STATE OF MISSOURI v. TERRANCE CADWELL (2026)

Introduction

Terrance Cadwell (“Appellant”) appeals the circuit court's judgment after a jury found him guilty of second-degree child molestation under Section 566.068.¹ Appellant's sole point on appeal argues the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting M.N.’s (“Victim”) school counselor's (“Counselor”) testimony as an expert about delayed disclosure in sexual abuse cases involving child victims, and Counselor's testimony was prejudicial. This Court holds the circuit court did not err in allowing Counselor's testimony because the State laid a proper foundation to establish Counselor was an expert. Even if admission were improper, the testimony was cumulative and not prejudicial. Point One is denied.

The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

Factual and Procedural History

Because Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict are:² In the fall of 2021 into the winter of 2022, Victim was living with his mother (“Mother”), step-father, and Appellant, step-father's father. At the time of the inappropriate touching, Victim was ten years old.

The inappropriate touching occurred in Appellant's bedroom. Appellant was showing Victim rock band videos when he told Victim he needed to check Victim's underwear size. Appellant asked Victim to take his pants down which Victim did, but he kept his underwear on. Appellant then checked Victim's underwear band. Appellant touched Victim's penis and butt over his underwear. As Mother approached the bedroom, Appellant told Victim to pull up his pants.

Victim's initial disclosure happened almost two years after the incident. Victim told his Mother's friend that Appellant asked to inspect his underwear and Appellant touched his butt and penis. Victim repeated this disclosure to Counselor a month later. Victim also told the Children's Advocacy Center (“CAC”) forensic interviewer Appellant touched his butt and penis.

Appellant was arrested and charged with second-degree child molestation. At trial, the State called Counselor as a witness. The State questioned Counselor about his education, qualifications, and experience as a school-based therapist. Counselor explained his undergraduate education included majors in psychology, prelaw, and criminal justice. Counselor obtained a master's degree in social work which required 3,000 practicum hours under a supervising social worker. After graduation, Counselor completed another 3,000 practicum hours to become a licensed clinical social worker. Also, every two years Counselor must complete at least 36 hours of continuing education classes on topics like suicide prevention, ethics, and mandatory reporter training. At the time of trial, Counselor had been a school-based therapist for seven years.

Victim had been meeting with Counselor weekly since October 2023. During one of their meetings, Victim disclosed Appellant wanted to examine his underwear to ensure they fit properly, and Appellant “felt-up” Victim's penis and butt.

The State asked Counselor about whether a disclosure occurs immediately after the abuse, and Counselor explained it usually does not. The State then asked Counselor what contributes to the timing of a disclosure. Appellant objected, arguing Counselor was not qualified to testify about delayed disclosure because he was not an expert in psychology or child psychiatry. The circuit court directed the State to lay more foundation and granted Appellant a continuing objection.

The State asked Counselor to explain his experience with children making disclosures. Counselor testified to observing hundreds of cases involving disclosures and has had twelve to fifteen specific incidents disclosed directly to him. He stated delayed-disclosure is common in child victims, and “very rarely” did the disclosure happen immediately after the abuse. Counselor explained safety is a “large part” that contributes to the timing of when a child decides to make a disclosure. Counselor stated Victim felt safe to make this disclosure when he did because Victim was with a trusted adult, Mother's friend, who encouraged Victim to tell Counselor about the incident.

The CAC interviewer also testified about Victim's disclosure, which echoed the disclosure he made to Mother's friend and Counselor. The CAC interviewer also testified about delayed disclosure. She testified studies show delayed disclosure is common in boys because they are concerned about masculinity, sexuality, potential consequences, and safety. Appellant did not object to this testimony at any point.

Appellant testified in his own defense. He admitted to checking Victim's underwear but denied the inappropriateness of it. Appellant explained he touched only the underwear band to ensure they fit Victim properly.

The jury convicted Appellant of second-degree child molestation. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to five years’ imprisonment.

This appeal follows.

Preservation and Standard of Review

“The general rule for the preservation of error is an objection stating specific grounds must be made at trial, the same grounds must be set out in the motion for new trial, and these grounds must be renewed in the appellate brief.” State v. Young, 603 S.W.3d 305, 313 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (quoting State v. Salmon, 563 S.W.3d 725, 731–32 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)). Here, Appellant objected to the admission of Counselor's testimony at trial, renewed the objection in his motion for new trial, and raised the issue in his point relied on. This issue is properly preserved.

“The [circuit] court is vested with broad discretion to exclude or admit evidence at trial.” State v. Whittier, 591 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (quoting State v. Wright, 551 S.W.3d 608, 616 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)). Because whether Counselor was qualified to testify at trial about delayed disclosure is properly preserved, this Court “review[s] the [circuit] court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of that broad discretion.” Id. “The [circuit] court's discretionary ruling is presumed to be correct and the burden is on the defendant to overcome that presumption.” State v. Harmon, 719 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting State v. Adams, 443 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)). “A [circuit] court abuses its discretion only if its decision to exclude evidence is ‘clearly against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration.’ ” State v. Taylor, 466 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Mo. banc 2015) (quoting Mitchell v. Kardesch, 313 S.W.3d 667, 675 (Mo. banc 2010)). “[I]f reasonable persons can differ about the propriety of the action taken by the [circuit] court, then it cannot be said that the [circuit] court abused its discretion.” State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 533 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State v. Brown, 939 S.W.2d 882, 883–84 (Mo. banc 1997)).

“This Court's direct appeal review is for prejudice, not mere error, and the [circuit] court's decision will be reversed only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.” Murrell v. State, 215 S.W.3d 96, 109–10 (Mo. banc 2007). This Court “will not find prejudice in a [circuit] court's admission of evidence that is merely cumulative to other similar evidence to which the defendant did not object.” State v. Dodd, 711 S.W.3d 619, 627 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025).

Discussion

Point One: Admissibility of Expert Testimony

Party Positions

Appellant argues the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Counselor's testimony about the reasons child victims typically make delayed disclosure. He contends Counselor does not have the skill, knowledge, training or experience to provide an expert opinion on “psychological characteristics of delayed disclosures of child sexual abuse.” Appellant argues he was prejudiced by Counselor's testimony because the testimony bolstered the credibility of Victim's disclosure. The State asserts Counselor was a qualified expert to testify about delayed disclosure. The State also asserts Appellant was not prejudiced by the testimony because the comments were brief and unsolicited.

Analysis

“The general purpose of expert testimony is to assist the jury in areas that are outside of everyday experience or lay experience.” State ex rel. Gardner v. Wright, 562 S.W.3d 311, 319 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (quoting State v. Rogers, 529 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)). This Court has held “expert testimony about delayed disclosure is outside the jury's common knowledge and will assist the jury in understanding a child victim's delay in disclosure.” Id. at 321 (emphasis in original).

To determine expert testimony admissibility, courts use a “three-part test: (1) whether the expert is qualified, (2) whether the testimony is relevant, and (3) whether the testimony is reliable.” Id. at 319. Here, Appellant challenges the first part: whether Counselor was qualified as an expert to testify about delayed disclosure. “A witness is not considered an ‘expert’ witness unless and until a proper foundation has been laid as to his qualifications.” State v. Suttles, 581 S.W.3d 137, 153 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) (quoting State v. Edwards, 365 S.W.3d 240, 252 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). “To lay a proper foundation for the testimony of an expert witness, the proponent must show that the witness has sufficient expertise and acquaintance with the incident involved to testify as an expert.” Id.

“An expert is qualified if he or she has knowledge from education or experience which will aid the trier of fact.” State v. Williams, 427 S.W.3d 259, 266 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014); see also Section 490.065.2(1), RSMo (Supp. 2017) (stating a witness can qualify as an expert due to their “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”). “The expert's testimony should be allowed if the witness possesses ‘some qualification.’ ” Williams, 427 S.W.3d at 266 (quoting State v. Poole, 216 S.W.3d 271, 274–75 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007)). “Section 490.065.2(1)’s plain language states an expert may be qualified based solely on training or experience.” State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 734 (Mo. banc 2022) (emphasis added).

“The [circuit] court also has discretion in determining whether a witness qualifies as an expert.” Williams, 427 S.W.3d at 266. “The extent of an expert's experience or training in a particular field goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.” Minor, 648 S.W.3d at 733 n.6 (quoting State v. Mosley, 526 S.W.3d 361, 365 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)). “As long as an expert's testimony ‘rests upon “good grounds, based on what is known” it should be tested by the adversary process with competing expert testimony and cross-examination, rather than excluded by the court at the outset.’ ” Suttles, 581 S.W.3d at 150 (quoting Jones v. City of Kan. City, 569 S.W.3d 42, 56 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. City of Kan. City, 598 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 2020)).

Here, Appellant argues Counselor was not a qualified expert to testify about delayed disclosures. This Court disagrees. Section 490.065.2(1)’s plain language allows experience alone to qualify a witness as an expert. Counselor has 6,000 hours of practicum experience, observed hundreds of cases of children making disclosures, and had twelve to fifteen disclosures made specifically to him. This experience of seeing and personally receiving multiple disclosures gave Counselor “some qualifications” about the disclosure process and delayed disclosures. Counselor's experience qualifies him to explain what causes a child victim to delay disclosure which can assist the jury. Counselor's significant experience paired with his education and trainings qualified him as an expert.

Even if Counselor's testimony was erroneously admitted, the testimony is not prejudicial because it was cumulative. “In a criminal case involving improperly admitted evidence, the test for prejudice is whether the error was outcome-determinative.” State v. Thomas, 628 S.W.3d 686, 691 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Yung, 246 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008)). “A finding of outcome-determinative prejudice expresses a judicial conclusion that the erroneously admitted evidence so influenced the jury that, when considered with and balanced against all evidence properly admitted, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted but for the erroneously admitted evidence.” Id. at 694.

“Evidence is said to be cumulative when it relates to a matter so fully and properly proved by other testimony as to take it out of the area of serious dispute.” Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49, 56 (Mo. banc 2004) (quoting State v. Kidd, 990 S.W.2d 175, 180 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999)). “A complaining party is not entitled to assert prejudice if the challenged evidence is cumulative to other related admitted evidence.” Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 536 (quoting Saint Louis Univ. v. Geary, 321 S.W.3d 282, 292 (Mo. banc 2009)).

Counselor's testimony was cumulative to the CAC interviewer's testimony about delayed disclosures. Both witnesses explained delayed disclosure is common in sexual abuse cases with child victims, specifically emphasizing the importance of safety regarding the timing of the delayed disclosure. Appellant objected only to Counselor's testimony. Because both witnesses gave similar testimony about delayed disclosure, Appellant cannot show prejudice from the admission of Counselor's testimony because it does not create a reasonable probability he would have been acquitted.

The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Counselor's testimony. Point One is denied.

Conclusion

The circuit court's judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

2.   State v. Stewart, 560 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Mo. banc 2018).

Philip M. Hess, Judge

Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.