of the time alleged in the indictment, his absence essentially rendered him unable to commit the crime, and his attorney should have sought the instruction. Id. at (¶¶7-8). However, keeping in mind that the defendant not only “conceded at trial that he was in Sharkey County on three separate occasions” during the time period alleged in the indictment but further “admitted that he had access to his granddaughter” during the same period, we reasoned that “Hamlin was not so far geographically removed from the scene and time of the crimes “as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.” Id. at (¶9); see also Ford v. State, 230 So. 3d 316, 320-21 (¶¶11-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that even though the defendant testified he was with his girlfriend at the time of the shooting, “the evidence presented at trial did not require an alibi instruction” because the girlfriend's “mobile home was located ․ in the vicinity of the shooting,” and “she was admittedly asleep at the time it occurred”).

¶36. Just as in Hamlin, there are gaps in time that cannot be accounted for by any of Mangum's alibi witnesses. Each witness could only account for a portion of time covered by the indictment. For instance, Count IV of the indictment alleged that Mangum sexually abused the child in Jasper County on or about November 25, 2017, through November 25, 2018. So while Mangum's aunt and her boyfriend testified that they were in Texas with him for work from August 17, 2018, until Christmas Eve of that same year, the rest of the year remained unaccounted. Additionally, Mangum's mother claimed she and her son were in North Carolina for the entirety of the time period listed in Count IV of the indictment and in Texas for the entirety of the time period listed in Count V of the indictment. But the jury heard Mangum admit during his interrogation interview that he was “positive” he was in Stringer, which is located in Jasper County, on New Year's in January 2018. Therefore, none of the alibi witnesses provided testimony showing that Mangum's “location at the relevant time was so removed ․ as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party.” Body, 394 So. 3d at 1055 (¶35) (emphasis added).

¶37. Mangum further contends that the State's “witnesses were contradicted by defense witnesses and the trial [court] should have allowed the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the conflicting testimony.” But that is precisely what happened here. Not only was Mangum able to present his alibi defense, he called three different witnesses to do so. It follows that the jury was undeniably apprised that his ultimate defense was that he was out of town working when Jane was sexually abused. But “it is well established that a jury is not under a duty to accept an alibi defense;” rather, it “must consider all of the testimony in determining the guilt or innocence of an accused.” Lee v. State, 457 So. 2d 920, 924 (Miss. 1984).

¶38. And regardless of whether Mangum's requested jury instruction was given or refused, the following remains true: “[w]hen evidence or testimony conflicts, the jury is the sole judge of the weight and worth of evidence and witness credibility.” Campbell v. State, 380 So. 3d 985, 990 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Wayne v. State, 337 So. 3d 704, 715 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). The jury sat through the entire trial, heard the testimony of Jane and her aunt, saw the video of Mangum's interview, and saw the photographs of an adult male with Jane. To the extent any evidence or testimony conflicted, the jurors were empowered to “believe or disbelieve, accept or reject the utterances of any witness.” Ducksworth v. State, 767 So. 2d 296, 299 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).

¶39. As such, we find it was within the trial court's discretion to refuse instruction D-13 as it relates to Mangum's alibi defense.

II. The admission of photographic evidence was not plain error.

¶40. Mangum also argues that the trial court's admission of photographic evidence was illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment as well as Mississippi law. However, because Mangum challenges these issues for the first time on appeal, he now relies on plain error review.

¶41. “Plain-error review is properly utilized for correcting obvious instances of injustice or misapplied law.” Ambrose v. State, 254 So. 3d 77, 111 (¶100) (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstead v. State, 196 So. 3d 913, 916 (¶11) (Miss. 2016)). It “is employed only in situations when a defendant's substantive or fundamental rights are affected.” Green v. State, 183 So. 3d 28, 31 (¶6) (Miss. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Flora v. State, 925 So. 2d 797, 811 (¶42) (Miss. 2006)). “To determine if plain error has occurred, we must determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal rule, whether the error is plain, clear or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Ambrose, 254 So. 3d at 111 (¶100) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Armstead, 196 So. 3d at 916 (¶11)).

¶42. Mangum argues that the trial court's admission of the photographic evidence contained on the camera's memory card constituted plain error. Specifically, he contends that when law enforcement viewed the SD card's content “without a warrant,” it was an “unwarranted invasion of [his] Fourth Amendment rights.”

¶43. But Mangum did not raise this issue in the trial court; therefore, it is waived on appeal. See Carson v. State, 341 So. 3d 995, 1001 n.2 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (“The general rule is that a failure to object with specificity in the trial court below results in a waiver of review by this Court. The rule applies to Fourth Amendment claims; where the defendant fails to object to the admission of illegally obtained evidence, the objection is waived”).

¶44. Mangum further argues that the admission of photographic evidence from the camera's SD card violated his expectation of privacy pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-29-63 (Rev. 2014). Essentially, Mangum insinuates that because Jane placed the camera in the bedroom without his knowledge, Jane should be held responsible, and all evidence stemming from the camera's SD card should have been inadmissible.

¶45. Because Mangum also raises this issue for the first time on appeal, it is barred from review as well. “[I]ssues raised for the first time on appeal are procedurally barred from review as they have not first been addressed by the trial court.” Farris v. State, 394 So. 3d 1028, 1030 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024); see also Moffett v. State, 49 So. 3d 1073, 1101 (¶91) (Miss. 2010) (“We will not hold a trial court in error on appeal for a matter not presented to it for decision”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

¶46. Accordingly, because Mangum failed to raise either issue in the trial court, we find both procedurally barred. We find no clear or obvious error that affects Mangum's substantive rights.

CONCLUSION

¶47. For the reasons above, we find that Mangum was not entitled to an alibi instruction given the lack of foundation in the record. Furthermore, we find his arguments regarding the admission of the photographic evidence procedurally barred, as they were not raised in the trial court, and also find no plain error. Therefore, Mangum's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

¶48. AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because we decline to identify victims of sexual assault, we use a pseudonym.

2.   Miss. Code Ann. § 97-5-23 (Supp. 2015).

3.   Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95(1)(d) (Rev. 2014).

4.   For purposes of clarity, we note that Mangum was not Jane's biological father, nor was he her stepfather. During the period of time in which he sexually abused Jane, Mangum was engaged to Jane's mother.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR.